No B3/2000/2475
B2/2001/0366
Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Civ 918
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE                           
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)                                                
APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND AN
EXTENSION OF TIME
APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

								Royal Courts of Justice
								Strand
								London WC2

								Tuesday, 5th June 2001

B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE ROBERT WALKER

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CHITOLIE
Applicant
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RONA PROPERTY INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD
Respondent

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(Computer Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street,
London EC4A 2HD
Tel: 0171 421 4040
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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The Applicant appeared in person

The Respondent did not attend and was not represented

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J U D G M E N T
1.	LORD JUSTICE ROBERT WALKER: There are before the court two 
2.	applications by Mr Dick Chitolie who has appeared in person. The first application is for permission to appeal and an extension of time for appealing from an order of Mr Peter Leaver QC made on 15th June 2000 when sitting as a deputy judge of the Chancery Division in Bankruptcy. The second application is for permission to appeal from an order of Mr Justice Pumfrey made on 31st January 2001 when sitting in the Chancery Division in Bankruptcy.
3.	Mr Leaver's order dismissed Mr Chitolie's appeal from an order made on 29th February 2000 by Mr Registrar Simmons declining to set aside a statutory demand served on Mr Chitolie on 15th January 2000 by Rona Property Investment Company Ltd (“Rona”). Mr Justice Pumfrey's order dismissed Mr Chitolie's appeal from a bankruptcy order made by Mr Registrar Jacques on 7th November 2000 on a petition presented by Rona as the petitioning creditor.
4.	Both these proposed appeals would be second appeals. By Section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 a second appeal to the Court of Appeal is permitted only if it would raise an important point of principle or practice or for some other compelling reason.
5.	Both the proposed appeals have the same background, that is an action which Mr Chitolie brought against Rona in relation to some leasehold property at Burnham on Crouch, Essex. Mr Chitolie has this morning told me more about that action and what he hoped to achieve in it. However, for present purposes the details of the action between himself and Rona are not important.
6.	The important starting point was a hearing which took place before Master Bragge in Chancery Chambers on 18th October 1999. Mr Chitolie appeared in person at that hearing but he left in the course of the hearing in order to show his dissatisfaction with the proceedings. Since then Mr Chitolie has persistently and determinedly attacked the order made by Master Bragge and, in particular, the Master's summary assessment of costs against Mr Chitolie in the sum of £3,843 odd. It is that liability for costs which has led to the statutory demand with which Mr Leaver was concerned on the first appeal and to the bankruptcy order with which Mr Justice Pumfrey was concerned on the second appeal.
7.	The judgment of Mr Justice Pumfrey recounted the history in some detail. Although he had absented himself from the hearing before Master Bragge, Mr Chitolie appealed from it. His appeal was dismissed by Mr David Mackie QC on 3rd December 1999. Mr Chitolie sought to take the matter to this court. However on 28th March 2000 Lord Justice Mummery, sitting in open court, refused to grant permission to appeal.
8.	That was therefore the end of any direct route of appeal from the order of Master Bragge. Despite that, Mr Chitolie has determinedly sought to go behind the order and to challenge it in the course of proceedings leading up to his bankruptcy. The first challenge was occasioned by Rona's statutory demand leading to the orders of Mr Registrar Simmons and Mr Leaver QC. The second was the bankruptcy petition. The third was when Mr Chitolie applied to the vacation Chancery judge, Mr Justice Lightman, on 8th August 2000. Mr Chitolie sought an injunction but it was refused.
9.	The order of Master Bragge has therefore been considered at the level of High Court judge or above on at least seven occasions between December 1999 and January 2001. On the last occasion Mr Justice Pumfrey reconsidered all Mr Chitolie's complaints in some detail. Mr Chitolie does not accept that Mr Justice Pumfrey dealt satisfactorily with all his complaints, but he has told me that the hearing lasted two hours or more so plainly Mr Justice Pumfrey did give himself time to consider the matters of complaint. These included a mistake in a reference to the case number which Mr Chitolie believes was made deliberately and deceitfully. I can see no evidence to support that. Mistakes in case numbers are made from time to time, but there is no suggestion that the court didnot understand with what matter it was dealing. There was also a point taken as to the absence of a VAT registration number on a summary of costs (not, it should be noted, a full bill of costs). That matter has also been considered by the court on a number of occasions and so has another matter of complaint which Mr Chitolie mentioned to me this morning, that is an item for courier fees which appeared on the costs summary considered by Master Bragge. It is a matter to which Mr Chitolie takes particular exception. Mr Justice Pumfrey concluded that there were no grounds for Mr Chitolie's contention that the bankruptcy order was either unlawful or irregular. I see no reason to disagree with that conclusion.
10.	On that occasion Mr Justice Pumfrey raised the question of making a restraining order against Mr Chitolie under the jurisdiction established or illustrated by Grepe v Loam (1887) 37 Ch D 168 (see also the decision of this court in Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484). When the judge raised this question Mr Chitolie said to him, as recorded by the transcript, and with reference to Master Bragge's order:
“I'm not going to make any application regarding that. The matter's finished. You know that.”
11.	On the strength of that assurance Mr Justice Pumfrey decided not to make a restraining order. It appears that the applications made to this court this morning may be seen as going back on that assurance.
12.	The judge also referred at the end of his judgment to Mr Chitolie's inclusion in his submissions of matter which should never have been placed before the court. I think Mr Chitolie has accepted that he was not doing justice to himself on that occasion.
13.	I have come to the conclusion, having considered these applications as carefully as I can, that they have no prospect of success and would not meet even the lower standard for granting permission to appeal, still less the higher standard set by Section 55 of the Access to Justice Act. I regard them as hopeless for the reasons which are clearly and fully set out in the judgment of Mr Justice Pumfrey and which I do not propose to repeat. I have considered whether I should make a Grepe v Loam order prohibiting Mr Chitolie from making any application either to this court or to any division of the High Court where the application raises any issue relating to or arising out of the order of Master Bragge or the subsequent bankruptcy proceedings without first obtaining permission by submitting a written application to a judge of the Chancery Division. I have not asked Mr Chitolie to address me on that subject because it seems to me that it is more appropriate for any such order to be made by a High Court judge rather than by a single Lord Justice sitting for the purpose of hearing applications for permission to appeal. Mr Chitolie should understand that any further hopeless applications to the Chancery Division or to any other division of the court are likely to meet the response which Mr Justice Pumfrey himself considered.
14.	I must therefore dismiss these applications.
Order: Application refused
(Order does not form part of approved Judgment)