NO:  B1/2000/3389

Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Civ 408
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM ROMFORD COUNTY COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE PAYNTER REECE)
                                  Royal Courts of Justice  
                                  Strand  
                                  London WC2
 
                             Thursday, 15th March 2001
 
B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE ROBERT WALKER

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BRENDAN ANDREW JOHNSON

‑ v ‑

WIMPEY HOMES (HOLDINGS) LIMITED

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Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
180 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HD
Telephone No: 0171‑421 4040 Fax No: 0171‑831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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MR BRENDAN ANDREW JOHNSON the Applicant in Person

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J U D G M E N T
Thursday, 15th March 2001.
1.	LORD JUSTICE ROBERT WALKER: This is an application by Mr Brendan Andrew Johnson who has appeared in person and addressed me with considerable vigour and some skill. Mr Johnson is applying for permission to appeal and an extension of time for appealing from an order of His Honour Judge Paynter Reece made on 16th October 2000 in the Romford County Court.
2.	The judge dismissed Mr Johnson's appeal from an order of District Judge Jackson made in the same court on 16th August 2000, dismissing a claim which Mr Johnson had brought against Wimpey Homes (Holdings) Limited (“Wimpey”). The claim had been allocated to the small claims track. The claim arose out of Mr Johnson's wish to acquire from Wimpey a new property in Eastbourne, plot 22, Kings Reach, which was then still unbuilt, and in doing so to take advantage of Wimpey's part exchange plan. Under that plan Wimpey offered, subject to contract, to acquire Mr Johnson's existing house, 20 Brendon Road, Dagenham, Essex, for £86,000. The offer set out in a letter dated 29th October 1999 was not only subject to contract but was also subject to various conditions, one of which was that Mr Johnson purchased the Eastbourne property for the contract price of £111,000. Another condition was as follows:
“Your permitting (by prior appointment) reasonable access for our appointed Agent to prepare sales details of your property, conducting prospective purchasers to view your property and erecting a suitable for sale board.” 
3.	On 1st November 1999, Mr Johnson signed a copy of the letter indicating his agreement subject to contract. He then went abroad for about two weeks on business. On his return Mr Johnson found a “for sale” notice had been erected at his property. This understandably upset him very much, especially when he heard that members of the public had been knocking on his neighbours' doors and showing interest in viewing his property. He made complaints to various employees and directors of Wimpey, moving to an increasingly high level with his complaints, but he received no satisfaction. He then started proceedings against Wimpey in the county court alleging that by offering his house for sale without his knowledge, consent or authority it had frustrated his purchase of the Eastbourne property.
4.	On 16th May 2000 there was a first hearing in the county court. On 6th June 2000, Mr Wright, Wimpey's solicitor, wrote an open letter to Mr Johnson offering his client's apologies and offering the sum of £500 in full and final satisfaction. I should add that Mr Johnson does not accept that that letter was sufficiently apologetic nor does he accept that the sum of £500 was anything like adequate compensation. He did not therefore accept the offer. He amended his claim in order to claim damages for an unlimited amount, and he pleaded causes of action in conversion, breach of confidence, trespass, breach of trust, repudiatory breach of contract, defamation and other matters.
5.	The district judge dismissed the claim. Unfortunately, there is no complete transcript of the district judge's judgment. There are notes made by Wimpey's solicitor which the district judge has approved as substantially correct. The district judge seems to have dealt with all the pleaded heads of claim so far as he could, that is so far as he understood them. As might be expected, he concentrated on the trespass claim. He was not satisfied that the need for prior appointment applied to the fixing of a “for sale” notice which did not require entry to Mr Johnson's house. He held that Mr Johnson's signature of the letter of 29th October 1999, albeit subject to contract, amounted to consent to what would otherwise have been a trespass. After giving judgment, he was shown the open letter of 6th June 2000, and he awarded costs against Mr Johnson.
6.	Mr Johnson appealed to the circuit judge. He relied on a number of matters including sections 3 and 5 of the Theft Act 1968, but the judge took the view that that Act had nothing to do with the matter. The judgment records that Mr Johnson did not point to any particular defect in the district judge's reasoning, but complained of the effect of the district judge's judgment having been (as the circuit judge put it):
“... to disregard the protection offered by consumer legislation to private people such as himself, without identifying any particular consumer legislation.” 
7.	The circuit judge dismissed the appeal. Mr Johnson complains that at some stage in the hearing the judge made a remark which Mr Johnson found offensive about the unwisdom of representing oneself in court. I have not seen any transcript of that part of the hearing, but if that remark was made it was regrettable. With the attenuation of civil legal aid litigants sometimes have little or not choice but to represent themselves. Whether Mr Johnson had a good case in this particular matter is a another question.
8.	This would be a second‑tier appeal, and by section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 a second appeal is permissible only if it would raise an important point of principle or practice, or for some other compelling reason. The Court has no discretion to permit a second appeal unless that demanding test is met. It seems to me that the proposed appeal simply does not meet that test. I doubt whether it meets the lower test of having a reasonable prospect of success. I must therefore dismiss this application.
(Application dismissed)