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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> K (Children), Re [2002] EWCA Civ 1836 (27 November 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1836.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 1836

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM CARDIFF COUNTY COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE HUGH JONES)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Wednesday, 27th November 2002

1. LADY JUSTICE HALE: This is a father's application for permission to appeal against the order of His Honour Judge Hugh Jones in the Cardiff County Court on 24th September 2002 dismissing the father's application for the discharge of care orders relating to his two children, S, who is aged five and a half, and A who is aged two and a half, and also dispensing with the father's agreement to their adoption.
2. The children's parents were not married to one another, indeed the father was married to somebody else and had been for a very long time and was still based in the marital home. But they had a relationship which lasted for some years. The mother was much younger than the father. The concerns of the social services related to poor home conditions, a lack of hygiene, leaving the children with inappropriate babysitters and drug abuse, but also to serious domestic violence between the parents. The father has a very long list of convictions, including many for drug-related offences and some for violence. The mother was said to be terrified of him. In May 2000 she jumped out of a bedroom window in fear of him, but later returned and she told a social worker of her extreme fear. She was placed in a refuge but was collected and taken away by a man, and hence an application was made for emergency protection orders. The guardian reported that the father's lifestyle and behaviour were the predominating factors in the removal of the children from their mother.
3. Emergency protection orders were granted on 21st May 2000, when S was two years old and A only three months. Contact between S and his father was seen to be positive. It was seen that they had a good relationship. Listening to the father talking about S today it is clear that the father has a memory of very happy times with him, taking him out and giving him treats and generally behaving as any father would towards his son. But in June 2000 the father abducted and assaulted the mother. He was later charged with assault and kidnapping and in December he was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment for serious assault on the mother. Meanwhile on 16th August 2000 the Family Proceedings Court had given the local authority permission to refuse contact between the children and their father. This means, and it is deeply upsetting to him, that he has not seen his children for more than two years.
4. The social services did, however, try to reunite the children with their mother. There was an assessment placement with her and they were reunited with her in August, but that broke down after the father had been at the property. There were further attempts to reunite the children with their mother, but these failed because of her problems with alcohol and her failure to maintain contact or her commitment to seek help. The Family Proceedings Court made full care orders on 11th June 2001, although at the same time they gave the father parental responsibility for both children.
5. The father opposed the care orders. There had been a psychiatric assessment by a Dr Redding. This referred to his prison medical record, that his diagnostic profile was anti-social, narcissistic, suspected borderline personality disorder, emotional instability and mild depression. She felt that he showed abnormal personality traits, but not as severe as a borderline personality disorder. Nevertheless it would be best treated as if that was what the problem was. But she also discerned some positives in the way that he talked about the children and his reactions to a parenting test.
6. The children endured a regrettable number of moves when they were in care and while there were attempts made to reunite them with their mother. But they have been placed with prospective adopters since July 2001, shortly after the final care orders were made. They have settled very well there. All the reports are quite clear about that.
7. In June and July this year the father applied for contact and to discharge the care orders. Those applications were consolidated with the applications to adopt the children, and it was directed that the father's application should be heard in conjunction with the application to dispense with his agreement to adoption. The mother supports the adoptions taking place.
8. The judge held that there was no ground to discharge the care orders. There was nothing to suggest that the father had undergone a sufficient change since the proceedings from 2000 to 2001 to justify his assessment as a carer for the children. He had not requested one earlier because he was supporting a return to their mother, and in any event he was in prison for most of the time the care proceedings were going on. He had not attended appointments to discuss contact with social workers in January and August of this year. So there was absolutely nothing to suggest that discharging the care orders would be in the best interests of the children now, which is why he refused that application.
9. As for dispensing with the father's agreement to adoption, the judge correctly directed himself as to the law. There is a two-stage test. The first question is whether adoption is in the children's best interests. All the reports of how the children were getting on were in favour of adoption and the children's mother supported it. The guardian reported, as might be expected, that A had no memory of her father and that S did not ask about him, although he did ask about his mother. Their needs were being very well met where they were. A move would be enormously detrimental to them. The father had no practicable alternative to offer. It was better that they be adopted than to remain in foster care.
10. The judge secondly considered whether a hypothetical reasonable parent would agree, and he said this:

"It is perfectly true that there is a band of decisions in cases like this which may be described as reasonable, even though they may have different outcomes. But the question here is, so far as [the father] is concerned, if these children are not being returned to their mother and if they are not being returned to [their father], what is the best for them? He knows and he accepts, in fairness to him, that the children are being well cared for. He accepts that they are settled where they are. In those circumstances, difficult though it is for him, and I accept that none of us in the court, apart from [the father], is likely to know really how difficult it is, it does seem to me that when one looks at it objectively and asks the question what would a reasonable parent do in those circumstances, the answer must be that a reasonable parent would give his consent. In those circumstances I feel I have no option and indeed no other duty other than to dispense with [the father's] consent, which I do."

11. The father's notice of appeal to this court puts his case very well and very movingly:

"I have led a destructive life without giving thought to any consequences of my actions and when I could see my children being mistreated and neglected and my constant pleas to the mother to change being completely ignored I stupidly allowed myself to get caught up in verbal abuse and violence, not realising the disastrous consequences this would have on my children.

I have had two years to reflect on my actions and now know I dealt with the situation appallingly. I am 46 years old and never known the joy of being a full-time father.

I feel social services have not given me full consideration towards me in raising my children. Nobody could love my children as I do and I know with help and support I could raise my children to be educated, balanced and well-loved individuals. Before my children nothing had ever made an impact on my life, but the impact losing my children has made is so great I know I could completely turn my life around and am ready in order to give the nurturing and stability my children need."

12. His basic case is that he loves his children as any father would, that he was never given the chance to be assessed as a full-time carer for his children and he wishes now to be given that consideration. He also makes the point that no normal human being would agree to his children being adopted by someone else.
13. It is of course the case that the law expects reasonableness of parents faced with these impossible situations and that is the one thing parents cannot be. Parents cannot be reasonable about their children. We all love them to bits. So what the law is asking of us is something which we cannot do. But that does not mean that the law cannot do it or must not do it. These children have had, as the father has movingly said, a great deal of loss in their lives and yet now they are living a happy, contented, stable life together, with prospective adopters who love them and know how to look after them. It is quite clear that that is where their future lies. It is quite clear that it is now far too late to change the course which was set two years ago. There is no prospect at all that this court, the Court of Appeal, would interfere with the decision which His Honour Judge Jones made in September. So I cannot give permission to appeal.
14. The application must be refused, but I will make an order that the father has a transcript of what I have said so that he understands my reasons and my appreciation for the very moving way in which he put his application. I could only have wished that the realisation that he has so eloquently expressed in his notice of appeal had reached him three years ago. He would not be here now.

ORDER: Application for permission to appeal refused; copy of the judgment to be provided to the applicant at public expense.

(Order not part of approved judgment) ______________________________