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WRIGHT, R v. [2000] EWCA Crim 28 (5th April, 2000)
Case No: 9903978W3
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Wednesday 5th April 2000
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE BELDAM
MR JUSTICE SILBER
and
THE RECORDER OF LEEDS
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R -v- GLENN PAUL WRIGHT
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(Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street
London EC4A 2HD
Tel No: 0171 421 4040, Fax No: 0171 831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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Edward Rees Esq QC (Miss .R. Towler) for the Appellant
M.D.L. Worsley Esq QC appeared for the Crown
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Judgment
As Approved by the Court
Crown Copyright ©
On 13th April 1999 at the Central Criminal Court the appellant, Glenn Paul
Wright, pleaded not guilty to an indictment containing three counts. The first
count charged him with aiding and abetting the attempted suicide of William
Scott on 16th November 1996. Count 2 charged that he murdered Karelius Smith
on 8th February 1997 and count 3 that he attempted to murder Kenneth Cross on
27th January 1998. On 30th April the jury found the appellant guilty of aiding
and abetting Scott to commit suicide, guilty of the murder of Karelius Smith
but not guilty of attempted murder of Kenneth Cross.
For aiding and abetting the attempted suicide of Scott, the appellant was
sentenced to eight years imprisonment to be served concurrently with the
sentence of life imprisonment for the murder of Karelius Smith.
At the time of the offences the appellant was either in custody on remand or as
a serving prisoner. He is twenty-seven years of age and since the age of
fifteen has been convicted on many occasions of offences largely of dishonesty
but occasionally of violence. The offences charged in counts 1 and 2 occurred
when he was on remand at the Vulnerable Prisoners Unit in HM Prison, Woodhill.
At the time of the offence of attempted murder, he was subject to a sentence of
three years imprisonment and in HMP Pentonville. The three offences charged
against him were committed in circumstances so similar that they were tried
together. In every case there was evidence that the appellant had taken an
active part in assisting the victim to hang himself by creating a noose from
bedlinen, securing it and encouraging the victim to suspend himself.
On 16th November 1996 William Scott, the victim in count 1, was on remand
awaiting trial for the murder of his girlfriend. He was depressed and spoke to
the appellant of ending his life. Initially he contemplated cutting his wrists
with a razor blade. The appellant offered to assist him and eventually, when
Scott said he did not have "the bottle" to slash his wrists, made a noose from
a strip of bedspread. The appellant placed the noose around Scott's neck,
eventually looping the end of the noose over the bathroom door and placing a
chair outside for Scott to stand upon. Scott then stood on the chair, kicked
it away and passed out. The appellant pressed the emergency call button and a
prison officer found Scott hanging from the bathroom door. The appellant said
that at the time he had been lying on his bed with his back to the bathroom and
facing the wall listening to his Walkman when he heard a thump, turned round
and saw Scott hanging on the door.
On 1st February 1997 Karelius Smith was found in the cell he shared with the
appellant unconscious and apparently lifeless lying on his back on the floor
with a piece of brown bedsheet tied round his neck. He was resuscitated but
died a week later. The appellant said that while he was asleep Smith had
hanged himself. Karelius Smith was a very immature young man who was described
as "a little depressed and acting strangely". He had said that he wanted to
hang himself. He had been sentenced to 15 months imprisonment on 20th January
and on 29th was placed in a cell with the appellant. However, about half an
hour before he was found, he had seemed reasonably cheerful when discussing a
possible transfer with a prison officer. In February the appellant told
another prisoner at Woodhill that he had hanged another inmate and that the
Authorities were trying to "get him" for it. He said he had hung him and
kicked the chair away.
The charge of attempted murder arose from a similar incident on 27th January
1998 when Kenneth Cross, a prisoner in HMP Pentonville, was transferred to
share a cell with the appellant. That night prison officers who were summoned
by the appellant found Cross unconscious on the floor of the cell. Cross
recovered and later described how the appellant, after giving him some 30
tablets, made a noose from the bedsheet which he attached to a metal grill on
the window. He told Cross to stand on the pipes beneath the window and put the
noose around his neck explaining that this would secure a transfer to hospital
for both of them and they would be able to get drugs. Cross said the appellant
had pulled his legs off the pipes and he began to asphyxiate when the noose
snapped and he collapsed on the floor.
The appellant gave evidence insisting that he had no involvement in any of the
hangings. He repeated his account of the events leading to the attempted
suicide of Scott, said that he had been unaware Smith intended to commit
suicide until he woke up to find him hanging from the lavatory door but agreed
that he had told another prisoner that he had killed his cellmate. He
explained that he had merely said this to emphasise he was not a sex offender.
He disputed Cross's evidence though he admitted he had told another prisoner
that he had been involved. He had done this to convey the impression that he
was a hard man so that other prisoners would leave him alone.
The Basis of the Appeal.
In his summing-up the Common Serjeant of London explained to the jury that to
prove the charge of murder the prosecution had to satisfy them that the
appellant had done a deliberate act which caused Smith's death and that when he
did so he intended to kill him or cause him really serious harm. He reviewed
the evidence fully and fairly and Mr Edward Rees QC, who appeared for the
appellant, accepted that the judge's initial directions gave no cause for
complaint. However the facts of the case were unusual and after they had
retired the jury asked three questions seeking further guidance. The ground of
appeal relates to the directions then given by the Common Serjeant in answer to
those questions. Mr Rees submits that they were not sufficiently detailed to
cover the uncertainties disclosed by the questions and the conviction is
accordingly unsafe.
The Three Questions.
The first question asked by the jury was:
"In the case where the victim does not intend to die is the deliberate
preparation and encouragement of an act knowing that the victim is highly
likely to suffer very serious injury, and as a result of that act the victim
dies, murder."
The second question was:
"In the case where the victim does not intend to die is a deliberate failure to
execute a pre-arranged plan which would avoid the death of a victim murder."
Finally the jury asked for more guidance on:
"To what extent one's involvement in an act would constitute murder."
After lengthy discussion with counsel, the Common Serjeant addressed the jury
saying:
"What I propose to do as the note plainly relates to count 2 is I am going to
go through again the directions I gave you in respect of count 2, and then deal
with the questions you have asked."
After reminding the jury that they had to be satisfied that the prosecution had
proved that the defendant did an act which caused the involuntary death of
another human being, he said:
"And ... the prosecution have to prove that when the defendant did the act
which caused or led to the death he intended either to kill Smith or to cause
him really serious injury ... There are really two things the prosecution have
to prove. Did the defendant do an act which led to the death of Smith?
Second, if he did, when he did that act did he intend to kill Smith or to cause
him serious, really serious injury. Those are the elements of murder."
He then reminded the jury of the alternative verdicts open to them and turned
to the questions they had asked. After reading out their first question, he
said:
"Encouragement of a voluntary act which results in death would not be murder.
So encouragement to commit suicide would not be murder. But it would amount to
or might amount to assisting, aiding and abetting suicide. A deliberate act
which causes an involuntary death with the requisite intention either to kill
or to cause serious injury is murder. If when you ask the question the words
"preparation" and "encouragement" are as it were conjunctive, in other words if
when you say "preparation" and "encouragement" you mean an act which leads to
death, then that is murder but mere preparation would not amount to murder if
for example a man prepares a noose on the basis that at some future time the
other man might use it to kill himself. That would not be murder, it could not
be murder."
Turning to the second question, he said:
"I take it that what you have in mind there is if there was some plan along the
lines that a noose would be put round Smith's neck, his chair would be kicked
away or pulled away but that the defendant would cut him down before any real
damage was done. Would that be murder? Well the answer must, I think, be
this. If the elements of murder are made out in other words if an act is done
which leads to the death and there is the intention to cause death, to kill or
cause serious injury, then failure to abide by a pre-arranged plan which would
have avoided death does not stop it being murder. It remains murder. But of
course merely being a spectator cannot be enough for murder. There must be to
put it in ordinary language there must be a murderous act, an act with the
intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm."
In answering the third question he said:
"There must be an act which leads to death done by the defendant."
He asked the jury if that answered their question and they apparently
acknowledged that it did. After a further retirement the jury found the
appellant guilty of the murder of Karelius Smith.
Mr Rees submitted that the judge's direction overlooked what he described as
another credible scenario on the evidence in which the appellant did not commit
murder, namely:
(a) That the appellant and the deceased were involved in a scheme to fake
suicide by hanging in order to achieve transfer to the prison hospital.
(b) That as part of that scheme, once Smith lost consciousness, the appellant
would summon official help so that Smith could be resuscitated in time.
(c) That Wright encouraged or assisted Smith to suspend himself knowing that it
was dangerous so to do but not necessarily intending that Smith should suffer
serious injury or die.
(e) That the appellant failed to summon help in time to prevent Smith dying
accidentally.
Mr Rees argued that the first of the jury's questions suggested that they were
actively considering that possibility. That question contained the phrase
"knowing that the victim is highly likely to suffer very serious injury" which
Mr Rees said was equivalent to recklessness and not the same as an intent to
cause him really serious harm. In these circumstances he submitted that the
judge ought to have expanded his direction to the jury by making it clear that
they could not convict the appellant of murder by finding the necessary intent
unless they felt sure that death or really serious bodily harm was a virtual
certainty from what the appellant was doing (barring some unforeseen
intervention) and that he appreciated that fact. He submitted that the judge
ought to have given the expanded direction referred to by Lord Lane in
Nedrick [1986] 83 CAR 267 and approved by the House of Lords in
Woolin [1999] 1 CAR 8. He said that the issues for the jury were
extremely if not impossibly difficult and that the third question asked showed
how uncertain they were in their approach to the question of participation and
causation. To answer that question by saying that there must an act which
leads to death done by the defendant did not give the jury the help they
required. The phrase "leads to death" could be misleading and the judge should
have said that the act had to cause death. Mr Rees accepted that it was clear
from the jury's question that they rejected the appellant's explanation that he
had played no part at all in the hangings.
Mr Worsley QC, for the prosecution, submitted that the judge in this case was
justified in confining his direction to the simple and straightforward terms he
used which, he submitted, was in accordance with the guidelines given by Lord
Steyn and Lord Hope in Woolin. He relied, in particular, on the
observations of Lord Hope that:
"I attach great importance to the search for a direction which is both clear
and simple. It should be expressed in as few words as possible. That is
essential if it is to be intelligible. A jury cannot be expected to absorb and
apply a direction which attempts to deal with every situation which might
conceivably arise."
He submitted that the judge was right to confine his directions to those he
gave. Once the jury had reached the conclusion that the appellant had done a
deliberate act which caused Smith's death by hanging, it was not difficult for
a jury to come to the conclusion whether or not he intended at least really
serious bodily harm. Thus the question of the appellant's intention was
straightforward and could properly be answered without drawing complicated
distinctions between foresight and intent, between substantial risk and virtual
certainty (or any other degrees of likelihood) and intention and recklessness.
It was not, therefore, a case which required the judge to direct the jury in
terms which went beyond the simple direction which he gave them.
Turning to the question of the appellant's criticism of the use of the phrase
"which leads to death", Mr Worsley drew attention to the number of occasions on
which the judge told the jury that they had to be satisfied that the defendant
did an act which caused the death of Karelius Smith.
We note that the judge on several occasions used the words "an act which caused
death". On some he paraphrased it as "the defendant did the act which led to
the death". It must therefore have been quite clear to the jury that he was
using the words "led to the death" in the sense of "caused the death".
Our Decision.
In cases in which the jury seek further guidance from the judge in the form of
questions on which they want further assistance, it is seldom profitable to
speculate upon the discussions which have prompted the questions or to analyse
too closely the reason why the question has been asked. It is more relevant to
consider whether in the light of the directions they had already been given and
the additional directions they received whether they could have been in any
doubt as to the finding they were required to make if they were to find a
charge of murder proved. The questions and the directions given have to be
taken together with the earlier directions to determine whether on the
assumption that the jury were loyal to the directions they received they could
have arrived at their verdict by finding facts which fell short of those
required to prove murder. On that basis the question we have to consider is
whether the jury in this case following the direction the Common Serjeant gave
them could have concluded that the appellant was guilty of murder although they
did not find that he intended to kill or do really serious harm. For example,
following the judge's directions, could they have decided that the appellant
was guilty of murder on the basis that they found that he knew or was aware
that Smith was highly likely to suffer very serious injury although he did not
intend or desire him to do so?
We do not think that if they followed the directions clearly given by the
Common Serjeant the jury could have done so. As Lord Steyn said in Woolin
(supra) at page 19, the trial judge is best placed to decide whether it is
helpful to go beyond the simple direction and, if so, in what terms.
By giving the straightforward direction on intention the judge was directing
the jury to the real question they had to determine and steering them away from
the chameleon-like concepts of purpose, foresight of consequence and awareness
of risk. Once the jury rejected the appellant's account that he had taken no
part whatever in the hanging, his actions of preparing the noose and securing
it in a position from which the victim could be suspended and placing a chair
from which the victim could fall and be hung were plainly actions from which
the jury could find that the appellant at the time intended serious harm to the
victim. Accordingly we reject the criticism of the additional guidance given
to the jury by the judge. Equally we do not think his use of the phrase "which
led to the death" in the context in which it was used in the summing-up was
capable of being misunderstood. It was, as we have said, used interchangeably
with "caused the death". The circumstances were not such as to call for any
more elaborate explanation of the principles of causation. In our view the
jury were properly directed on the issues they had to decide, there was
evidence on which they could find the appellant guilty of murder and his
conviction is not, in our view, unsafe. The appeal will be dismissed.
© 2000 Crown Copyright
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