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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (High Court Judges) >> A, Re (Care Proceedings: Non-Accidental Injuries: Identifying the Perpetrator) [2025] EWFC 54 (14 March 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2025/54.html Cite as: [2025] EWFC 54 |
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Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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A London Borough |
Applicant |
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(1) A Mother (2) A Father (3) A (By his Children's Guardian) |
Respondents |
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An Assessment Centre |
Intervenor |
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Re: A (Care Proceedings: Non-Accidental Injuries: Identifying the Perpetrator) |
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Alison Grief KC and Alison Brooks (instructed by Emma Taylor at SBS Solicitors) for the First Respondent
Denise Gilling KC and Elpha LeCointe (instructed by Cathy Snowdon at Owen White Catlin Solicitors) for the Second Respondent
Pamela Warner and Costanza Bertoni (instructed by Samantha Little at Russell Cooke Solicitors) for the Third Respondent
Kemi Mustapha (directly instructed as a Solicitor Advocate) for the Intervenor
Hearing dates: 1-19 July 2024, 24 July, and 20 November 2024
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Crown Copyright ©
Ms Justice Henke:
Introduction
The Issues
i) Who caused them?
ii) Whether either parent failed to protect A?
iii) Whether A was forcibly fed by his father thereby damaging his lingual frenulum?
iv) Whether either or both of A's parents failed to seek medical advice or treatment for A within a reasonable time in relation to the bleeding in A's mouth?
v) Whether the parents' handling of A in the Assessment Centre presented a risk of physical harm?
This Hearing
The Parties' Positions in Closing
i) Lying a maximum of 3 minutes without moving with A on her chest (in which she was merely asked did you fall asleep and the worker could not assert that she was, in fact asleep); and
ii) placing A on the bed for 21 seconds whilst she stood in front of him the whole time before picking him up,
do not meet the three elements set out by Peter Jackson LJ in Re B-T (A Child: Threshold Conditions) [2020] EWCA Civ 697. I have re-read that decision and specifically reminded myself of paragraph 45 of the judgment:
45. There are three elements to the harm required by the threshold condition in section 31(2) of the CA 1989 : it must be actual or likely; it must be significant; and it must be due to parenting that is not reasonable.
Further it is submitted on behalf of the mother that neither alleged event provides an evidential basis for asserting that there is a real possibility that the mother caused the injuries.
"62. Failure to protect comes in innumerable guises. It often relates to a mother who has covered up for a partner who has physically or sexually abused her child or, one who has failed to get medical help for her child in order to protect a partner, sometimes with tragic results. It is also a finding made in cases where continuing to live with a person (often in a toxic atmosphere, frequently marked with domestic violence) is having a serious and obvious deleterious effect on the children in the household. The harm, emotional rather than physical, can be equally significant and damaging to a child."
63. Such findings where made in respect of a carer, often the mother, are of the utmost importance when it comes to assessments and future welfare considerations. A finding of failing to protect can lead a Court to conclude that the children's best interests will not be served by remaining with, or returning to, the care of that parent, even though that parent may have been wholly exonerated from having caused any physical injuries.
64. Any Court conducting a Finding of Fact Hearing should be alert to the danger of such a serious finding becoming 'a bolt on' to the central issue of perpetration or of falling into the trap of assuming too easily that, if a person was living in the same household as the perpetrator, such a finding is almost inevitable. As Aikens LJ observed in Re J, "nearly all parents will be imperfect in some way or another."
i) Did the Assessment Centre fail to adequately supervise A's bath time? It was submitted that when the family arrived at the Assessment Centre, they signed a "Working Agreement." Paragraph 3 of the agreement included the parents agreeing to be observed by a staff member whilst undertaking all care tasks in relation to A. Paragraph 4 of the agreement says the parents should "report all basic care tasks with A to staff so this can be observed in person or via camera/or be recorded." It is averred that the evidence demonstrates that the parents failed on several occasions to follow these important rules and principles. It is said that they failed on several occasions to verbally inform staff before starting to bathe A. The father told the court that the reason why he sometimes failed to wait for staff was because he just wanted to get things done quickly, because other residents might want to use the bathroom. It is submitted that he also told the court that he was always expecting someone to come up. Mr X (junior) gave evidence that when parents took A to the bathroom without informing Assessment Centre staff first, they usually went to the bathroom without adequate preparation for A's bath. That meant that when staff arrived at the bathroom, they would have to go back to the family's room to bring adequate items of clothing or whatever else was needed for A. This would usually result in A being left on his own with his parent or parents. One of the rooms, apart from the staff toilet, where there is no CCTV at the Assessment Centre is the bathroom.
(ii). Did the Assessment Centre fail to protect A adequately? It is submitted that it is wrong to assume that the Assessment Centre staff failed to protect A adequately. Evidence revealed there were occasions when the father was seen to be heavy handed or rough handed when handling A. Staff intervened on such occasions, advising the father to be gentler with A. It is submitted that the Assessment Centre was diligent in its observations of A and ensured any bruising, marks or injuries were evidenced by body maps and photographs, brought to the attention of the local authority, and that A was taken for medical attention at the GP, Hospital B or that medical attention was sought from 111 in relation to the mouth injury.
(iii) Did Ms H cause injuries to A on 4.1.2023? It is submitted that it is clear from the CCTV evidence of 4.1.2023 and the expert medical evidence in the proceedings that A's injuries could not have been caused by Ms H.
(iv) Did the Assessment Centre staff cause A's injury when they had sole care of him in the absence of his parents? It is submitted that the evidence has shown that A was looked after by the Assessment Centre staff on five occasions without his parents. On behalf of the Assessment Centre, the evidence of Ms N, Ms X (senior), Mr X (junior), Ms D, Ms S and others is relied upon. In evidence, the Assessment Centre staff have confirmed that there were always other staff members in the staff room whenever A was taken to the staff room. Hence, A was never truly alone when taken there. It is averred that evidence from Ms N revealed that the only time that A was truly alone with staff members was when he was taken to the GP for his immunisation; and this was because his parents were unable to wake up to take him to the GP for his appointment.
The Law
19. The term 'non-accidental injury' may be a term of art used by clinicians as a shorthand and I make no criticism of its use but it is a 'catch-all' for everything that is not an accident. It is also a tautology: the true distinction is between an accident which is unexpected and unintentional and an injury which involves an element of wrong. That element of wrong may involve a lack of care and / or intent of a greater or lesser degree that may amount to negligence, recklessness or deliberate infliction. While an analysis of that kind may be helpful to distinguish deliberate infliction from, say, negligence, it is unnecessary in any consideration of whether the threshold criteria are satisfied because what the statute requires is something different namely, findings of fact that at least satisfy the significant harm, attributability and objective standard of care elements of section 31(2).
20. The court's function is to make the findings of fact that it is able on the evidence and then analyse those findings against the statutory formulation. The gloss imported by the use of unexplained legal, clinical or colloquial terms is not helpful to that exercise nor is it necessary for the purposes of section 31(2) to characterise the fact of what happened as negligence, recklessness or in any other way. Just as non-accidental injury is a tautology, 'accidental injury' is an oxymoron that is unhelpful as a description. If the term was used during the discussion after the judgment had been given as a description of one of the possibilities of how the harm had been caused, then it should not have been; it being a contradiction in terms. If, as is often the case when a clinical expert describes harm as being a 'non-accidental injury', there is a range of factual possibilities, those possibilities should be explored with the expert and the witnesses so that the court can understand which, if any, described mechanism is compatible with the presentation of harm.
21. The threshold is not concerned with intent or blame; it is concerned with whether the objective standard of care which it would be reasonable to expect for the child in question has not been provided so that the harm suffered is attributable to the care actually provided. The judge is not limited to the way the case is put by the local authority but if options are not adequately explored a judge may find a vital piece of the jigsaw missing when s/he comes to look at all the evidence in the round.
"I also consider that the judge was in error in relation to the issues of propensity and hindsight bias. The question of propensity or similar fact evidence arises where an individual's behaviour in other circumstances makes it more likely that he will have behaved in the manner now alleged: see R v P (Children: Similar Fact Evidence) [2020] EWCA Civ 1088, [2020] 4 WLR 132 at [23]. In that case, the question was whether a's behaviour towards one partner was admissible in relation to allegations made by another partner. Here, the court was concerned with a sequence of events within the same family. Self-evidently, one finding about a parent's behaviour towards a child might be relevant to another similar allegation and there was no need to resort to the concept of propensity or to erect artificial barriers around the assessment of evidence. Similarly, the well-known concept of hindsight bias cannot deflect the court from making a common-sense assessment of the evidence as a whole, and I do not understand the judge's apprehension that the local authority was asking him to do something unusual or impermissible."
"[101B] …The range of facts which may properly be taken into account is infinite. Facts including the history of members of the family, the state of relationships within a family, proposed changes within the membership family, parental attitudes, and omissions which might not reasonably have been expected, just as much as actual physical assaults. They include threats, and abnormal behaviour by a child, and unsatisfactory parental responses to complaints or allegations. And facts, which are minor or even trivial if considered in isolation, taken together may suffice to satisfy the court of the likelihood of future harm. The court will attach to all the relevant facts the appropriate weight when coming to an overall conclusion on the crucial issue."
"Where a prosecution is able, by advancing an array of experts, to identify a non-accidental injury and the defence can identify no alternative cause, it is tempting to conclude that the prosecution has proved its case. Such a temptation must be resisted. In this, as in so many fields of medicine, the evidence may be insufficient to exclude beyond reasonable doubt an unknown cause. As Cannings teaches, even where, on examination of all the evidence, every possible known cause has been excluded, the cause may still remain unknown.".
In Re R (Care Proceedings: Causation) [2011] EWHC 1715 Fam, Mr Justice Hedley, who had been part of the constitution of the Court of Appeal in the Henderson case, developed this point further at paragraph 10:
"A temptation there described is ever present in family proceedings too and in my judgment should be as firmly resisted there as the courts are required to resist it in criminal law. In other words, there has to be factored into every case which concerns a discrete aetiology giving rise to significant harm a consideration as to whether the cause is unknown. That affects neither the burden nor the standard of proof. It is simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the causation advanced by the one shouldering the burden of proof is established".
Later in the judgment at paragraph 19 Mr Justice Hedley added this observation:
"In my judgment a conclusion of unknown aetiology in respect of an infant represents neither a provision of professional nor forensic failure. It simply recognises that we still have much to learn and it also recognises that it is dangerous and wrong to infer nonaccidental injury merely from the absence of any other understood mechanism. Maybe it simply represents a general acknowledgement that we are fearfully and wonderfully made."
Specifically, in Re U (supra) Dame Elizabeth Butler Sloss stated at paragraph [23]:
"i. the cause of an injury or an episode that cannot be explained scientifically remains equivocal.
ii. recurrence is not in itself probative.
iii. particular caution is necessary in any case where the medical experts disagree, one opinion declining to exclude a reasonable possibility of natural cause iv. the court must always be on guard against the over-dogmatic expert, the expert whose reputation or amour proper is at stake, or the expert who has developed a scientific prejudice v. the judge in care proceedings must never forget that today's medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research will throw light into corners that are at present dark."
a. Whilst appropriate attention must be paid to the opinion of medical experts, those opinions need to be considered in the context of all the other evidence. In A County Council v KD & L [2005] EWHC 144 Fam. at paragraphs 39 to 44, Mr Justice Charles observed: "It is important to remember that (1) the roles of the court and the expert are distinct and (2) it is the court that is in the position to weigh up the expert evidence against its findings on the other evidence. The judge must always remember that he or she is the person who makes the final decision.
b. Later in the same judgment, Mr Justice Charles added at paragraph 49: "In a case where the medical evidence is to the effect that the likely cause is non-accidental and thus human agency, a court can reach a finding on the totality of the evidence either (a) that on the balance of probability an injury has a natural cause, or is not a non-accidental injury, or (b) that a local authority has not established the existence of the threshold to the civil standard of proof … The other side of the coin is that in a case where the medical evidence is that there is nothing diagnostic of a non-accidental injury or human agency and the clinical observations of the child, although consistent with non-accidental injury or human agency, are the type asserted is more usually associated with accidental injury or infection, a court can reach a finding on the totality of the evidence that, on the balance of probability there has been a non-accidental injury or human agency as asserted and the threshold is established."
c. As Mr Justice Ryder (as he then was) observed in A County Council v A Mother and others [2005] EWHC 31 (Fam) "A factual decision must be based on all available materials, i.e. be judged in context and not just upon medical or scientific materials, no matter how cogent they may in isolation seem to be".
d. The inability of a parent to explain an event cannot be relied upon to find an event proved. Per Re M (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 1580 at §16
e. The burden of disproving a reasonable explanation put forward by the parents falls on the local authority: Per §10 of S (Children) [2014] EWCA Civ 1447.
f. There is no burden shifted to the parents to prove a natural cause for symptoms. In Lancashire County Council v D and E [2010] 2 FLR 196 FD Charles J said:
"[36] The exercise of identifying a perpetrator, or pool of perpetrators, forms part of the exercise of considering whether there was an inflicted injury. In my view, it is important to remember this because it removes or reduces an approach which considers the overall question from the standpoint that someone with the opportunity to injure a child has to show that he or she did not do so. Again, in my view, the approach of the local authority and the guardian, at times, came perilously close to this. The correct position is that a medical view as to the most likely cause of injuries is that that cause is clearly established as a real possibility that has to be considered, in all the circumstances of the case, together with the other possibilities, in determining whether a child was the victim of an inflicted injury."
g. In Re M (Fact finding: Burden of Proof) [2013] 2 FLR 874 at paragraph 881 Ward LJ stated:
"That, too, was the effect of the judge's view of the case: that absent a parental explanation, there was no satisfactory benign explanation, ergo there must be a malevolent explanation. And it is that leap which troubles me. It does not seem to me that the conclusion necessarily follows unless, wrongly, the burden of proof has been reversed, and the parents were required to satisfy the court that this is not a non-accidental injury."
7. It is therefore possible in cases of non-accidental injury for the attributability condition to be satisfied without identifying the person who inflicted the injury. But it is well established that a court should where possible endeavour to identify the perpetrator. The standard of proof for identifying a perpetrator is the balance of probabilities: Re C (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] AC 11 ; Re S-B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2009] UKSC 17, [2010] 1 AC 678.
[…]
Baroness Hale, endorsing the earlier statements in the Court of Appeal in North Yorkshire County Council v SA [2003] 2 FLR 849, said (at paragraph 43):
"If the evidence is not such as to establish responsibility on the balance of probabilities it should nevertheless be such as to establish whether there is a real possibility that a particular person was involved. When looking at how best to protect the child and provide for his future, the judge will have to consider the strength of that possibility as part of the overall circumstances of the case."
"Drawing matters together, it can be seen that the concept of a pool of perpetrators seeks to strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual, including those of the child, and the importance of child protection. It is a means of satisfying the attributable threshold condition that only arises where the court is satisfied that there has been significant harm arising from (in shorthand) ill-treatment and where the only 'unknown' is which of a number of persons is responsible. So, to state the obvious, the concept of the pool does not arise at all in the normal run of cases where the relevant allegation can be proved to the civil standard against an individual or individuals in the normal way. Nor does it arise where only one person could possibly be responsible. In that event, the allegation is either proved or it is not. There is no room for a finding of fact on the basis of 'real possibility', still less on the basis of suspicion. There is no such thing as a pool of one."
"The court should first consider whether there is a 'list' of people who had the opportunity to cause the injury. It should then consider whether it can identify the actual perpetrator on the balance of probability … Only if it cannot identify the perpetrator to the civil standard of proof should it go on to ask in respect of those on the list: "Is there a likelihood or real possibility that A or B or C was the perpetrator or a perpetrator of the inflicted injuries?" Only if there is should A or B or C be placed into the 'pool'."
Finally, Lord Justice Baker reminded us in Re Y, V and B supra that Peter Jackson LJ in Re B added these further observations:
"51. It should also be noted that in the leading cases there were two, three or four known individuals from whom any risk to the child must have come. The position of each individual was then investigated and compared. That is as it should be. To assess the likelihood of harm having been caused by A or B or C, one needs as much information as possible about each of them in order to make the decision about which if any of them should be placed in the pool. So, where there is an imbalance of information about some individuals in comparison to others, particular care may need to be taken to ensure that the imbalance does not distort the assessment of the possibilities. The same may be said where the list of individuals has been whittled down to a pool of one named individual alongside others who are not similarly identified. This may be unlikely, but the present case shows that it is not impossible. Here it must be shown that there genuinely is a pool of perpetrators and not just a pool of one by default."
"The unvarnished test is clear: following a consideration of all the available evidence and applying the simple balance of probabilities, a judge either can, or cannot, identify a perpetrator. If he or she cannot do so, then, in accordance with Re B [2019], he or she should consider whether there is a real possibility that each individual on the list inflicted the injury in question."
"To these matters I would only add that in cases where repeated accounts are given of events surrounding injury and death, the court must think carefully about the significance or otherwise of any reported discrepancies. They may arise for a number of reasons. One possibility is of course that they are lies designed to hide culpability. Another is that they are lies told for other reasons. Further possibilities include faulty recollection or confusion at times of stress or when the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record-keeping or recollection of the person hearing and relaying the accounts. The possible effects of delay and repeated questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect on one person hearing accounts given by others. As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural - a process that might inelegantly be described as 'story-creep' - may occur without any necessary inference of bad faith."
The Background
i) 1cm x 1cm x 1cm triangular red area, posterior and superior to the lateral malleolus of the right foot (the outer aspect of the right ankle).
ii) 1cm x 0.5cm red mark located on lateral surface of lower leg, superior to the lateral malleolus (above the right ankle).
iii) 1.2cm linear red mark on lateral aspect of right foot/5th toe.
iv) 0.3cm x 0.3cm red mark on left lower leg, medial aspect of the anterior tibia.
v) 1.5cm x 0.4cm red mark on left lower leg, lateral aspect of the anterior tibia.
vi) 0.3cmx0.2cm red mark on left lower leg, medial aspect of the anterior tibia.
vii) 1.6cm vertical linear red mark overlying Achilles tendon of left leg.
Each of the above marks were considered to be consistent with bruising. Father suggested that each of them could be due to tight clothing.
i) Non-blanching linear lines red in colour around 1 cm in length over the right iliac fossa.
ii) A large area of bruising measuring 7cmx 4.5cm x 2.5cm which was bluish in colour
iii) Linear scratches on the left ankle 0.5cm-1 cm
iv) A brown circular mark on the right posterior calf which was 0.5 cm.
The Evidence
The Clinical Evidence
The Experts' Evidence
i) the posterior aspect of the right 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th ribs.
ii) the anterior aspect of right 4th, 5th 6th 7th and 8th ribs.
iii) the anterior aspect of the left 3rd, 4th.5th, 6th,7th, 8th, 9th and 10th ribs.
iv) the left 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th rib.
From the amount of healing response seen on the survey, Dr Johnson estimated all the rib fractures to be between 3-8 weeks old. However, Dr Johnson reminded the court that radiological dating of fractures is difficult, imprecise and a subjective estimation.
i) Dr Hall that there is no evidence that A's fractures could be attributed to A's premature birth and no evidence of any underlying metabolic bone disease.
ii) Professor Ng and her conclusions, recognising her as an expert in her field.
Social Workers and other professionals
The Assessment Centre Staff
Management
i. Ms X (senior). Ms X (senior) is the Registered manager and company director of the Assessment Centre. She has been running the Assessment Centre for 8 years. When she gave her evidence, it was obvious that she had pride in the centre, was defensive of it and its practices. After all, the whole purpose of the centre is to safeguard, and A had been injured whilst staying there with his parents and she and the centre had much to lose. That said, I formed the view that she was ultimately a truthful witness who gave evidence upon which I could rely.
Ms X (senior) told me that she does not have any social work experience; Mr K was to provide a parenting assessment. The PAMS element of the assessment was to be conducted by Ms N. The PAMs assessment was not included in the Midway assessment. She had no direct contact with the parents.
In terms of observation in the placement, she told the court that the CCTV covered all areas except the bathroom. She accepted that there were blind spots in the parents' room, namely behind the door and from the chest up by the room's window. The CCTV did not have audio but there was a baby monitor. A member of staff should be present when all care tasks are carried out and parents are expected to notify staff if they intend to carry out such tasks. She had not reviewed the CCTV footage relevant to A's stay at the placement because the police had taken it. At the time staff had seen the father rough handle A and had intervened. That was recorded in the logs which they had reviewed after A was found to have been injured. She had not asked any member of staff if they had caused injuries as staff had reported their safeguarding concerns. Staff had taken A into the office but there was always at least one other member of staff there. She could not countenance any member of staff having caused the injury. They had a safe recruitment policy
ii. Mr X (junior). Mr X (junior) gave evidence before me twice. He is Ms X's (senior) son. He was the key worker who worked with the family. He had concerns about the tit-for-tat between the parents; about them not getting up early enough etc. The mother was overall gentle and caring but had to be encouraged to do tasks. The father could be gentle with A but he was also heavy handed when patting his back and touching him. You could hear the father on the monitor patting A's back. He was mortified that A was injured on the Unit. Mr X (junior) actually broke down in tears when giving evidence and was clearly devastated at what had happened but also, I considered during his first time in the witness box, defensive of the Unit and worried about reputational damage. When he gave evidence for the first time he had not seen the CCTV footage of the time A was at the Unit because it had been in the possession of the police. When he returned to the witness box for the second time, he had had the opportunity to view selected parts of the CCTV. Having done so he had to accept that there were two occasions when A had been in the bathroom with his father without supervision in January 2023. Mr X (junior) accepted in cross-examination on behalf of the mother, that the father had a habit of not reporting that he was going to carry out a care task before he did it. However, in cross-examination by the father, he had to accept that on 4 January 2023 the father had said over the monitor that he was taking A for a bath. I got the impression from listening to what the witness said and the way he said it, he had informally relaxed supervision of the father with A because he did not consider A would come to harm in his care and that he could leave him to bath his son. I have asked myself why then did his log entries not reflect that conclusion or the lack of supervision on two occasions. I have decided that there is only one answer to that question - that is that he knew the tasks should be supervised and that was what the local authority expected of the Unit. What had happened was not consistent with the 24/7 monitoring and supervision the local authority had requested of the placement. I consider that Mr X (junior) was a defensive witness. When he gave evidence on the second occasion, he did not appear to me to understand the import of two occasions when there was no supervision or of his log not being accurate on those occasions.
The Family Support Workers
iii. Ms N. She is PAMS trained. Her role was to do work with the family and Mr K was the ISW responsible for doing the assessment. He would receive all updates and they would have conversations. She would work with the parents and give them verbal feedback. She had not completed any direct work with the parents.
She had had A in her sole care and thus was on the list of those who had had opportunity to injure him. Nevertheless, she gave her evidence fairly and professionally. She was obviously an honest witness. She had taken A to a GP's appointment because his parents could not be raised from their sleep. She told me she had handled him appropriately on the journey to the surgery and back and whilst in the surgery. Her logs were accurate and reflected what she had observed. Her view of the mother was that she was extremely slow at tasks and very gentle. In relation to the father, she told me that he was very pleasant and clearly loved A and M. Her concern was he needed to be more gentle with A and that he did not know his own strength. She had never seen him intentionally harm A. No worker ever suggested at the time that either parent would have intentionally harmed A.
iv. Ms S. She was another honest witness. When monitoring the CCTV, she would write her note at that time but if out of the office, she would make it as soon as she could. When she had said at C346 paragraph 10 that the father had been heavy handed and impatient with A, what she had meant was that he was not very gentle and she had had to remind him to be a bit more gentle as A was so small. A would get frustrated and he would cry. She had noticed that A developed a high pitched cry which you would hear if you picked him up too quickly. She noticed it when A was handled and mentioned it to management.
v. Ms E gave evidence before me. She had not worked much with this family. In her statement to this court she described how A's parents would need a lot of prompting and would not always naturally attend to A when he was crying. In evidence her view, which I accept, was that this family needed more prompting than other families that she had worked with. She noted that A cried very loudly and he had a unique cry - very high pitched. She did not know the reason for it. She and other members of staff were concerned about it. She had observed the family more closely after the staff (Ms Z and Ms O) had spoken about it. I found her to be a calm and considered witness who was obviously honest.
vi. Ms Z. In her statement to the court Ms Z described M as being slow when tending to A's needs. In relation to the father she described him as sometimes needing to be prompted to meet the child's needs. In her statement and in her evidence before me she described how every time the father holds the baby he just screams, an unusual scream, and that every time A screamed she or another member of staff would go upstairs immediately to check on him. Ms Z told me that she had seen the father be rough with A on one occasion and a bit impatient with him. He would lose his temper and say to A - why are you crying? She had heard A's unusual scream only 3 or 4 times but on each occasion his father was holding him. The staff had thought at the time that A might be teething. A's parents had made a complaint about her which had been dealt with at the time. The father later apologised to her about it. It was clear from the manner in which she gave her evidence that she bore the parents no ill will. Ms Z was a member of the night staff. The night staff raised concerns with management about A's unique cry. The mother was gentle and slower with A in carrying out tasks. The father was too quick. She could not explain why every time the father held A, he screamed. She told me that she saw nothing to suggest that the father had hurt A. I found Ms Z to be an honest and fair witness.
vii. Ms D. She was an honest and nervous witness. She had had sole care of A but denied harming A. I accept her denial. She told me that overall the mother was very gentle with A but needed prompting to care for him. She had a polite and respectful working relationship with the father. She had observed that A was more upset when held by his father but observed that might be because he held him more. She observed tit-for-tat between A's parents. She observed the father on occasion to be irritated with A.
viii. Ms H denied ever hurting A and when cross-examined on behalf of the mother about a specific incident when she had lost her grip on him momentarily said - absolutely not, not too tight. She had not in panic or to stop him falling gripped him too tight. I found her to be an honest witness and an impressive witness. She was open and reasonable in the answers she gave. I accept her denial. When she was cross-examined on behalf of the father, she had concerns that father had been too heavy handed with A. She could not recall if he cried with others, other than the father. When she spoke about the father, she did so professionally and with care. Despite the fact that the parents had effectively accused her of causing A injury, she did so without any ill-will. Her answers when questioned on behalf of the parents were measured and professional.
ix. Ms J. She told me that she had intervened to tell the father to support A's back on one occasion. She described the father as being a nice person. He was more hands on than the mother. He was attentive but could be heavy handed. He would rush and we would tell him to slow it down.
x. Ms M gave evidence to me by link from Uganda. She confirmed her statement and was an obviously truthful witness. She had had a normal relationship with Father, just as she would with any other client. She had heard A's unusual scream and seen the father comforting him.
xi. Ms A. Ms A confirmed her statement. She had no independent recall in the witness box and her evidence was accordingly brief.
xii. Ms T was a weekend worker who confirmed her statement. She did not know what A's cry signified: babies cry. She regarded the father as lazy as it would be his turn to get up to care for A but he would nudge the mother to do it. From what she saw nothing caused her to consider A was at risk of harm
xiii. Ms C. Ms C confirmed her statements. She too told me that the mother was soft and caring with A. She had had a good relationship with the father. She remembered a little bit of conflict between the parents.
xiv. Ms P. Ms P confirmed her statements. She had no recollection of events beyond that which she had recorded in her notes.
xv. Ms R. It was apparent as she gave her evidence that Ms R had little independent recollection beyond her observations in the logs but she was able to tell me about the events of 25 December 2022. She had heard M say that A was bleeding from his mouth. She was worried by that bleeding and panicked. She could not get through to 999 and so dialled 111. Later that evening she had intervened when Father was playing airplanes with A.
xvi. Ms O set out in her statement her concern that every time F held A he would scream and cry. Other staff members experienced the same thing but we thought F just had a firm grip on him due to his stocky build.
xvii. Ms R . She gave a statement within which she set out the time line for evening of 25 December 2022 as follows:
18:23 - M and F take A upstairs and put him in the cot. M and F are resting on the bed on their phones. 19:30 - M and F are playing charades in the lounge with the other residents. A is upstairs asleep in his cot. 20:18 - A is wriggling around in the cot awake and then falls back to sleep 20:45 - M leaves the lounge area and goes to the room to check on A. 21:10 – F knocks on the door to request the Infacol as A's feed is coming up. He also informs that he will also be changing his nappy 21:15 – F changes A's nappy and does this competently whilst engaging with A throughout. 21:26 – M knocks the door and requests medication Desogestrel 21:45 - M came running downstairs in a panic to inform A was bleeding from the mouth. Staff assisted and called 999 who advised to call 111. Whilst calling Father observed the bleeding was coming from under A's tongue 22:19 - F started to throw A up in the air and was advised by staff not to do that. F's response was he is trained in it. Staff also asked for F & M to take off the disco lights so staff could observe A attentively. Both parents agreed and appeared fine with this. 22:25 - Staff called Duty Manager Ms X (senior) to advise whether to continue feeding A as both M and F cannot get through to 111. Duty Manager advised to keep feeding as normal. 22:35 - Staff inform M and F to continue feeding. F appears frustrated as he does not want to keep calling 111 as he says A is now settled. Staff inform him that even if they go to sleep staff will take over and call as this was protocol 22:38 - M is in the kitchen making A a 6-ounce bottle 22:50 - M is feeding A a 6-ounce bottle in the bedroom 23:12 - A has stopped feeding and fallen asleep. M has put him back in the cot to sleep. 23:30 - F is changing A's nappy whilst he is on a phone call which appears to be a friend.
The challenge to her evidence did not alter the timeline.
The Parents' Evidence
My Findings with My Reasons
i) 6 fractures to the posterior right side
ii) 5 rib fractures to the anterior right side
iii) 8 rib fractures to the anterior left side
iv) 4 rib fractures post laterally on the left side.
In addition, I find that whilst at the Assessment Centre, A sustained a fracture to his left wrist. He also suffered a tear to his lingual frenulum.
i) A's blood clotted normally and that he was therefore at no greater risk of bleeding than any other child of his age and development; and
ii) there is no radiological, metabolic, genetic or other evidence that A suffered from or suffers from any bone disease or fragility, including osteogenesis imperfecta or osteopenia of prematurity. Accordingly, I find that A was no more susceptible to fractures than another child of similar age and development.
a) F, like M, knew of A's habit of putting the teat under his tongue and that as a consequence, he knew, as she did, he needed to proceed gently when feeding A.
b) That evening, A had been difficult to settle. He had needed Infacol and Desogestrel.
c) On his own admission F found feeding A hard. It, in any event, made him stressed and frustrated.
I find that it is likely that F was stressed when feeding A on 25 December 2022. I find that it is likely that he became frustrated when feeding him as he had previously on 3 December 2022. I find that on 25 December 2022 and shortly before 21.45hrs, F had given A his bottle without taking the care that a reasonable parent should have given to him. He did not ensure that the teat was not under A's tongue, and he placed the bottle in A's mouth with inappropriate force, sufficient to cause the lingual frenulum to tear. I find that M's reaction was almost immediate at the sight of the blood. She might not have seen F cause the injury but she saw the aftermath. M did not tell the court the truth when she said she didn't know what caused A's mouth to bleed. I find that she knew that A had been fed by his father shortly before blood came from A's mouth and that she knows in her heart of hearts that F caused that injury. However, I find that she simply could not bring herself in evidence to say he did it.