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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Santander UK Plc v Harrison & Anor [2013] EWCA Civ 1362 (03 July 2013) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/1362.html Cite as: [2013] EWCA Civ 1362

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE MALES)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		3 July 2013

Lady Justice Gloster:

1. I am not going to grant permission to appeal in this case. This is a second appeal in relation to which the criteria under CPR 52.13(2) have to be satisfied: that is to say, that the appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
2. I am not satisfied that the appeal raises an important point of principle or practice. I am not satisfied that this sort of issue is the type of issue that creates numerous problems in relation to the operation of the Consumer Credit Act. Nor do I consider that there is any other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
3. Mr Pugh pointed out that Males J appeared, at paragraph 9 of his judgment, to have erroneously recorded the submission of the borrowers that the effect of the success of their argument would be that the failures were not capable of being remedied, with the consequence that the loan would be irrevocable and the mortgage securities worthless, which Mr Pugh tells me was not a submission that was ever made to Males J. Mr Pugh told ne that the only submission (as made in paragraph 45 of his skeleton argument) in this respect was to the effect that, if the borrower's arguments were correct, that would lead to further formalities being required under the Consumer Credit Act in the event of the agreement being a regulated one, in relation to service of a default notice as a statutory precondition to the commencement of proceedings, and the consequence that the modifying agreement would not be enforceable without an order of the court. But despite what appears to be that error on behalf of the judge, that does not, in my judgment, in any way vitiate his reasons in the remaining paragraphs of his judgment.
4. I consider that there is no real prospect of success in relation to an argument that the correct analysis is that credit in the form of a cash loan was provided. In my judgment, the judge correctly approached the analysis of that issue and was entitled to come to the conclusion which he did, and indeed which the judge below did, to the effect that in the circumstances this was not credit in the form of a cash loan.
5. In those circumstances, I am not prepared to grant permission to appeal.
6. I should point out that Mr Ross also referred to the fact that, in the light of amendments to the Consumer Credit Act 1974, it is unlikely that this point is going to be of importance for a great number of cases.

Order: Application refused