B1/02/0128
Neutral Citation Number: [2002] EWCA Civ 237
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE                            
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE COVENTRY COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Eccles QC)
                                    Royal Courts of Justice
                                    Strand
                                    London WC2
 
                          Friday, 2nd February 2002
B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE WARD

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W (A CHILD)

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(Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes
of Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
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THE APPLICANT did not appear and was not represented.

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J U D G M E N T
1.	LORD JUSTICE WARD: This is an application by Mr. W for permission to appeal against an order made by His Honour Judge Eccles on 4th January 2002 in the Coventry County Court. As I understand the position, he had before him on that day a directions appointment. He may also have had (it is not clear to me) the father's application to transfer the matter to the Canterbury County Court for various directions about contact, and in particular an application that the travelling arrangements should be shared equally with the mother.
2.	Mr. W did not attend that hearing. The judge made the following orders: firstly, that the respective applications, which must have included the application of the father that I have mentioned, be adjourned to 7th February. He directed, secondly, that both parties file statements to include details of their means and the cost of transporting B for contact, and what, if any, alternative means of transport exist. The judge said that if Mr. W wished to rely on any comment of his, he should serve a transcript on the court. He made a contact order for the weekend of 18th to 20th January and directed that the father be responsible for delivery and collection. He allowed the mother to apply for a penal notice if there was a breach of the order. He gave liberty to the father to apply to vary and he reserved the costs. Mr. W seeks to appeal against that order.
3.	According to his application, he would wish this court to deal particularly with the venue for these disputed proceedings and to resolve the travelling issue. Mr. W does not appear today, as I have said, and I give this judgment in his absence. If he wishes to reinstate this matter he can within the next 14 days, but I shall dismiss the application because in my judgment it is utterly hopeless. This was a directions appointment before Judge Eccles. The directions he gave for each party to set out their case so that the court could resolve the issue of transport was proper and necessary, and I simply do not understand what challenge could be made against it. That the judge made an interim order for contact, ordering the father to continue to transport over the one weekend between the hearing and the restored hearing in February, seems well within the ambit of the judge's discretion. He did not impose a penal notice, which was again entirely proper. The attempt to appeal it is utterly misconceived from beginning to end. Mr. W's right course was to await the full hearing on 7th February, when the court would be able to determine the transport issue and give a full ruling on whether Coventry or Canterbury was the appropriate venue for the dispute. I would therefore dismiss the application.
4.	I should not finally dispose of the matter without saying something about the use to be made of the transcript of my judgment given when the case was last before me. In that judgment, which was to dismiss the application for permission, I said that there “might be” some ground for attacking the penal notice which had in fact been made on that occasion because arguably the order was too vague to be enforced by a committal. Those were tentative preliminary views indicating that there may have been an arguable case to put before the full court on appeal. They were not comments that indicated any concluded view at all. I then added a postscript. It was exceedingly stupid of me to do so. I regret it. In an effort to try and persuade this father that he was not being unfairly treated, I made this comment:
“The principle of give and take is not a bad one to apply in family matters. One wonders whether the court would be as sympathetic to a father seeking contact as it may be to a mother seeking contact if the burden of carriage were the other way round. But that may be a wholly unfair, inappropriate remark. Nonetheless, I hope the judge will bear it in mind, whether it is politically correct or politically incorrect.” 
5.	I have reflected that it was an inappropriate remark and I regret making it. There are so many fathers who parade before this court complaining that they have been harshly dealt with and that the mother's case is always favoured, that I thought it might assuage this father's concerns. Instead he seems to be using my remarks to suggest that I was finding that the Coventry County Court had not dealt fairly with him and that they had behaved in a “sexist” way. I was doing nothing of the kind. I was endeavouring to give him the confidence to accept the judgment of the court, to accept that the judge would not favour either mother or father unless there were justifiable reasons on the facts of the case which made it necessary to direct that one or other might have to bear more of the responsibility for transport than he or she felt appropriate. This judgment should also be placed on the file in the Coventry County Court.
Order: Application refused; copy of judgment to be placed on the file in the Coventry County Court.