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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Baker, R (on the application of) v Devon & Cornwall Constabulary & Its Police Authority [2002] EWCA Civ 769 (15 May 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/769.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 769

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
CIVIL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT LIST
(Mr Justice Hooper)

		The Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London Wednesday 15 May 2002

Wednesday 15 May 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: This is a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review following the refusal by Hooper J of 7 November 2001 to grant Mrs Baker permission to apply for judicial review of a decision by the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, to which I shall come in a moment.
2. First it is necessary to paint a little of the background. Mrs Baker's father died in 1960, leaving everything to his wife in a trust fund for their children, one of the beneficiaries, therefore, being Mrs Baker. A Coventry solicitor named Newsome had been appointed an executor of Mrs Baker's father's will. She says that the family was told that because her father's estate was insolvent or bankrupt, his assets had to be sold. Mrs Baker's mother died in 1995 and Mrs Baker received her share of the money which had been held on trust, namely £7,000. It was at about that time that Mrs Baker decided to act on suspicions that she entertained as to how her father's estate had been dealt with by Newsome. In particular she was concerned that on her father's death there had been no trace of signed codicils which her father had wanted to be appended to his will, and a hotel owned by the Palm Beach Hotel (Falmouth) Limited, of which her father had been managing director, had not been properly dealt with on his death.
3. As a result of these concerns she contacted the Essex Fraud Squad to complain about the way in which her late father's estate had been dealt with by Newsome. This complaint was referred to the West Midlands Fraud Squad. They investigated the matter and wrote to Mrs Baker in June 1998 saying that her allegations were of a civil nature and that their investigation into the matter was now closed. Mrs Baker was not satisfied with this response and wrote to the Chief Constable of the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary. As a result of this, further enquiries into Mrs Baker's complaint were made and in September 1998 a letter was sent to Mrs Baker stating that there was no evidence of criminality for the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary to investigate. Mrs Baker has since sent further letters to the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary. There have also been letters sent to the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary on this matter by Mrs Baker's local MP, and I am told that other senior members of the Government, and indeed the Prime Minster's wife, have been involved, or at any rate shown a real interest, in her case. On 31 August 1999 the Deputy Chief Constable wrote to the MP, Mr Bernard Jenkin, stating that Mrs Baker's allegations had been investigated and that there was no evidence that any criminal offences had been committed.
4. On 12 January 2001 Detective Chief Superintendent Pyke of the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary wrote to Mr Jenkin affirming the position of the Police Authority. That letter concludes in the following way:

"Mrs Baker has been contacted on numerous occasions and informed accordingly but appears unwilling to accept there is no justification for any further police enquiries into her allegations.

At present the investigation into the allegations of theft made by Mrs Baker is closed. As previously stated the CPS and Force Legal Advisor concur the complaint is not of a criminal nature.

I hope that this letter answers your queries and re-affirms the position of the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary in this matter."

5. It was this letter which prompted Mrs Baker on 23 July 2001 to bring her claim for judicial review. She alleged that the letter contained "multiple evasions and fabrications" and that her Convention rights created by the Human Rights Act 1998 had been infringed in the way in which her complaint had been handled by the police.
6. Her challenge was, as is clear from the form 86A, to the decision said to have been contained in the letter of 12 January 2001. The essential basis of her challenge is that there was a strong prima facie case that criminal offences had been committed and that the Devon and Cornwall Police Authority should not have concluded that there was no evidence of criminality to investigate.
7. The matter has been put even more forcefully this afternoon by Mr Remington-Hickes, Mrs Baker's McKenzie Friend. He does not mince his words and says in terms that it is Mrs Baker's case that when the Authority asserts that the allegations have been investigated, that is untrue. It is said that there has been no investigation of the allegations and that the reason for that is because something in the nature of a cover-up has been going on in this case.
8. Following an oral hearing of her application for permission on 7 November 2001, Hooper J refused her application, stating that the letter of 12 January did not contain any decision and in any event that he had no jurisdiction to decide whether the Police Authority was or was not right to conclude that there was no evidence of criminality. Mrs Baker now renews her application for permission to apply for judicial review.
9. One thing is clear about this case. The strength of feeling borne by Mrs Baker and indeed by Mr Remington-Hickes is palpable. It is quite plain that she feels a real sense of grievance and that she cannot accept that the Police Authority, if it has indeed carried out any sort of investigation, was justified in reaching the conclusion that there was no evidence that any criminal offences have been committed.
10. I regret to say that, in my judgment, her application must be rejected. I reject it for the following reasons. First of all, the decision not to investigate her complaint further was taken in September 1998, almost three years before she launched these judicial review proceedings. It is simply not right to say that the decision of which she complains is contained in the letter of 12 January 2001. In my view it is now far too late to allow a judicial review challenge. The rules require the claim form to be filed promptly, and in any event not later than three months after the grounds to make the claim first arose. I refer to the Civil Procedure Rules Part 54.5(1).
11. Secondly, I have not been persuaded, on the basis of the material that has been placed before me, either that no investigation has been carried out at all, or that it was not reasonably open to the Authority to conclude that there was no prima facie evidence of criminality. It is not sufficient for an applicant simply to assert that something stated by a respondent is false. That is not sufficient to raise an arguable case that the statement, that the allegations have been investigated and that there is no evidence that any criminal offences have been committed, is false. More is required in the way of evidence before a court exercising judicial review jurisdiction will consider the next question, which is whether such a conclusion is unlawful on one of the grounds well established by English public law.
12. Thirdly, although much has been made both in the papers and, indeed, in oral argument this afternoon about the Human Rights Act, I am afraid that I cannot see that the decision not to investigate because of lack of evidence raises any arguable violation of any Convention right. Mr Remington-Hickes has referred to Article 6 and there has been some reference to a right to be heard. But that only arises either where a party is facing criminal proceedings -- and that is not this case -- or where a party's civil rights are engaged, such as to justify the conclusion that that person has a right to an oral hearing by some impartial tribunal. But it seems to me that none of that has any application here. What is happening in this case is that Mrs Baker, undoubtedly as an interested party, is aggrieved by the decision taken by the Police Authority not to investigate further the question whether criminal offences have been committed.
13. So for those three reasons, any one of which would be fatal to this application, I am afraid that I do not consider that this is a case in which it would be right to grant permission to apply for judicial review. It may be that there are other avenues available to Mrs Baker, either civil proceedings against Mr Newsome, possibly, or, alternatively, seeking to use such political influence as is available to her. But on the material that has been placed before me, I am afraid this is not a case for judicial review.
ORDER: Application refused