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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Garcia v Marex Financial Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1468 (26 June 2018) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2018/1468.html Cite as: [2018] 3 WLR 1412, [2018] WLR(D) 395, [2019] 1 All ER (Comm) 522, [2018] BPIR 1495, [2019] QB 173, [2018] 2 BCLC 601, [2018] EWCA Civ 1468 |
[New search] [Printable RTF version] [View ICLR summary: [2018] WLR(D) 395] [Buy ICLR report: [2019] QB 173] [Buy ICLR report: [2018] 3 WLR 1412] [Help]
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE KNOWLES CBE
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE LINDBLOM
and
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX
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CARLOS SEVILLEJA GARCIA |
Appellant |
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- and – |
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MAREX FINANCIAL LIMITED |
Respondent |
____________________
Alain Choo Choy QC and Sophie Weber (instructed by Memery Crystal LLP) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 14 June 2018
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Flaux:
Introduction
Factual background
The judgment below
"41. The no reflective loss principle is a valuable and important principle. However in my judgment, the better argument is that the no reflective loss principle does not apply where the claimant sues, as here, for a defendant's knowingly inducing and procuring a third party to act in wrongful violation of the claimant's rights, or for the defendant's intentionally causing loss to the claimant by unlawful means.
42. Were the position otherwise these torts would be left with little application in situations where, in my view, they have a principled part to play. The primary focus of these torts is on loss to the claimant, not to the third party (the company in the no reflective loss context). They purposely recognise that the defendant incurs liability to the claimant by what he has caused to be done to the claimant through his actions with or to the third party. I strongly resist the proposition that the claimant is then to be confined to remedies against the third party, perhaps often (as here) remedies in its insolvency. I strongly resist the proposition that the defendant is answerable in law, and for damages, only to the third party for what he has done."
The correct ambit of the rule against reflective loss
"…what [the shareholder] cannot do is to recover damages merely because the company in which he is interested has suffered damage. He cannot recover a sum equal to the diminution in the market value of his shares, or equal to the likely diminution in dividend, because such a "loss" is merely a reflection of the loss suffered by the company. The shareholder does not suffer any personal loss. His only "loss" is through the company, in the diminution in the value of the net assets of the company, in which he has (say) a 3 per cent. shareholding. The plaintiff's shares are merely a right of participation in the company on the terms of the articles of association. The shares themselves, his right of participation, are not directly affected by the wrongdoing. The plaintiff still holds all the shares as his own absolutely unencumbered property. The deceit practised upon the plaintiff does not affect the shares; it merely enables the defendant to rob the company."
"(1) Where a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty owed to it, only the company may sue in respect of that loss. No action lies at the suit of a shareholder suing in that capacity and no other to make good a diminution in the value of the shareholder's shareholding where that merely reflects the loss suffered by the company. A claim will not lie by a shareholder to make good a loss which would be made good if the company's assets were replenished through action against the party responsible for the loss, even if the company, acting through its constitutional organs, has declined or failed to make good that loss…
(2) Where a company suffers loss but has no cause of action to sue to recover that loss, the shareholder in the company may sue in respect of it (if the shareholder has a cause of action to do so), even though the loss is a diminution in the value of the shareholding…
(3) Where a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty to it, and a shareholder suffers a loss separate and distinct from that suffered by the company caused by breach of a duty independently owed to the shareholder, each may sue to recover the loss caused to it by breach of the duty owed to it but neither may recover loss caused to the other by breach of the duty owed to that other…"
"The position is, however, different where the company suffers loss caused by the breach of a duty owed both to the company and to the shareholder. In such a case the shareholder's loss, in so far as this is measured by the diminution in value of his shareholding or the loss of dividends, merely reflects the loss suffered by the company in respect of which the company has its own cause of action. If the shareholder is allowed to recover in respect of such loss, then either there will be double recovery at the expense of the defendant or the shareholder will recover at the expense of the company and its creditors and other shareholders. Neither course can be permitted. This is a matter of principle; there is no discretion involved. Justice to the defendant requires the exclusion of one claim or the other; protection of the interests of the company's creditors requires that it is the company which is allowed to recover to the exclusion of the shareholder."
"It is of course correct that the diminution in the value of the plaintiffs' shares was by definition a personal loss and not the company's loss, but that is not the point. The point is that it merely reflected the diminution of the company's assets. The test is not whether the company could have made a claim in respect of the loss in question; the question is whether, treating the company and the shareholder as one for this purpose, the shareholder's loss is franked by that of the company. If so, such reflected loss is recoverable by the company and not by the shareholders."
"With respect, I cannot accept this either. As Hobhouse LJ observed in Gerber Garment Technology Inc v Lectra Systems Ltd [1997] RPC 443, 471, if the company chooses not to exercise its remedy, the loss to the shareholder is caused by the company's decision not to pursue its remedy and not by the defendant's wrongdoing. By a parity of reasoning, the same applies if the company settles for less than it might have done. Shareholders (and creditors) who are aggrieved by the liquidator's proposals are not without a remedy; they can have recourse to the Companies Court, or sue the liquidator for negligence.
But there is more to it than causation. The disallowance of the shareholder's claim in respect of reflective loss is driven by policy considerations. In my opinion, these preclude the shareholder from going behind the settlement of the company's claim. If he were allowed to do so then, if the company's action were brought by its directors, they would be placed in a position where their interest conflicted with their duty; while if it were brought by the liquidator, it would make it difficult for him to settle the action and would effectively take the conduct of the litigation out of his hands. The present case is a fortiori; Mr Johnson cannot be permitted to challenge in one capacity the adequacy of the terms he agreed in another."
Reflective loss extends beyond the diminution of the value of the shares; it extends to the loss of dividends (specifically mentioned in Prudential Assurance v Newman Industries…) and all other payments which the shareholder might have obtained from the company if it had not been deprived of its funds. All transactions or putative transactions between the company and its shareholders must be disregarded. Payment to the one diminishes the assets of the other. In economic terms, the shareholder has two pockets, and cannot hold the defendant liable for his inability to transfer money from one pocket to the other. In principle, the company and the shareholder cannot together recover more than the shareholder would have recovered if he had carried on business in his own name instead of through the medium of a company. On the other hand, he is entitled (subject to the rules on remoteness of damage) to recover in respect of a loss which he has sustained by reason of his inability to have recourse to the company's funds and which the company would not have sustained itself.
The same applies to other payments which the company would have made if it had had the necessary funds even if the plaintiff would have received them qua employee and not qua shareholder and even if he would have had a legal claim to be paid. His loss is still an indirect and reflective loss which is included in the company's claim. The plaintiff's primary claim lies against the company, and the existence of the liability does not increase the total recoverable by the company, for this already includes the amount necessary to enable the company to meet it."
"In any event I do not see that [these] other heads are pure "reflective loss". If Mr Giles had not been a shareholder but simply an employee or a lender with an enforceable covenant in his favour, those losses surely would have been recoverable. The fact that he is also a shareholder should not deny him his claims under those other heads."
"35. On analysis, the present case appears to contain the two essential ingredients which result in the rule against reflective loss being engaged, namely:
i) the losses claimed to have been suffered by BDC are losses suffered in its capacity as shareholder in, or creditor of, Scoutvale: that is made as clear as could be in paragraph 14 of the Re-amended Statement of Claim;
ii) the damages claimed in these proceedings against Mr Parker, being based on the losses suffered by BDC as a result of the transfer of the Old Hall Shares at a substantial undervalue, are damages which would have been made good if Scoutvale 'had enforced its rights' against Mr Parker. The fact that BDC only had a proportion of the issued shares in Scoutvale, and the fact that one may not be able to 'trace' Scoutvale's loss to the shareholders, without effecting some sort of adjustment, cannot make any difference. If it were otherwise, then the reflective loss principle would in practice rarely apply."
"49. It is clear, from the analysis and discussion in the cases to which I have referred, that the rule against reflective loss is not concerned with barring causes of action as such, but with barring recovery of certain types of loss. On that basis, there is obviously a powerful argument for concluding, as this court did in Shaker's case, that, whether the cause of action lies in common law or equity, and whether the remedy lies in damages or restitution, should make no difference as to the applicability of the rule against reflective loss. Furthermore, given that the foundation of the rule is the need to avoid double recovery, there is a powerful case for saying that the rule should be applied in a case where, in its absence, both the beneficiary and the company would be able to recover effectively the same damages from the defaulting trustee/director."
70. It is clear from those observations, and indeed from that aspect of the decision, in Johnson that the rule against reflective loss is not limited to claims brought by a shareholder in his capacity as such; it would also apply to him in his capacity as an employee of the company with a right (or even an expectation) of receiving contributions to his pension fund. On that basis, there is no logical reason why it should not apply to a shareholder in his capacity as a creditor of the company expecting repayment of his debt. Indeed, it is hard to see why the rule should not apply to a claim brought by a creditor (or indeed, an employee) of the company concerned, even if he is not a shareholder. While it is unnecessary to decide the point, as BDC was a shareholder in Scoutvale, it is hard to see any logical or commercial reason why the rule against reflective loss should apply to a claim brought by a creditor or employee, who happens to be a shareholder, of the company, if it does not equally apply to an otherwise identical claim by another creditor or employee, who is not a shareholder in the company.
"Similarly, he said in terms that the fact that Mr Johnson was claiming, as it were, qua employee, rather than qua shareholder, made no difference (see [2002] 2 AC at 67). I can see no basis whatever in logic or principle as to why, if a claim qua employee is barred by the rule, a claim made qua creditor is not similarly so barred. In most cases where an employee's claim is barred by the rule against reflective loss, the employee will be a creditor of the company. It is hard to see why a creditor who is an employee should be treated differently from any other creditor of the company when it comes to applying the rule against reflective loss."
"It appears to me that, even if the claimant in Humberclyde had held no shares in the company, his claim would almost certainly have been barred by the rule against reflective loss. In any event, it is clear that, provided the claimant owns some shares in the company concerned, his claim for lost pension rights is liable to fail owing to the rule against reflective loss."
The Giles v Rhind exception
"34 One situation which is not addressed is the situation in which the wrongdoer by the breach of duty owed to the shareholder has actually disabled the company from pursuing such cause of action as the company had. It seems hardly right that the wrongdoer who is in breach of contract to a shareholder can answer the shareholder by saying, 'The company had a cause of action which it is true I prevented it from bringing, but that fact alone means that I the wrongdoer do not have to pay anybody.'"
"…even in relation to that part of the claim for diminution which could be said to be reflective of the company's loss, since, if the company had no cause of action to recover that loss the shareholder could bring a claim, the same should be true of a situation in which the wrongdoer has disabled the company from pursuing that cause of action. I accept that on the language of Lord Millett's speech there are difficulties with this second proposition, but I am doubtful whether he intended to go so far as his literal words would take him. Furthermore it seems to me that on Lord Bingham of Cornhill's speech supported by the others, it would not be right to conclude that the second proposition is unarguable."
"To put the point more starkly, the effect of the judge's decision—as he himself recognised—is that a wrongdoer who, in breach of his contract with the company and its shareholders, "steals" the whole of the company's business, with the intention that the company should be so denuded of funds that it cannot pursue its remedy against him, and who gives effect to that intention by an application for security for costs which his own breach of contract has made it impossible for the company to provide, is entitled to defeat a claim by the shareholders on the grounds that their claim is "trumped" by the claim which his own conduct was calculated to prevent, and has in fact prevented, the company from pursuing. If that were, indeed, the law following the decision in Johnson v Gore Wood, I would not find it easy to reconcile the result with Lord Bingham of Cornhill's observation, at p 36c, that 'the court must be astute to ensure that the party who has in fact suffered loss is not arbitrarily denied fair compensation'".
"The premise which underlies that passage is that the company has, and can pursue, its own cause of action. Absent that premise there would be no danger of double recovery at the expense of the defendant; and no occasion to protect the interests of the creditors and other creditors of the company. It is, I think, clear that Lord Millett was not addressing his observations, in that passage, to a case where the company has abandoned its cause of action against the wrongdoer; a fortiori, he was not addressing those observations to a case where the company has had to abandon its cause of action because of the wrong done to it by the wrongdoer."
"I do not think that Lord Millett could have intended it to be understood, from that sentence, that the question whether the company ever had a cause of action in respect of the wrong which has caused its loss is irrelevant."
"79 The policy consideration to which, as it seems to me, Lord Millett is referring in that passage is the need to avoid a situation in which the wrongdoer cannot safely compromise the company's claim without fear that he may be met with a further claim by the shareholder in respect of the company's loss. That, I think, is what he had in mind when he referred to the difficulty which a liquidator would have in settling the action if a shareholder, or creditor, were able to go behind the settlement. He had recognised, in the previous paragraph, that an aggrieved shareholder or creditor could sue the liquidator; his concern was to limit their remedy to a claim against the liquidator. Similar considerations apply where the company's claim is settled by the directors. But, in such a case, there is the further consideration that directors who are also shareholders (or creditors) should not be in a position where settlement of the company's claim at less than its true value (or abandonment of that claim) leaves them with a claim which they can pursue against the wrongdoer in their own interest. If that is a correct analysis of that passage, then the passage presents no difficulty in the case where the company has not settled its claim, but has been forced to abandon it by reason of impecuniosity attributable to the wrong which has been done to it. In such a case the policy considerations to which Lord Millett referred are not engaged. And it is difficult to see any other consideration of policy which should lead to the conclusion that a shareholder or creditor who has suffered loss by reason of a wrong which, itself, has prevented the company from pursuing its remedy should be denied any remedy at all."
"a loss claimed by a shareholder which is merely reflective of a loss suffered by the company – i.e. a loss which would be made good if the company had enforced in full its rights against the defendant wrongdoer – is not recoverable by the shareholder save in a case where, by reason of the wrong done to it, the company is unable to pursue its claim against the wrongdoer".
"…the critical point in Giles v Rhind was, as Waller LJ put it at [28], that the company was disabled from bringing the claim by the very wrongdoing which the defendant had by contract promised him, as a shareholder, and the company that he would not carry out.
Status of the proceedings
Lord Justice Lewison
"In a common law system, where the law is in some areas made, and the law is in virtually all areas developed, by judges, the doctrine of precedent, or as it is sometimes known stare decisis, is fundamental. Decisions on points of law by more senior courts have to be accepted by more junior courts. Otherwise, the law becomes anarchic, and it loses coherence clarity and predictability."
Lord Justice Lindblom