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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Maloney v Alexander Johnson (A Firm) [2002] EWCA Civ 1544 (14 October 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1544.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 1544

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE EADY)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Monday, 14th October 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE RIX: This an application for permission to appeal by Mr Neil Maloney against the judgment of Eady J of 13th June 2002, whereby he struck out Mr Maloney's claim against his ex-wife's solicitors, Alexander Johnson & Co, as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.
2. The claim arises out of divorce proceedings between Mr Maloney and his wife. As a result of those proceedings, the Willesden County Court made an order on 4th March 1999 ordering Mr Maloney to transfer to his ex-wife a property, then in his sole name and subject to a mortgage in favour of the Abbey National Plc, on condition of the payment to him by his ex-wife of a sum of £3,000 within three months. That figure of £3,000 was designed to cover the amount needed to redeem Mr Maloney's mortgage on the property.
3. Arising out of those divorce proceedings and that disposition by the Willesden County Court in respect of that property, Mr Maloney commenced this action against his ex-wife's solicitors: he complained that they had breached the Data Protection Act 1998 in obtaining from the Abbey National without his consent the redemption payment details relating to his mortgage. He claimed that that breach of the Act led in due course to the loss of his property to his wife. He further complained of malpractice and obtaining goods (the property) by deception.
4. The solicitors applied to strike out that claim and they succeeded before Deputy Master Hoffmann on 1st February 2002, at any rate to the extent of the striking out of the fifth and sixth paragraphs of his claim relating to what is said to be malicious prosecution or malpractice or the obtaining of goods by deception. That left his claim for breach of the Data Protection Act particularised briefly in four paragraphs complaining about the obtaining of the redemption details from the Abbey National.
5. The solicitors appealed from the limited order of Deputy Master Hoffmann to Eady J. He considered further the claim for breach of the Data Protection Act. Mr Maloney made it clear to the learned judge that his complaint was under section 55(1) of the Act, which provides that a person must not knowingly or recklessly obtain personal data:

"... without the consent of the data controller."

That is made an offence under section 55(3).

6. The data controller in question in this case was the Abbey National. However, the information in question was not obtained without the consent of the Abbey National because what happened was that by letter dated 19th November 1998 Mr Maloney's ex-wife's solicitors wrote to the Abbey National stating plainly that their client was "Glenda Maloney" and referring to the mortgagee plainly as "Mr NR Maloney" (that is the applicant in this court), stating further in the body of the letter:

"We act on behalf of Glenda Maloney in respect of the above mentioned property. We would be grateful if you would provide us with a redemption statement."

That is what the Abbey National did. It is plain, therefore, that nothing was obtained "without the consent of the data controller", and that is what Eady J said. Therefore the basis of Mr Maloney's complaint against the solicitors was gone and the learned judge struck out the remaining paragraphs of his claim.

7. In his application today to this court Mr Maloney is seeking a second appeal. It follows that under the rules of jurisdiction binding this court Mr Maloney must persuade the court, if it is to give him permission, that there is a point of practice or principle of general importance or that there is some other compelling reason why permission to appeal should be granted. That, I fear, Mr Maloney has been unable to do. He is unable to show that any point of principle arises under the construction of section 55 of the Act. He is unable to point to any other error of principle or practice on the part of the judge that is of general importance, or indeed any error at all.
8. Following the striking out of his short-form particulars of claim, Mr Maloney has, for the purposes of this application, drafted new particulars of claim, this time running to some seven pages and to some 18 or more paragraphs, with many sub-paragraphs involved as well. I have read those particulars of claim. In effect they raise the same complaints as before, but in greater detail and at longer length. However, this morning Mr Maloney has pointed out to me in particular paragraph 11 of those particulars, where he complains (and he has accepted before me this morning it is an entirely new complaint) of what he describes as a failure by the solicitors to comply with the original court order of the Willesden County Court in that, as he tells me because it is not clear from the written particulars, the payment of £3,000 by Mr Maloney's ex-wife pursuant to that order of the Willesden County Court was proffered late. Mr Maloney tells me that he has never cashed the proffered payment. He also tells me that he sought to raise the matter of the late payment with the court, but was unable to receive any remedy. He also tells me that he complained to the County Court about further matters that he raised against his ex-wife or his ex-wife's solicitors, but again was able to obtain no remedy.
9. The details of these matters are really unknown to me and I can make no comment on them, other than that there is nothing in these proceedings which arises as a matter of complaint out of the Willesden County Court proceedings. Those matters are simply not part of the proceedings before me, which have raised a claim directly against the solicitors. It seems to me that Eady J's judgment dealt fully with the matter. I can find no error in his judgment at all, certainly no point of practice or principle of general importance and no other compelling reason why permission should be granted upon this application.
10. In these circumstances, I am compelled to refuse this application.
11. I am reminded that you needed an extension of time for this application. In the circumstances I refuse an extension of time as well.

ORDER: Applications for permission to appeal and an extension of time refused.

(Order not part of approved judgment)