B1/00/2691

Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Civ 463
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
(His Honour Judge Cryan)
                                     Royal Courts of Justice
                                    Strand
                                    London WC2
 
                          Monday, 19th February 2001
B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE THORPE

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G (A CHILD)

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(Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes
of Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2AG
Telephone No: 0171‑421 4040
Fax No: 0171‑831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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THE APPLICANT FATHER appeared in Person.

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J U D G M E N T
1.	LORD JUSTICE THORPE: This is an application for permission brought by Mr. F in person against an order of His Honour Judge Cryan made on 24th July 2000. On that occasion Miss G was also before the court in person. These two are parents of a girl, J, who will be 12 at her next birthday. It is difficult to follow precisely what was the ambit of the hearing on 24th since only the last words have been transcribed. What Judge Cryan said was that he was going to make an order that Miss G hand to J swiftly any letters, presents and the like, sent by Mr. F, but the order was only to run for three months or shorter if, in the interim, Mr. F initiated proceedings in Scotland and obtained a first appointment there. After the judge had announced that order Mr. F applied for a penal notice which the judge refused, and that really ended the proceedings.
2.	Mr. F has maintained indirect contact over the intervening eight months. He has at least received from the mother on 16th January notice of a change of PO Box to which he is to write. So to that very limited extent the mother is co‑operative. But, manifestly, Mr. F is not going to remain content with such one way communication. He has every right to an adjudication from a specialist and independent judge, who can determine in the interests of J what should be the developing relationship between her and her father. It plainly is not safe to leave that decision to Miss G alone, since there is evidence to suggest that she may put her own wishes above the interests of J.
3.	The judge's intention that there should be a swift initiation of proceedings in Scotland has simply not materialised. Mr. F's explanation for his failure to issue an application in Scotland is that he telephoned the Court of Session and was informed by a lady in the Court Service that that court had no jurisdiction unless Mr. F, as applicant, had established three months habitual residence within the jurisdiction. That statement seems implausible on its face since, were it true, any mother could defeat a continuing programme of contact by moving north of the border, knowing that the father was, by virtue of his work commitments or other commitments, incapable of following.
4.	While it is not for me to advise Mr. F, I have looked swiftly to the Family Law Act 1986, sections 8 and 9 of which seem to me to indicate that the Sheriff Court of Glasgow would have jurisdiction in relation to J, since it seems that J is habitually resident within the sheriffdom. I would imagine that Mr. F would have access to legal advice in the Scottish system. I imagine that he should be able to find a specialist solicitor in Glasgow who would on his behalf bring an application for review of this rather sterile contact situation before a sheriff of the court. The one thing that is abundantly plain is that no error has been demonstrated in the adjudication of Judge Cryan. Mr. F's sense of frustration has brought him to this court. It is not the appropriate court. This is a matter for a court of trial, and every indication suggests that the court of trial with jurisdiction is the Scottish court. For all those reasons this application for permission is refused.
Order: Application refused.