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	England and Wales Family Court Decisions (High Court Judges)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (High Court Judges) >> Galbraith-Marten v De Renee (Extension of Extended Civil Restraint Order) [2025] EWFC 96 (15 April 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2025/96.html Cite as: [2025] EWFC 96

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IN THE FAMILY COURT
SITTING AT THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		15/04/2025

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 15 April 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives. ............................. THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE COBB

The Honourable Mr Justice COBB:

Introduction

1. This judgment sets out my reasons for the order I propose to make (see §§34-36 below) in respect of two discrete applications brought within these long-running financial remedy proceedings. The applications are:

i) An application dated 24 September 2024 made by Jason Galbraith-Marten KC by which he seeks a further extension of an Extended Civil Restraint Order ('ECRO') against Ms Catherine De Renée, pursuant to the provisions of rule 4.8 Family Procedure Rules 2010 ('FPR 2010'), and its associated Practice Direction (PD4B), especially at §3.10;

ii) An application dated 10 March 2025 made by Ms De Renée by which she seeks "financial/maintenance" orders against Mr Galbraith-Marten; in the body of the application she references the alleged non-disclosure by Mr Galbraith-Marten of his annual tax returns for the last two years, in apparent breach of the requirement upon him to provide disclosure for the purposes of the computation of child maintenance. In her oral submissions, it became clear that within the spirit (if not the letter) of this application she actually sought a wide-reaching order for disclosure of financial information from Mr Galbraith-Marten in order to assist her to consider further whether to apply to the court for an order for relief under Part III Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 ('MFPA 1984') and/or variation of child maintenance under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 ('CA 1989').

There is, additionally, an oral application by Mr Galbraith-Marten under rule 29.1 FPR 2010 for disclosure of Ms De Renée's home address and contact details (she having filed a form C8 earlier this year). I deal with this separately at §§38-44 below.

2. Important background context to the judgment which follows is to be found in the following judgments, which all relate to these parties and this litigation:

i) MG v FG (Schedule 1: Application to Strike out: Estoppel: Legal Costs Funding) [2016] EWHC 1964;

ii) De Renée v Galbraith-Marten [2022] EWFC 118;

iii) Galbraith-Marten v De Renée [2023] EWFC 141;

iv) Galbraith-Marten v De Renée [2023] EWFC 253.

Additionally, I have delivered one unreported judgment (29 January 2024) disposing of Ms De Renée's earlier application for permission (under the ECRO) to make an application for permission to bring proceedings under Part III of the MFPA 1984. I refer to this judgment briefly below (see §6(iii)).

3. The first ECRO was made in this case of the court's own motion (Mostyn J) in October 2019. That order has been extended twice, most recently in October 2022; that order expired in October 2024. The hearing of Mr Galbraith-Marten's application has been postponed several times over the last six months at Ms De Renée's request, in part on account of her alleged ill-health, and also because she wished to avail herself of legal advice and representation. The applications for adjournments have been unopposed, and I have made interim orders pending this hearing. In the event, Ms De Renée has been unrepresented at the hearing.
4. For the purposes of determining these applications I have read a number of documents, including:

i) Mr Galbraith-Marten's application referred to at §1(i) above;

ii) Mr Galbraith-Marten's Skeleton Argument dated 1 April 2025 in support of his application and in opposition to Ms De Renée's application;

iii) The documents contained in the trial bundle (generated in the main by Ms De Renée, including three detailed witness statements);

iv) Ms De Renée's application dated 10 March 2025, together with her statement in support (and exhibits, one of which was a letter to the Bar Standards Board dated 23 January 2024 in relation to Mr Galbraith-Marten, and a number of the judges who have presided over hearings in this case);

v) Ms De Renée's statement dated 31 March 2025, with five exhibits;

vi) A further short statement from Ms De Renée (11 April 2025) which she requested permission to file following the oral hearing of the applications, to which Mr Galbraith-Marten chose not to reply.

I have received the oral submissions of both parties.

Background

5. The depressing background to this application is conveniently summarised in an abbreviated form at [4] to [12] of my last judgment at [2023] EWFC 253. Suffice it to say that the parties have been engaged in litigation in England and Australia in relation to financial matters on and off since early 2009.
6. It is material for present purposes to note that:

i) Ms De Renée has made at least four applications for relief in this jurisdiction under Schedule 1 CA 1989 (namely, in 2011, 2016, 2018, and 2022);

ii) Ms De Renée has made at least three applications for permission to pursue relief under Part III MFPA 1984 (namely in 2015, 2019, and 2023); the last such application (for which she required leave under the ECRO), made on the eve of the last substantive hearing (see [2023] EWFC 253 at [33]), was supported by two witness statements and just under 300 pages of documents;

iii) In disposing of the last application for permission (under the ECRO) to make an application for permission to apply under Part III MFPA 1984 (unreported judgment: 29 January 2024) (see (ii) above), I concluded that the "application is a further abuse of process" and "utterly hopeless";

iv) Ms De Renée has launched applications for permission to appeal against a number of final and interlocutory orders made since 2016; Ms De Renée has withdrawn other applications for permission to appeal before determination;

v) Ms De Renée made an application before Mostyn J in 2022 for Mr Galbraith-Marten to pay school fees at a private school for A; this application was described by Mostyn J as "untenable and unarguable" ([2022] EWFC 118 at [43]), and was refused. Undeterred, Ms De Renée informally renewed this application before me in 2023, and I rejected it ([2023] EWFC 253 at [18]);

vi) Various costs orders have been made against Ms De Renée, including an indemnity costs order, and most recently an order made by me in December 2023. I am told by Mr Galbraith-Marten (without contradiction) that the total outstanding sum of costs due to Mr Galbraith-Marten stands at more than £35,000;

vii) Ms De Renée has been subject to an ECRO continuously since October 2019. By its terms, she is "restrained from making applications in any court specified below concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which this order is made without first obtaining the permission of Mr Justice Mostyn or, if unavailable a permanent puisne judge of the Family Division of the High Court of Justice. The specified courts are the Court of Appeal, the High Court and the Family Court"; of course, provision is made within the order for her to apply for permission to make an application;

viii) When renewing the ECRO in 2022, Mostyn J confirmed that Mr Galbraith-Marten needed "the maximum protection from prospective unmeritorious claims by [Ms De Renée]" and described Ms De Renée's submissions to him at that time as "unfortunate litanies of invective"… "melodramatic and self-righteous";

ix) In 2023, Mr Galbraith-Marten successfully made an application to vary the terms of the 2022 order for child maintenance (by consent) under Schedule 1 CA 1989; I do not believe that he has made further substantive applications in this jurisdiction;

x) Mr Galbraith-Marten has made two applications for extensions to the ECRO.

7. Alongside the family law litigation, Ms De Renée has made extremely serious allegations to the police, repeated to this court, against Mr Galbraith-Marten, including allegations of "rape, grievous bodily harm, attempted murder, aggravated fraud, threats to sexually abuse the child, attacks on the mother's cat, and threats to kill": see [2022] EWFC 118 at [5] and [14]. Indeed, further (more recent) allegations in relation to alleged historic offences perpetrated by Mr Galbraith-Marten against Ms De Renée have been hinted at in these proceedings.
8. As signalled above, a substantive financial order under Schedule 1 CA 1989 was made by Mostyn J with the consent of both parties on 20 December 2022. This order provides at §4(a):

"The Respondent [Mr Galbraith-Marten] shall send to the Applicant [Ms De Renée], as soon as it becomes available to him, for each tax year commencing with the 2022/23 tax year and continuing until [A]'s eighteenth birthday, a copy of his submitted tax return showing his income from all sources".

The December 2022 order also provides §4(e):

"In the event that the Respondent fails to provide his tax return in accordance with clause (a) above, he acknowledges - and the Court endorses — that this will be sufficient ground for the Applicant to return the matter to Court, on the sole issue of the appropriate amount of child maintenance, notwithstanding any Civil Restraint Order or other prohibition that may be in force at the time".

9. That order was varied in part by a subsequent order made on 20 December 2023. By that order (December 2023) I set the periodical payments at the rate of £1,960 per calendar month, adopting a different formula for calculation, giving credit to Mr Galbraith-Marten for overpayments made. I ordered that for the future the payments would be varied automatically on 1 April for each applicable year by applying the formula set out in James v Seymour [2023] EWHC 844 (Fam) 675 to Mr Galbraith-Marten's gross annual income disclosed in his tax return.
10. I recited on the face of the order (in similar although not identical terms to the 2022 order) that:

"This order shall set the basis of the father's obligations to maintain the child until she attains the age of eighteen or finishes fulltime secondary education. The intention of this order is to avoid the need for any future litigation concerning the child support that the father is to pay to the mother for the benefit of the child."

11. Throughout these proceedings over a number of years, Ms De Renée has repeatedly claimed that Mr Galbraith-Marten failed to give full and frank financial disclosure to her of his financial circumstances in 2009 and at all times thereafter; she further asserts that he has manipulated and suppressed his financial situation to her detriment and the detriment of A (see [2023] EWFC 253 at [14]).

Mr Galbraith-Marten's case

12. Mr Galbraith-Marten contends that by her conduct since the last ECRO was made, Ms De Renée has shown little sign of letting up in her unwavering ambition to re-open the long-since-concluded matrimonial litigation. He points out that since the last ECRO was made, Ms De Renée has attempted to make two further applications:

i) for permission to pursue a Part III MFPA 1984 claim (December 2023) which I rejected, describing it as an 'abuse of process';

ii) the recent application (10 March 2025).

He relies on these applications as clear evidence of Ms De Renée's congoing persistent vexatiousness. He argues that, unless constrained by further order, Ms De Renée is bound to launch further wholly unmeritorious claims against him.

13. In response to Ms De Renée's application for financial disclosure based on alleged non-compliance with the order for the provision of tax returns, he contends that:

i) The application is plainly caught by the terms of the ECRO (contrary to Ms De Renée's submission);

ii) He has in fact provided the relevant information on which the child support computation can be made. In this regard, he has been able to produce documentary evidence to support his contention:

a) A copy e-mail to Ms De Renée dated June 2023 attaching his 2022/2023 accounts;

b) A copy e-mail in April 2024 forwarding an e-mail from his accountant explaining that his tax return is not yet available for the reason she explains, but attaching an excel spreadsheet setting out his profit & loss, workings and expenses, and the full tax calculation to enable the computation to be made.

Ms De Renée's case

14. As earlier mentioned (see §1(ii) above) Ms De Renée has filed, or purported to file, an application dated 10 March 2025. Within this application, Ms De Renée formally applies for "Financial/Maintenance orders". The application is specified on its face to be "urgent", though it plainly is not. On 12 March 2025 Ms De Renée attended before the Urgent Applications Judge (Lieven J) without notice (no explanation offered) to Mr Galbraith-Marten, seeking directions or orders on her application. Lieven J made no order on the application other than to direct its service on Mr Galbraith-Marten; she then rightly adjourned the application to be heard by me at this hearing which had been (with Ms De Renée's knowledge) fixed some weeks ago.
15. In the body of the application, Ms De Renée alleges that Mr Galbraith-Marten is in contempt of court by reason of his failure to provide his tax returns since 2022 as required by the order of December 2022 (see §8 above). She does not appear to seek an order for enforcement or committal, and she has not issued a form FC600, nor has she taken any steps in accordance with rules 37.3 and 37.4 of the FPR 2010.
16. Ms De Renée maintains that her current application falls outside of the terms of the ECRO. In her statement supporting this application Ms De Renée alleges that Mr Galbraith-Marten "has continued to remain in contempt of the recent financial orders, specifically in relation to the disclosure of his various tax returns… since the 2022 financial year." She alleges that he has further reduced the child maintenance without advising her of the reason.
17. The statement filed in support of the 10 March 2025 application contains a suggestion that Ms De Renée would seek my recusal from dealing with her application. This had been hinted at over a year ago, in documents filed in December 2023, and at that time I had specifically directed that if she sought my recusal she needed to file an application and short statement. In fact, she has made no formal application in this respect, then or now, and has not pursued this. I note that Ms De Renée has previously unsuccessfully sought the recusal of HHJ Oliver (who dealt with the private and public law proceedings concerning A) and Mostyn J (asserting that he had a conflict of interest, filing a three page witness statement in 2021 to that effect). Ms De Renée has also complained to the Bar Standards Board about Mr Galbraith-Marten, although I do not believe that any action was taken on her complaint; in the same letter she suggests that a number of judges (including the President of the Family Division and me) would be or had been biased against her. I note that Ms De Renée has previously issued complaints against solicitors instructed by her within these protracted proceedings both in England and in Australia.
18. As I referenced at §11 above, it is evident that Ms De Renée continues to adhere to a firm belief that Mr Galbraith-Marten has failed to give full disclosure of his finances over a number of years, and has repeatedly suppressed his income so as to defeat her Part III MFPA 1984 claim and the current child support computation. In her oral submissions, she was clear that she wishes now for the court to order extensive financial disclosure from Mr Galbraith-Marten so that she can see his "full financial landscape". She told me that Mr Galbraith-Marten has a "limitless capacity to misrepresent his financial circumstances", and complained that "his financial disclosure has been wanting for the last two decades". She told me in terms that she now wishes to consider pursuing a renewed application under Part III MFPA 1984 (this would be the fourth such application), and in order to be able to do so she needed (what she called) "full transparency"; she complained that she was working in a "blacked out jungle", adding "I want the truth and full daylight shone on this". Ms De Renée also confirmed that she is considering making a further application to vary the Schedule 1 application (this would be the fifth application under this statutory provision).
19. Ms De Renée addressed me at length at the hearing; notwithstanding her nerves and her state of anxiety, she was nonetheless able to present her case with great fluency, even if her remarks were at times lacking in focus. It is evident that she is angry and frustrated by what she sees as a gross injustice. That said, she entirely properly emphasised the seriousness of an ECRO and the impact it has on her access to justice (although she did not express herself exactly in these terms). She describes the ECRO as "defamatory" and "punitive" and a "public degradation". She asserted that she had not "behaved in any way since the last hearing in any way which justifies this…".
20. In drawing her submissions to a conclusion, she told me "I am not a perfect litigant but I have done my time… even if the previous ECRO had its purpose, I don't see how it could be justified after all this time".

The law

21. The lead application before me is that filed by Mr Galbraith-Marten, by which he seeks an extension of the ECRO.
22. Different considerations apply to an application for an extension of an ECRO as would apply to the first grant of such an order. Indeed, the sole criterion for determining an application for an extension of a civil restraint order is "appropriateness". Para.3.10 of PD4B FPR 2010 makes clear that the court may extend an ECRO (or a General Civil Restraint Order: para.4.10) for a further two years on each occasion "if it considers it appropriate to do so". The rationale for a different test for an extension of an ECRO (as opposed to a first grant) is that the person who has already been subject of an ECRO will (theoretically at least) have had limited if any opportunity to issue any application or claim ruled to be totally without merit.
23. The duration of the extended order must not exceed two years on any given occasion.
24. In determining this application, I have regard to all of the circumstances of the case, including the conduct of the person who is subject to the ECRO since the order was made, and their attitude towards further litigation which is to be gauged at the time of the hearing (i.e., have they demonstrated any interest or enthusiasm in persisting in unmeritorious litigation): see generally Re M [2024] EWFC 375, and the authorities cited therein. It is further appropriate for me to consider whether the extension of the order is necessary in order (a) to protect Mr Galbraith-Marten from vexatious proceedings against him and/or (b) to protect the finite resources of the court from vexatious waste: see Webster v Penley & Ashcroft [2023] EWHC 1034 (Ch), and Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset v Gray [2019] EWCA Civ 1675.

Discussion and Conclusion

Application for extension of the ECRO

25. I am satisfied that it is necessary for me to extend the ECRO for a further two years to protect Mr Galbraith-Marten from further vexatious proceedings against him and to protect the finite resources of the court. I say so for the following reasons.
26. First, it is important to consider the context of this application, and specifically the appalling litigation history which I have summarised above. I bear much in mind in particular the number of failed applications issued by Ms De Renée over a number of years, and the multiple findings of her abuse of the court process. I take into account the fact that she has, as recently as 10 March 2025, sought to issue a fresh application for financial disclosure from Mr Galbraith-Marten which (she told me, as is also evident from e-mails which she has sent to the court in the last month) is a likely precursor to further applications under Part III MFPA 1984 and/or Schedule 1 CA 1989. She seeks to have knowledge of Mr Galbraith-Marten's "full financial landscape".
27. Secondly, in her submissions Ms De Renée displayed her continuing fixation with Mr Galbraith-Marten's alleged non-disclosure of financial information, going back (she told me) "more than two decades". She continues to believe that she was gravely wronged by Mr Galbraith-Marten in proceedings which were concluded in Australia (with both parties being represented) as long ago as 2009.
28. Thirdly, Ms De Renée has performed a volte face in relation to the computation of child support for A. In July 2023, I recorded in my judgment that "she favoured the "longer-term benefit" of the imposition of a "calculative formula" which would secure the level of maintenance for the balance of A's minority" see [2023] EWFC 141 at [16] and also [38(iv)]. Regrettably, however, she now tells me that she seeks to re-open the computation, and award, of child support under Schedule 1 CA 1989.
29. Fourthly, it is clear that Ms De Renée wishes to re-launch a further Part III MFPA 1984 application. It is a matter of record that on the day before the hearing of the application by Mr Galbraith-Marten for the variation of the order under Schedule 1 in December 2023 Ms De Renée filed, or attempted to file, a renewed application under Part III (ibid.), seeking further financial relief pursuant to her overseas divorce (see [2023] EWFC 253 at [3]). I rejected this in January 2024 as an abuse of process.
30. For the reasons summarised above, I am satisfied that Ms De Renée has displayed, and continues to display, the type of persistent vexatiousness, even since the last ECRO was made, which warrants the making of this extended order. I am acutely conscious of the significant implications of such a draconian order; I am not insensitive to the impact of such an order on Ms De Renée. But if ever there was a case in which the necessity for such an order was justified, this is it. That said, this extended ECRO will not prohibit Ms De Renée's access to justice as such; it will require her to submit any new claim or application which falls within the scope of the order for review by a judge at the outset, to determine whether it should be permitted to proceed. I remind her that the purpose of such an order is to protect Mr Galbraith-Marten and the court itself from abuse of process; it not designed or intended to shut out claims or applications which are properly arguable: see Leggatt J (as he then was) in Nowak v The Nursing and Midwifery Council and Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust [2013] EWHC 1932 (QB)  at [59].

Application for 'financial/maintenance' order / disclosure of documents / contempt

31. There is no doubt in my mind that the application brought by Ms De Renée on 10 March 2025 for 'financial/maintenance orders' falls squarely within the ambit of the ECRO; her oral expansion of the ambit of this application at the hearing, by which she made clear that she seeks further financial disclosure, is yet more obviously a "matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which this order [was] made". Accordingly, Ms De Renée needs permission to bring the application.
32. Contrary to Ms De Renée's submission, I find that Mr Galbraith-Marten has complied with my earlier order for the provision of financial information in the last two tax years so as to facilitate the computation of child support in accordance with the relevant formula. No enforcement question arises.
33. There is, otherwise, no proper basis for permitting Ms De Renée to pursue her application and I dismiss it. Moreover, I am satisfied that she knew full well that this was not an 'urgent' application as she claimed on its face; she should never have troubled the Urgent Applications Judge with the application, particularly without notice to Mr Galbraith-Marten. The manner in which Ms De Renée sought to launch this purported application was nothing more, in my finding, than a cynical attempt to bypass the restrictions imposed on her by the ECRO. It does her no credit.

The order

34. I propose to make the extended ECRO for a period of two years; it shall therefore expire at 23:59hs on 14 April 2027. It is appropriate that the managing judge should be a full-time judge of the Family Division, and – with his agreement – I propose that this should hereafter be Mr Justice PEEL.
35. The order I propose to make is therefore as follows:

1) Catherine de Renée is restrained from making applications in "any court" specified below concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which this order is made without first obtaining the permission of Mr Justice PEEL or, if unavailable a permanent puisne judge of the Family Division of the High Court of Justice. The specified courts are the Court of Appeal, the High Court, and the Family Court (per para.3.2(a) PD4B FPR 2010);

2) This order will remain in effect until 23:59 on 14 April 2027;

3) If Catherine de Renée wishes to apply for permission:

a. to make an application in these proceedings; or

b. to make an application to amend or discharge this order,

she must first serve notice of her application on Jason Galbraith-Marten. The notice must set out the nature and grounds of the application and provide Jason Galbraith-Marten with at least 7 days within which to respond. Catherine de Renée must then apply for the permission of Mr Justice PEEL. The application for permission must be made in writing and must include Jason Galbraith- Marten's written response, if any, to the notice served. The application will be determined without a hearing per para.3.4/5 PD4B FPR 2010);

4) If Catherine de Renée repeatedly makes applications for permission under the paragraph above which are totally without merit, the court may direct that if Catherine de Renée makes any further application for permission which is totally without merit, the decision to dismiss the application will be final and there will be no right of appeal, unless the judge who refused permission grants permission to appeal (per para.3.3(b) PD4B FPR 2010).

5) Any application for permission to appeal a refusal of an application under paragraph 4 above must be made in writing and will be determined without a hearing (per para.3.6 PD4B FPR 2010).

6) Ms De Renée's application on form C2, dated 10 March 2025, is dismissed.

36. The Order will contain a further recital to the effect that if Ms De Renée attempts to make a further application in these proceedings without first obtaining permission of the judge named in the order above, her application will automatically be dismissed without the judge having to make any further order and without the need for the other party to respond to it (per para.3.3(a) PD4B FPR 2010).
37. I will deal separately with any application for costs once the parties have read this judgment.

C8 Application: Ms De Renée's address and contact details

38. In January 2025, Ms De Renée applied to the court on form C8 for her home address and her e-mail address to remain confidential from Mr Galbraith-Marten. Until that time, so far as I can tell, she had not sought to withhold either piece of information; indeed, a home address is openly displayed on a number of documents filed with the court and served on Mr Galbraith-Marten over recent years. Moreover, Ms De Renée has corresponded directly by e-mail with Mr Galbraith-Marten in the past, including by serving on him previous applications.
39. The rules provide that "unless the court directs otherwise, a party is not required to reveal the party's home address or other contact details" (see rule 29.1 FPR 2010).
40. Ms De Renée alleges historic domestic abuse and an ongoing fear of abuse from Mr Galbraith-Marten; she maintains that Mr Galbraith-Marten has no need to know her home address, as he has had no relationship with A for many years.
41. Mr Galbraith-Marten has invited me to rule that Ms De Renée's address should be disclosed to him. He denies the allegations of abuse. He submits that he would not be concerned by the application (and has no actual desire to know where Ms De Renée is currently living) but believes that if her application is granted she will interpret this, and/or rely on it in subsequent proceedings, as evidence that the court accepts and/or supports her allegations of domestic abuse.
42. Ms De Renée has not made any application to the court to restrain Mr Galbraith-Marten from attending her former address, nor has she been able to demonstrate to my satisfaction that Mr Galbraith-Marten has abused his knowledge of her address in the past, and/or has communicated by e-mail in an inappropriate way with her. I further note that insofar as Ms De Renée's allegations of domestic abuse have been tested in the past, they have been rejected by the court.
43. I have considered this application carefully, and have resolved to decline Mr Galbraith-Marten's application for disclosure of the address. I nonetheless will direct Ms De Renée to disclose her e-mail address.
44. In refusing the application to disclose Ms De Renée's home address, I wish to make crystal clear that I am not making any finding (explicit or implied) about alleged domestic abuse. However:

i) Mr Galbraith-Marten had candidly acknowledged that he has no real interest in knowing the address;

and

ii) I consider that if I order disclosure of the home address this may well provide fertile territory for future allegations to be made and/or wasteful proceedings to be issued, which I earnestly wish to avoid.

[End]