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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Lloyd & Anor v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 839 (19 May 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/839.html Cite as: [2014] EWCA Civ 839

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
BIRMINGHAM DISTRICT REGISTRY
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE DAVID COOKE
(sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court))

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL
		19 May 2014

LORD DYSON, MR: I will ask Lord Justice Sullivan to give the first judgment.

LORD JUSTICE SULLIVAN:

Introduction

1. This is an appeal against the order dated 16 October 2013 of His Honour Judge David Cooke, dismissing the appellants' application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 ("the Act") to quash a decision dated 2 August 2012 of an Inspector appointed by the first respondent dismissing the appellants' appeal under section 78 of the Act against the second respondent's decision to refuse planning permission for the retention of what was described as a "replacement dwelling" on land at Doone Brae Farm, Windmill Road, Pepperstock in Hertfordshire.

Factual background

2. The factual background to this appeal is set out in some detail in the judge's judgment (Neutral Citation [2013] EWHC 3076 (Admin)).
3. Doone Brae Farm ("the site") is in the green belt. The "replacement dwelling" is a Canadian log cabin, which in 2003 replaced a mobile home that was stationed on the site. The log cabin does not have planning permission. The appellants have made a number of attempts to obtain planning permission for the retention of the log cabin. The Inspector noted that two previous appeals had been dismissed.
4. The appeal before the Inspector proceeded on the basis that there was a lawful development certificate which confirmed that a mobile home for residential use could lawfully be placed on the site in a similar position to the log cabin. The Inspector said, in paragraph 4 of the decision:

"I have therefore assessed the fallback position on the basis that if the log cabin was removed a mobile home could be placed in a similar position."

5. In paragraph 5 of the decision, the Inspector identified four main issues, which for convenience I will number 1 to 4:

"(1) whether the proposal is inappropriate development in the Green Belt for the purposes of the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework) and development plan policy;

(2) the effect of the proposal upon openness;

(3) the effect of the proposal upon the character and appearance of the area; and

(4) if the proposal does represent inappropriate development, whether the harm by reason of inappropriateness, and any other harm, is clearly outweighed by other considerations, so as to amount to the very special circumstances necessary to justify the development."

6. In respect of the first main issue, the Inspector concluded that as a new dwelling house the "replacement dwelling" was inappropriate development in the green belt.

The policies

7. The relevant policies are those contained in the National Planning Policy Framework ("the Framework") and the Dacorum Local Plan ("the Local Plan").
8. Policy 89 in the Framework is as follows:

"A local planning authority should regard the construction of new buildings as inappropriate in Green Belt. Exceptions to this are:

• buildings for agricultural and forestry;

• provision of appropriate facilities for outdoor sport, outdoor recreation and for cemeteries, as long as it preserves the openness of the Green Belt and does not conflict for the purposes of including land within it;

• the extension or alteration of a building provided that it does not result in disproportionate additions over and above the size of the original building;

• the replacement of a building, provided the new building is in the same use and not materially larger than the one it replaces;

• limited infilling in villages, and limited affordable housing for local community needs under policies set out in the Local Plan; or

• limited infilling or the partial or complete redevelopment of previously developed sites (brownfield land), whether redundant or in continuing use (excluding temporary buildings), which would not have a greater impact on the openness of the Green Belt and for the purpose of including land within it than the existing development."

9. The Inspector concluded that Policy 4 of the Local Plan was consistent with the Framework, insofar as it relates to the replacement of dwellings in the green belt. So far as relevant, Policy 4 is as follows:

"Policy 4 The Green Belt

Within the Green Belt, there is a presumption against inappropriate development. New buildings will therefore only be acceptable where they are for the following purposes:

(a) agriculture;

(b) forestry;

(c) essential facilities for outdoor sport and outdoor recreation, for cemeteries and for other uses which preserve the openness of the Green Belt and which do not conflict with its purposes;

(d) the limited extension of existing houses in accordance with Policy 22;

(e) the replacement of existing houses in accordance with Policy 23;

(f) limited infilling in selected small villages in accordance with Policy 6; and

(g) limited infilling or redevelopment of major existing development sites in accordance with Policy 5."

10. Policy 4 also refers to the reuse of an existing building, and it is to be noted that the Policy also says:

"Engineering or other operations, including mineral extraction, and material changes in the use of land will only be acceptable where they maintain openness and do not conflict with the purposes of including land in the Green Belt."

11. Although we are directly concerned with Policy 23, it is helpful to set out the relevant parts of Policy 22 to place Policy 23 in context. Policy 22 deals with "Extensions to dwellings in the green belt or the rural area", and provides relevantly as follows:

"Extensions to dwellings in the selected small villages in the Green Belt and in the Rural Area will be controlled under Policies 6 and 8 respectively.

Elsewhere in the Green Belt and in the Rural Area the extension of existing dwellings will not be permitted unless:

(a) the extension is compact and well-related to the existing building in terms of design, bulk, scale and materials used;

(b) the extension is well-designed having regard to the size and shape of the site and retains sufficient space around the building to protect its setting and the character of the countryside;

(c) the extension is not visually intrusive on the skyline or in the open character of the surrounding countryside;

(d) the extension does not prejudice the retention of any significant trees and hedgerows; and

(e) the extension is limited in size."

12. Criterion (e), relating to size, sets limits on the size of what is described as "the resulting building" and it also refers to "the location of the building".
13. Turning to Policy 23, this deals with "Replacement Dwellings in the Green Belt and Rural Area", and states as follows:

"Replacement dwellings are acceptable in the selected small villages in the Green Belt and in the Rural Area if the requirements of Policies 6 and 8 are satisfied.

Elsewhere in the Green Belt and Rural Area the replacement of existing dwellings, including dwellings which have been destroyed, will be permitted provided that:

(a) the original dwelling remains in place substantially as built, or it was occupied within the three years preceding the planning application; and

(b) the proposed dwelling is not a replacement for temporary residential accommodation or a building constructed of short-life materials.

Rebuilding a dwelling in a different position on the site may be possible providing its impact on the openness and character of the Green Belt or Rural Area is no worse than the dwelling it replaces, and if possible much less. In particular, the dwelling should ..."

14. Certain criteria are then set out and these include the limitation that:

"Any new dwelling should not be larger than:

• the dwelling which it replaces; or

• the original dwelling on the site plus an allowance for any extension that would have been permitted under Policy 22."

15. The reasons for Policy 23 are set out in paragraph 23.1 of the Local Plan, and are as follows:

"Strict control is applied over new building as part of the policies of general restraint which protect the countryside. The establishment of new permanent buildings, for example on sites occupied by structures not intended for permanent residential accommodation, is not acceptable. However it is reasonable for house owners to replace their buildings when they are damaged or structurally unsound. The reconstruction of buildings already there should have no material impact on the countryside."

16. Finally, I should refer to Policy 26, which deals with "Residential Caravans", as follows:

"Proposals for residential caravans and mobile homes will be treated as though they were for residential buildings and will therefore be subject to the same policies and criteria unless they fall into one of the following categories:

(i) temporary accommodation for agricultural or forestry workers which complies with the criteria in Policy 24;

(ii) touring caravan sites that accord with Policy 95;

(iii) gypsy caravan sites which meet the criteria in Policy 27.

In addition special circumstances may justify permission being given for a temporary period (for example when the viability of a new agricultural unit needs to be tested - see Policy 24). A temporary period will not normally exceed three years."

17. The reasons given for this policy are explained in paragraph 26.1 of the Local Plan as follows:

"Caravans and other moveable structures can provide permanent homes. They can have an impact on the environment just as static forms of housing accommodation do. In most circumstances therefore it is appropriate that all housing accommodation is treated similarly."

The Inspector's decision

18. Before the Inspector it was argued by Mr Leigh, who appeared at the hearing on behalf of the appellant, that, having regard to Policies 23 and 26 of the Local Plan, the replacement of the mobile home by the log cabin was not inappropriate development in the green belt.
19. The Inspector rejected this argument in paragraphs 8 and 9 of his decision:

"8. Prior to the construction of the log cabin a mobile home was stationed on the site. Policy 23 of the Local Plan specifically excludes temporary residential accommodation from the type of residence that can be replaced by a dwelling house. The appellant contends that as the lawful use of the land allows for the permanent stationing of a mobile home such a home would not be temporary residential accommodation and would effectively be a permanent dwelling. I concur with the first Inspector that it is well established in planning law that the stationing of a caravan or mobile home comprises a use of land, not the creation of floor space, and is not operational development. As a consequence, although the use of the land for the siting of a residential home may be permanent, the accommodation itself is not. Therefore, whilst a mobile home could lawfully be placed on the site instead of the log cabin it would not constitute a permanent dwelling and so could not under the terms of policy 23 be replaced by a dwelling house.

9. Policy 26 of the Local Plan advises that proposals for residential caravans and mobile homes will be treated as though they were for residential buildings. However, as the justified reasoning to the policy explains, this means that as the two types of development can have a similar impact on their surroundings the same policies should apply in assessing these impacts. Given that policy 23 distinguishes between applications for residential caravans/mobile homes and applications for residential buildings policy 26 does not mean that in planning terms they are the same."

20. When considering the second issue, openness, the Inspector said in paragraph 13 of the decision:

"13. It was argued that if the application was treated as a replacement dwelling house that policies 22 and 23 of the Local Plan would allow a new house of 176.8 sqm, 30% larger than the floor area of the largest mobile home that could be placed on the site. A dwelling with such a footprint would only be 6.2 sqm smaller than the appeal proposal. However, for the reasons given in paragraph 8 a mobile home is not a permanent dwelling and so policies 22 and 23 do not apply."

21. The Inspector concluded that the harm to openness caused by the fallback position would be greater than the appeal proposal but the harm to the character and appearance of the area would be less. He therefore attached "only some weight to the fallback position in favour of the appeal" and concluded that special circumstances to justify inappropriate development in the green belt did not exist.
22. In reaching that conclusion, the Inspector had regard to other appeal decisions, to which he had been referred by Mr Leigh. In paragraph 26 the Inspector said of those other decisions:

"26. Several other permissions, allowed on appeal, have been referred to. They relate to the replacement of mobile homes, where a lawful development certificate for their stationing exists, by a permanent dwelling. These cases are materially different to the appeal proposal. This is because none of the cases referred to are within the Green Belt where more stringent policies at local and national level on the development of new permanent dwellings apply. I therefore attach little weight to these decisions in favour of the appeal."

The judgment below

23. The Inspector's decision was challenged before the judge on the basis that it was inadequately reasoned in a number of respects.
24. After a detailed examination of the Inspector's reasoning, the judge rejected all of the appellant's criticisms of the decision.
25. It is unnecessary to consider the judgment in any detail because permission to appeal was granted by Lewison LJ on a limited basis as follows:

"The only arguable grounds of appeal are:

(i) whether 'building' in para 89 of the National Planning Policy Framework includes a mobile home;

(ii) whether the replacement of a mobile home by a permanent structure falls within the category of development permitted by Policy 23 of the Local Plan;

(iii) if the answer to either or both of those questions is affirmative, whether the contrary conclusions reached by the Inspector and the judge vitiate their decisions.

Although the skeleton argument veers towards a reasons challenge, that line of attack is unarguable.

Permission is limited to the three questions specified above."

26. The judge dealt with paragraph 89 of the Framework in paragraph 6 of his judgment. Having set out the relevant extract from paragraph 89, the judge recorded Mr Leigh's submission that the replacement dwelling was not inappropriate development in the green belt because paragraph 89 of the Framework:

"... should be interpreted as including the replacement of a mobile home by a building where the mobile home has the benefit of a certificate of lawful use, since although the placement of a mobile home constitutes, in planning terms, a 'use' of land rather than permitted development on the land, the practical effect of the certificate of lawful use was that the site would always be used for residential purposes by people living inside a structure. Mr Leigh suggested that the change in language between the previous policy guidance given in PPG2 which referred to the replacement of a 'dwelling' and the Framework referring to a 'building' suggested a more generous interpretation of what was to be regarded as not inappropriate development."

27. Continuing in paragraph 6(ii) of his judgment, the judge said:

"In my judgment however the opposite is the case. A mobile home might potentially be regarded as a 'dwelling' as a matter of language simply because someone 'dwells' in it, but it is much less easy to regard it as a 'building'."

28. Before the Inspector, the emphasis seems to have been on Policies 23 and 26 of the Local Plan rather than the Framework. The judge endorsed the Inspector's approach to those policies in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the decision (see above).
29. In paragraphs 9 to 14 of his judgment, the judge said this:

"Although Policy 23 referred to the replacement of 'existing dwellings', when read as a whole and in the context of the remainder of the Plan that phrase does not include the replacement of mobile homes by buildings. Policy 4 entitled 'the Green Belt' provides that 'Within the Green Belt, there is a presumption against inappropriate development. New buildings will therefore only be acceptable where they are for the following purposes: ... (e) the replacement of existing houses in accordance with Policy 23 ...' This clearly suggests that the 'dwellings' referred to in Policy 23 are intended to be 'houses' which implies a permanent building rather than a caravan or mobile home.

10. The explanatory notes to Policy 23 state that 'strict control is applied over new building as part of the policies of general restraint which protect the countryside. The establishment of new permanent buildings, for example on sites occupied by structures not intended for permanent residential occupation, is not acceptable. However it is reasonable for house owners to replace their buildings when they are damaged or structurally unsound. The reconstruction of buildings already there should have no material impact on the countryside, the phrase 'sites occupied by structures not intended to the permanent residential occupation' seems to me to refer very aptly to sites on which caravans or mobile homes are situated. They are 'structures' which 'occupy' a site, rather than buildings situated on such a site. Although they could in principle be permanently occupied and a particular occupier may have the personal intention to do so, they would not [be] the sort of structures that would normally be regarded as 'intended' for permanent occupation. The log cabin would be a 'new permanent building' on such a site, and therefore in my judgment clearly within the activity deemed unacceptable. It would manifestly not be' reconstruction of [a building] already there'.

11. Given this explanation of the purpose behind the Policy, it is clear in my judgment that replacement of a caravan by a permanent building would be 'a replacement for temporary residential accommodation' and thus excluded from the permission contemplated by Policy 23. A caravan or mobile home is inherently a structure of a temporary rather than permanent nature, notwithstanding that there may be a subjective intention of the present user to occupy that structure permanently and replace it with another as and when required.

12. Policy 26 is in my judgment restrictive rather than permissive. The explanatory notes refer to the similarity of impact they may have to 'static forms of housing'. A proposal to site a caravan is thus to be treated no more leniently than a proposal to build a house. This is not, in my judgment, at all the same as saying that a caravan once sited is to be treated as if it were a house for the purpose of considering its replacement, particularly given the contrary intention expressed in Policy 23 which deals with that matter specifically. That is the point the Inspector made at para 9 of his decision letter.

13. The Inspector was referred to other cases in which replacement of mobile homes by permanent buildings had been permitted on appeal, including one in 2012 particularly relied on by Mr Leigh against a decision of the Vale of White Horse District Council. It was he said inconsistent to decide the present case in a different way. While accepting the desirability in general terms of consistency of decision-making, the decisions of Inspectors on matters that are heavily dependent on the facts and planning judgment in each case are in no sense to be regarded as binding precedents on subsequent appeals. In this case, the Inspector correctly noted that none of the appeals referred to him had related to land in the Green Belt, to which special restrictions apply, so that no analogy could properly be drawn with them. There was therefore no inconsistency between his decision and those earlier cases.

14. The Inspector was therefore right, and gave sufficient reasons, for his finding that the development was 'inappropriate'."

The appellant's submissions

30. While paying lip service to the limited basis on which permission to appeal had been given, Mr Leigh's skeleton argument raised a number of other matters, for example as to the effect of the lawful development certificate, which had not been raised before either the Inspector or the judge.
31. We invited Mr Leigh to focus his oral submissions on the proper interpretation of Policy 89 of the Framework and Policy 23 in the Local Plan.
32. At the outset of his submissions on these issues, Mr Leigh said that there was no dispute that, in ordinary language, a mobile home was not a "building". It was common ground that placing a mobile home on land was a use of land and not operational development.
33. Although Mr Leigh referred to the fact that Policy 23 referred to "replacement dwelling" which could, he submitted, include mobile homes, he appeared to accept the proposition that if Policy 23 was read as a whole and particularly if it was read in conjunction with Policy 4, then the "existing dwellings" which could be replaced under the policy were houses or buildings and not mobile homes.
34. However, he submitted that Policy 23 had to be read together with Policy 26, which required decision-takers to treat mobile homes similarly to bricks and mortar homes. The exception in proviso (b) to Policy 23 was not applicable, in his submission, because there was here a lawful development certificate which enabled the site to be used permanently for residential accommodation.
35. Turning to the Framework, Mr Leigh took us to paragraph 50, which explains how local planning authorities should deliver a wide choice of high quality homes. Mr Leigh submitted that mobile homes formed part of the mix of housing provision and referred to a statement by the Housing Minister that, despite representing less than 1 per cent of housing stock, the residential parks sector should be regarded as an integral part of the housing market.
36. As I understood his submissions, Mr Leigh accepted that, at least on the face of it, Policy 89 in the Framework referred to the construction of new buildings and the replacement of existing buildings in the green belt, but he submitted that the policy should be "extrapolated" by reference to Policy 26 in the Local Plan, and also by reference to a number of appeal decisions so as to treat mobile homes as though they were buildings for the purposes of the policy. He referred us to a number of appeal decisions, by Inspectors which demonstrated, in his submission, that mobile homes were to be treated for the purposes of planning policy in the same way as bricks and mortar homes.
37. Finally, he referred us to the definition of "dwelling" in the Department for Communities and Local Government's dwelling stock estimates, which includes mobile homes. He submitted that his approach to the interpretation of Policy 89 and Policy 23 would not result in the widespread replacement of mobile homes in the green belt by permanent buildings because the normal requirements for, for example, adequate size for the replacement dwelling and for its garden would apply to any such proposal.

Discussion

38. It is common ground that Policy 89 of the Framework and Policy 23 of the Local Plan do not operate in a vacuum. They operate within a detailed statutory context, which:
39. (1) Distinguishes between operational development, including building operations and development by the making of a material change of use. For the purposes of the Act, "building operations" include rebuilding (see section 55(1A)(b) of the Act).
40. (2) Extends the definition of "caravan" in section 29(1) of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 -- "any structure designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from one place to another" -- so as to include a mobile home, that is to say:

"(1) A structure designed or adapted for human habitation which:

(a) is composed of not more than two sections separately constructed and designed to be assembled on a site by means of bolts, clamps or other devices; and

(b) is, when assembled, physically capable of being moved by road from one place to another (whether by being towed, or by being transported on a motor vehicle or trailer) ..."

41. See section 13 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968.
42. (3) Treats the stationing of a caravan (as so defined) on land as a use of land and not as a building operation: see Wealden District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1988) 56 P&CR 286.
43. I accept the submission of Miss Leventhal on behalf of the Secretary of State that within this statutory context, references in national and local policy documents to "buildings", more particularly if they contain references to "the construction of new buildings" (see Policy 89) or to "rebuilding" (see Policy 23) do not include mobile homes. Mobile homes are not built or constructed on a site, they are constructed off site and are designed (if in two sections) to be assembled on site by means of bolts, clamps or other devices so that when they have been so assembled they are physically capable of being moved off the site.
44. Even if the statutory context is put to one side, Mr Leigh rightly accepted the respondent's submission that in ordinary language a mobile home is not a "building".
45. If Policy 89 is read as a whole, it is clear that the word "building" in that policy has its ordinary and natural meaning and does not include mobile homes. The purpose of Policy 89 is to set out the exceptions to the general rule that "the construction of new buildings" is inappropriate development in the green belt. A building is something that is constructed on a site. It does not include a moveable structure that is merely stationed on a site.
46. Turning to the Local Plan, the green belt policies within the plan were required to be in conformity with national planning policy for the green belt. National policy was previously set out in Planning Policy Guidance 2 ("PPG2"). For present purposes, the only material difference between paragraph 3.4 of PPG2 and Policy 89 of the Framework is that the former referred to the "replacement of existing dwellings", whereas the latter now refers to the "replacement of a building".
47. When paragraph 3.4 was read as a whole and in context, together with paragraph 3.6 to which it cross-referred, it was plain that the "existing dwellings" which could be replaced were buildings. The difference in wording between the old and the new policies is therefore not material for present purposes. The Inspector rightly concluded that Policy 4 was consistent with the Framework insofar as it relates to the replacement of dwellings (houses).
48. When interpreting the Local Plan, the starting point is not Policy 23 but Policy 4, which sets out the exceptions to the general presumption against "new buildings" in the green belt. Two of those exceptions are "a limited extension of existing houses" (Policy 22) and "the replacement of existing houses" (Policy 23).
49. It is clear, therefore, at the outset that any dwelling referred to in either Policy 22 or Policy 23 must be a "house". Mr Leigh accepts that in ordinary language a mobile home is not a house.
50. Although both Policies 22 and 23 do refer to "dwellings", if the policies are read as a whole it is clear that those dwellings must be buildings. Thus, in Policy 22 extensions to dwellings that are not within selected villages will not be permitted unless "the extension is compact and well related to the existing building in terms of design, bulk, scale and materials used." Sufficient space must be retained "around the building" and the "resulting building" must comply with certain limitations as to its size.
51. In respect of those limitations, Policy 23 cross-refers to Policy 22. Thus, it imposes limitations upon the size of "the resulting building".
52. Moreover, Policy 23 permits the replacement of existing dwellings, provided that "the original dwelling remains in place substantially as built" or if it was occupied within three years preceding the planning application.
53. The policy specifically excludes dwellings which are replacements for temporary residential accommodation or buildings constructed of short-life materials, and there is reference to the possibility of "rebuilding a dwelling in a different position on the site" in certain circumstances.
54. Pausing there, and subject to the effect of Policy 26, Mr Leigh appeared to accept that all of these references in Policies 4, 22 and 23 made it clear that where "dwellings" are referred to, those dwellings must be buildings, (houses), and not mobile homes or caravans stationed on land. The reasons given for the policy confirm that this is the case:

"The establishment of new permanent buildings, for example on sites occupied by structures not intended for permanent residential accommodation, is not acceptable."

55. It seems to me that the only basis on which Mr Leigh was able to submit that mobile homes should be treated as houses or buildings for the purposes of Policy 23 is Policy 26, which I have set out above.
56. On this issue I endorse the reasoning of both the Inspector and the judge. The reasons for Policy 26 explain that caravans and other moveable structures can have the same impact on the environment as static forms of housing, so that in "most circumstances [note, not all circumstances] it is appropriate that they receive similar treatment in policy terms". Policy 23 specifically excludes dwellings (houses, see Policy 4) that are proposed as replacements "for temporary residential accommodation". Those words have to be read in the light of the explanation given in the reasons for the policy. Unsurprisingly, given that the policy is concerned with development in the green belt, "the establishment of new permanent buildings, for example on sites occupied by structures not intended for permanent residential accommodation is not acceptable."
57. Thus, even if there is a planning permission or as in the present case a lawful development certificate for a permanent use of land for the stationing of residential caravans or mobile homes, the structures stationed on the land are, as the judge said, inherently of a temporary rather than a permanent nature. Unlike "new permanent buildings" mobile homes are not intended for permanent residential accommodation. They are constructed of relatively short-life materials (by comparison with a house), need regular replacement and must be physically capable of being moved off site when assembled.
58. As the Inspector said, while the use of the land for the siting of a mobile home may be permanent, the accommodation provided in the mobile home will not by its very nature be permanent. Recognition of this characteristic of mobile homes can be found in one of the appeal decisions on which Mr Leigh relied before the Inspector. The appeal concerned a refusal of planning permission by the Vale of White Horse District Council. It was not a green belt case, and the local planning authority had conceded that its particular policy did permit the replacement of a mobile home by a permanent house. There is in that case no mention of an exception similar to that which is to be found in proviso (b) to Policy 23 in the present case.
59. In the Vale of the White Horse case, the local planning authority objected to the proposed replacement only on the basis of its size. When considering the strength of the fallback position, the Inspector noted in paragraph 7 of the decision letter that:

"The existing mobile homes are by their very nature temporary and will at some point need to be replaced as their condition and appearance deteriorates."

60. This approach to the temporary nature of mobile homes is echoed in paragraph 8 of the Inspector's decision in the present case.
61. The other appeal decisions on which Mr Leigh relied, far from casting doubt on this approach, merely serve, in my judgment, to confirm it.
62. In two other appeal decisions, neither of them being green belt cases, the Inspectors recognised that the replacement of residential mobile homes by bricks and mortar dwellings in the countryside was contrary to policy, but concluded that material considerations justified making an exception to policy. As one of the Inspectors put it:

"... I consider that whilst the overall approach of resisting the replacement of caravans with permanent dwellings in the countryside is an important feature of national and local planning policy, there has to be recognition that there are some cases where, due to the particular circumstances at a site, a different view has to be taken. This, I consider, is one such case ..."

63. Other than confirming the wisdom of the Inspector's overall approach to green belt policy in the present case, it is difficult to see how these appeal decisions, concerned as they are with different policies, can be of any real assistance in the interpretation of Policy 89 of the Framework or Policy 23 of the Local Plan in this case.
64. Mr Leigh placed particular reliance on the decision of an Inspector in appeal by Lakeminster Park Ltd against a decision of the East Riding of Yorkshire Council. This decision post-dates the decision in the present case and was not referred to before the judge.
65. In my judgment, the decision in the Lakeminster appeal is wholly irrelevant for the purposes of this appeal. It was not a green belt case. It was concerned with policies for the location of new housing development -- in or adjacent to settlements and not in the open countryside. In that policy context, the occupation of park houses on a permanent residential basis (rather than for tourism) was contrary to housing policy. The Inspector's approach to housing policy in the Lakeminster case is entirely consistent with Policy 26 of the Local Plan in the present case. In "most circumstances", it will be appropriate that all housing development is treated similarly in policy terms. We are not dealing with "most circumstances", but with specific policies and, more particularly, with a specific exception in Policy 23 of this Local Plan. It is one thing to say that new residential development, whether in the form of houses or residential mobile homes, should not be located in the open countryside. It is quite another thing to say that existing mobile homes within the green belt should be replaced by permanent houses.
66. It is difficult to see how any of the other material relied upon by Mr Leigh in his submissions before us could be relevant for the purpose of interpreting either the Framework or the Local Plan. Insofar as this additional material, which was not before the Inspector or the judge, can be said to be relevant at all, it supports, in my view, the Inspector and the judge's approach to the issue of temporary residential accommodation. Thus, we find that the house building data defines permanent dwellings as having a design life of 60 years, and while the definition of "dwellings" does include both permanent and non-permanent or "temporary" dwellings, if they are the occupier's main residence, caravans and mobile homes are given as examples of non-permanent or "temporary" dwellings.
67. Finally, I accept Miss Leventhal's submission that the appellant's approach to the interpretation of both Policy 89 of the Framework and Policy 23 of the Local Plan would seriously undermine the protection afforded to the green belt because it would permit, in principle, the replacement of non-permanent structures that are by definition moveable with permanent buildings.
68. Mr Leigh submitted that replacement would not be appropriate in every case because, for example, the size of the replacement building or the amount of amenity space around it might be insufficient. That might well be the case, but such site-specific considerations have no bearing on the question of principle. If the replacement of non-permanent, moveable structures by permanent buildings was within the limited categories of appropriate development within the green belt, then green belt protection would be significantly weakened.
69. As Miss Leventhal points out in her skeleton argument, there is no need to weaken that strong policy protection in order to deal with the exceptional case. It is always open to an appellant to argue, as the appellant did in the present case before the Inspector, that the strength of his fallback case is such as to amount, together with any other factors in favour of the proposed development, to very special circumstances justifying the grant of planning permission for inappropriate development within the green belt.
70. The Inspector concluded that very special circumstances did not exist in the present case, and permission to appeal was not granted in respect of that aspect of his decision.

Conclusion

71. For the reasons which I have set out above, I consider that the statutory context, the ordinary and natural meaning of the word "building", the wording of the policies themselves with their references to the "construction of new buildings", "as built" and "rebuilding", coupled with broader green belt policy considerations, all point to only one conclusion, that the answer to both questions 1 and 2 in the grant of permission to appeal is in the negative.
72. It follows that question 3 does not arise.
73. I would, for my part, dismiss this appeal.
74. LORD JUSTICE PATTEN: I agree that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Lord Justice Sullivan. One is reminded of Lord Hoffmann's dictum that no one has ever made an acontextual statement, and that applies as much to the construction of the national and local policies at issue in this case as it does to everything else.
75. LORD DYSON, MR: I agree with both judgments.
ORDER: Appeal dismissed with costs. Permission to appeal to the Supreme Court refused. (Order not part of approved judgment)