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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Boulton & Anor, R (on the application of) v Leeds School Organisation Committee [2002] EWCA Civ 884 (20 June 2002)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/884.html
Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 884

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    Neutral Citation Number: [2002] EWCA Civ 884
    Case No: C/2002/0374

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
    COURT OF APPEAL (CI]VIL DIVISION)
    ON APPEAL FROM QUEENS BENCH DIVISION
    Mr Justice Maurice Kay

    Royal Courts of Justice
    Strand,
    London, WC2A 2LL
    20 June 2002

    B e f o r e :

    LORD JUSTICE SEDLEY
    and
    LADY JUSTICE ARDEN

    ____________________

    Between:
    R (on the Application of Boulton & Anr)
    Appellant

    - and -


    Leeds School Organisation Committee

    Respondent

    ____________________

    (Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment of
    Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street
    London EC4A 2AG
    Tel No: 020 7421 4040, Fax No: 020 7831 8838
    Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

    ____________________

    Mr Marc Beaumont (instructed by Messrs Shulmans) for the Appellant
    Ms H Mountfield (instructed by Leeds City Council) for the Respondent

    ____________________

    HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
    AS APPROVED BY THE COURT
    ____________________

    Crown Copyright ©

      Lord Justice Sedley:

    1. This is the judgment of the court.
    2. Because of heavy pressure on the day’s list, we granted permission in this case but reserved our reasons. Those which follow are in very short form, designed only to indicate to the parties and to the court which will now hear the application why we have granted permission.
    3. Arguable case

    4. While we see no foundation for Mr Beaumont’s submission that every objector has a right to be heard orally by the SOC, we consider it arguable that the SOC are entitled to hear any objector orally if they consider that to do so will help them. If so, they must consider whether to invite or accept particular oral submissions. If there is an arguable error of law, it is the SOC’s failure to do this. The claim is to be amended accordingly.
    5. Ms Mountfield’s answer that these objectors did not ask to be heard in support of their written submission, and so cannot complain now, may not be met by the fact that they were given no notice of the meeting; but in view of the shape the case has now acquired (see paragraph 9 below) this is unlikely to matter to the outcome.
    6. Standing

    7. The working assumption is naturally that it is parents rather than pupils who will want to make submissions to the SOC about school reorganisation. Nevertheless there seems to be nothing in the statute which prevents the SOC from hearing pupils’ views. And it is for pupils, not for parents, that schools are provided.
    8. In these circumstances it seems to us a defensible proposition (as evidently it did to the LSC) that pupils may have a sufficient interest to seek judicial review of a decision affecting their schooling.
    9. Abuse

    10. The proposition for which the SOC relies on a passage of the judgment of Kennedy LJ in R v Richmond LBC, ex p JC [2001] ELR 13, para. 31, goes not to standing but to abuse and hence discretion. It merits careful consideration, but it is obiter and in our respectful view not easy to apply. We are not persuaded that the fact that some of the parents who were objectors are ineligible for public funding and have a sufficient interest is necessarily enough to render the claim an abuse, and we think the concept of a device needs elaboration.
    11. Time

    12. The claim was brought within three months of the decision. We do not accept Ms Mountfield’s submission that time began to run earlier: see the House of Lords’ decision in Burkett [2002] 1 WLR 1593. It may be that the application was not prompt, but the remarks of the House at paras. 53 and 59-60 have put lower courts on notice that promptness is a tool to be handled now with great care. The same is true of s. 31(6): see the (undisturbed) remarks of this court in Burkett.
    13. Relief

    14. The problem which has concerned us most is relief. Having heard the parties, we are quite certain that even if the claim succeeds in law, no court would grant any form of relief which had the effect, or the potential effect, of disturbing the school reorganisation which is now all but complete. The relief claimed is therefore to be limited to declaratory relief. This has the advantage of resolving a potentially recurrent issue without pressure of time or present or future disruption, and the new public funding system appears to be adapted to it. The court may be able to reflect in its costs order the fact that the Leeds SOC has had to be the guinea pig.
    15. Forum

    16. Since the initial refusal of permission is the subject of a fully reasoned judgment of Maurice Kay J, it might be felt invidious to remit the case to another single judge. We have ascertained that a divisional court is able to take it on 23-4 July, and we consider that this is the appropriate forum. To this end we exercise our power to give permission to apply for judicial review under CPR 52.15(3), with the consequence spelt out in 52.15(4).


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URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/884.html