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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Stapley, R. v [2004] EWCA Crim 1139 (31 March 2004) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2004/1139.html Cite as: [2004] EWCA Crim 1139 |
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CRIMINAL DIVISION
Strand London, WC2 |
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B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE EADY
MR JUSTICE ROYCE
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R E G I N A | ||
-v- | ||
MICHAEL STAPLEY |
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Smith Bernal Wordwave Limited
190 Fleet Street London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
MR D ATKINSON appeared on behalf of the CROWN
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Crown Copyright ©
"It is difficult to imagine a more cold-blooded, callous and evil crime."
When dealing with this appellant he said:
"Michael Stapley, on the jury's verdict you were the other man who chopped and battered this unfortunate woman to death. In your case too it seems to me there is only one possible sentence; again it is one of life imprisonment. I make a slight reduction in the minimum term and I do so solely on the grounds of your youth. The nominal determinate term in your case would have been 32 years; half of that is 16 years and I take off a further year for your time in custody, so you will serve a minimum term of 15 years."
"(1) This section applies where-
(a) a person is convicted of a serious offence committed after 30th September 1997; and
(b) at the time when that offence was committed, he was 18 or over and had been convicted in any part of the United Kingdom of another serious offence.
(2) The court shall impose a life sentence, that is to say-
(a) where the offender is 21 or over when convicted of the offence mentioned in subsection(1)(a) above, a sentence of imprisonment for life,
(b) where he is under 21 at that time, a sentence of custody for life under section 94 above,
unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances relating to either of the offences or to the offender which justifies its not doing so."
"On the other hand, we do not think that it would be appropriate to arrive at a determinate sentence for conspiracy to murder by working backwards from the period which the court would be likely to recommend as the 'tariff' for murder. The sentence for murder itself has always been treated differently in our sentencing system from sentences for other crimes. Moreover, although it may be that these appellants could have been charged with aiding and abetting the murder of the victim, they were not and we do not know why that is so. In these circumstances we have reached the conclusion that it would be wrong to sentence them as if they had been convicted of murder, which they were not."
In the immediately preceding paragraph the court had considered the case of R v Daddow (1996) 2 Cr.App.R (S) 10. The judgment reads as follows:
"In considering Daddow, it must be borne in mind that the Court was not laying down guidelines for sentencing in conspiracy to murder cases where the murder is carried out. The court was considering whether a sentence of 18 years was manifestly excessive, so that the observation that the sentence was 'entirely appropriate' must be seen in that light. Thus a somewhat longer sentence than 18 years might also been considered 'entirely appropriate'. The fact is that the court sets the tariff for murder at a substantially higher level than for other crimes because of society's particular abhorrence of the crime of murder. In these circumstances we are of the view that the level of sentence for conspiracy to murder in cases where the murder has been carried out should reflect that fact."
"1. Twelve years for the killing of an adult victim arising from a quarrel or loss of temper between two people known to each other. (49:10)
2. Fifteen to Sixteen years. The higher starting point will apply to cases where the offender's culpability was exceptionally high or the victim was in a particularly vulnerable position. Such cases will be characterised by a feature which makes the crime especially serious, such as: (a) the killing was 'professional' or a contract killing; (b) the killing was politically motivated; (c) the killing was done for gain (in the course of a burglary, robbery etc); (d) the killing was intended to defeat the ends of justice (as in the killing of a witness or potential witness); (e) the victim was providing a public service; (f) the victim was a child or otherwise vulnerable; (g) the killing was racially aggravated; (h) the victim was deliberately targeted because of his or her religion or sexual orientation; (i) there was evidence of sadism, gratuitous violence or sexual maltreatment, humiliation or degradation of the victim before the killing; (j) extensive and/or multiple injuries were inflicted on the victim before death; (k) the offender committed multiple murders." (49:13)
Whatever starting point is appropriate it may be varied to take account of aggravating or mitigating factors (49:14). Aggravating factors in relation to the offence include those set out at paragraph 49:15:
"... (a) the fact that the killing was planned; (b) the use of a firearm; (c) arming with a weapon in advance; (d) concealment of the body, destruction of the crime scene and/or dismemberment of the body."
Those in relation to the offender at paragraph 49:16 include:
"... the offender's previous record and failures to respond to previous sentences, to the extent that this is relevant to culpability rather than to risk."
Mitigating factors are set out in paragraph 49:17 including:
"... (a) an intention to cause grievous bodily harm, rather than to kill; (b) spontaneity and lack of premeditation; (c) the offender's age; (d) clear evidence of remorse or contrition; and (e) a timely plea of guilty."