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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Middlesborough Football & Athletic Company (1986) Ltd. v Liverpool Football & Athletic Grounds Plc [2002] EWCA Civ 1929 (25 November 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1929.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 1929 |
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE ASTILL)
Strand London, WC2 | ||
B e f o r e :
Vice-President
LORD JUSTICE MAY
LORD JUSTICE CLARKE
____________________
MIDDLESBOROUGH FOOTBALL & ATHLETIC COMPANY (1986) LTD | Appellants | |
-v- | ||
LIVERPOOL FOOTBALL & ATHLETIC GROUNDS PLC | Respondents |
____________________
Smith Bernal Wordwave Limited
190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
MR P TALBOT QC AND MR G RICHARDSON (instructed by Mace & Jones, Liverpool L2 0RP) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
____________________
(APPROVED BY THE COURT)
Crown Copyright ©
"The court may give summary judgment against a claimant ... on the whole of a claim ... if -
(a) it considers that -
(i) that claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim ..."
"The decisions below are to opposite effect ... the judge's decision has the radical effect of striking out the whole of a claim for a potentially very significant sum, prior to disclosure of documents and without any of the evidence being developed, heard or tested. The existence of a breach of contract is not in issue. The only issue is whether any and if so what damages are recoverable. The judge does not appear to have covered all the points, and his reasoning on the points he has covered appears to me open to the criticisms of principle that he has attempted to evaluate the evidence, and to do so on a wrong basis (probability rather than loss of a chance). The prospects of success also appear to be sufficiently good to constitute a compelling reason for permission."
(Second appeals, it will be appreciated, are rare creatures).
"1. A Club shall be at liberty at any time to make
an approach to a player with a view to negotiating a contract with such a Player,
1.1 if he is an Out of Contract Player, or,
1.2 in a case of a Contract Player, with the prior
written consent of the Club ... to which he is contracted.
3. Any Club which by itself, by any of its Officials, by any of its Players, by its Agents, by any other person or body on its behalf or by any other means whatsoever makes an approach either directly or indirectly to a Contract Player except as permitted by Rule J.1.2 or Rule J.2. [Rule J.2 allows Clubs to approach contract players in certain circumstances between the third Saturday in May and 1st July. It has no application whatever to the circumstances of the present case] shall be in breach of these Rules ...
5. ... a Contract Player, either by himself or by any person or body on his behalf, shall not either directly or indirectly make any such approach as is referred to in Rule J.4. [an approach to the club with a view to negotiating a contract] without having obtained the prior written consent of his Club.
22. A contract between a Club and a Player shall be treated as confidential and its contents shall not be disclosed or divulged either directly or indirectly to any person, firm or company whatsoever by either party thereto except:
22.1 with the prior written permission of both parties ..."
"f7. In the event that during the period of this contract Middlesborough Football Club receive an offer in writing for the transfer of the registration of the player for a minimum sum of £5.5 million, the club will give the player permission to discuss personal terms with the offering club. If the player agrees personal terms with the offering club, Middlesborough Football Club will grant his release and terminate his contract on receipt of a written request from the player."
"On joining Middlesborough, Christian had, it seemed to us, played well for that club but not so well for his national side. In any event, we certainly thought that £5.5m was at the upper end of the price range for a full-back and certainly more than we expected to receive for Matteo, who would have to leave if Christian arrived ...
Indeed, at the time, as I recall, I was dubious about even considering paying so much as £5.5m to Middlesborough ... We most emphatically would not have paid materially more for him and nowhere near the £7.5m I understand that Middlesborough are seeking to claim that he was worth."
"The difficulty facing [Middlesborough] in the £2 million claim is clause f7. That effectively removed [Middlesborough] from the picture. It was left with no choice, a choice which it would otherwise have had under the terms of the standard contract. The only way in which it could be saved is if it could show that it was probable that [Liverpool] would have offered more than £5.5 million or that Mr Ziege would have been persuaded to stay.
As to the first, Mr Parry has categorically
stated otherwise and if that is suspect as a hindsight statement the valuations of Mr Ziege are not. He was sold by AC Milan to the respondent for £4 million, sold to the appellant for £5.5 million and sold on to Tottenham Hotspur Football Club for £4.5 million [the true figure, as previously stated, being somewhat less].
There is no realistic possibility of Mr Parry
changing that view at trial. It is speculation based on hope rather than the chance of adducing evidence which might reasonably satisfy the standard of probability. In my judgment, there was no market value in the sense that Mr Ziege was available to any other club rather than the appellant for the reasons given by Mr Ziege in his latest statement. The value placed on a player is not the market value unless he is available on the market. It is the potential market value, and that was the position here. The respondent had no control over what happened once an offer of £5.5 million was received. By its own hand, it had removed itself from the negotiating process by agreeing to the inclusion of clause f7 in Mr Zeige's contract.
It is not so much that the claim on this
basis is fanciful, it is that it does not exist. The loss of a chance to persuade Mr Ziege to remain at [Middlesborough] is fanciful, given Mr Ziege's latest statement that for footballing reasons he wanted to go to Liverpool and would go nowhere else whatever the offer. There is no existing or potential evidence to support the probability that the respondent would have been able to persuade him to stay if Liverpool had not approached him first.
For these reasons, the £2 million claim has
no real prospect of success and the Master was in error in holding otherwise."
So much for the first limb of the claim.
" ... the proper disposal of an issue under Part 24 does not involve the judge conducting a mini-trial, that is not the object of the provisions; it is to enable cases, where there is no real prospect of success either way, to be disposed of summarily."
1. The claim for £2 million.
2. The alternative claim.
(Appeal allowed; order of judge below set aside; part of the Master's order be reinstated; Appellant's costs to be subject to a detailed assessment).