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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Imran, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 162 (24 January 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2025/162.html Cite as: [2025] EWCA Crim 162

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT MANCHESTER
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE GILBART) [T20217069]

		Royal Courts of Justice The Strand WC2A 2LL
		24 January 2025

Friday 24 January 2025

LORD JUSTICE JEREMY BAKER: I shall ask Mrs Justice Stacey to give the judgment of the court.

MRS JUSTICE STACEY:

1. The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act.
2. On 25 July 2024, following a trial in the Crown Court at Manchester before His Honour Judge Thomas Gilbart and a jury, the appellant (then aged 27) was convicted of one count of rape.
3. On 11 September 2024, he was sentenced to a term of seven years' imprisonment and ancillary orders consequential to the conviction were made. The judge did not impose either a Sexual Harm Prevention Order or a Restraining Order, since it was neither appropriate, necessary, nor proportionate, given the passage of time and the appellant's current vulnerabilities.
4. With the leave of the single judge the appellant appeals against sentence.
5. On 14 December 2018 the appellant was visiting his cousin for the weekend. They and a number of other friends went to a busy student party in the Fallowfield area of Manchester where the complainant and the appellant's cousin met. They got on well and both ended up going back to the complainant's house with several others after the party. The two of them went into the complainant's bedroom in the early hours of 15 December.
6. Later, the appellant turned up at the complainant's house for an exchange of car keys with his cousin. Although his cousin told him not to go into the house, the appellant made his way in and at one point even went into the complainant's bedroom whilst she was with his cousin. The complainant was shocked and asked who he was. The appellant left the complainant's bedroom and she eventually fell asleep. His cousin went outside to meet the appellant whom he had asked to collect him.
7. The appellant's cousin boasted to the appellant that he had had sexual intercourse with the complainant. This was not true, as he had been unable to maintain an erection. He told the appellant that the complainant was asleep and "knocked out" as a result of his vigorous sexual activity with her. The appellant asked for details of exactly where she was in the house. He then went back to the complainant's house. Others, who were still up, opened the door to him as he claimed that he had left something there.
8. He then went into the complainant's room as she slept. He took a photograph of her naked body without her knowledge or consent. She woke up to find that there was someone on top of her, having sexual intercourse with her. It was the appellant. He was pushing down on her shoulders. At first she thought it was his cousin, although she was confused since the cousin had not been forceful, unlike the person on top of her. She told the man to stop and get off. He did not do so, but instead lay his full weight down flat on top of her so that she could not get him off. He kissed her and forcefully penetrated her vagina with his penis, causing her pain. He did not stop until he ejaculated. When she fully realised that the man was not the appellant's cousin but someone she did not know, she chased him out of the house and found the appellant's cousin waiting for him outside in a car. She bravely tried to stop them from making off, but the appellant jumped into the car and drove away.
9. During the journey the appellant bragged to his cousin and lied that the complainant had wanted to have sex with him. He later sent the photograph of the complainant asleep and naked to his associates, boasting that he had had sex with her. When word reached his group of friends of what had happened, they called him out, and his brother texted him to say that he would be in trouble if he was arrested and that the police would have his DNA from the complainant.
10. The police did indeed have his DNA from the semen recovered from intimate body swabs from the complainant, and he was arrested.
11. His defence at trial was consent.
12. The Victim Personal Statement taken from the complainant some five years and nine months after the rape describes the significant impact that the offence has still had on her and how much her life has changed since because of it. Christmas and New Year celebrations have never felt the same since. Things like going to sleep, being able to trust people, feeling safe, and the socialising that she had previously taken for granted have changed. She initially tried to repress the trauma it had caused, which made her angry and defensive. She became self-destructive and her life began to fall apart. She had panic attacks at night and whenever she was in a room with a closed door. She is only now beginning to deal with the effect of having her body and safety violated in such a way.
13. The appellant was aged 21 at the date of the offence and 27 at the date of sentence. He was of previous good character. At the time of the offence he was in good health, but in 2021 he developed a rare, possibly inherited neuropathological condition which has affected his lower limb mobility, and he now uses a wheelchair. He has a diagnosis of severe length dependent, sensorimotor polyneuropathy, which has restricted his independent living skills. Although he can stand up by himself and weight bear on his legs, he is unable to walk unaided.
14. In a psychological report prepared in September 2024, before the sentencing hearing, he was also diagnosed with severe depression and PTSD. Great fears were expressed about his ability to cope in a custodial setting and of his suicidal ideation. On one occasion he had locked himself in his bedroom for 24 hours and had refused to eat and drink for fear of going to prison.
15. The author of the pre-sentence report noted that the appellant continued to deny the offence. He was assessed as posing a medium risk of re-offending and a high risk of harm to others.
16. In his careful and detailed sentencing remarks, the judge set out the facts of the case. He noted that when the appellant first went into the complainant's house, he seemed to be drawn to the fact that his cousin was with a woman and had been intimate with her. When he decided to go back into the house, he was clearly drawn to the fact that there was a woman inside who he could attack because she was asleep.
17. The judge reminded himself of the glowing character testimonials about the appellant and the appellant's extensive medical difficulties that had developed some years after the offence. He accepted that the offence was out of character; that the appellant supports and cares for others; that he is now in poor health and significantly affected by his health difficulties; and that in the five and a half years since the offence he had not committed any further offences. The judge acknowledged that the appellant's physical and mental health difficulties would make a custodial sentence more difficult for him. The judge also acknowledged the delay in the case coming to trial and found that it was a relevant part of the picture but that the weight to be attached to the delay must be measured.
18. In his analysis of the Sentencing Council's guidelines, the judge was satisfied that the complainant was particularly vulnerable because of her personal circumstances. She was asleep and had taken intoxicants, which had made her drowsy. She was entirely defenceless; and it was the fact that she was so vulnerable that had drawn the appellant into the house. The level of harm under the guideline was 2, and culpability B, since none of the culpability A factors applied. The starting point was eight years' custody, within a range of seven to nine years.
19. The judge identified a number of aggravating features: firstly, ejaculation; secondly, the offence was committed in the complainant's own bed, in her own room – a place where she was entitled to feel safe and secure – and her Victim Personal Statement showed that the effect of the violation had, understandably, had a particularly bad effect on her; thirdly, the appellant had taken a photograph of her whilst she was asleep and naked; and fourthly, there was a degree of specific targeting of a vulnerable victim. This was evidenced by the fact that he had already gone into her room, uninvited, when she was awake. Once he was told that she was "knocked out" or asleep inside the house, he deliberately went back into the property, with the obvious intention of raping her. The judge made an upward adjustment to reflect the aggravating features, which took the case to the very top point of the range for a 2B offence of nine years' custody.
20. He then considered the available mitigating features: firstly, that the appellant was 21 years old at the time of the offence (and the judge kept in mind the slow development of maturity in young men); secondly, his previous good character and aspects of positive good character set out in his testimonials; thirdly, and most significantly, his very serious ill-health and dependence upon care from others and also his mental health issues; fourthly, that he would find custody particularly difficult and is himself vulnerable; fifthly and finally, the judge accepted that the appellant's current circumstances were entirely different from his circumstances at the time of the commission of the offence and that his risk of committing further offences was now low. The judge therefore made a downward adjustment of two years from the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed, which he considered to be appropriate in all the circumstances. He arrived at a final sentence of seven years' imprisonment and directed that 24 days of the 48 days spent on qualifying curfew would count towards the sentence.
21. The grounds of appeal that have been most ably and powerfully advanced by Mr Neale are:

(1) That the sentence was manifestly excessive and/or wrong in principle as the judge failed to make sufficient allowance for the physical and mental condition that had overtaken the appellant since the date of the offence;

(2) That this was an exceptional case that should fall outside the guidelines because of the appellant's health conditions.

(3) That the appellant will face difficulties in custody which will make the sentence much more oppressive for him;

(3) That he is now 27 years of age and was aged 21 years at the date of the offending; and

(4) That he led a blameless and praiseworthy life in the intervening period from the date of the offence to the date of the sentence.

22. Both a general Prison Report and a Prison Medical Report were obtained in advance of today's appeal. It appears that, contrary to the earlier indications, the appellant has settled in well and has adjusted to a custodial environment. His behaviour is good. He has been awarded enhanced status and has attracted no adjudications or negative behaviour comments. He presents as open to engaging in program work to address identified risk factors. He has been allocated a larger cell within the vulnerable prisoners wing, and has been able to choose his own cellmate with whom he gets on well.
23. The prison doctor considers that from a healthcare point of view there is no reason why his standard of care should be in any way less than an able-bodied prisoner and that other challenges of the activities of daily life will be addressed by social care.
24. We accept that the appellant's health position is likely to continue throughout his sentence and may well deteriorate.

Our Conclusions

25. As the trial judge, the sentencing judge was best placed to understand all the facts of the case. In his meticulously careful sentencing remarks he identified all the features of the case and carefully explained why the offence fell into category 2B under the rape sentencing guidelines. He also identified each of the aggravating features that resulted in a significant upward adjustment to the top of the sentencing range. He was fair minded in deciding not to treat the appellant's entry back into the house effectively as a trespasser as an additional aggravating feature, and he avoided any double counting.
26. Having identified the aggravating features, the judge then scrupulously followed the guidelines in identifying the mitigating features and found that it took the final sentence to the very bottom of the range for a 2B offence. He demonstrably took sufficient account of, and gave appropriate weight to, all the matters relied on by counsel in support of the appeal: the appellant's age, good character, significant health difficulties, and the delay in the matter coming to trial. All matters were properly considered and addressed in his sentencing remarks.
27. This was a very serious offence of rape for the reasons identified by the judge. It has had a very long-lasting impact on the complainant, as can be seen from her Victim Personal Statement written nearly six years after the incident.
28. The sentence of seven years' imprisonment is not manifestly excessive. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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