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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Waldman v Mahajan [2002] EWCA Civ 1839 (29 November 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1839.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 1839

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE NEUBERGER)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Friday, 29th November 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS: Mr Mahajan (who I will refer to as "the applicant") has listed before us three applications. However, I must deal with three other applications which he made at the start of the hearing. First, he applied to take a tape recording of the proceedings and when we came into court we found the appropriate apparatus there. We informed him that it was not appropriate to make a recording privately. All these proceedings are tape recorded and the tape can be available to listen to if necessary. Therefore that application was refused.
2. He next sought an application for a copy of the order of Master Venne, which again related to another application with which we will have to deal. Master Venne's order was contained in a letter which set out his opinion and no further order is necessary.
3. Third, the applicant said that this was a matter that should have been dealt with on paper. He is wrong. The practice in respect of litigants in person is to give them the opportunity of an oral hearing at which they can put forward their case. That is the practice which has been adopted in this case.
4. MR MAHAJAN: My Lord, could you please refer to the law.
5. LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS: Please shut up.
6. MR MAHAJAN: Could you please refer to the law.
7. LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS: Please shut up --
8. MR MAHAJAN: Ah yes, I will shut up.
9. LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS: -- while I am giving my judgment.
10. The first application that is listed is that the court should order that a transcript of the proceedings before Neuberger J on 23rd July 2002 should be supplied to him at public expense and thereafter there should be an adjournment. The second application before us is an application for permission to appeal the order of Neuberger J of 23rd July. The third is an application to introduce fresh evidence.
11. I will deal with those applications in turn, starting with the application that a transcript of the proceedings before Neuberger J should be supplied at public expense. The applicant submits that that is necessary to determine what he had submitted and to show that the judge manufactured evidence. In my view he is totally wrong. The crucial matter in this case is the reasons that the judge gave for dismissing his applications. If the reasons are correct, then in those circumstances that is sufficient. The judge in this case set down his reasons at considerable length and the applicant has a copy of the judgment. This application is in my view hopeless and should be rejected.
12. As to the application to adduce further evidence, I consider that on this application for permission to appeal, it would be right to look at all the evidence that is before the court and therefore would allow it to that extent.
13. I therefore come to the main application which is for permission to appeal the order of 23rd July 2002.
14. I turn first to the background facts. The whole dispute turns upon events which happened way back in the 1990s. Between January 1996 and November 1997 the applicant was employed as an accountant by a company called Pearlion Associates (GB) Ltd. In November 1997 that company was taken over and from then until January 1998 he was employed by that company. Both those companies were owned by the Waldman family. The applicant left Pearlion on 7th January 1998. I believe he found employment with another company. But in August 1999 he was dismissed from that job and has since, I understand, not worked.
15. Shortly after leaving Pearlion the applicant brought proceedings in the Employment Tribunal alleging, amongst other things, unfair dismissal and race discrimination. The Employment Tribunal considered his case and dismissed it. The applicant subsequently appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. That application was heard on 19th June 2000 and judgment was delivered on 13th July 2000. The result was that his appeal was dismissed.
16. These applications arise out of proceedings that the applicant brought in the Willesden County Court against Mrs Waldman and a company called Sibell Associates Ltd, which was another company owned by Mrs Waldman. The applicant claimed about £30,000 against Mrs Waldman personally. He claimed that he had completed approximately 600 hours of overtime at Mrs Waldman's request on her own tax affairs and on litigation that was under way against Barclays Bank. He claimed that there were agreements between himself and Mrs Waldman as to the remuneration that he received, which included £10,000 in respect of an alleged saving that he had made for her on a claim against her by the Inland Revenue.
17. The claim was disputed by Mrs Waldman, except that she agreed to pay £10,000 of any saving the applicant had actually achieved against the Inland Revenue. That dispute came before His Honour Judge Ryland, sitting at the Central London County Court. Judgment was given on 8th December 1999. The applicant was legally represented until the final day of the hearing, when he dismissed his counsel and solicitors. The judge found in Mrs Waldman's favour. He was not satisfied that the applicant had done the amount of work he claimed or that he had spent the amount of time he claimed on that work. He also concluded that there was no evidence to show that he had achieved any reduction in the claim by the Inland Revenue. He therefore dismissed the applicant's claim and awarded costs in Mrs Waldman's favour.
18. On 25th February 2000 the applicant complained to the Office for the Supervision of Solicitors in respect of the alleged conduct of Miss Rachel Harrap of Edwin Coe, who was the solicitor acting for Mrs Waldman. He alleged that she had conspired with Mrs Waldman, the Court of Appeal, various court staff and the police to pervert the course of justice against him. The allegations were denied and the Office for the Supervision of Solicitors wrote to him informing him that there was no evidence to suggest that Miss Harrap's behaviour throughout the case amounted to professional misconduct.
19. The applicant did not accept that and referred the matter to the Legal Services Ombudsman, but subsequently withdrew his complaint.
20. In the interim the applicant had applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal the decision of His Honour Judge Ryland. It came before Tuckey and Jonathan Parker LJJ. They refused permission to appeal on 25th July 2000, on the basis that there was no evidence to undermine the judge's conclusions on the merits. It is appropriate that I should read short passages from the judgment of Tuckey LJ. Tuckey LJ cited this passage from His Honour Judge Ryland:

"I do not accept that Mrs Waldman entered into numerous agreements put forward for her to be personally liable for the work done for and on behalf of Mrs Waldman and the company save for the extra work done in relation to the Inland Revenue."

Tuckey LJ continued:

"11. I have already referred to that. The judge examined the documentation put before him and concluded that there was no evidence which satisfied him that the applicant had achieved any reduction in the claim by the Inland Revenue so as to be entitled to payment for that work.

12. It is apparent from the judge's findings that he had to rely heavily on the view he formed of the credibility of the applicant and Mrs Waldman. It was, as he said, for the applicant to prove his case, and it is apparent that there were no, or very few, contemporaneous documents to support it. In these circumstances it is inconceivable that this court would interfere which the judge's findings of fact based as they were on his view of the witnesses whom he saw and heard. The Court of Appeal do not have this advantage, and in a case such as this they must be guided solely by the judge's findings of fact. It is for this reason that we have not ordered the transcript of the proceedings. It would not help the applicant at all in this court, and so it would be a complete waste of money.

13. In support of his appeal the applicant has filed a long statement which, among other things, repeats the basis for his claim against Mrs Waldman. The applicant's ground of appeal, supported by a skeleton argument, repeat the reasons why he says the judge should have found for him and against Mrs Waldman. He also complains about the conduct of her lawyers, the court staff, and the judge himself. I can see nothing in the mass of material which the applicant has put before us which justifies these complaints or more importantly which undermines in any way the judge's conclusions on the merits of the applicant's case.

14. It will be of no comfort to the applicant for me to say this but I will do so nevertheless. The time has come for the applicant, for his own sake and the sake of his family, to put this dispute with Mrs Waldman and her companies behind him. This application for permission is refused. This at least brings these proceedings to an end."

21. What is quite clear from the application that is before us, the applicant did not take Tuckey LJ's advice and certainly he does not believe that those proceedings have come to an end.
22. I turn back to the history. The costs were assessed and the final costs certificate in respect of the proceedings amounted to over £51,000. That was the sum that had to be paid by the applicant.
23. On 4th December 2000 Edwin Coe, the solicitors acting for Mrs Waldman, served a statutory demand for the outstanding costs owed by him. The applicant issued an application to set aside the statutory demand on 8th January 2001. He was at that time represented by a firm of solicitors called Salim & Patel. The application came before Mr Registrar Baister on 13th January 2001, who dismissed it. He ordered that Sibell be authorised to present a bankruptcy petition on or after 5th February 2001.
24. In the meantime, on 23rd January 2001 Mrs Waldman had presented a bankruptcy petition for over £55,000, being the outstanding debt plus accrued interest. Edwin Coe instructed a process server to effect service of the petition on the applicant. A representative of the company attempted to serve the petition at the address of the applicant's estranged wife on 26th January 2001, again on 27th January, again on 6th February and later on 22nd February.
25. On 7th March 2001 Mr Registrar Baister ordered that the date of the hearing of the bankruptcy petition be extended to 12th April 2001. On 12th March 2001 Mr Registrar Baister ordered that the sending of a sealed copy of the bankruptcy petition, together with a copy of his order to the applicant be deemed good and sufficient service. A certificate of service was duly issued on 30th March 2001.
26. The hearing of the bankruptcy petition took place on 12th April, before Deputy Registrar Brettle. The applicant did not attend. In his absence he was adjudged bankrupt. A public examination pursuant to the bankruptcy order was ordered to take place on 15th June but was adjourned to 27th July by Mr Registrar Jacques. It appears that the examination was subsequently abandoned altogether. The Official Receiver was released as the trustee in bankruptcy on 10th December 2001.
27. On 12th July 2002 the applicant applied for an order setting aside the bankruptcy order and requested that permission to issue proceedings against eight specified defendants, including Mrs Waldman, Mr Waldman, Edwin Coe, Miss Harrap of Edwin Coe and John Russell, who was counsel at the hearing on 8th December. The applicant advanced five grounds in support of his application to set it aside. Briefly they were. First, the court had no basis to make the bankruptcy order. It appears that he was contending that he had not been properly served.
28. Second, the orders on the basis of which Mrs Waldman issued the statutory demand were perverse. The applicant alleged that His Honour Judge Ryland was secretly influenced by the Chief Rabbi and Rabbis.
29. Third, the Court of Appeal decision of 25th July 2000 was predetermined and was not delivered properly.
30. Fourth, the court did not consider the evidence available and was too ready to accept the judgment of other courts, and the court staff and the judiciary had conspired to pervert the course of justice.
31. Fifth, the manner in which the Deputy Registrar took over the case from Mr Registrar Baister was indicative of the court being party to the conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.
32. That application was heard by Neuberger J on 23rd July 2002. The judge noted that the application was out of time, but considered the applicant's arguments in depth. His judgment was carefully reasoned, amounting to just over 15 pages. He dismissed each of the applicant's submissions in relation to the bankruptcy order and upheld the decision of Mr Deputy Registrar Brettle. He then came to consider the application for permission to issue the proceedings. He noted the balancing act the court must perform in order to ensure the interests of justice.
33. It is appropriate that I should read a substantial part of his judgment on this point. At page 12 of the transcript he said this:

"The allegations against each of the defendants involve serious dishonesty, effectively, one way or another, to pervert the course of justice and thereby to cause harm to Mr Mahajan in connection with the county court and possibly the Employment Tribunal proceedings to which I have briefly referred.

Again, the Court has to tread a careful line here. It is all too easy to conclude that a litigant, particularly a litigant in person who has become obsessed and deluded about a particular case, must therefore have nothing of substance in any of his allegations of fraud and dishonesty. The Court must be careful of blithely making such an assumption. Against that, the Court should be very anxious and concerned before it allows proceedings of this sort to be brought, bearing in mind that very serious allegations will be made against various individuals and organisations which will involve them in a great deal of worry and expense, which expense will almost certainly be irrecoverable because Mr Mahajan is bankrupt. If there is any real possibility of the claim having anything in it then the Court should be very careful before it does not allow it to proceed. In the first place, it would involve shutting out Mr Mahajan from seeking legal redress in respect of a claim which may be valid. Quite apart from the consideration of the European Human Rights aspect, it would be an affront to shut somebody out from bringing proceedings that had a real chance of success, subject, of course, to the bankruptcy point. Furthermore, the very seriousness of the allegations, which would be of such concern to the defendants, could be said to be a factor in favour of allowing the proceedings to continue or to be brought if there is anything in the allegations. It is obviously in the public interest that any iniquity, particularly in connection with perverting the course of justice, is brought to light."

34. In my view the judge quite clearly had in mind the difficulty that the decision involved and clearly weighed up the considerations that were necessary. Having done so, the judge concluded his judgment in this way:

"Having examined the particulars of claim and listened to Mr Mahajan, I am quite satisfied that the balance that I have identified comes down very clearly indeed in favour of not granting him permission to proceed with this claim. The allegations are serious but, again, I revert to the fact, as is well-known to any barrister considering pleading dishonesty, that it is inappropriate to make allegations of dishonesty unless there is credible evidence, or there is a reasonable ground for anticipating credible evidence, upon which a judge or, as the case may be, a jury could conclude that dishonesty has occurred, as alleged.

Again, I have asked Mr Mahajan as to what independent evidence there is in the form of documents, admissions and that sort of thing which might show that there had been dishonesty. Apart from Mr Mahajan's obsession and delusions and apart from the letter from Mr and Mrs Waldman's Rabbi in connection with not being able to attend court for religious reasons for a certain period, Mr Mahajan has not taken me to anything, although he refers to the fact that he has eight lever-arch files. That will not do. In order to let this very serious action proceed, because it involves such grave allegations against so many people, I think that it is the Court's duty to satisfy itself that it has some prospect of success. I am quite satisfied there is nothing to support the allegations he makes of dishonesty against the various eight defendants and I would not be doing my duty if I permitted the action to proceed. In those circumstances I dismiss the application."

35. The crux of the applicant's complaint is in effect the decision and order of His Honour Judge Ryland of 8th December 1994. He believes that in some way he has new evidence of a conspiracy, not only amongst the lawyers but amongst the judiciary which means that that judgment can be impugned.
36. He passionately believes that the decision was wrong. Thus the consequent order for costs was wrong. Thus the bankruptcy order was wrong. However, he must in my view realise that there has to be finality in litigation and that the issues raised before His Honour Judge Ryland are now finally decided against him. He sought to appeal that decision and permission was refused on 25th July 2000. That brought that dispute to an end. The costs ordered to be paid were certified. He therefore, in the view of the law, owed the amount of money certified. He did not pay his debt and therefore it was not surprising that he was made bankrupt. He has failed to understand and accept the passages in the judgment of Tuckey LJ to which I have referred.
37. The applicant applies for permission to appeal and again seeks to obtain permission to issue the proceedings which were considered by Neuberger J. His grounds of appeal are set out in length in the documents which he has put before us. He has also filed a lengthy witness statement in support of his application in which he sets out the background to his claim and expands his grounds of appeal.
38. He in effect advances 17 grounds of appeal. They are not new. They can be summarised in this way. Primarily they consist of allegations that Neuberger J was wrong in law to conduct the hearing as he did. He failed to consider all the relevant evidence and imported false evidence and misdirected himself as to the law. Furthermore, he contends that the judge was biased against him in a number of respects. The order was made fraudulently and in breach of his human rights, with the result that he is unable to find employment. More generally he argues that the conduct of the judge drove him away from the seat of justice. Further, there was clear evidence of the corruption inherent in the judiciary and the legal system and the overall conduct of the hearing was repugnant in law.
39. I have read carefully the judgment of Neuberger J. In my view it is a careful and reasoned judgment and cannot be faulted. The applicant did not substantiate his application to set aside the bankruptcy order and the grounds that he put forward had no basis for the order that he sought. Here was a case in which the Court of Appeal had refused him permission to appeal the judgment upon which the costs order was based. The costs order had been made against him and in that case he owed in the eyes of the law over £55,000.
40. As to the bankruptcy petition, I have already referred to the way that it was served by sending it to him, and in those circumstances proper service was made. I therefore conclude that there is no real prospect of success in setting aside the bankruptcy order.
41. I have also looked at the particulars of claim which were drafted by the applicant in support of his action against the proposed defendants. It contains no evidence. He has not put forward any further evidence than he put forward before the judge. In my view the judge exercised his discretion correctly. He considered the matters that he should consider and came to a conclusion. This court would not set aside that exercise of the discretion.
42. In those circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that there is no real prospect of an appeal succeeding and permission should be refused.
43. LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I agree.

ORDER: Applications refused; copy of judgment to be provided at public expense to the applicant.

(Order not part of approved judgment) ______________________________