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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> HM Attorney General v Douglas [2006] EWHC 1982 (Admin) (08 June 2006) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2006/1982.html Cite as: [2006] EWHC 1982 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		8th June 2006

1. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: There is before the court an application by the Attorney General under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 in relation to the defendant Paula May Gladys Douglas. There is also before the court an application by Miss Douglas to strike out the application of the Attorney General. We propose to deal with those applications together.
2. The background to the matter is that Miss Douglas is an intelligent woman who obtained a degree in Law from Lancaster University in 1994. In September 1995 she began a legal practice course at the College of Law in Chester with a view to qualifying as a solicitor. Up until that time she had not engaged in any litigation that we are aware of, certainly none that requires comment. Very early in the course at the College of Law, an lecturer used an old-fashioned and now disapproved expression with racial connotations. Miss Douglas understandably took exception to the use of the phrase. She also considered that it was directed to her, she being of Afro-Caribbean ethnicity, although, for reasons that will become obvious, there has never been any judicial finding as to whether the phrase was in fact directed at her. Certainly, the person who uttered it did not accept that it was.
3. In some ways that unfortunate incident seems to have triggered extensive litigation by Miss Douglas, although it did not begin immediately. Unfortunately, Miss Douglas failed her LPC examinations in 1996 and again in January 1997. It was after that that the extensive litigation began. It will be necessary to consider it in two phases, because the first phase of her litigious activity came to an end when the Attorney General took earlier section 42 proceedings against her. Those proceedings resulted in a judgment on 18th July 2001. This court, comprising Brooke LJ and Newman J, concluded that whereas the Attorney General had established conduct which satisfied the test in section 42, in its discretion the court preferred not to make an order against Miss Douglas and chose instead to adjourn the matter for a year to see whether she would make good her stated intention to desist from such litigious activity in the future. For all practical purposes, she did so desist for that period of a year.
4. The matter came back before this court on 15th July 2002, the court then comprising Brooke LJ and Bell J. The Attorney General consented to the dismissal of the section 42 application in view of the apparent improvement in Miss Douglas's behaviour. However, very soon after that she became litigious again and the second phase runs from August 2002 until the present time.
5. The first phase was described in the judgment of Brooke LJ in 2001 and it is not necessary now to rehearse the detail of all that took place. In April 1997 Miss Douglas commenced proceedings in the Employment Tribunal against the College of Law alleging "racial discrimination and undue pressure within the teaching establishment". Her application was dismissed as being out of time and, save for the part of it which relied on the unfortunate comment to which I have referred, the Tribunal considered the case also to be without merit.
6. Between September 1998 and December 2000, Miss Douglas commenced at least 41 further proceedings, 12 of them against the College of Law and 16 of them against the Law Society. They were based largely on racial discrimination and concerned the refusal of the College to excuse her from the examination requirement of the legal practice course and the refusal of the Law Society to waive certain training requirements. In addition to those defendants, Manchester City Council was named in 10 claims arising from disciplinary and recruitment decisions which it had taken as Miss Douglas's employer in 1997 and 1998. A firm of solicitors who have acted for Miss Douglas, Clifford Coppock and Carter, were named in four claims in which allegations were made about the services which they had supplied to Miss Douglas in 1996 and 1997, in addition to which, there was an allegation about racial discrimination when she applied to the firm to become a trainee solicitor.
7. Those then were the matters that brought the first section 42 application before this court. It is appropriate to refer to some passages in the judgment of Brooke LJ. First, in paragraphs 55 and 56 he said this:

"(55) The trouble in this case, in my judgment, lies with Miss Douglas' unwillingness to refrain from pursuing her complaints against the Law Society and the educational instruments of that society at the College of Law. In my judgment, the history that I have recorded, the applications, both to the County Court and to the Employment Tribunal, and the applications to this court for permission to apply for judicial review, have the hallmark and can properly now be described as coming within the statutory definition of section 42(1). I say nothing about the applications for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. This is now a without notice procedure and although she made these applications which took up a good deal of court time, I would not place so much weight on those apart from expressing concern about the new set of applications which were triggered off in May of last year.

(56) But what rings out from this history is that there was a period of her life in which she was psychologically very concerned and troubled about the way that her hopes of pursuing a professional career had been thwarted. There was a period of under two years between September 1998 and the time when these proceedings were instituted last year when she behaved in a way which can be properly stigmatised by the language used in section 42."

Having been impressed with the polite and courteous way in which Miss Douglas had addressed the court and had expressed an intention to change her ways, Brooke LJ said this at paragraph 63:

"With some hesitation I consider that the appropriate course to take would be to adjourn these proceedings for a period of 12 months. The purpose of this adjournment will be to see if Miss Douglas is willing to desist on her own initiative from any further applications or actions of the type in which she has taken part too often in the past. There will be liberty to apply, so that if at any time during this period of 12 months the Attorney General wishes to restore this application, he will be at liberty to do so. The matter will be adjourned for 12 months. At the end of the period the Attorney, given the history of the previous 12 months, can form a view as to whether there is any need to press for an order, or whether the matter can now be said to have been satisfactorily resolved, there having been, by then, quite a long period since the litigious activity between September 1998 and June 2000 will have come to an end . . .

(65) In effect, when she came down to court this morning, having travelled all night by coach to be here, she was saying to the court, 'give me a chance'. We are willing to give her a chance, and I hope that she will enter the spirit of the court's willingness to give her a chance and desist from any further litigation. If she does not, then it seems to me almost inevitable that the order will have to be made against her under section 42 of the Act. I would, therefore, adjourn these proceedings for a period of 12 months."

Newman J agreed, adding this:

"I desire to emphasise that it has been central to my concurrence with the course which has been proposed by my Lord that the defendant should be given the opportunity to implement the substance of that which she offered to the court as an unconditional undertaking. That means that she cannot repeat her conduct of resorting to litigation in connection with past grievances and must not resort to litigation as a means of expression of frustration against each and every negative response that she receives. She will undoubtedly suffer rebuffs and set backs in the pursuit of her career."

8. The ensuing 12 months saw no litigious activity on the part of Miss Douglas, save for one application to the Employment Tribunal which was, it seems, lodged at a particular time because of concern about the forthcoming expiration of a limitation period. Accordingly, when the matter came back before Brooke LJ and Bell J on 15th July 2002, Miss Douglas had a clean bill of health and that led to the dismissal of the Attorney General's application by consent. It is important to record this passage in the judgment of Brooke LJ on that occasion:

"The Attorney General . . . has told us today that he does not wish the court to make an order on his application which is therefore dismissed. He made it clear that if the nuisance of which he made complaint resumes at any time in the future, he will not hesitate, if so advised, to come to this court again to apply for an order under section 42 of the Act. He has made it quite clear that if he does so he will maintain his right to rely on all the material which he put before the court on the previous occasion. This is a quite understandable attitude to take, in my judgment. I only hope that it will be unnecessary and that the happy story which Miss Douglas has told the court in a letter which it has just received will mean that she is able to continue with her hopes of developing a legal career without feeling she has to have recourse to litigation in the way that coloured her approach to her ambitions in the months leading up to the hearing on 18th July."

9. Sadly, the hopes expressed by Brooke LJ were very soon dashed and there followed a substantial number of litigious initiatives from Miss Douglas. They began some five weeks after the second judgment of this court in July 2002. In August, Miss Douglas lodged an application for judicial review of the Law Society's refusal to consider or grant a hearing of her application for waiver of some of the vocational training requirements. In the event, that claim was never served and was withdrawn on 5th September 2002.
10. On 15th December 2003, Miss Douglas made an application expressly to reopen four of the matters which had preceded the first section 42 application. That application by Miss Douglas was refused, because the matters had been the subject of earlier judicial decision. There was then a group of three Employment Tribunal claims against the Law Society, again relating to the refusal to waive the requirement that Miss Douglas take examinations. The application included an allegation of disability discrimination. In addition, some of these claims appeared to seek the reopening of previously decided matters. The Tribunal held that two of the claims were misconceived and an abuse of process, and Miss Douglas was ordered to pay some costs in relation to them. Costs in the Employment Tribunal can, of course, only be ordered where an applicant has behaved at least unreasonably.
11. Further claims were initiated against Manchester Metropolitan University, two of them relating to the examination of a social work placement in 2003 and a further two of them relating to the refusal of that University to offer Miss Douglas a place on its legal practice course or to consider an application to transfer to a youth and community work course. These were applications for permission to apply for judicial review. They were unsuccessful and a costs order was made against her in relation to one of them. One was struck out as being misconceived and a County Court claim was discontinued.
12. The next action was in the form of a purported challenge to the Higher Education Ombudsman's rejection of Miss Douglas' complaint against Manchester Metropolitan University. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused with costs. Miss Douglas then turned her attention to defendants including the Black Solicitors Network and the Solicitors with Disabilities Group, commencing proceedings in each case in the County Court. In each case she later discontinued the proceedings after the court had notified her of its proposal to dismiss the claim as an abuse of process.
13. In September 2004, Miss Douglas commenced the legal practice course at Liverpool John Moores University. In May 2005 she again applied unsuccessfully to the Law Society for a waiver of the examination requirement. This gave rise to claims against Liverpool John Moores University, the Students' Union and the Disability Rights Commission for failing to support her application for a waiver. These matters also resulted in failure in one form or another, either withdrawal or discontinuance.
14. On 17th March 2006 His Honour Judge Holman in the Manchester County Court struck out an action against the Commission for Racial Equality and others, describing it as an attempt to relitigate old matters relating to the College of Law and the solicitor who had originally acted for Miss Douglas. The particulars of claim were described as "a complete muddle", thus disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and as an abuse of process.
15. Without dealing with all these matters, it is perhaps appropriate next to refer to another judgment of His Honour Judge Holman who considered seven pending matters in which Miss Douglas was the claimant. They were variously against Liverpool John Moores University, Manchester Metropolitan University, the Law Society, the General Social Care Council and the same solicitor who had acted on the earlier occasion. In a careful judgment, Judge Holman went through each of the seven actions. He struck out the first claim against Manchester Metropolitan University, describing it as "wholly without merit". He used the same language in relation to a second claim against that University with the same result. So far as an action against the Law Society was concerned, he concluded, "not without some hesitation", that he should let the claim proceed so as to enable the claim form and particulars of claim to be served, observing that the position may well fall to be reviewed in due course in light of the response by the Law Society. He issued a warning as to costs in relation to that.
16. So far as the claim against the General Social Care Council was concerned, he described the claim form and particulars of claim as constituted as being "wholly without merit". The claim against Liverpool John Moores University on this occasion was allowed to proceed in part, awaiting the response of the University in precisely the same way as with the proceedings against the Law Society. The claim against the solicitor was described as an attempt to relitigate the issues raised in two claims that had been struck out seven years previously.
17. He concluded that that was an abuse of process. He again used the words "a complete muddle" to describe the pleadings, and held that they disclosed no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim and were an abuse of the court's process. He struck them out as being "wholly without merit". He then made a civil restraint order against Miss Douglas, limited in time until 31st October this year:

" . . . not because I consider this adequate, but because I intend to refer the matter to the Attorney General for further consideration as to an application under section 42. To my mind there is a need to regulate Miss Douglas for a far longer period than I can impose. It is also apparent that she has engaged, and indeed is still engaging, in litigation elsewhere -- there have been applications for judicial review and to tribunals."

18. In all, Miss Douglas has commenced at least 23 proceedings since August of 2002. That is the figure advanced by the Attorney General. According to Miss Douglas, the correct figure is slightly higher. In the very recent past, she sought a judgment in default in an action in Manchester County Court against the Central Manchester Primary Care Trust. That came before His Honour Judge Holman who dismissed the application because the proceedings had not been properly served on the defendant. He also struck out the particulars of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. That was on 28th April of this year, after the present application by the Attorney General had been instituted.
19. On 23rd April in the Employment Tribunal in London, Miss Douglas lodged an application against the Bar Council. In addition, as I have related, she has issued applications in the present proceedings before this court, one of which was dismissed by Sedley LJ at an earlier stage, the other of which is the application to strike out the application by the Attorney General.
20. That, then, is the background. I turn briefly to the law. Section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 provides:

"If on an application made by the Attorney General under this section, the High Court is satisfied that any person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground --

(a) instituted vexatious civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; or

(b) made vexatious applications in any civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or any inferior court, and whether instituted by him or another,

the court may, after hearing that person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, make a civil proceedings order."

21. It is now established that an Employment Tribunal is an inferior court for the purposes of section 42. The approach of this court to section 42 applications has been set out in a number of well known authorities. In Re Vernazza [1959] 1 WLR 622 at 624 Lord Parker CJ said:

"In considering whether the proceedings are vexatious one is entitled to, and must look at, the whole history of the matter, and it is not determined by whether the pleading discloses a cause of action."

In Attorney General v Barker [2001] FLR 759, Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ considered the words "vexatious" and "habitually and persistently". He said this at paragraphs 19 and 22:

"(19) The hallmark of a vexatious proceedings is in my judgment that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process . . .

(22) The hallmark [of section 42] usually is that [the claimant] sues the same party repeatedly in reliance on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, thereby imposing on defendants the burden of resisting claim after claim; that the claimant relies on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, in actions against successive parties who if they were to be sued at all should have been joined in the same action; that the claimant automatically challenges any adverse decision on appeal; and that the claimant refuses to take any notice of or give any effect to orders of the court. The essential vice of habitual and persistent litigation is keeping on and on litigating when earlier litigation has been unsuccessful and when on any rational and objective assessment the time has come to stop."

22. Finally, so far as the law is concerned, it is axiomatic that upon determining an application pursuant to section 42 in this court, the court is entitled to rely on conclusions reached by judges in the earlier proceedings and does not investigate the merits of those cases or act as a quasi-appellate court in relation to them.
23. On a fair appraisal of the history of this matter, it rapidly becomes apparent that Miss Douglas has particularly sought to litigate and relitigate certain matters, or that her litigation has been directly or indirectly linked with those matters. The first matter was that of the comment made by the lecturer at the College of Law. The second matter has been the attempt to rely on the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 to secure adjustments to education and training requirements, particularly in relation to the Law Society. The disability upon which Miss Douglas relies is a diagnosis of dyslexia and a degree of dyspraxia. Thirdly, she has repeatedly sought to litigate and ventilate her allegation that the solicitor who acted for her some years ago on one occasion uttered a falsehood in an affidavit. As I have indicated, it is not for this court to go behind the findings of the courts that have dealt with the various matters which reflect those underlying concerns of Miss Douglas.
24. On behalf of the Attorney General, Mr Bourne draws attention to certain features of the case as it now stands before us. First, he draws attention to the earlier proceedings and the "last chance" that was extended to Miss Douglas by Brooke LJ and Newman J in 2001. Mr Bourne observes that since the moratorium ran out in the summer of 2002, Miss Douglas has resorted to her previous litigation habits, and indeed has continued to do so since the issue of the present proceedings. Secondly, he draws attention to what is perhaps a less common feature of the present case, namely the habit of Miss Douglas of withdrawing or discontinuing proceedings that she has commenced. Thirdly, and linked to that, the fact that she has on a number of occasions later sought to reopen matters which have previously been withdrawn, discontinued or otherwise disposed of. Fourthly (and this is not Mr Bourne's word but it is essentially what he is submitting), he suggests that Miss Douglas has unfortunately shown herself to be incorrigible in the matter of litigation and that section 42's requirements are satisfied and should result in the making of an order.
25. Miss Douglas has addressed us with great care by a video link from Manchester. We have heard her oral submissions which largely took the form of reading her carefully prepared paperwork, involving three lengthy documents. Perhaps I can summarise her principal submissions in these ways. First, she denies that she has litigated vexatiously. Indeed, she maintains that it is the Attorney General and the Law Society and her other adversaries who have behaved vexatiously and oppressively towards her. Secondly, she refers to her dyslexia and dyspraxia and submits that not enough allowance has been made for those conditions by judges and tribunals considering her cases, nor have those judges and tribunals made sufficient allowance for her status as a litigant in person, albeit one with a law degree. Thirdly, she draws attention to a number of occasions when judges or tribunals did not make potentially punitive orders (for example, orders for costs) against her, having considered doing so, sometimes concluding that she had not acted abusively or vexatiously. Fourthly, she accuses the judges who have dealt with her cases (particularly Judge Holman and his colleagues in Manchester) of bias and prejudice. Fifthly, she seeks to invoke her Convention rights under the ECHR. Sixthly, she draws attention to the fact that on a number of occasions, many of them recent, she has actually withdrawn applications and actions, thus indicating her willingness to back down.
26. As to those submissions, for my part I find them unpersuasive. There is absolutely no basis for the suggestion that the Attorney General, the Law Society or any of Miss Douglas's adversaries in litigation have behaved vexatiously towards her. She is entitled to, and has, the sympathy of the court in relation to her dyslexia and dyspraxia, but I am wholly unpersuaded that they explain her prolific litigious activity or that they have been disregarded or insufficiently regarded by the courts and tribunals who have dealt with her. The allegations of bias and prejudice are wholly unsustainable, as indeed are the allegations by reference to Convention rights. When Miss Douglas points to those occasions when courts or tribunals have declined to make adverse costs orders against her, she is doing so -- and can only do so -- within the context of those cases looked at individually. Necessarily, the court or tribunal considering the application before it on those occasions can only deal with it within the parameters of the case that it has before it. The position in this court is very different. It is the duty of this court to take an overview of the litigious activity. As Brooke LJ said when the previous application was made:

"It is now well settled law that consideration of the question whether a person has habitually and persistently instigated vexatious legal proceedings does not depend on a minute examination of the question whether in each particular action there was a reasonable ground. The court must consider the number of actions brought, their general content and their results and must not review the merits of the underlying decisions."

He also added, and I of course keep in mind, that although the standard of proof is the civil standard, it is heightened to take into account the seriousness of the issues at stake.

27. In addition to the submissions to which I have just referred, Miss Douglas also seeks to advance a legal submission to this effect: namely, that this court should disregard the litigious activity which preceded the hearing in July 2001 because it is akin to res judicata or is the subject of issue estoppel. I accept the submission of Mr Bourne that Miss Douglas is simply incorrect about that. The words of section 42 itself require the court to look at the matter broadly. The fact of the matter is that there was a finding of vexatious litigation in July 2001 but, as a matter of discretion, the court took a merciful course in relation to Miss Douglas. When the matter came back a year later, it is significant that counsel for the Attorney General and the court made it clear that if Miss Douglas were to relapse and take up indiscriminate litigation again, the Attorney General would not hesitate to come to the court again for an order under section 42, and maintained his right to rely on the material that had been put before the court in 2001. Brooke LJ described that as "a quite understandable attitude to take".
28. In my judgment, there is no question of res judicata or issue estoppel here. The court is entitled to look at (and indeed would not be carrying out its duty properly if it failed to look at) the copious material which preceded July 2001.
29. I am left with the clearest of views that Miss Douglas has conducted and sought to conduct litigation habitually, persistently and without any reasonable ground in a vexatious form. Indeed, in my judgment, this is as clear a case of that as it is possible to find. The fact that she has withdrawn cases and that occasionally unsuccessful applications for costs have been made against her, and that she has not always sought or maintained applications for permission to appeal are nothing to the point. Plainly she has subjected her adversaries to a torrent of misjudged litigation in a most vexatious way.
30. Brooke LJ in 2001 described this as "a sad case". In many ways it still is. As I have recounted, Miss Douglas is obviously an intelligent woman with much to offer, but sadly in my judgment, she has become obsessive about these matters and her adversaries and the courts are entitled to protection against more litigious activity of this kind. In my judgment, it will be wholly inappropriate to make again the kind of order that was made by Brooke LJ and Newman J in July 2001. Indeed, it is plain from the passages in the judgments on that occasion to which I have referred that the judges themselves would not have contemplated such an indulgence on a second occasion.
31. Miss Douglas suggests that if we feel bound to make an order under section 42 we should make it of limited duration because she has no intention of continuing with vexatious litigation in the future and now only wishes to qualify as a lawyer in another jurisdiction. Even if that is her present intention, and I am quite prepared to accept that it is, past history simply gives this court no confidence that she will behave in a more responsible way if limited by order for only a short period of time. In my judgment, the appropriate course is for the order to be unlimited in time, although in due course she will be able to make an application to the court for its discharge.
32. Finally, there are current matters which Miss Douglas suggests that, in the event of a section 42 order being made, she ought nevertheless to be granted leave to continue. I remind myself that Judge Holman limited the ambit of the civil restraint order in that sort of way. Having considered the matter, I have come to the conclusion that the appropriate course is for this court today not to involve itself in the question of leave to continue individual actions, the files of which are before us. In order to investigate whether any of those actions ought to be the subject of leave, it would require a careful and time consuming consideration. Accordingly, in my judgment, the appropriate course is for this court not to grant leave in respect of any of them, but of course to enable Miss Douglas, if she so wishes, to make application in relation to specific ongoing actions, or indeed new actions, which will be considered by a High Court judge in the usual way.
33. Accordingly, for my part I would simply make the order without limitation of time under section 42.
34. MR JUSTICE MITTING: I agree for the reasons given.
35. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Thank you both very much.
36. MR BOURNE: My Lord, can I --
37. MISS DOUGLAS: Do I have leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal?
38. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Just a moment. One thing at a time.
39. MR BOURNE: Two matters which logically precede permission to appeal. Do your Lordships dismiss the application to strike out?
40. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Yes, we do. I should have made that clear.
41. MR BOURNE: Secondly, can I mention the question of appeal. It is requested since there is sometimes uncertainty how a section 42 order is policed or polices itself. There have been occasions where claims have slipped through the net which causes complications in terms of liability for costs, whether the action is to be regarded as an action for costs purposes. For that reason, since this is an order against a person to desist from doing specified things, I request the court to direct that a penal notice be attached.
42. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Has it become the practice of this court to attach penal notices?
43. MR BOURNE: One was attached in a case I did a few weeks ago. I cannot really assist whether other courts do it or not.
44. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: That would warn the defendant that if she were to breach the order she would be committing a contempt of court.
45. MR BOURNE: My Lord, that is correct.
46. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Miss Douglas, you would like permission to appeal?
47. MISS DOUGLAS: Yes, my Lord.
48. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: We will retire and consider those applications.
(A short break)
49. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: As to the application for a penal notice, whilst we consider that we have jurisdiction to attach such a notice to the order, we are not going to do so in this case, the reason being that we take account of the fact that for those 12 months between July 2001 and July 2002 Miss Douglas behaved entirely in accordance with what she had indicated to the court. Whilst she has on occasions sought to litigate in Preston rather than in Manchester, she has given a reason for that. We do not think it was with a view to evading any order. Indeed, there was no such order. Accordingly, whilst a penal notice may be appropriate in some cases, we do not think it is appropriate in this case.
50. As to the application for permission to appeal, we refuse that application. In our judgment, it has no real prospect of success. This is a very clear case for the making of an order under section 42. If Miss Douglas wants to appeal, she will have to make an application to the Court of Appeal to do so.
51. MISS DOUGLAS: Can I just say before I go. Can I ask for a transcript of this at public expense?
52. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Yes, you may have a transcript at public expense.
53. MISS DOUGLAS: If I appeal to the Court of Appeal, is there nothing to redraft the order?
54. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: No, you do not need leave as a vexatious litigant to appeal the order that made you a vexatious litigant.
55. MR BOURNE: My Lord, I may be wrong but I think you do. What you do not need leave to do is seek section 42 permission. What courts have done on a previous occasion is refuse permission to appeal but grant section 42 permission to ask the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal.
56. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Very well. We shall refuse permission to appeal. We grant leave to seek permission to appeal from the Court of Appeal. So you may do that without breach of the order.
57. MISS DOUGLAS: You mentioned earlier about applying for discharge of this order. Can I make application, with my application put before you, for that. I did ask for discharge of the order.
58. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Miss Douglas, in my view you would be very ill advised to make any application for discharge, assuming you do not appeal successfully, for quite a long time. It is not for me to say other than that. In any event, we thank you for your careful submissions, and thank you, Mr Bourne, as well.
59. MISS DOUGLAS: This is just the start of my future.
60. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: We wish you well.
61. MISS DOUGLAS: There will be a lot of casualties. Not physical casualties but casualties of representation.