C & Anor v Buckinghamshire County Council & Anor [1998] EWHC Admin 572 (20 May 1998)

1. MR JUSTICE LAWS: This is a statutory appeal brought under the provisions of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992, against a decision of the Special Educational Needs Tribunal given on 3rd November 1997. It concerns a child, NC, who is the subject of a statutory statement maintained under Part IV of the Education Act 1996 by the first Respondent to this appeal, the Buckinghamshire County Council. NC parents appealed against the contents of the statement under section 326 of the Education Act 1996. Part IV of the statement had named a school called Wye Valley School as being appropriate for NC. The parents desired that to be amended to name Stanbridge Earls School, which is an independent school.

1. NC, who is now aged fifteen, has specific learning difficulties. NC's potential falls within the low average range. In tests administered at a chronological age of fourteen years and seven months NC achieved a reading age of only 7 years and six months, a spelling age of 7 years and nine months and a reading comprehension age of 9 years. There appears to be no reason why NC should not be able to read and write and spell efficiently. The LEA first issued a statement of special educational needs "for NC on 13th April 1991. NC's present statement was issued on 14th March 1997. Mr and Mrs C asked us to consider the contents of part 3 of the statement, on the basis that the provisions specified is inadequate, and the school named in Part 4 of the statement, on the basis that the school is unsuitable.

2. NC attended mainstream school until September 1993 when Mr and Mrs C placed him at Nanhurst School, an independent, residential special school. NC remained at Nanhurst School until July 1997. NC now attends Stanbridge Earls School, an independent school and Mr and Mrs C would prefer him to remain at that school. The LEA has named Wye Valley School, in a specialist unit for children with specific learning difficulties as a suitable placement for NC.

3. Mr and Mrs C also asked the Tribunal to consider three specific amendments to Part 3 of NC's statement. The LEA agreed the first two amendments relating to the detail of the provision to be made available for NC. Mrs Darnell was able to tell us that the LEA were in a position to supply the provision set out by these amendments and would intend to do so regardless of which school NC attends. The third proposed amendment concerning the question of NC's self esteem was directly connected to the question of whether NC should attend Wye Valley school or Stanbridge Earls School and could not be agreed. We were able to hear evidence from Mrs C about C's behaviour when he was placed in a mainstream school and his perception of himself. Mrs C told us that she considered it very important that NC did not see himself as different to other children. She pointed out that it was inevitable that NC would be withdrawn from a number of lessons in a mainstream environment and that he would require assistance in others. This would set him apart from the other children and adversely affect his self-esteem. Ms Williams and Mrs Darnell were able to tell us that Wye Valley School had experience of this problem dating back to before 1981. The school would be in a position to address this problem in a sensitive fashion.

4. We were able to hear in some detail about the provision available at Wye Valley school. The school has a total of about 470 children. The unit for children with specific learning "difficulties has a staff of two full time teachers and a specialist welfare assistant. Twenty-four children attend the unit. The LEA would intend to provide a total of twenty hours assistance from a welfare assistant for NC each week. The school has experience educating children with specific learning difficulties and has the appropriate material to ensure that when the children from the unit are being taught in a mainstream class they are able to understand and participate in the lesson.

5. They were also able to hear in some detail about the provision available at Stanbridge Earls School. This school has a total of approximately 190 pupils. Teaching takes place in small groups of 6-8 and the school also has an accelerated learning unit where one-to-one tuition takes place. NC has now attended Stanbridge Earls School for some five weeks and appears to have settled in well at the school. NC has said that he is happy at this school.

(b) NC has specific learning difficulties. His abilities are around the average range. We were concerned that the lack of progress that NC achieved while he was placed at his previous school. NC attended Nanhurst School, an independent residential school, from September 1993 to July 1997. During this period his reading age, for example, has not significantly improved. We accepted the evidence that NC's difficulties are of an atypical nature.

(c) We considered whether Wye Valley School was able to meet NC's needs. We agreed with the conclusion of Mr Rabinowicz (report dated 30th April 1997) that NC is not responding to standard dyslexic teaching methods. We also agreed that NC required a more 'specialised, specialist and concentrated approach' than that he has previously experienced. We were not convinced that NC has an educational need for a residential school. We listened carefully to the evidence from Mrs Williams and Mrs Darnell about the provision that is available at Wye Valley "School and the expertise of the staff within the specialist unit at the school. We were satisfied that the recommendations made by Mr Rabinowicz could be provided in a specialist unit of a mainstream school. We noted that NC would wish to attend college for further study after taking his GCSE examinations. We considered that in the light of the evidence we had heard about Wye Valley School that school is able to meet NC's needs.

(d) We also considered the provision available at Stanbridge Earls School. We agreed that that school may also be able to meet NC's academic needs although we had reservations about the placement of NC in a residential school particularly bearing in mind his wish to attend college in the future. We also considered the expenditure required to educate NC at both Wye Valley School and Stanbridge Earls School. We reached the conclusion that the difference was not material to our considerations.

(e) We carefully considered the submission of Mr Bibby that in accordance with section 9 of the Education Act 1996 Mr and Mrs C's preference for Stanbridge Earl's School should prevail in the absence of material financial considerations. We agree that this section of the Education Act 1996 sets out a general principle that local education authorities shall have regard to the wishes of parents so far as those wishes are compatible with the provision of efficient instruction and training and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure. We considered that this section is qualified by the contents of Schedule 27, paragraph 3 of the Education Act 1996 which is head 'choice of school' and deals specifically with the naming of a school in a statement of special educational needs. Schedule 27 clearly limits the issue of parental preference to maintained, grant-maintained or grant-maintained special schools. We were not convinced that merely because a school is capable of meeting a child's needs the placement of the child at that school is also necessarily compatible with the provision of efficient instruction and training.

(f) We therefore considered the issue of the school NC should attend on the basis of which school we considered to be appropriate for his needs. We considered carefully the evidence from NC's parents about his fears of mainstream education and his preference for Stanbridge Earls "School. We also considered the evidence of Mrs Williams from the LEA who told us that in her view NC needed to be educated within his own community rather than isolated and secluded in a residential environment. We accepted the evidence from Mr and Mrs C that Wye Valley School is some fifteen miles distant from their home. We were impressed by the evidence we heard from the LEA about the arrangements Wye Valley School is able to make to assist pupils from the unit to enter further education. We were also impressed by the expertise of Wye Valley School in assisting pupils with persistent and sustained difficulties in acquiring basic literacy. We accepted the evidence of Mrs Williams that NC needed to reintergrate into mainstream schooling in order to progress satisfactorily to college. We concluded that if NC is to progress to college as he wishes and to develop appropriately he should now be placed at Wye Valley School. In the light of this conclusion we did not agree that the further amendment to Part 3 of NC's statement requested by Mr and Mrs C should be included in the statement as this amendment was dependent upon NC attending a special school."

"In exercising or performing all their respective powers and duties under the Education Acts, the Secretary of State, local education authorities and the funding authorities shall have regard to the general principle that pupils are to be educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents, so far as that is compatible with the provision of efficient instruction and training and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure."

4. The section makes no reference to the Tribunal. But I should say at once that if, in the fulfilment of their functions under Part IV of the 1996 Act, the Local Education Authority must pay attention to section 9, then in my judgment so should the Special Educational Needs Tribunal on a section 326 appeal. Section 326 clearly provides for an appeal on the merits of the statement made by the Local Education Authority. Section 326(3) is in these terms:

5. Within the limits of this provision (and of section 326(4) to which I will come) the Tribunal stands in the shoes of the Local Education Authority. What is a relevant factor for the Local Education Authority is a relevant factor for the Tribunal.

6. Mr Bowen for the Appellants submits that the Tribunal was wrong to state, in paragraph (e) of their reasons, that "Schedule 27 clearly limits the issue of parental preference to maintained, grant-maintained or grant- maintained special schools". This, he says, is a holding, in effect, that section 9 was excluded from the Tribunal's consideration.

"Every local education authority shall make arrangements for enabling a parent on whom a copy of a proposed statement has been served under paragraph 2 to express a preference as to the maintained, grant-maintained, or grant-maintained special school at which he wishes education to be provided for his child and to give reasons for his preference.

(3) Where a local education authority make a statement in a case where the parent of the child concerned has expressed a preference in pursuance of such arrangements as to the school at which he wishes education to be provided for his child, they shall specify the name of that school in the statement unless

8. Both counsel were armed with a considerable body of authority, but, as I understand it, there is no case which addresses in terms the relationship between section 9 and Schedule 27, paragraph 3. Mr Oldham for the first Respondent made this submission in his skeleton argument:

"... it is plain that paragraph 3 of Schedule 27 is a self-contained code for the manner in which parental preference is to be taken into account where a child has a statement of SENs [special educational needs]. There is no scope for stating that that section applies if paragraph 3 of Schedule 27 does not. ..."

9. Mr Oldham referred in the skeleton to the unreported decision of Moses J in Burridge v London Borough of Harrow (transcript, 9th December 1997), but the learned Judge in that case had no occasion to engage with the impact of section 9. He held (see page 7A of the transcript) that there exists a separate statutory code in relation to children who have no special educational needs, and referred in that context to section 411 of the Education Act 1996, which I need not set out. Clearly Schedule 27, paragraph 3 and section 411 constitutes separate "codes", if that is the appropriate word, for giving effect to parental choice in cases of children respectively subject to statements and not so subject. But, in my judgment, none of this casts determinative light on the scope or ambit of section 9.

10. In my view, even in a case where Schedule 27, paragraph 3 has no application because the parents' preference is for an independent school, section 9 raises a relevant factor for the Local Education Authority's consideration in the performance of their duties under Part IV of the 1996 Act. Mr Oldham submitted that so to hold would be to render Schedule 27, paragraph 3 otiose: it would enable the child's parents to "trump", as he put it, the schedule with section 9 in any case where the schedule did not apply. But this ignores a critical difference between section 9 and Schedule 27. The former requires the Local Education Authority only to have regard to the principle of parental choice. But Schedule 27, paragraph 3 requires the Local Education Authority to give effect to parental choice, subject, of course, to the important qualifications there stated. The difference is very important. Schedule 27, paragraph 3 (and, for that matter, section 411) has teeth which section 9 lacks.

12. Mr Oldham's argument would read in a qualification for which Parliament has not provided, namely that section 9 only bites where there are further provisions specifically giving effect to it, such as are to be found in section 411 and Schedule 27, paragraph 3. I see no warrant for imposing any such implied limitation upon the words Parliament has chosen to use. Mr Oldham, however, supported his argument that section 9 is to be limited in this way by reference to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Watt v Kesteven County Council [1955] 1 QB 408. That case concerned the original predecessor of section 9, namely section 76 of the Education Act 1944, which I need not set out. It was also concerned with section 8 of the 1944 Act, which imposed a duty on Local Education Authorities to secure sufficient availability for their area of schools providing secondary education. The Plaintiff in that case took proceedings because the relevant Local Education Authority were not prepared to pay the full tuition fees at the Roman Catholic School where he chose to send his sons. He relied on section 76. Lord Justice Denning (as he then was) said this at page 423 to 424:

"... it was urged before us that independent schools stand in a special position. If the county council have no school of their own, or grant-aided school to which to send the boys, but have to send them to an independent school, then it was said that the father has a right to choose which independent school they should go to; and, corresponding to this right, that the county council are bound to pay the fees in full.

"Even if it was a duty of the county council to make available all the independent schools in the country, nevertheless I do not think that section 76 means that every parent has a right to choose any of them he likes. Section 76 does not say that pupils must in all cases be educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents. It only lays down a general principle to which the county council must have regard. This leaves it open to the county council to have regard to other things as well, and also to make exceptions to the general principle if it thinks fit to do so. It cannot therefore be said that a county council is at fault simply because it does not see fit to comply with the parent's wishes. And that is all that the father's complaint comes to in this case."

13. However, this decision is not authority for the proposition, for which Mr Oldham contends, that section 9 is altogether disapplied save where there is some specific provision elsewhere in the Education Acts which gives focussed, or executive, effect to the principle of parental choice. In Watt the Court of Appeal was dealing with an argument that the then section 76 required the Local Education Authority to give effect to parental choice. Clearly the section did not do so; nor does section 9 and Mr Bowen for the Appellants does not contend the contrary.

14. Mr Oldham next submitted that section 9 is, as he put it, "not justiciable" before the Special Educational Needs Tribunal. This is a confusing expression. If he meant (which, in fairness, I do not think he did) that even if the Local Education Authority had to have section 9 in mind in a case of a statemented child, still the Tribunal did not, I have already rejected any such notion. I understood Mr Oldham to mean, however, that even if the Tribunal (or the Local Education Authority) ought to have considered section 9 but avowedly ignored it, this court would have no jurisdiction to interfere. On the face of, this is an extraordinary proposition: it assumes the existence of a public law error by the Local Education Authority or Tribunal, but asserts that this court, in the exercise of what is a statutory form of judicial review, has no power to correct it.

15. Mr Oldham founded on Cummings v Birkenhead Corporation [1972] 1 Ch 12. That case again concerned sections 8 and 76 of the Act of 1944. A group of parents issued a writ, claiming (in effect) that their choice of schools for their children had been improperly denied, and that the Local Education Authority were in breach of their duties under sections 8 and 76. Their claim was dismissed on the merits, but Mr Oldham cites the case because of what was said by Lord Denning at page 36C-D:

"Stopping there, however, I would have thought that, in case of a wrong exercise of their discretion, the only remedy is that given by statute. If the education authority fail to discharge a duty which is imposed upon them by the Act, a remedy is given by section 99 of the Act of 1944. If the education authority are acting or proposing to act unreasonably in regard to the "execution of their duties, then again a remedy is given by section 68 of the Act. In either case the person aggrieved can apply to the Minister."

17. Mr Oldham's submission must be that sections 68 and 99, now replicated in section 496 and section 497 of the 1996 Act, provide an exclusive remedy in any case where an aggrieved person claims that section 9 has not been taken into account in any educational decision. He refers also to a passage towards the close of Lord Denning's judgment in Watt at page 425:

"It is plain to me that the duty under section 8 (to make schools available) can only be enforced by the Minister under section 99 of the Act and not by action at law. That being so, a breach of section 76 in the exercise of section 8 can also be enforced by the Minister and not by action at law."

18. In my judgment, this argument is misconceived. The Court of Appeal in Cummings was dealing with a case where, as it held, Parliament had provided a statutory remedy, a remedy which in that case the Plaintiff had not sought to invoke. There might nowadays well be arguments to the effect that section 496 and section 497 do not oust the judicial review court's jurisdiction, and it is to be noted that Cummings and Watt were writ actions decided before the reforms of Ord. 53 in 1977 and the growth of judicial review since. But it is unnecessary to go into such questions. The position today is that at least a complainant must first avail himself of any appropriate remedy made available by statute. Judicial review is a remedy of last resort. However, none of this can assist Mr Oldham in the present case: the Appellants here availed themselves of their statutory remedies, by appeal to the Tribunal under section 326 and now to this court under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act. They are within the statutory system which Parliament has provided. It cannot possibly be argued that in respect of one aspect of their case (section 9), they should have gone off to the Minister. They have availed themselves of the proper appeal route open to them.

19. In the result, none of Mr Oldham's submissions deflects me from my conclusion that section 9 provides a relevant factor for the Local Education Authority's consideration under Part IV of the Act and for the Tribunal to consider on appeal. This result, I think, is supported by the terms of section 326(4), which are as follows:

20. Section 326(4)(b) thus specifically contemplates a case where a parent has proposed a particular school for inclusion in a Part IV statement. It seems to me that in such a case the Tribunal is by the statute invited to consider the parents' views. It does not have to specify any particular school (nor, on authority, does the Local Education Authority under section 344(b)). But given that the Tribunal may specify a school proposed by the parent, it seems to me simply quixotic to suppose that it must then (in a case to which Schedule 27, paragraph 3 does not apply, a case that is, of course, covered by section 326(4)(a)) ignore the parents' preferences.

21. Accordingly, I uphold Mr Bowen's submission, that section 9 fell to be considered here untrammelled by Schedule 27, paragraph 3, and that in taking the contrary view the Tribunal fell into error. This is, I think, supported by the dictum of Dyson J in White and others v London Borough

"It is common ground that Sch 27 did not apply in either of the two appeals before me. Accordingly, the authority was under a duty to name a school which it considered would be appropriate for the child and should be specified in the statement (s 324(4)(b)). In deciding whether a school was one which should be specified in the statement, the authority was obliged to take into account two other statutory duties. These were: (i) the duty to have regard to the general principle that pupils are to be educated in accordance with the wishes of their parent, so far as that is compatible with the provision of efficient instruction and training, and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure (s 9); and (ii) that a child with special educational needs is normally to be educated in mainstream schools ..."

(3) A Local Education Authority is not obliged to provide the best available education for a statemented child. Any school specified in Part IV of the statement must simply be one capable of delivering this specified special educational provision deemed necessary to meet the child's special educational needs: see ex parte C [1998] ELR 66 at 76E-78E per Sedley J. It follows that the parents are not entitled to insist on the best available school.

(5) Given all these considerations, I apprehend that the case where the parents' choice (outside Schedule 27) might be determinative of the question what, if any, school should be named in the statement will be very rare; I doubt whether it would arise at all. At most, section 9 creates a bias in favour of parental choice where more than one school is under consideration and where, to put it in very crude terms, everything else is equal.

24. This brings me to Mr Oldham's second argument which is very important. It is that the Tribunal did (despite their finding about Schedule 27, paragraph 3 in section 9) consider the parents' choice, and that in any event the error of law which I have found present in their decision could have made no difference to the result. I should note the terms of Ord. 55, r.7(7):

28. The real question is this: if they had correctly applied the law concerning section 9, might it have made a difference to the result? Mr Oldham submits that whereas there was an unequivocal finding as to Wye Valley's suitability (see paragraph (c) of the reasons), the Tribunal's view on Stanbridge Earls were much more guarded. It is convenient just to notice again what is said in paragraph (d) and part of (f) in the reasons:

"(d) We also considered the provision available at Stanbridge Earls School. We agreed that that school may also be able to meet NC's academic needs although we had reservations about the placement of NC in a residential school particularly bearing in mind his wish to attend college in the future. We also considered the expenditure required to educate NC at both Wye Valley School and Stanbridge Earls School. We reached the conclusion that the difference was not material to our considerations.

"... We accepted the evidence of Mrs Williams that NC needed to reintergrate into mainstream schooling in order to progress satisfactorily to college. We concluded that if NC is to progress to college as he wishes and to develop appropriately he should now be placed at Wye Valley School."

30. Might the Tribunal have resolved the matter differently if they had correctly understood section 9? I think not . Mr Bowen submitted that if they had got the law right they would have carried out a balancing exercise between the two schools, whereas, as it was, "their intellectual decision-making process was effectively at an end once they had found Wye Valley to be suitable". Moreover he argued that, in order to uphold Wye Valley in face of the parents' choice, the Tribunal would have had to make an unequivocal finding that Stanbridge Earls was not suitable.

31. I do not accept Mr Bowen's submissions. The pressure of parental choice, in a case where it is invoked by virtue only of section 9, does not imply that the parents' choice is to be rejected only if the school nominated by them is categorically unsuitable. As I have said, the overriding consideration under Part IV is the fulfilment of the child's special educational needs. Parental choice is in the back seat.

32. Here, the Tribunal's conclusion is, in effect, that NC's needs require that he be returned to mainstream schooling, and that meant a placement at Wye Valley. I cannot see that that conclusion might have in the least been displaced if the Tribunal had expressly recognised the need to have regard to the parents' preference, of which, plainly, they were very well aware.

39. MR BOWEN: Before I get to costs, my Lord, can I just make a preliminary point? I am slightly (and it may well be that I am in error here) discomforted by the way matters have developed, because you will remember at the beginning of the hearing it was accepted (and I am not seeking to fault my opponent at all) and it was made clear that the last part of my argument (and you will remember my skeleton dealing with suitability and the various points I made on the suitability and whether or not the finding had been made as to the inappropriateness of Stanbridge Earls) all fell away, and it then became known as the "proviso argument". I did not, therefore, seek to argue the point on the supplementary notice. I do not know whether you zoned in on that at all, my Lord.

40. MR JUSTICE LAWS: Mr Bowen, my apprehension was that it was made entirely clear to me that that latter part of the argument was no longer in play, for what I had to consider was a point of principle under section 9 and, if I was in your favour on that, whether nevertheless the decision should not be quashed because of what became called the proviso point. It was not suggested to me that the so-called proviso argument required all your latter argument to be reintroduced. That is certainly not the impression I had.

43. MR BOWEN: We did have a very short interchange beforehand, when I observed that, perhaps, the concession that was made has led to some difficulty because, in fact, the long point that I did have there on paper and would have emphasised orally, I did not make because of the way the argument developed. Even if that is right, I do not see now how it can be done save for me now to make an application for leave to appeal.

46. MR BOWEN: My Lord, on costs, I say this: we clearly won on the legal point. The vast majority of the costs in this case, if not all the costs in this case, have been engaged because of the section 9 point. There is no evidence. A bundle was put together; it was simply replicated by my solicitors through the photocopier. All papers were before the Tribunal.

47. There is some guidance from Collins J in Staffordshire v J & J that it should always be available at court but it should not be photostated several times. That is the only costs that could be said to be unnecessarily incurred. Everything else, all of the authorities, all of the arguments were on the law and I won that. I should, therefore, surely have my costs.

53. MR BOWEN: My Lord, this has occurred on numerous occasions in this type and what often happens is that judges apportion the costs. It is said, on the one hand, that maybe it should go off for taxation for the Taxing Master to work out exactly what ----

59. MR OLDHAM: My Lord, the case was heard before your Lordship so that Mr Bowen could attack the decision and so that I could defend it. That, I have done in the judgment successfully, for whatever reason. Costs related to that defence for whatever reason.

62. Where, however, I do take substantial issue is that the test, expanded by Sedley J in the ex parte C case, is that all that the Tribunal have to do and all that the Local Education Authority have do is to provide a school that is good enough. The findings, and I as understand your own analysis of the Tribunal's findings, do not say that Stanbridge Earls is not good enough. They simply express some concern on certain points: the residential point and the further education point; the further education point being the point that I was describing as an irrelevant consideration by way of the supplementary notice, which I did not argue because of the way the case proceeded.

63. As I understand your Lordship's judgment, it would appear that you are taking issue with that basic question. Because if that question is right, the question for the Tribunal was: having decided that the Local Education Authority school was suitable and Stanbridge Earls was good enough but they had problems, there should then have been the two factors being brought into play which I described earlier on?

64. MR JUSTICE LAWS: I think what you are submitting (and if this is what you are submitting, I will agree with you) that if the Local Education Authority decided that both schools were suitable (you used the expression "good enough", which appears nowhere in the statute), then it may be that parental choice would come into play and section 9 would have made a difference. Is that it?

69. MR JUSTICE LAWS: Whether "appropriate" or "suitable", if there is (to use a crude expression which I may have used in the judgment) a level playing field, then something has to weigh one way or the other and it may be parental choice -- you would say.

70. MR BOWEN: Precisely, and I say that once you get past the stage of suitability, appropriateness or being good enough, then it does not matter that, in motoring terms, the Local Education Authority have suggested a BMW, but a Ford Mondeo is good enough and the parents want something between a Mondeo and a BMW.

72. MR BOWEN: Precisely, and I say, as a matter of fact, I plainly have that, and you have not said otherwise in your judgment. The logical result must be that because you said it would not have made a difference, the Tribunal asked themselves exactly the right question. I say plainly they did not. It is in many ways a slightly different rerun of the argument in front of Sedley J. You will see there that he gave leave to appeal because he accepted there -- and can I just take you to it very briefly? It is at tab 9, page 79. You can see at the very last line that "... the first Respondent to have leave to appeal". I referred to it just to show your Lordship that leave was given to the local authority.

74. MR BOWEN: No, but what I can say, my Lord, is that in Sedley J's judgment the question of ex parte H Utopia, precisely what questions should be asked by the Tribunal, was one of great significance, and on that basis plus several others he gave leave to appeal. That point is now directly in issue. Ironically we started with a section 9 argument which has been developed very fully (and I say the right answer has been reached), but by a strange turn of circumstances we are now dealing with a different question, which is whether or not, if this Tribunal found that it was good enough, which I said it did and nobody has disagreed with that, as I understand it and as understand the judgment, then ----

76. MR BOWEN: You have, my Lord, but it could still very easily be good enough. But they still think (and this is where they went wrong) that Wye Valley School was better. That does not matter, as long as Stanbridge Earls is good enough. My Lord, that is my argument.

78. MR OLDHAM: Would your Lordship just give me a few moments? Your Lordship will realise that I have two interests in this point: (i) to protect the Special Educational Needs Tribunal's decision in a particular case and (ii) for future reference, to have any issue under section 9 sorted out if the matter were to go further in our favour. Because I have competing interests, I have no particular instructions one way or the other, so I will say that I neither resist nor support the application.

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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> C & Anor v Buckinghamshire County Council & Anor [1998] EWHC Admin 572 (20 May 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/1998/572.html Cite as: [1998] COD 279, [1999] Ed CR 430, [1998] ELR 463, [1998] EWHC Admin 572

England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions