[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> FJ [a child], Re [2016] EWFC B28 (04 May 2016) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2016/B28.html Cite as: [2016] EWFC B28

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

IN THE FAMILY COURT
Sitting in Leeds


In the matter of FJ [a child]

		04/05/2016

HHJ TROY:

The Child

1. The court is concerned in these proceedings with one child "FJ" who was born on 7^th November 2015.
2. His Mother is the First Respondent to these proceedings ["the Mother"] and his Father is the Second Respondent ["the Father"]. The Mother is now 17 years of age and she will be 18 years old on [date] 2016. The Father is identified on FJ's birth certificate and shares parental responsibility for FJ with the Mother.
3. FJ is represented in these proceedings through his Children's Guardian Saima Gulzar.

The Applications

4. By application issued on 10^th November 2015 the Applicant Local Authority invited the court to make FJ the subject of a care order. The care plan filed dated 16^th March 2016 provides for FJ to be placed with prospective adoptive carers and by further application issued on 8^th April 2016 the Applicant Local Authority invites the court to make FJ the subject of a placement order.
5. The Mother opposes the applications for care and placement orders and asks the court to place FJ in her care.
6. The Father also opposes the applications and supports the Mother in seeking to have FJ in her care. He does not seek to care for FJ himself but wishes to continue to have contact with him.
7. On behalf of FJ, the Children's Guardian supports the applications for care and placement orders made in respect of him.

Events prior to Issue of Proceedings

8. Social care services have been involved in the Mother's life since 21^st January 2014 when she was accommodated by the Applicant Local Authority due to difficulties arising following the death of her father and concerns that she was vulnerable to child sexual exploitation. Those concerns continued following her accommodation as the Mother regularly left her placements and was associating with individuals who presented a risk to her.
9. In October 2014 and aged 16 years, the Mother became involved in a relationship with the Father who was then 25 years old.
10. The Father is a Pakistani national. The Home Office has informed the court that he has "no valid basis of stay in the UK". He was married but is now divorced and has no direct contact with the child of his marriage following private law proceedings in respect of that child. His former wife alleged that the Father was violent towards her though no findings of fact were made in the proceedings in respect of their child. The Father has been the subject of investigations undertaken by the Greater Manchester Police arising from his involvement with a girl aged 14 years in respect of whom he was issued with a Child Abduction Warning Notice on 3^rd June 2014 and made the subject of a restraining order for a period of 12 months. He is awaiting trial for offences of assault, affray and possession of an offensive weapon and drugs alleged to have been committed on 13^th March 2015.
11. The Applicant Local Authority undertook a pre-birth assessment of the parents who had been living together in the Father's home in Rochdale from September 2015 when informed by the Mother of her pregnancy. Despite being made aware of the Father's involvement in criminal proceedings and the allegations of violence made by his former wife, the Mother did not regard herself as being at risk or vulnerable to exploitation in maintaining her relationship with the Father. She was offered support and advice from a Family Nurse and social workers and her foster placement remained available for her.
12. The conclusion of the pre-birth assessment was that proceedings should be issued on FJ's birth due to the risks to FJ arising from the lack of stability in the relationship between his parents, the Father's involvement in criminal proceedings including his association with the 14 year old girl, his immigration status and his drug and alcohol misuse.

Events Following The Issue of Proceedings

13. FJ was made the subject of an interim care order on 10^th November 2015 and was placed with his own foster carers.
14. The Mother returned to live with her foster carers with whom she has developed a good relationship having first been placed in their care on 10^th April 2015. She said that she had decided to end her relationship with the Father and wished to be assessed as FJ's sole carer. Arrangements were made for the Mother to have contact with FJ at the home of her foster carers with a plan to increase contact gradually provided that she maintained her separation from the Father. In addition, the court gave permission for the instruction of an expert psychologist to prepare a report about the Mother in the light of concerns about her mental health. The Applicant Local Authority also undertook an assessment of the Father and considered whether any other family members were able to care for FJ if his parents could not do so.
15. The view of the Applicant Local Authority at the conclusion of the assessments was that the parents were not able to meet FJ's needs even with support. There was no member of the extended family who could be considered as a carer for FJ and therefore the Local Authority's agency decision maker was invited to approve and on 30^th March 2016 has approved a care plan providing for FJ to be placed with permanent alternative carers with a view to him being adopted.

Section 31[2] Children Act 1989

16. In considering any application for a care order – the preliminary issue to be determined is whether the statutory threshold criteria set out in section 31[2] of the CA 1989 are met.
17. Supreme Court Justice Lady Hale emphasised in the case of Re: J [2013] UKSC 9 that the requirement that the threshold criteria must be met before a court can consider what order, if any, should be made in respect of a child is designed to restrict compulsory intervention in family life to cases which genuinely warrant it, while enabling the court to make the order which will best promote the child's welfare once the threshold has been crossed.
18. The court must be satisfied that – at the time proceedings were issued - FJ was suffering or was likely to suffer significant harm and the harm or likelihood of harm must be attributable to the care given to him, or likely to be given to him, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him.
19. In this case – it is accepted by the Mother that the court can make the findings of fact set out in the schedule dated 17^th March 2016 and on the basis of those findings determine that the criteria in section 31[2] CA 1989 are met. The Father also accepts that the criteria in s.31(2)CA 1989 are met in this case but does not accept that the court should make all the findings of fact set out in the schedule, specifically the findings relating to his involvement with the 14 year old girl and relating to violence in his relationship with the Mother.

Legal Principles to be Applied in Determining the Orders to be Made

20. If the criteria in section 31[2] CA 1989 are met in this case met I must go on to consider whether to make any orders in respect of FJ and if so, what those orders should be.
21. The Children Act 1989 and the Adoption & Children Act 2002 set out the guiding principles which form the basis upon which these proceedings including this hearing are conducted – taking into account the judgments of the higher courts providing direction and guidance as to how these principles are to be interpreted and applied.

Firstly

Section 1[2] ACA 2002

22. In determining the appropriate orders to be made – section 1[2] of the ACA 2002 requires that the welfare of FJ throughout his life must be my paramount consideration.

Secondly

Sections 1[2] & 2A CA 1989 and Section 1[3] ACA 2002.

23. The principles encapsulated in section 1 [2] CA 1989 and section 1[3] of the ACA 2002 – which relate to delay - apply and the court is required pursuant to Section 2A of the Children Act 1989 to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that involvement of a parent in the life of the child concerned will further the welfare of the child.

Thirdly

Section 1[3] CA 1989 and Section 1[4] ACA 2002.

24. The court must have regard to the matters set out in section 1[3] of the Children Act 1989 and section 1[4] of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 which have become known as the welfare checklists.

Fourthly

Section 31[3A] CA 1989

25. Before making a care order the court is required pursuant to Section 31A of the Children Act 1989 to consider the permanence provisions of the Section 31A plans for FJ and pursuant to Section 34[11] to consider the arrangements the Applicant Local Authority proposes to make for affording contact with those identified in section 34[1] of the Act – in this case his Mother and his Father - and to invite the parties to these proceedings to comment on those arrangements.

Fifthly

Articles 6 & 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950

26. The case of Re: B [2013] UKSC 33 lies at the heart of the jurisprudence concerning the making of care and placement orders and is thus of fundamental importance to this case.
27. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Re: B emphasises the duty of this court to determine these applications in a way which is compatible with FJ's and each of his parents' Article 6 rights to a fair trial and Article 8 rights to respect for his family life and in a manner which is proportionate to any risks identified which FJ would face in the care of his Mother or his Father.
28. In order to determine the applications in the manner prescribed by the Supreme Court, I must bear in mind nature of the orders I am invited to make, described in the judgments as a 'very extreme thing, a last resort' to be made 'only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short, where nothing else will do'.
29. The proper interpretation of this aspect of the judgments delivered in the case of Re:B has been considered by the Court of Appeal in the case of CM –v- Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council [2014] EWCA Civ 1479. In his judgment, Lord Justice Ryder explains that the phrase "nothing else will do" does not require there to be no other realistic option on the table, even less so no other option or that there is only one possible course for the child. It is, he held, a description of the conclusion of a process of deductive reasoning within which there has been a careful consideration of each of the realistic options that are available on the facts so that there is no other comparable option that will meet the best interests of each child.

Sixthly

Analysis of the options available for the child

30. In determining whether to make orders in respect of FJ, and if so what those orders should be, it is necessary to undertake an analysis of each of the options available to the court and to assess each of these options in the context of the other options as the decisions of the Court of Appeal in the cases of Re: B-S and Re: R [2014] EWCA Civ 1625 make clear.
31. In Re: B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 the President in his judgment emphasises two important matters of principles drawn from the judgments of Supreme Court Justices Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale in the case of Re: B which are to be taken into account in carrying out the analysis of the options available to the court.
32. The first matter of principle is the value and importance to a child of being brought up as a member of his birth family if his needs could possibly be met in this way. The President states:

'although the child's interests in an adoption case are paramount, the court must never lose sight of the fact that those interests include being brought up by the natural family, ideally by the natural parents, or at least one of them, unless the overriding requirements of the child's welfare make that not possible'.

33. The second related matter of principle arises from the provisions of section 1[g] CA 1989 which provides that the court must have regard to

[g] the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question

- and section 1[6] of the ACA 2002 which provides that

1(6) The court .. must always consider the whole range of powers available to it in the child's case (whether under this Act or the Children Act 1989.

34. One aspect of these provisions is that the court's assessment of the Mother's and the Father's ability to discharge their responsibilities towards FJ must take into account the assistance and support which the authorities could offer each of them. The President explains that

"before making an adoption order … the court must be satisfied that there is no practical way of the authorities (or others) providing the requisite assistance and support."

35. In this context – the court must consider the decision of the ECtHR in the case of YC –v- United Kingdom [2012] EHRR 967 para. 134. The court found that:

"family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and… everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to 'rebuild' the family. It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing."

36. In his judgment in the case of Re:D(A Child)(No 3)[2016] EWFC 1 the President described the concept of "parenting with support" as crucial, explaining that there is a positive obligation on the local authority to provide support if that will enable a child to remain with his parents.
37. Therefore, and as required by section 1(3)(g) of the 1989 Act and section 1(6) of the 2002 Act, the court "must" consider all the options before coming to a decision. As Supreme Court Justice Lady Hale said in Re: B it is "necessary to explore and attempt alternative solutions".
38. In considering the range of orders available to the court – Lord Justice McFarlane explains at paragraph 50 in his judgment in the case of Re: G[2013]EWCA Civ 965 that there must be

"a global, holistic evaluation of each of the options available for the child's future upbringing before deciding which of those options best meets the duty to afford paramount consideration to the child's welfare"

The Evidence

39. In determining the applications before the court – I have considered the documentary filed including statements from both parents. I have also seen a medical report about the Father dated 26^th April 2016. No party invited the court to hear any oral evidence but I heard submissions on behalf of each of the parties.
40. Social worker Nicola Milner undertook an assessment of the ability of both parents to meet FJ's needs.
41. As the assessment commenced following FJ's birth, the Mother said that she had ended her relationship with the Father recognizing the risks he presented to her and to FJ and she wished to work towards caring for FJ. Plans were made for FJ to spend increasing periods of time with his Mother in her foster placement. FJ has been observed to respond to the love and care his Mother provides, smiling, laughing and giggling in her presence.
42. During December 2015 and January 2016, the Mother missed a series of appointments including two appointments with the psychologist instructed to prepare a report about her, appointments with her General Practitioner and assessment sessions with FJ's social worker. There were occasions when she was still in bed when FJ arrived at the foster carer's home for contact and on one occasion she left the foster home before contact was due to end. When she was caring for FJ and particularly when the duration of the contact sessions increased to include overnight stays, the Mother struggled to meet FJ's needs although she did attend three sessions at an "Incredible Babies" parenting course aiming to improve her parenting skills. She required advice about practicalities of caring for FJ such as the dangers of prop-feeding. She was frequently missing from her foster placement during those times when she was not caring for FJ.
43. Although both parents had denied that they had resumed their relationship, it became clear that they had done so. It emerged that they had remained in communication for the whole of the period following FJ's birth and the Mother had been visiting the Father on a regular basis. Indeed she was found at his home on 24^th February 2016 and moved to live with him, remaining there until 15^th April 2016. Thereafter she missed a number of contact sessions with FJ, though it is right to observe that she had to travel a considerable distance to attend contact from the Father's home.
44. The Mother accepted when found at the Father's home on 24^th February 2016 that she had been visiting him and staying at his Rochdale address on a regular basis since the proceedings were issued. At that stage, the Mother planned to continue to live with the Father. She had met members of the paternal family and had attended a family wedding on 25^th December 2015. She entered into a form of marriage with the Father in an Islamic ceremony which she subsequently informed Ms Milner she had not understood or agreed to participate in. Even following her eventual return to her foster placement on 15^th April 2016, the Mother said that she remained in her relationship with the Father.
45. The Mother has required support in meeting her own health needs, including registering with a General Practitioner and attending appointments with medical professionals including a dentist. She remains at high risk of sexual exploitation and engages in behaviour which places her at risk of harm although she does not regard herself as being at risk.
46. The Mother has benefitted from the unrelenting support provided to her by her foster carers. They have repeatedly welcomed her back into their home after periods when she has been missing from the placement, even when they became aware that the Mother had been secretly visiting and staying with the Father and they have attended each and every court appointment with her. They have supported the Mother during extended periods of contact with FJ in their home
47. Psychologist Helen Roberts prepared a report about the Mother dated 11^th March 2016. Ms Roberts reports that the Mother told her on 4^th March 2016 that her relationship with the Father had been volatile and she had decided to separate from him including ending all forms of communication with him. She described being prepared to do whatever was asked of her to be able to care for FJ. In fact, it is now clear that the Mother was living with the Father at the time.
48. Ms Roberts felt during of her meeting with her that the Mother had engaged with the psychological assessment at only a superficial level. She reported that the Mother's subsequent apparent compliance with the expectations of professionals in declaring that she was finally prepared to end her relationship with the Father was "also superficial and does not represent a real shift in [the Mother's] psychological or social functioning".
49. Ms Roberts' view was that "the primary influence in [the Mother's] presentation and life choices is her need to have a relationship with [the Father], to feel loved and nurtured by him". She could not envisage a package of support which would enable the Mother to keep FJ safe explaining:

"Her preparedness to be dishonest and her capacity to deceive means that if [the Mother] decided to lie in the future, FJ could not be protected….. I am of the view that [the Mother] cannot currently prioritize FJ and is unable to keep him safe."

50. Hair strand testing of a sample of the Father's hair taken on 14^th January 2016 revealed the presence of cocaine [likely to represent use of crack cocaine] over the period between the end of August 2015 and the end of December 2015. He also appeared to have consumed "an excessive and chronic amount of alcohol, most likely during the period of between approximately the end of September 2015 and the end of November 2015" but there was then an approximate four week period of abstinence/reduction in drinking. In respect of the testing for alcohol consumption, the report does record that the Father's use of hair products may have affected the accuracy of the test results.
51. The Father attended regularly for contact with FJ and attended one assessment session on 7^th December 2015. However, he smelt strongly of alcohol at that session and the failed to attend the next session arranged for 22^nd December 2015 or any further sessions.
52. Ms Milner has sadly concluded that FJ cannot be placed in the care of either of his parents. The relationship between his parents is a volatile one with repeated separations and reconciliations which places FJ at risk of significant harm. The nature of the relationship between the parents is an exploitative one in which the Mother is subjected to domestic abuse and exposed to risks arising from the Father's drug and alcohol misuse, his involvement in activities which mean he is the subject of criminal investigations and the uncertainties connected with the prospect of his deportation.
53. The Mother would require a high level of support to meet FJ's basic needs and would therefore need to work in co-operation with professionals. She has been given every possible opportunity in a supportive foster placement to demonstrate that she can focus on meeting FJ's needs and she has repeatedly and deliberately deceived everyone involved in seeking to support her in caring for FJ. Ms Milner concluded that the Mother is not yet able to separate from the Father or to meet FJ's most basic care needs so that he would be at risk of significant emotional harm and neglect in her care. Similarly in the Father's case, Ms Milner concluded that FJ would be at risk of significant harm in his care arising from his drug and alcohol misuse, involvement in criminal proceedings, the uncertainties created by the threat of deportation and the nature of his relationship with the 14 years old girl in the past and now with the Mother which he wishes to pursue.
54. Ms Milner also assessed the only family members who offered to care for FJ if his parents were unable to do so - "the Paternal Aunt and Uncle". They were complicit with the parents in secretly maintaining their relationship and did not accept that the Father presented any risk to FJ despite being made aware of the complaints made by his former wife, his involvement with a 14 year old girl and his misuse of drugs and alcohol. They believed that FJ should be placed in the care of his parents and Ms Milner concluded that they would not protect FJ from the risk that his parents and their relationship present for him.
55. In her statement signed on 29^th April 2016 and in accepting that the facts set out in the schedule prepared by the Applicant Local Authority are true, the Mother has acknowledged that her relationship with the Father was based on sexual exploitation, intimidation and domestic violence. She states that she separated from the Father on 25^th April 2015 and now intends to maintain that separation. She accepts that she has lied about the relationship in the past. She has now changed her telephone number and wishes to have no further contact with the Father.
56. The Mother expressed through submissions made on her behalf her love for FJ and the great regret she feels looking back at the chances she accepts she had to care for him which she feels she allowed to slip by. She now believes that she would be able to protect FJ and care for him and asks the court to give her a further opportunity to do so.
57. The Father has attended for contact with FJ on a regular basis and the quality of the contact has been good as Ms Milner recognizes in her assessment. There is no doubt as was submitted on his behalf that he loves FJ very much.
58. The medical report prepared by the Father's General Practitioner explains that he has been very stressed by these proceedings but is working to address his misuse of drugs seeking help from the drug and alcohol team.
59. In his statement signed on 28^th April 2016, the Father says that he remains in a relationship with the Mother and wishes to care for FJ together with her. He says, "I know [the Mother] wishes that we could be a family with FJ and settle down in a home together". Although he is opposed to FJ being placed for adoption, he wishes to continue to have contact with him wherever he is placed.
60. In submissions on behalf of FJ's Children's Guardian it was confirmed in that her recommendations remain as set out in her report dated 18^th April 2016. She was aware that the Mother had again said that she wished to end her relationship with the Father but remained of the view that FJ would be at risk of significant harm in the care of either parent. It was her view that the Mother has not been able to demonstrate that she can make caring for FJ her priority over her involvement with the Father. Given the extent of her dishonesty and the level of deception she has used to conceal her continuing relationship with the Father there can be no confidence that the most recent separation is genuine or will be sustained.
61. Although Ms Gulzar had supported the Applicant Local Authority in its decision to undertake an assessment which would give the Mother every opportunity to care for FJ, she had concluded that his welfare now demands that he is placed for adoption.

Findings of Fact

62. I have reviewed the evidence filed in support of the findings of fact which the court is invited by the Applicant Local Authority to make.
63. The Mother accepts that the findings sought are true. In the Father's case, I have considered the evidence about his involvement with the 14 year old girl and make each of the findings set out in paragraph 3 of the schedule. Many of the findings sought [such as the issue of the Child Abduction Warning Notice] are simply matters of fact extracted from the evidence before the court and plainly demonstrate that the Father was involved in relationships with vulnerable young women.
64. Turning to the findings about the relationship between the parents, at times when she has been separated from the Father the Mother has given clear accounts of incidents of domestic abuse and violence including coercive behaviour. Her accounts have been detailed and include specific incidents of violence and occasions when the Father has exerted control over her. I accept her evidence I make the findings set out in the schedule.
65. Both parents accept and on the basis of the findings of fact set out in the schedule I am satisfied that the criteria in s.31(2)CA 1989 are met in this case.

Options Available In These Proceedings

66. Placing FJ in the care of his Mother or his Father. The court could determine that FJ should live with his Mother or his Father and could make FJ the subject of a child arrangement order providing for him to live with one parent and spend time with the other parent. It would be open to the court at the same time make FJ the subject of a supervision order or a family assistance order if it was determined that the Applicant Local Authority should be placed under a statutory duty to allocate resources in order to advise, assist and befriend him.
67. Placing FJ with Prospective Adopters. The court could make FJ the subject of care and placement orders as sought – approving the care plan which provides for him to be placed with permanent adoptive carers and for direct contact with his parents to be reduced until a permanent adoptive placement is found and then replaced with indirect, letterbox contact for FJ with both parents.
68. Adjourning the proceedings for further enquiries including considering long term foster care or further assessment of the ability of the Mother or the Father to meet FJ's needs. The court could determine that further investigations are required before a final judgment about the appropriate orders to be made can be reached including considering whether the Applicant Local Authority should be invited to submit care plans providing for FJ to be placed in a long term in a foster placement where he could continue to have direct contact with his parents.

Sections 1[4] ACA 2002 and Section 1[3] CA 1989

69. I have considered in particular the following matters:

CA 1989 s.1[3][d] his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant

ACA 2002 s.1[4][d] the child's age, sex, background and any of the child's characteristics which the court consider relevant

70. FJ is a young boy, now almost 6 months old. He is of dual heritage as his Mother is British and his Father is Pakistani. Both parents follow the Muslim faith and wish FJ to have the opportunity to do so and he has been circumcised in accordance with their beliefs.

CA 1989 s.1[3][a] the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned [considered in the light of his age and level of understanding];

71. FJ is too young to express any wishes and feelings about his situation or about his future directly but he has been observed in contact sessions to respond to the love and care offered to him by his Mother and his Father and it is proper to assume that he would wish to live with his Mother or his Father if either parent could possibly meet his needs.

ACA 2002 s.1[4][a] the child's ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision [considered in the light of the child's age and understanding]

72. FJ is too young to express any wishes or feelings about the application for a placement order which has been made in respect of him but he is certain to wish to know, as he grows up, why he is not in the care of his Mother or his Father if that is the decision which is made. It will be important for any prospective adoptive carers identified for FJ to be provided with the information they require to explain the situation to FJ as he grows up taking into account his age and his level of understanding.

CA 1989 s.1[3][b] his physical, emotional and educational needs;

73. FJ has the same physical and educational needs of other young boys of his age for a loving, stable and supportive home where he is kept safe and where his needs are met. It is especially important that his emotional needs are met given the difficulties that he has faced since his birth being removed to a foster placement and attending for contact sessions with his parents whilst awaiting a decision about his future.

CA 1989 s.1[3][c] the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances;

74. FJ faces changes in the future in his circumstances. He will have to move from the foster placement where he has lived since his discharge from hospital and adapt to new circumstances and a new carer or carers whatever order is made by the court.
75. I agree with his Children's Guardian that it is important that FJ moves as quickly as possible to a permanent placement wherever that is to be and any delay in determining where his future lies will be detrimental to his welfare given his age and stage of development.

[c] the likely effect on the child [throughout his life] of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person;

76. If a placement order is made in this case, FJ will cease to be a member of his original family. The impact of this is potentially damaging to his sense of identity and to his emotional wellbeing. Children who become adopted persons face emotional challenges as they grow up and come to understand that they are not living with their original family. Older children and young adults often wish to seek out and meet with members of their family of origin. The real possibility that FJ will wish to have direct contact with his mother and his father as a young adult and the potential difficulties for him, practical and emotional, which would arise must be taken into account. He would need support from his carers in addressing these issues.
77. In determining what order to make in respect of FJ, I must consider not just the immediate future – when being so very young he will quickly form attachments to and relationships with his adopted carers and their extended family – but must look forward in time to the point when FJ may find it difficult to come to terms with his status as an adopted person and the issues that will raise for him. Furthermore, some adoptive placements do break down and placement breakdown is likely to cause emotional harm to the child, distress and uncertainty about his future.
78. Whilst there are many potential advantages for FJ in an adoptive placement which would meet all of his immediate needs – physical, emotional and educational – to a high standard it must be taken into account that there are also these possible negative consequences of such a placement for the future.

[f] the relationship which the child has with relatives and with any person in relation to whom the court considers the relationship to be relevant including –

[i] the likelihood of the relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so;

79. FJ has regular contact with his Mother and his Father and the contact has been of good quality. If FJ was to be placed in his Mother's or his Father's care, he would also have the opportunity to form relationships with members of his extended maternal and paternal families and to develop as other children do a sense of his own identity within his family of origin and an understanding of his cultural and religious background and heritage.
80. If FJ is placed with another family with a view to him being adopted, and if as the care plan provides there is no direct contact for FJ with his Mother or his Father following his placement with prospective adoptive carers, he will not have the opportunity to develop the same understanding of his identity and background and he will no longer benefit from the love and affection he is shown during the contact sessions.

[ii] the ability and willingness of any of the child's relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop and otherwise to meet the child's needs;

81. I have considered the report of Ms Milner and I accept and find that there are no family members in a position to care for FJ. The Paternal Aunt and Uncle would not protect FJ from the risks arising from the nature of the relationship between his parents as they believe that he should be in their care and colluded with the parents in maintaining their relationship. They were invited to attend court if they challenged Ms Milner's conclusions in her assessment of them but have chosen not to do so.

[iii] the wishes and feelings of any of the child's relatives or of any such person regarding the child.

82. FJ's Mother and Father have each made it clear that they are opposed to FJ being placed for adoption.

CA 1989 s.1[3][f] how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;

83. The key issues in these proceedings are whether the Mother or the Father is capable of meeting FJ's needs including whether either of them could be assisted and supported in doing so and whether FJ should move to a long term foster placement rather than an adoptive placement. I bear in mind in considering these issues the significant benefits that there would be for FJ identified above if he could be cared for by his Mother or his Father and the importance of looking whenever possible of rebuilding a family and respecting this family's right to family life. I also bear in mind in assessing the evidence in this case that FJ's Mother is only 17 years of age and herself in need of care and protection.

CA 1989 s.1[3][e] any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

84. In determining this issue, I must take into account

a. the nature of the feared harm in the event that FJ was to be placed in the care of his Mother or his Father;

b. whether it is significant; and

c. how likely it was to happen.

85. I am satisfied on the basis of the evidence of the assessment of each of his parents that FJ would suffer significant harm if placed in the care of either of them. The nature of the harm which FJ would suffer is emotional harm and neglect and it is almost inevitable that he would suffer harm as a result of the nature of the relationship between his parents and the failure of both parents to make FJ's needs the priority over their own need to maintain the exploitative and damaging relationship between them.
86. The Mother is not able to meet FJ's basic care needs without considerable support. She has repeatedly said that she wishes to end her involvement with the Father and concentrate on learning to meet FJ's needs, but she has repeatedly demonstrated that in practice she is unable or unwilling to do so. She has deceived everyone seeking to assist her in caring for FJ and I accept the unchallenged evidence of Ms Roberts that the Mother's apparent compliance with the expectations of professionals has been superficial, not representing a real shift in her functioning.
87. I have taken into account the Mother's most recent separation from the Father and bear in mind that she states that she has maintained that for almost two weeks now [since 25^th April 2016] and intends to remain separated from him. However, I must consider this in the light of all the evidence demonstrating that she has been unable to maintain separation and the evidence that the Father regarded the relationship as continuing as recently as 29^th April 2016. The evidence before this court is that, if the Mother has indeed separated from the Father on 25^th April 2016, about which she must understand there is considerable doubt, she will find it extremely difficult to maintain that separation and is highly likely to resume communication with him and then be persuaded to return to the relationship.
88. Whilst they are together, FJ would be exposed to neglect as he would not be the focus of his parents' attentions and to the risk of emotional harm arising from the volatile nature of the relationship, characterized by periods when they live together followed by short periods of living separately. The Father subjects the Mother to domestic abuse which includes violence but also coercive controlling behaviours and there is evidence of his recent and sustained drug misuse and consumption of alcohol to excess. He has been involved in a wholly inappropriate relationship with a 14 year old girl, he is the subject of criminal investigations and may be deported at any time. To describe his situation as unstable is to fail to convey the level of uncertainty and chaos which surrounds him and the situation in which he has been living and in which he has encouraged the Mother to join him despite knowing that she is a child in care.

CA 1989 s.1[3][g] the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question

89. There is no possibility given the matters set out above of FJ being safe in the care of his Father and no steps which could be taken to reduce the level of risk so that FJ could be placed in his Father's care.
90. Very considerable efforts have been made to seek to offer support to the Mother in caring for FJ to manage or to reduce the level of risk which FJ would face in the care of his Mother so that FJ's welfare would best be served by being placed in her care.
91. All the efforts made to support being placed in the care of his Mother depended on the Mother being able to live separately from the Father. To be supported in caring for FJ the Mother would need to work in close co-operation with professionals able to assist her with practical childcare tasks and to maintain her separation from the Father so that FJ was the focus of her attention. The evidence that she is unable to do so is overwhelming.
92. The Mother has been offered numerous opportunities in a supportive foster placement to demonstrate that she could live separately from the Father and learn to meet FJ's needs. The commitment of all professionals in this case, but particularly FJ's social worker Ms Milner and the Mother's foster carers, to provide the Mother with every opportunity to care for her son cannot be questioned. There are no orders which the court could make which could provide the Mother with more support or a better chance to care for FJ than she has been given during the proceedings and no reason to suppose that given further opportunities the outcome would be different.

Foster care/Adoption

93. In assessing the potential benefits and detriments for the FJ in an adoptive placement as compared to a long term foster placement – I have considered the judgment of Lady Justice Black in the case of Re: V [2013] EWCA Civ 913 at paragraph 96 where she identifies some of the advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives.
94. Adoption makes a child a permanent part of the adoptive family to which he fully belongs. Adoptions do fail but the commitment of the adoptive family is of a different nature to that of a local authority foster carer whose circumstances may change and who is not in a position to determine the caring arrangements for children placed by the local authority in their care.
95. Whereas a parent may apply for the discharge of a care order with a view to having the child live with them, once an adoption order is made it is made for all time.
96. Contact in the context of adoption is different from contact in the context of a fostering arrangement. Where a child is in the care of a local authority, the starting point is that the authority is obliged to arrange reasonable contact for that child with their parents as provided by Section 34[1] of the Children Act 1989. The arrangements for contact can be regulated by orders under section 34 but there remains a marked contrast with the situation for adopted children. If a placement order is made – the care plan provides for there to be no direct contact for FJ with his Mother or his Father and they would need the permission of the court to make an application for a contact order.
97. The routine of life is different for a child in a long term foster placement. The Local Authority would have a role in his life for the whole of his childhood. There would be regular reviews and it would be necessary to consult with social workers about many issues which would ordinarily be decided by parents or carers. In contrast, for the adopted child, the Local Authority has no further role in his life.
98. A family approved as adopters would be in a position to meet FJ's practical, emotional and educational needs on a permanent basis and this must be balanced against the loss of the links with his Mother and his Father which would be a consequence of the care plan for adoption.

Adjournment

99. The proceedings could be adjourned. However, I can identify no advantage to FJ in delay in reaching a final determination in this case. There are no avenues left unexplored which might on further enquiry either enable the Mother or the Father to be better placed to meet the needs of FJ or provide an option for his future care other than those which have been explored – and it is recognized as a matter of law as I indicated at the commencement of this judgment that delay in determining this matter is likely to prejudice the welfare of FJ.

evaluation of options

100. Having identified the positive and negative aspects of each realistic options for FJ's future care I must now determine whether to make any orders, and if orders are to be made, what those orders should be – the welfare of FJ throughout his life being the paramount consideration in forming this judgment.
101. The only realistic options for FJ are placement in the care of his Mother or Father, the making of care and placement orders or a care order with a care plan for long term foster placement – since I have found no factors to support the adjournment of these proceedings.
102. I accept the evidence of the Children's Guardian in finding that remaining long term in a foster placement would not meet FJ's needs for a secure and permanent home and family. The parents have not suggested that such a placement would be in FJ's interests.
103. In my judgment it would not be possible for FJ to continue to have direct contact with either parent on being placed for adoption as such contact would jeopardise the security and stability of such a placement as Ms Gulzar explains. However, the benefits to FJ of continued contact which a long term foster placement would offer are significantly outweighed by the lack of stability and security for him in such a placement and foster care would not meet his needs.
104. In the care of his Mother, FJ would face the risk of significant harm in the form of neglect of his basic needs and emotional harm. His Mother would in my judgment find it impossible as she has demonstrated to focus her attentions on FJ and to end her relationship with the Father. The Father does not wish to end his involvement with the Mother, asserting that they remained together as recently as 29^th April 2016. There are no steps which can be taken to reduce the risks to FJ in the care of his Mother given her determined dishonesty about her situation and the extent to which she is distracted from her role in caring for FJ by her need for a relationship with the Father.
105. The evidence in this case clearly supports the finding that the Mother will resume her relationship with her Father to the detriment of FJ. She is capable of deceiving everyone involved in FJ's life about her relationship and when her focus is her relationship with the Father FJ's needs are neglected. Whether he was in the joint care or his parents or placed with his Mother, FJ would be at risk of very significant harm because of the relationship between his parents and the instability in the Father's life.
106. Balancing the harm FJ would suffer by not being returned to the care of his Mother or his Father and the risks for him in an adoptive placement against my findings as to the risk of the harm, the nature and likelihood of harm I have found he would face in the care of his Mother taking into account the support and assistance which could be provided to reduce or manage those risks, I am satisfied that placement for adoption is the only option which safeguards the welfare of FJ throughout his life.
107. I have also considered the proportionality of permanent separation when set against the findings made as to the harm FJ would suffer or be at risk of suffering if returned to the care of his Mother or his Father. The risks faced by FJ on placing him in the care of his Mother or his Father are so serious as to outweigh all the other possible factors in favour of this course.
108. The orders sought would be an interference with FJ's and each of his parents' Article 8 rights to family life and such an interference will only be sanctioned by the court if it is satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate and that no other less radical form of order would achieve the essential end of promoting the welfare of FJ. I am satisfied in this case that there is no other order which would promote FJ's welfare for the reasons set out above.

Application for A Placement Order

109. Having determined that it is in the best interests of FJ to make him the subject of a care order approving a care plan providing for him to be placed for adoption, I must go on to consider the applications for a placement order in respect of FJ.
110. Section 21[3] of the ACA 2002 provides that

(2) The court may not make a placement order in respect of a child unless—

(a) the child is subject to a care order,

(b) the court is satisfied that the conditions in section 31(2) of the 1989 Act (conditions for making a care order) are met, or

(c) the child has no parent or guardian.

(3) The court may only make a placement order if, in the case of each parent or guardian of the child, the court is satisfied—

(a) that the parent or guardian has consented to the child being placed for adoption with any prospective adopters who may be chosen by the local authority and has not withdrawn the consent, or

(b) that the parent's or guardian's consent should be dispensed with.

111. Both parents have made it clear that they do not consent to FJ being made the subject of a placement order. I must therefore determine whether a ground for dispensing with consent of the Mother and the Father is established. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 52[1][b] ACA 2002 – the court cannot dispense with the consent of any parent of a child to the child being placed for adoption unless satisfied that the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with.
112. Taking into account the analysis of the relevant statutory criteria, the welfare evaluation set out above and the conclusion that in my judgment placement for adoption is the only option which safeguards FJ's welfare throughout his life, I have considered whether dispensing with the consent of the Mother and the Father to the application for a placement order is a proportionate interference in the family life of FJ and his parents. Although the nature of the interference with family life is the most draconian this court can sanction, the level of risk to FJ if the consent of his Mother and his Father to the application for a placement order is not dispensed with is such that it is both proportionate and necessary to dispense with their consent because the welfare of FJ requires their consent to be dispensed with. Further, I am satisfied that it would not be in FJ's interests to make any order providing for his parents to have direct contact with him following his placement for adoption. I agree with Ms Gulzar's analysis of the risks to FJ in such contact which would not meet his needs and would be likely to undermine his adoptive placement.

Orders

113. I therefore make the findings set out in the schedule dated 2016. On the basis of those findings I find that the criteria set out in Section 31[2] CA 1989 are met in this case. I make FJ the subject of care and placement orders dispensing with the consent of his Mother and his Father on the grounds that the welfare of FJ requires that their consent be dispensed with.
114. There shall be detailed assessment of the costs of the publicly funded parties.