No C/2001/0174
Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Civ 737
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE   
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
DECISION TO REFUSE PERMISSION TO 
APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
								Royal Courts of Justice
								Strand
								London WC2

								Friday, 27th April 2001
B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE JUDGE

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WATSON
Respondent

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DILMITIS
Applicant
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(Computer Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street,
London EC4A 2HD
Tel: 0171 831 3183
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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The Applicant appeared in person

The Respondent was not represented and did not attend

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J U D G M E N T
1.	LORD JUSTICE JUDGE: I shall take the very brief description of what the original litigation was about from this short passage of the judgment of His Honour Judge Brunning given on 28th January 2000:
“The events which give rise to this case occurred when Miss Dilmitis, who was employed at a school in Market Bosworth, asserted that she had been constructively dismissed. She brought a case alleging unfair dismissal.
She was, at her request, represented at a hearing before the Industrial Tribunal by Mrs Watson, who specialised in such cases on behalf of teachers. The costs of that representation, which Miss Dilmitis had agreed to pay, were not paid, and Mrs Watson brought an action before this court seeking to recover the sums which she says she was contractually entitled to. Miss Dilmitis disputes that she is obliged to pay, asserting that the quality of service which Mrs Watson had provided fell significantly below the standard to be expected and in the circumstances she was discharged from her obligation to pay for those services.”
2.	That was the issue which came before Deputy District Judge Jeffries on 6th September 1999.
3.	Miss Dilmitis who appeared in person before me today made it clear with absolute courtesy, but with a strong sense of the sureness of her position that an injustice was done, that the proceedings were superficial and that the end result was wrong. She complains, as she complained before Judge Brunning, of the fact there was no transcript of the judgment given by the deputy district judge. Judge Brunning summarised that part of the complaint in this way:
“There is not a transcript of his judgment. Both parties were invited to, and did, put their notes to him and he accepted the summary that was therein contained. There are differences between the two, but they are not, in my judgment, significant.”
4.	She then set out on appeal before Judge Brunning on 28th January a number of complaints, errors of law and flaws in the judgment: for example - and I mention this particularly today because Miss Dilmitis mentioned it in the course of her submissions to me this afternoon - the question whether a document was put before the judge which contained hearsay evidence, and, as Judge Brunning put it, the complaint simply was that the judge accepted hearsay evidence contained in a written statement. Miss Dilmitis says she had no opportunity to cross‑examine on it. Then he put the opposite contention by Mrs Watson, the claimant. The judge said:
“It is clear that she had opportunity to deal with this in the course of her evidence, and had not taken that opportunity.”
5.	In the result Judge Brunning, after setting out the details, expressed his conclusion on the appeal.
6.	All the aspects of care and skill were put before him and evidence was given to him by Miss Dilmitis about it. He rejected every one of the allegations made and, in my judgment, was entitled to do so. There was nothing here which has been established as indicating an error of law.
7.	I am satisfied that this appeal must fail save to the extent that the sum ordered to be paid, that is £1,415.20, must be reduced to £1,360.20.
8.	Then there were some further costs. Miss Dilmitis was extremely unhappy about the way in which those proceedings had concluded and so she came to this court seeking permission to appeal. That was heard, as I understand it from the papers, on 14th July. In the course of his judgment Lord Justice Brooke, refusing the application, expressed himself in a way which Miss Dilmitis regarded as sympathetic - again this is not her word and she would intend no discourtesy - but useless in practice from her point of view because Lord Justice Brooke said:
“The procedure is made clear in the rules which limit the scope for an appeal against an order of the district judge on a small claim. The ordinary right of appeal has always been very limited: if there has been misconduct in the conduct of a small claim or if the district judge has gone wrong on a point of law.”
9.	That apparently was the end of the proceedings taken by Mrs Watson save and except for enforcement. So far as enforcement is concerned, so far as I understand it proceedings have been started but they are some way off and Miss Dilmitis has received a letter in order to have that aspect of the case investigated. She took proceedings complaining about the way in which Mrs Watson had behaved. They resulted in a reduction in the costs which Miss Dilmitis was ordered to pay, but that is of no real comfort beyond, I suppose, the establishment of the principle, because she would contend that she caught Mrs Watson out - this is not her words but I am putting what I believe to be the impact of what she says to me in a few words - lying. Although she was no doubt content to have a reduction in the costs, it did nothing to still her sense of injustice and she would say, I have no doubt, that if the district judge had known all about that sort of behaviour that was revealed in relation to costs he might have come to a different conclusion. In the result, on 26th January 2001 after she had taken proceedings seeking damages for misrepresentation by Mrs Watson she tells me, and it is clear from the papers, that Judge O'Rorke dismissed her proceedings as an abuse of process because the issues involved in the litigation had already been decided on 6th September 1999 by the deputy district judge.
10.	In the meantime on 1st November 2000 her application for permission to move for judicial review was refused by Mr Justice Sullivan. The details of the remedy that Miss Dilmitis was seeking were that the order of Judge Brunning should be quashed, rescinded or reversed and that she “should be compensated for the time, costs and stress caused/incurred in having to pursue this case at this level”. She also sought an interim remedy in that -
“the order of Judge Brunning is suspended until this case is concluded.”
11.	The statement of facts relied on is set out in some detail together with the list of her complaints about the way in which the case had been handled and setting out the grounds for her application. On paper Mr Justice Sullivan on 1st November refused permission. He explained the reasons in stark language:
“Any challenge to a decision of a County Court must be made by way of an appeal - with the permission of the County Court or the Court of Appeal - to the Court of Appeal.”
12.	Dissatisfied with that, Miss Dilmitis renewed her application which came on before Mr Justice Ouseley sitting in London. He gave a very short judgment and he set out the real issue in this way:
“The simple point is that the matters that have been sought to be raised before me, whether or not put in a Human Rights context, are all matters which relate to the judgments of Judge Brunning and the Court of Appeal. This court simply has no jurisdiction to intervene further in relation to those matters.”
13.	She now renews her application for permission to seek a judicial review before me.
14.	I have listened to Miss Dilmitis who has presented her concerns and arguments to me with great care in moderate terms, using unemotional language. But despite her efforts and perhaps inevitably, it is absolutely apparent to me that she feels a profound sense of grievance at this injustice of which she is convinced she was a victim. The reality is that having failed unsuccessfully to persuade Lord Justice Brooke to give her permission to appeal she has sought to try and have the whole problem judicially reviewed by way of present proceedings. Unfortunately, as I have sought to explain to her in the course of the hearing, Lord Justice Brooke's decision represented the end of this particular road. The Administrative Court cannot provide what is, in effect, a new road of appeal to circumvent the arrangements which have been made and which govern rights of appeal to those involved in civil litigation of the kind involved here so as to enable questions like these to be litigated again in the Administrative Court. There is nothing I can do for Miss Dilmitis. Sympathy or not has nothing to do with the decision I have to make. What I have to decide is whether there is any arguable case that she would, if the case were pursued, be granted a judicial review. I do not think her case has any realistic possibility of success. In those circumstances I have to refuse the application.
15.	There was a discussion in the course of argument about the number of different matters, how any remedy could be obtained, whether and if so how the control and management of those who offer services of the sort offered by Mrs Watson of which Miss Dilmitis now complains should be supervised. In the end although those are matters of importance to Miss Dilmitis, they really do not bear on the decision which I have to reach. Using words which betray a sense of sympathy for the sense of grievance which Miss Dilmitis feels, I cannot help her. The application is refused.
Order: Application refused