No: 2009/2969/A6 
Neutral Citation Number: [2009] EWCA Crim 1915
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2A 2LL 

Wednesday, 23 September 2009
 
B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE HOOPER 

MR JUSTICE UNDERHILL 
 
MR JUSTICE IRWIN 
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R E G I N A 

v 

MICHAELA BRITTON
 
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Mrs M Smullen appeared on behalf of the Appellant
Mr R Gursoy appeared on behalf of the Crown
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J U D G M E N T
1.	LORD JUSTICE HOOPER:  On 20th November 2008 at the Crown Court at Chelmsford, the applicant was convicted of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.  The indictment read as follows.  The applicant and Paul Hendle, "between the 1st day of February 2006 and the 2nd day of August 2006, conspired together and with others unknown by falsely claiming to Essex Police and the West Midlands Police that they had been the victim of indictable offences and placed persons in jeopardy of arrest or criminal prosecution by such false allegations with intent to pervert the course of justice."  The applicant was convicted after a trial lasting some four weeks, during which time the trial judge, His Honour Judge Turner QC, had ample opportunity to make an assessment of her criminality.
2.	We should say that there was a considerable delay between the end of the indictment period and the trial, but that as we understand it was the responsibility of the applicant herself to the extent that she was able to convince the court on a number of occasions that she was not fit enough to attend her trial.  Part of the delay was also caused, so we are told by counsel for the respondent, Mr Gursoy, by the fact that she changed her counsel.  
3.	The applicant was sentenced to four years' imprisonment on 22nd December 2008 with a direction under section 240 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that 160 days on remand should count towards the sentence.  Today she has been, if we may say so, very ably represented by Mrs Smullen who did not conduct the trial.  Mrs Smullen has said everything that could possibly be said to assist the applicant in this application.  There is also an application for an extension of time which we grant.  The application for leave to appeal has been referred to the full court by the Registrar.
4.	Paul Hendle pleaded guilty to conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, less 355 days on remand.
5.	Taking the facts broadly, during a five month period in 2006 the applicant made a series of false allegations to the police.  She claimed that she had been burgled, blackmailed, kidnapped on at least two occasions, raped and attacked with a knife.  She further alleged that police officers were behind the various offences committed against her.  A schedule, which the judge accepted, showed that the various investigations took some 7,000 hours of police time and cost some £316,000.
6.	One of the false allegations involved the applicant reporting that her car had been shot at by a motor cyclist.  Paul Hendle admitted that he had done this so that the police would think that the applicant had actually been threatened.  He said it had been her idea.  The applicant also said she had information about the police acting corruptly in relation to a murder investigation in 1994 and that she had been targeted by police officers to silence her.  There is some suggestion in the papers that she was motivated by the prospects of financial gain, but Mrs Smullen submits, and we accept, that that was likely only to apply to one or two of the matters being reported to the police.
7.	On 27th February she made a false allegation that her home had been burgled.  On 14th April police officers received a call from the applicant's daughter.  She said the applicant was in difficulty and said where her mother could be located.  Armed police officers found the applicant tied up in a car.  She was hysterical and said she had met the blackmailers but the police found she was still in possession of the keys to the car and her mobile phone.  Her daughter was arrested at that time on suspicion of involvement with her mother in wasting police time.  Indeed, the applicant was charged with wasting police time shortly thereafter.  
8.	We refer to some of the other incidents.  The applicant reported being stabbed in the arm.  She told officers who attended that she had been stopped by what appeared to be a police car, that four men had showed what appeared to be police badges and that one of them had slashed her arm with a knife.  On 27th May the applicant went to a house on an isolated lane and claimed that she had been raped twice during an attack by people with a knife.  Her bra was ripped, there was tape on her hands and a bandage on her arm.  Her car was found nearby.  On 21st June the applicant claimed she had been kidnapped.  She refused to hand over her mobile phone to the police but when it was analysed it showed that she had made a large number of calls during the time she claimed to have been kidnapped, but not one of those calls had been made to the police.  By now the police were carrying out surveillance on her house and her account was contradicted by CCTV evidence.  
9.	When she was interviewed she denied the offence.  She said at the end of that interview:
"You haven't helped me from the start, you haven't helped me at the end, and all you've done has made matters 50 times worse.  So screw your help, screw your resources and screw your power.  That is all I'm going to say." 
At the trial she maintained her innocence and, as we say, it took four weeks for the trial to conclude.  
10.	We have looked at the pre‑sentence report that was prepared and that again shows not only her unwillingness to accept what had occurred but also a complete lack of remorse.
11.	She has previous convictions for two offences of deception involving cheques with 63 offences taken into consideration, but that was in 1990 and could not constitute an aggravating offence in determining what is the appropriate sentence for this conspiracy.  
12.	The judge in his sentencing remarks said a number of things which bear repetition in this court.  He said for example:
"You have, in statements and in your evidence, made and persisted in thoroughly unpleasant allegations of lies, bullying, targeting, humiliation, abuse and corruption by officers both in uniform and in the CID, from constables to a chief inspector.  No rank has escaped your insinuation."
The judge also said:
"You have duped and involved innocent members of the public as your rescuers and comforters, conning them by your tears and faux hysteria; and the result, as I have said, has been, literally, hundreds of hours of wasted police time and resources. Dozens of officers have been involved, directly and indirectly: uniformed and CID, armed officers, scenes of crime officers, helicopter pilots, police doctors, sexually trained officers, financial investigating officers, technical support officers, forensic specialists. Hours of Achieving Best Evidence interviews have been conducted. Hours of CCTV have been marshalled. There have been, literally, hours of evidence gathering, hundreds of phone calls and texts and hundreds of pages of notes and statements, all in pursuit of your fantasies. There has been a grotesquely wasteful programme of investigating, recording, photographing and sampling, all produced by your lies. This has all been carried out in a planned, premeditated, calculated and carefully executed way." 
13.	It is submitted on her behalf that no one was actually arrested as a result of the allegations that she made.  That is right, but persons were questioned.  We have already seen that her daughter was arrested and there can be no doubt that those who were the target of her allegations and others who recorded her false complaints (both lay people and police officers) would have suffered some stress as a result of what was happening.  There is no doubt that the police had serious doubts about the validity of the complaints that were being made, but nonetheless, as Mrs Smullen rightly accepts, they were not able simply to treat the complaints as groundless, at least until much later on in the investigation.  These were very serious allegations and had to be properly investigated.  
14.	Mrs Smullen is right when she says that this applicant certainly has a number of problems, but we have looked carefully at the reports about her mental health and there is nothing in those reports to suggest that she is suffering from some mental illness which caused her to believe genuinely that she had suffered the attacks of which she made complaint.  Mrs Smullen seems to be suggesting that the applicant genuinely believed what she had said.  We for our part cannot accept that submission.  If she genuinely believed what she was saying then there would be serious mental health issues which would have been properly explored at trial.  We have already mentioned the absence of remorse and we add to that the fact that she blames others for the predicament in which she finds herself.  We have mentioned the delay.  During that period awaiting trial she was on bail and required to live away from the Essex area.  The conditions imposed on her did prevent her from using her phone and when she travelled into the nearby city she had to be accompanied.  But in our judgment that should not have any impact on the sentence which was passed.
15.	The pre‑sentence report describes her as at low risk and in those circumstances Mrs Smullen submits the proper course now would be to suspend the sentence or to reduce the sentence.  
16.	We have looked at this case with considerable care.  It is a very unusual case.  We have looked at cases to which we have been referred: Inaam [2006] EWCA Crim. 1073 and also Walsh and Nightingale [1993] 14 Cr.App.R (S) 671.  Neither of those cases give us any assistance in deciding whether the judge's sentence of four years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive.  We take the view at the end of the day that this was a severe sentence but passed by a judge who had ample opportunity to see the applicant over a considerable period of time and severe as it may have been it cannot be properly described as manifestly excessive.  This application is refused.