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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Hall, R v [2010] EWCA Crim 2135 (9 September 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2010/2135.html Cite as: [2010] EWCA Crim 2135

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL
		Thursday, 9 September 2010

1. LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS: This an appeal against a sentence imposed on 30th April 2010 by His Honour Judge Hodson, the Recorder of Newcastle, at the Crown Court at Newcastle-upon-Tyne in respect of an offence of causing death by careless driving to which the appellant had previously pleaded guilty.
2. The circumstances of the offence are these. The deceased was a young man called Michael Taylor, aged 23. On 24th May 2009 he and his friends went to a public house in Sunderland to watch a football match on TV. They carried on drinking after the match. Post-mortem analysis of his blood showed that by the end of the evening Mr Taylor was more than three times over the legal limit for driving. But he did not in fact drive. He stayed in the town centre when his friends went off in a taxi at about 10.45 pm. He wandered around the town centre alone, as shown by CCTV pictures. At some point he walked along West Wear Street, a substantial dual-carriageway in the centre of town which was well lit and, at the point where the incident occurred, was leading to a single carriageway. He crossed the road, though not at a pedestrian crossing. He succeeded in crossing the first carriageway. He then climbed over the central reservation but at that point stumbled or fell and ended up lying across the second carriageway.
3. There was no traffic for about 19 seconds after that. The first vehicle to come along the carriageway was driven by the appellant. She was driving within the 30 mph speed limit. She was sober. But she did not slow down or take any avoiding action. She drove straight over Mr Taylor's body lying in the carriageway, coming to a stop shortly afterwards. Mr Taylor died at the scene from chest injuries sustained in that accident.
4. When interviewed the appellant said that she had been returning home from work, she was not in a hurry, she knew the road well, she simply did not see Mr Taylor in the road. An accident reconstruction indicated that he would have been in her sight for 62 metres with a travelling time of about five-and-a-half seconds. According to the Highway Code the stopping distance at 30 mph would have been 23 metres. The prosecution case was that the appellant simply did not register the fact that a man was lying in the road, but that there had been plenty of room for avoiding action even if she had not been able to stop. For whatever reason she had paid insufficient attention over a significant period of time and distance and this was the cause of Mr Taylor's death.
5. The appellant pleaded guilty only after the case was listed for trial. When it came to sentencing the judge imposed a community order with a 12 month supervision requirement and a 180 hour unpaid work requirement. No issue is taken with that aspect of the sentence which makes it unnecessary for us to elaborate on matters relevant to it.
6. The judge also ordered the appellant to be disqualified from driving for three years and ordered her to take an extended retest. Those are the only parts of the sentence in respect of which the appeal is brought.
7. The offence of causing death by careless driving is an offence contrary to section 2B of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (as amended). By virtue of the relevant provisions of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 conviction for such an offence carries with it obligatory disqualification for a minimum period of 12 months and obligatory endorsement.
8. It appears from his sentencing remarks that the judge thought that an extended retest was also obligatory. The requirement to order disqualification until an extended retest is passed is governed by section 36(1) to (3) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The requirement applies in a case of causing death by dangerous driving and in various other circumstances, but not in a case of causing death by careless driving. An extended retest was therefore not obligatory in this case. There is, however, a discretion to order an extended retest in any case where, as here, endorsement is obligatory: see section 36(4) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.
9. The result is that the judge had a discretion whether to disqualify the appellant for more than 12 months (the obligatory minimum period) and a discretion whether to order an extended retest. The question for us is whether a three year period of disqualification together with a requirement to take an extended retest were manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.
10. We have described the circumstances of the accident, which indicate that the one criticism to be made of the appellant's driving in this case was her failure to pay attention - an important criticism, of course, given the fatal consequences of the failure, but without any additional aggravating features to increase the appellant's culpability. The appellant herself is a 45 year old woman without any relevant previous convictions. She has had a clean driving record for many years. The pre-sentence report records that she was distraught about the offence, showed a high degree of victim empathy and was very remorseful. There was considered to be a low risk of re-offending.
11. For our part, we do not see anything in the circumstances of the accident or in the appellant's antecedents and background that make it appropriate to prevent her driving again for a period greater than 12 months or to make extended an retest appropriate. A shorter period of disqualification is sufficient to meet the purpose of protection of the public; and this one short period of inattention, extremely serious though it was in its consequences, does not suggest that the appellant needs to have her fitness to drive established by an extended retest before she is allowed back on the roads at the end of the period of disqualification. These cases all depend on their own particular facts, but we note that the conclusion we have reached in this present case is in line with that reached in R v McCurry [2010] EWCA Crim 2007, to which counsel has brought our attention.
12. We therefore allow the appeal to the extent of substituting a period of disqualification of 12 months and setting aside the requirement of an extended retest.