[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Ratra v Attorney General [2002] EWCA Civ 742 (26 April 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/742.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 742

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Friday, 26th April 2002

1. MR JUSTICE JACKSON: This is an application for permission to appeal. The facts giving rise to this application are as follows. The appellant is bringing a large number of actions against a variety of defendants in the Central London County Court. The defendants include, by way of example only, Mr Michael Scott, Chubb Security, The Board of Trustees of the Royal Botanic Gardens at Kew, Angel Drug Services and many other defendants. It appears from the material before me that over 80 actions in all have been commenced by the appellant in the Central London County Court.
2. On 10th January 2002 His Honour Judge Collins, in the Central London County Court, made an order staying all those actions pending a decision by the Attorney General whether or not to seek an order that the appellant is a vexatious litigant. On 6th January 2002 Mr Justice Owen, sitting in the Administrative Court, made the following order:

"It is ordered that the application for a transcript be allowed in the following terms: namely that a transcript of the judgment/directions given by His Honour Judge Medawar QC on 8th October 2001 be obtained at public expense. Reasons: it is not possible to determine the application for permission to appeal against the judgment/directions without such a transcript."

3. On 1st February 2002 the court manager of the Central London County Court wrote a letter to the appellant which, amongst other matters, refused the appellant's application for remission of fees.
4. The appellant was dissatisfied with the way in which matters were progressing on these various fronts. Accordingly, on 12th February 2002 the appellant appeared before Mr Justice Penry-Davey, sitting as judge in chambers, with a variety of applications. The first application which was made was an application for an order that the court manager in the Central London County Court do grant the fee remission which the appellant had sought. The second application was an application for an order that the order of Mr Justice Owen, dated 16th January, be implemented, and further for an order that the appellant be given copies of orders in respect of a number of cases as identified in the application notice. The third application was for permission to appeal to the High Court against the order of His Honour Judge Collins directing that the appellant's multitude of County Court actions be stayed pending the Attorney General's decision.
5. Mr Justice Penry-Davey refused all of the applications which were made for the reasons set out in his judgment. I do not need to go through that judgment in any detail because many of the issues that were live before Mr Justice Penry-Davey are no longer live issues in this court. The appellant was dissatisfied with the decision of Mr Justice Penry-Davey. Accordingly, he applied for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The permission application comes on this morning for hearing orally in this court. Mr Ratra appears on this application, as I understand he has on a number of occasions, as a litigant in person. He has put his points to me clearly and succinctly.
6. So far as the first matter is concerned - remission of fees - that issue has now been resolved. Mr Ratra produced to me a letter from the customer services manager, dated 25th March, stating that the group manager has considered and allowed Mr Ratra's appeal and has granted full fee remission on all his applications. That part of Mr Penry-Davey's judgment is no longer the subject of an application for permission to appeal. Mr Ratra has obtained the remedy he seeks in that regard.
7. I turn to the second matter which Mr Justice Penry-Davey dealt with. In relation to that Mr Justice Penry-Davey held that the order of Mr Justice Owen had been made; it was a valid order; it required to be obeyed. There was nothing which Mr Justice Penry-Davey should do or could do in that regard. Mr Justice Owen's order spoke for itself. Mr Ratra tells me that the problem with implementing Mr Justice Owen's order is that the Court Service now say they have lost the tape of the judgment given by His Honour Judge Medawar on 8th October 2001. Mr Ratra also tells me that in relation to this matter he appeared before Mr Justice Garland on 20th March and on that occasion Mr Justice Garland said that he would write to the Central London County Court pressing them to make further enquiries. Accordingly, Mr Ratra tells me that he no longer seeks permission to appeal to this court in relation to the decision taken by Mr Justice Penry-Davey in relation to Mr Justice Owen's order. That seems to me to be a sensible decision. Mr Ratra has now embarked upon a different avenue. Furthermore, I do not see any possible ground on which permission to appeal could be granted in respect of what Mr Justice Penry-Davey decided relating to the earlier order of Mr Justice Owen.
8. The next matter raised by Mr Ratra concerns the failure of the Central London County Court to supply to him certain orders. Mr Ratra tells me that a number of orders referred to in his application notice before Mr Justice Garland have now been provided to him. There are however three orders which have not been provided to him. The first is an order in action CL/105862 against Michael Scott. That is an order striking out the claim and Mr Ratra wishes to appeal against that order. The second order not provided is a judgment in default which Mr Ratra says he obtained against Chubb Security. The third order not provided, according to Mr Ratra, is an order striking out his claim against Angel Drug Service. Mr Ratra says he needs this strike out order in order to pursue his appeal. In relation to the second order, the one against Chubb Security, Mr Ratra says he was the victor in that litigation but he needs the order to proceed to an assessment of damages or assessment of costs. So far as this aspect of the case is concerned, the issue is narrower than it was before Mr Justice Garland because a number of the orders sought have now been obtained. Nevertheless, Mr Ratra seeks permission to appeal against Mr Justice Garland's decision in relation to the three orders not yet provided. In relation to orders not provided Mr Justice Garland said this:

"With regard to the remainder of that particular application notice that the claimant be given copies of the orders, again, in my judgment, there is no jurisdiction for me to make such an order. I think the appropriate order for me to make in respect of that particular application is no order."

9. Mr Ratra seeks permission to appeal to the extent which I have indicated on the grounds that it is at least properly arguable that Mr Justice Penry-Davey erred in law. I do not think that that is arguable. I am not persuaded that Mr Justice Penry-Davey, sitting as judge in chambers, had jurisdiction to make the order which the appellant was seeking in respect of the conduct of the Central London County Court.
10. Accordingly, I refuse permission to appeal in respect of that matter.
11. The third question which Mr Justice Penry-Davey decided was whether or not there should be permission to appeal against the order of Judge Collins directing stays of the various County Court actions. Mr Justice Penry-Davey decided that permission to appeal to the High Court should not be granted. In those circumstances there is no further right of appeal to this court. Accordingly, and very sensibly, Mr Ratra does not pursue his application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the third limb of Mr Justice Penry-Davey's order.
12. In the result therefore, for reasons indicated earlier in this judgment, I refuse permission to the appellant to appeal against any part of the order of Mr Justice Penry-Davey.
Order: Application refused