C1/2003/0249 
Neutral Citation Number: [2003] EWCA Civ 860
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) 
APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
DECISION REFUSING PERMISSION TO CLAIM 
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, A STAY OF EXECUTION 
AND AN EXTENSION OF TIME 
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand 
London, WC2 

Wednesday, 11 June 2003
 B E F O R E:

LORD JUSTICE CARNWATH 
  
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THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF KAIKAI
Claimant/Appellant 
-v-
 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES COMMISSIONER 
Defendant/Respondent 
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(Computer-Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
Smith Bernal Wordwave Limited
190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2AG
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The Appellant appeared in person 
The Respondent was not represented and did not attend 
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J U D G M E N T 
(As Approved by the Court)
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Crown copyright©

1.	LORD JUSTICE CARNWATH:  This is a renewed application for permission for judicial review by Mr Kaikai.  Under the name Emerson Oxford & Co, Mr Kaikai provided immigration services.  In April 2002 he applied for continued registration with the Immigration Services Commissioner under Schedule 6 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.  The Commissioner refused that application on 5 September 2002 citing a number of reasons, including non-compliance with the various rules and codes, doubts over the financial organisation of the business and allegations of abuse of process in relation to particular cases that have been handled.  
2.	That decision was subject to a right of appeal to the Immigration Services Tribunal and Mr Kaikai did lodge such an appeal, but he was naturally concerned that the effect of the decision was to prevent him carrying on his practice in the meantime.  He applied to the tribunal under Rule 10 of the relevant Rules for the decision to be suspended so that he could continue his practice.  The request for suspension was included in his detailed letter, dated 9 September 2002, in which he provided his answers to the complaints made by the Commissioner, and that no doubt would have provided the basis for his appeal.
3.	The application for suspension came before His Honour Judge Cripps.  He issued a decision on 20 September.  He said that he was not inviting written representations from the respondent and that no hearing was necessary before he decided.  No doubt that was because he had already the representations contained in Mr Kaikai's letter.  He went on to make clear that he was refusing the application to suspend because, as he saw it, the appellant's letter of 9 September conceded certain points, including the fact that no details of indemnity insurance had been sent to the respondent for the period since 5 April 2002, that there was no evidence that a separate client account had been provided, that no accounts for the year ending 31 March 2002 had been submitted to the respondent, and that both the cheque accompanying the April application and a second cheque dated 10 June were dishonoured on presentation.  Those points he extracted from the letter of 9 September, although it is fair to note that in that letter Mr Kaikai commented on them and gave some explanation of the circumstances.
4.	The judge clearly thought that those facts by themselves indicated that the business was not being run as it should be.  He said:
"His clients do not have the protection provided by those who provide immigration service and/or immigration advice and do so in accord with the respondent's Code and rules.  Those who cannot run their practice properly do not safeguard their clients' interests."
That was a decision entirely within the judge's discretion.  Mr Kaikai may complain of it and it naturally had a serious effect on him, but it seems to me that there is no error of law.  Mr Kaikai fairly concedes he cannot make any claim of bias against the judge although obviously he feels unhappy with the way the decision went.  
5.	However that may be, it was then open to Mr Kaikai to  pursue his appeal on the substantive point of the refusal of his application.  The matter did continue to the extent that the Commissioner put in a response on 9 October.  Then Mr Kaikai decided to take a different course, which was to apply to the High Court for judicial review of the decision not to suspend the Commissioner's decision; this was dated 30 September.  Permission was refused on paper by Mr Justice Silber.  It was renewed in open court before Mr Justice Elias on 23 January.  He refused permission on the simple ground, of which Mr Kaikai would have been well aware, that he had an alternative remedy by way of appeal to the Immigration Services Tribunal.  It is well known that this court will not exercise its jurisdiction where there is an alternative remedy for what is required.  That was the ground on which Mr Justice Elias refused permission.  Mr Kaikai seeks to renew it before this court.  The answer must be precisely the same.  
6.	Mr Kaikai says his complaint is that there was no natural justice and he was not properly heard by Judge Cripps.  Judge Cripps had Mr Kaikai's representations before him and he was satisfied - as, in my view, he was entitled to be - that he had sufficient material to reach a decision on the suspension issue without prejudice to any points that could be made in the substantive appeal.  I see no grounds on which this court can intervene.  I would only add that if Mr Kaikai had pursued his appeal, which it seems he has since withdrawn, I have no doubt this matter would have been dealt with long before now on the merits.  
7.	For these reasons this application must be refused.
Order: Application refused