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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> H (A Child), Re [2002] EWCA Civ 1021 (20 June 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1021.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 1021

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
CIVIL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM BIRMINGHAM COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Hamilton)

		The Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London Thursday 20 June 2002

Thursday 20 June 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE THORPE: This is an application for permission to appeal an order made by His Honour Judge Hamilton sitting in the Birmingham County Court on 24 August 2001. On that day he made a freeing order in relation to the relevant child on the ground that the parent's consent might be dispensed with on the basis that it was being unreasonably withheld.
2. This was one of those sad cases involving a conflict between the welfare of the child, A, and the deserts of the mother. The judge held that the former must prevail and that A could not afford to wait for the possibility of the mother's recovery. That was, of course, a sad conclusion for the mother, particularly because she had been tackling her problems of depression and disordered personality with some success. The judge held, however, that as a result of the timescales applying to the mother's recovery, it was inevitable that adoption was the best means of meeting A's needs as she grew up. The judge held that the mother lacked a realistic appreciation of the capacity required to meet the needs of A and, in that, her withholding of consent was objectively unreasonable.
3. Quite apart from the formidable hurdle constituted by those findings and conclusions, I record the fact that this application for permission is significantly out of time, having been filed eight months after the order was made. I therefore have no hesitation at all in dismissing the application. In the first instance it is simply far too late. A has already been placed with prospective adopters. Secondly, the only ground of appeal advanced is a change of circumstance. It is, however, obvious from the judgment that the changes referred to are ones which have been already ventilated in detail before the judge. No true new factor has arisen between the date of judgment and the date of application. This is in truth a hopeless application and it must be dismissed.
4. I have this morning received a faxed request from the applicant, saying that she is unable to attend the hearing today since she was only released from prison yesterday and is without the funds to travel to London. She accordingly asks for some other date to be set. It would achieve nothing for her were I to accede to this request. The sad reality is that there is no single prospect of any successful outcome to a challenge to the judgment of 24 August. The outcome is unchallengeable and an endeavour to bring the matter to this court must be closed now, absolutely and finally. Accordingly, I will not only dismiss the application, but I will order that it is not to be renewed or relisted.
5. However, since the applicant is not here today, I will say that the judgment is to be transcribed at public expense and sent to her at the address which she gives.
ORDER: Applications refused, not to be renewed or relisted. Copy of the transcript of this judgment to be sent to the applicant at public expense. (Order not part of approved judgment)