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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Shell UK Ltd v Molloy [2001] EWCA Civ 349 (22 February 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/349.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 349

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM BRADFORD COUNTY COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE GRENFELL)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Thursday, 22nd February 2001

Thursday, 22nd February 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE KAY: On 27th May 1996 the claimant Anthony Molloy sustained an accident at work whilst he was employed by ASL Scaffolding Ltd as a scaffolder working on a oil rig in the North Sea. The owner of the oil rig Shell UK Limited admitted liability and the claim was heard before His Honour Judge Grenfell at the Halifax County Court on 1st September 2000 for the assessment of damages.
2. The claim was initially a very large one because there was a claim for damages alleging that the claimant had essentially been off work from the date of his accident. This allegation was false and was fraudulently made. That fact was only discovered by the defendant shortly before the hearing date in the county court. It transpired that the claimant had returned to his pre-accident employment as early as 30th July 1997, and had worked fairly regularly in that capacity thereafter. Faced with documentary evidence that clearly established the fraudulent nature of the claim, the claimant at the hearing abandoned any claim for damages after 30th July 1997.
3. The only matter that it is sought to raise by way of appeal at this stage relates to the award of costs at the conclusion of the hearing. The judge was clearly faced with a difficult task in determining what the appropriate order for costs should be. There could be no doubt at all that the whole of the proceedings had been greatly complicated by the fraudulent nature of the claim.
4. There had been a payment made pursuant to Part 36. That payment was slightly short of the sum eventually awarded by the judge. Clearly, from the point of view of the defendant, the fact that they were trying to deal with a fraudulent claim must have meant that the making of such a payment was a difficult task in all the circumstances, much more difficult than it should have been if they had been dealing with an entirely genuine claim. Clearly that was a factor that had to be borne in mind. The judge's conclusion at the end of the day was that the claimant should be entitled to costs up to the date of the payment, but that thereafter the defendant should be entitled to three-quarters of their costs.
5. The ground of appeal contends that the judge was wrong only to award three-quarters of those costs and should have awarded the whole costs to the defendant. In those circumstances the matter is put before me. It is accepted that the award of costs was a matter for discretion, but it is contended that in the particular circumstances of this case the only reasonable order was one that the claimant should pay all the costs after the date of the payment.
6. Counsel have helpfully referred me to the case of Bajwa v British Airways Plc [1999] Q152. That decision, it seems to me, gives a basis for arguing notwithstanding that the judge did have a discretion he really could not exercise his discretion in the way that he did. In those circumstances and bearing in mind that there is, as is contended, a matter of some general public importance as to how judges should deal with costs in relation to fraudulent claims which sadly are becoming a more common feature of such litigation, it seems to me that it would be wrong not to grant permission.
7. For those reasons, although I took a different view on the papers, having now had the advantage of a much fuller skeleton on this point and the assistance of counsel, I grant permission.
(Application for permission to appeal allowed; permission to amend final ground refused.)