Case no: C1/2013/0255 
Neutral Citation Number: [2013] EWCA Civ 1261
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) 
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION 
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
(MR ROBIN PURCHAS QC)
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand
London WC2A 2LL 

Wednesday, 26 June 2013
B e f o r e: 

LORD JUSTICE SULLIVAN
LADY JUSTICE BLACK
and
LORD JUSTICE FLOYD 
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Between: 

ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL 
Appellant 

and 

KA
Respondent 
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Mr Bryan McGuire QC (instructed by Essex County Council Legal Services Department) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.

Mr Stephen Knafler QC (instructed by Messrs Deighton Pierce Glynn) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
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J U D G M E N T
LORD JUSTICE SULLIVAN:  
1.	Having heard the parties' submissions, we are satisfied that this appeal ought to be dismissed on the grounds that it is entirely academic.  The part of the judgment about which the Council is concerned was always academic on the facts as they stood before the judge.  On the facts as they now stand before us, the matters raised by the Council are even more academic.  It is plain that there is now an appeal on human rights grounds against removal directions which is due to be heard by the First‑tier Tribunal in September, so that this is a case which is squarely within the grounds for entitlement to support under section 17.  

2.	The wider issues of concern that are raised by the Council are to a large extent, if not almost entirely, addressed by the UKBA guidance which emerged during the course of the hearing before the learned judge.  In the light of that guidance, it is very far from clear precisely what the parameters of our judgment would have to be.  It is very likely that it would simply be an advisory or declaratory opinion based upon entirely hypothetical facts, unless, that is, we were to engage in a fact‑finding exercise which the judge below did not feel it necessary to do, and it is accepted on behalf of the Council that it would not be appropriate for us to engage in such an exercise.  

3.	In view of all of those matters, we have reached the view that it would not be appropriate to allow this appeal.  So the appeal is dismissed for those reasons. 

LADY JUSTICE BLACK:  
4.	I agree. 

LORD JUSTICE FLOYD:  
5.	I agree.

Order: Appeal dismissed