CO/5428/2004 
Neutral Citation Number: [2005] EWHC 1214 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION  
DIVISIONAL COURT 
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand
London WC2 

Tuesday, 12th April 2005

B E F O R E:

LORD JUSTICE LAWS 

MR JUSTICE DAVID STEEL 
 
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THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF FIONA ANWAR-LINDLEY
(CLAIMANT)

-v- 

LANCASHIRE JUSTICES
(DEFENDANT) 
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MR N LEY (instructed by Byrne Frodsham & Co) appeared on behalf of the CLAIMANT
The DEFENDANT did not appear and was not represented
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J U D G M E N T
1.	MR JUSTICE DAVID STEEL:  With the permission of the single judge, the claimant sought judicial review of a decision of the Lancashire Justices sitting at Reedley Magistrates' Court on 11th August 2004, when they refused to state a case for the opinion of the High Court.  
2.	On 9th July 2004 the claimant had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol and with careless driving.  The claimant asked for a case stated.  The refusal of the magistrates' courts is set out in the following terms:
"We are of the opinion that it is inappropriate for us to state a case for the opinion of the High Court.  We accept that our decision to convict Fiona Anwar-Lindley of both offences was one that a bench of Magistrates properly advised should not have taken and is therefore unreasonable within the Wednesbury principle.  In order to protect the interests of Fiona Anwar-Lindley and the public interest in ensuring that the time of the Administrative Court is not unnecessarily engaged and keep the cost of rectifying our error to an absolute minimum we will consent to an application for permission to seek a Judicial Review of our decision.  In due course we will not oppose an application to quash our decision and have it remitted to this Court for a re-hearing."
3.	In my judgment, the proper way forward would in fact have been to insist upon the statement of the case.  I do not endorse the judicial review avenue.  But the reality is that a consent order has now been signed by the interested parties which goes rather further than the magistrates were minded to accept, namely that the claimant's conviction be quashed and a not guilty verdict be entered and that the costs of the claimant be paid out of central funds. 
4.	The background is somewhat unsatisfactory given that the magistrates appear to have had before them no evidence whatsoever that the claimant was driving the car on the relevant date and, not surprisingly, they then concluded that the decision they had reached was unreasonable.  However, in all the circumstances, it does seem the most appropriate way forward is to accept this consent order rather than insist upon a case stated.
5.	LORD JUSTICE LAWS:  In those circumstances, and for the reasons my Lord has given, we will make the order in the form set out in the draft consent order.  
6.	I should just like, purely as a footnote, to emphasise for my part the importance that the court attaches to there being a proper explanation of the basis upon which it is asked to quash a decision of another public authority.