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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Wandsworth Borough Council v South Western Magistrates' Court & Anor [2007] EWHC 1079 (Admin) (02 May 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2007/1079.html Cite as: [2007] EWHC 1079 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		2 May 2007

1. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: This is an appeal by way of case stated against a decision of District Judge Bayne, sitting at the South Western Magistrates' Court on 3 October 2006, that the interested party was not guilty of the offence of displaying advertisements without consent under the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations 1992 ("the Regulations") contrary to section 224(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 ("the Act").
2. There was no dispute that the advertisements referred to in the information laid by the appellant had been displayed on the dates in question, in January and February 2006, on the flank wall of a building, No 48 Battersea Rise, London SW11 ("the property"). The interested party contended that the display was not unlawful because it had the benefit of deemed consent under section 6 of the Regulations which, so far as material, provides that:

"... deemed consent is hereby granted for the display of an advertisement falling within any class specified in Part 1 of Schedule 3, subject-

(a) to any conditions and limitations specified in that Part in relation to that class ..."

3. Class 13 in Part 1 of Schedule 3 is in these terms:

"Sites used for the display of advertisements on April 1, 1974.

Description 13. An advertisement displayed on a site which was used for the display of advertisements without express consent on April 1, 1974 and has been so used continually since that date.

Conditions and limitations 13-(1) No substantial increase in the extent, or substantial alteration in the manner, of the use of the site for the display of advertisements on April 1, 1974 is permitted ..."

4. It was common ground between the parties at the hearing before the district judge that there had been, on 1 April 1974 and was still, a painted sign on the upper half of the flank wall of the property. The painting had been in existence since before 1921. Unfortunately, since the existence of the painted sign was common ground, there is no description of it in the case stated. I am reluctant to supplement the findings of fact in a case stated, but in this case it is necessary and appropriate to do so because the parties' factual evidence was given by way of witness statements which were not challenged, and the witness statements and other relevant documents are listed in paragraph 3 of the case stated.
5. The painting was described in correspondence in 1970 as a "dilapidated painted sign". A recent coloured photograph which was in evidence before the district judge shows what appears to be very faded black lettering, painted directly onto the remains of white or cream painted brickwork on the flank wall. The lettering is so faded in places that it is difficult to read all of the letters by reference to the photograph, but the appellant's planning officer, Mr Drew Williams, gave evidence which was not disputed by the interested party that the message painted on to the brickwork read:

"Spend a happy Sunday with the National News Sunday Evening Telegram."

6. Mr Williams had researched the history of these publications and said in his witness statement that the National News was a weekly London paper, published from 28 January 1917 to 26 June 1921, and that the London paper called the Evening Telegram was published from 1 September 1910 to 4 February 1911. His evidence that the newspapers advertised by the painted lettering on the flank wall had not been available to purchase for a period of some 85 years was not in dispute before the district judge.
7. The case stated does not contain a description of the advertisement displayed by the interested party. In response to a notice issued by the appellant under section 11 of the London Local Authorities Act 1995 ("the 1995 Act") the advertisement had been removed by the interested party on or about 27 March 2006. Mr William Dunseath, the interested party's National Planning Manager, said in his witness statement that it was a "More square" scrolling display advertisement which had been erected by the interested party in 2001. The display was illustrated in photographs which were before the district judge. According to the information preferred by the interested party, the display advertised "HSBC", "Bon Jovi" and "New Star" on 13 January, and 6 and 21 February 2006, respectively. The photographs before the district judge showed other advertisements, for example for commercial property. The new scrolling display was contained within a frame and covered slightly less than the top right-hand quarter of the flank wall. Beneath the display panel was a gantry with railings around it. The scrolling advertisement was illuminated.
8. Against this agreed factual background, the district judge found the following facts in paragraph 12 of the case stated:

"I find as a fact that the painted sign which is visible still on the site in question is the painted sign referred to in the correspondence dated October 1970.

It follows that the painted sign which I find as a fact constitutes an advertisement was displayed on the site on 1 April 1974. The painted sign is still visible today.

On the evidence I have heard and for the reasons given I find that the site in question is a site continually used for the display of advertisements since 1 April 1974 and that the Defendant company is therefore entitled to claim that it has deemed consent to display advertisements provided it can show that there has been no substantial alteration in the manner of the use of the site.

I have considered the respective photographs showing the site before and after the removal of the defendant's illuminated hoarding when considering whether there has been a substantial increase in the extent of the use of the site and in the manner of the use of the site.

I have also taken judicial notice of the surrounding area and the fact that Battersea Rise is a busy well illuminated street because I am of the opinion that this is relevant. The sign erected by the Defendant Company was affixed to a very small part of the site and I find as a fact that there is no substantial increase in the extent of the use of the site. The Defendant Company's advertisement is much smaller than the painted sign.

The Prosecution seek to argue that the use of an illuminated sign constitutes a substantial alteration in the manner of the use of the site. I find that to come to a factual conclusion in respect of this contention it must be necessary to consider the effect the so called new use has on the amenity of the surrounding area. I come to this conclusion having considered the comments of Collins J at paragraphs 80 and 81 of his judgment in R(on the application of Maiden Outdoor Advertising Limited) v Lambeth LBC [QBD May 9 2003]. That these remarks were obiter dicta is irrelevant as they simply state and support the fact that the approach under the Regulations should be exercised in the interests of amenity and public safety. It is evident from the finding of a Planning Inspector at p7 of the Appeal Decision dated 26 October 2004 that it is the effect of illumination on the immediate vicinity of the site that is of paramount importance.

The illuminated sign was placed directly above the illuminated sign of shop premises next to Battersea Rise. It is relevant that there is no record of any complaint ever having been received and I find that the illumination of the advertisements in question did not constitute a substantial alteration in the manner of the use of the site being confined as it was to a small panel attached to the wall, a wall which abuts a busy, well illuminated street. It cannot reasonably be said that there is any adverse effect on either amenity or safety.

The gantry cannot be said to be part and parcel of the advertisement. Its existence does not impact upon the use of the site at all for the purposes of the Regulations, but is simply a means to simplify the maintenance of the site. In reaching this decision I have regard to the Planning Inspectorate Appeal Decision provided by the Defendant Company which at page 7 outlines the criteria that a Planning Inspector would take into account when considering whether a gantry was an integral part of the display itself.

I find that there has been no substantial increase in the extent of the use of the site, nor has there been any substantial alteration in the manner of the use of the site either by the use of illumination or as a result of the affixing of a gantry.

In reaching my decision in this case I have considered both the Regulations and the case law to which I have been referred by the parties.

I find that the Defendant's company has shown that it benefited on the relevant dates from Class 13 deemed consent and is therefore not guilty of these offences."

9. In paragraph 13 of the case stated, the district judge posed the following questions for the opinion of this court:

"(a) Within the meaning of Class 13 of Schedule 3 of the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations 1992 [the Regulations] was I correct to rule that a painting (unaltered save for progressive fading) upon a brick wall which was painted in or before 1920 and which advertised two newspapers which permanently ceased publication in or about 1921 was an 'advertisement' between April 1974 and 2006?

(b) Was I correct to rule that, within the meaning of the Regulations, a site consisting of a flank wall of 48 Battersea Rise has been used continually for the display of an advertisement between April 1974 and 2006 by reason of the fact that since about 1920 the painting upon this wall has remained notwithstanding that the products it purports to advertise ceased to exist in about 1921?

(c) Was I correct to rule that within the meaning of the Regulations the gantry did not form part and parcel of the advertisement and its attachment to the site did not amount to a substantial alteration in the manner and use of the site for the display of advertisements?"

10. In order to answer the first question, it is necessary to consider the definition of "advertisement" in section 336(1) of the Act:

"'advertisement' means any word, letter, model, sign, placard, board, notice, awning blind, device or representation, whether illuminated or not, in the nature of, and employed wholly or partly for the purposes of, advertisement, announcement or direction ..."

11. Words painted onto a brick wall are certainly capable of being an advertisement within this definition, but the words must be not merely in the nature of an advertisement, they must also be "employed wholly or partly for the purposes of advertisement". Whether a particular sign is in the nature of an advertisement and/or is employed wholly or partly for the purposes of an advertisement is pre-eminently a question of fact for the Magistrates' Court, hearing a prosecution under section 224 of the Act. Looking at the photograph, the words painted onto the flank wall are undoubtedly in the nature of an advertisement, and there is no dispute that when they were painted in or before 1920, they were employed for the purposes of advertisement.
12. While I am most reluctant to disagree with the district judge on a question of fact, I do not accept that the words painted on the flank wall were still being "employed for the purposes of advertisement" on 1 April 1974. The district judge does not appear to have considered this part of the definition of "advertisement" in the Act. Instead, she appears to have proceeded on the basis that, so long as the words which were originally an advertisement continued to be visible, that was enough. In my judgment, that was not the correct approach to the question: was the painted sign still being employed for the purposes of advertisement on 1 April 1974?
13. Each case will turn on its own facts, but the following matters appear to me to be of particular relevance in the present case. Not merely had the products which were being advertised by means of the sign painted in or before 1920 ceased to be available shortly thereafter, in or about 1921; there was no evidence that anything whatsoever had been done since then to maintain the sign. Indeed, the condition of the sign powerfully suggested that nothing whatsoever had been done over the intervening years. As the district judge said, the sign was "unaltered save for progressive fading". The sign had faded to such an extent that it had been described in 1970 as a "dilapidated painted sign". Judging from the more recent photograph, that must have been a fair description of the condition of the sign in 1974.
14. I would readily accept the proposition that advertisements may fade and still be employed for the purposes of advertisement, and that advertisements may become dilapidated and still be employed for the purposes of advertisement. I would also accept that an advertisement for a product that ceases to be available will not cease to be an advertisement merely because the product has ceased to be available for purchase. It may, for example, be advantageous for a commercial organisation to retain an advertisement in respect of a discontinued item in order to draw attention to the business carried on at its premises. However, it would not be right to disaggregate all of these various factors and consider them one by one as Mr Farrell QC sought to do in his submissions on behalf of the interested party. All of the relevant factors have to be considered in the round.
15. I accept the appellant's submission that a sign which was once being displayed for the purposes of advertisement may cease, by reason of the passage of time and changed circumstances, to be employed for that purpose. I do not accept the interested party's submission that "once an advertisement always an advertisement". A sign originally employed for the purposes of advertisement may remain in situ but cease to be employed for the purposes of advertisement. I have in mind, for example, signs on the walls of former coaching inns advising patrons that there is "good stabling" or "fresh straw", which once advertised a service, but have long since ceased to be an advertisement and have become part and parcel of the historic character of the building which may now be in a wholly different use.
16. In the present case the facts are so extreme that it is unnecessary to consider precisely when the words painted on the flank wall ceased to be employed for the purposes of advertisement. It is sufficient to conclude that it must have been very many years prior to 1 April 1974. Any other conclusion would be Wednesbury perverse.
17. It follows that, for my part, I would answer question (a): "no". That conclusion is fatal to the district judge's conclusion that no offence had been committed under the Regulations.
18. For much the same reasons I would give the same answer to question (b). The flank wall was not being "used for the display of advertisements" on 1 April 1974 for two reasons: (i) insofar as it could be said that the flank wall was being "used" to display the words "Spend a happy Sunday with the National News Sunday Evening Telegram", those words were no longer being employed for the purposes of advertisement (see the answer to question (a) above); and (ii) while I accept Mr Farrell's submission that the words used in the Regulations should be given their ordinary and natural meaning (save insofar as the Act or Regulations make specific provision for their interpretation), a wall on which words were painted over 50 years ago, and where the paint has simply been allowed to fade with the passage of time, is not, in ordinary English, being used for the display of advertisements.
19. Again, each case will turn on its own facts. While a use for a particular purpose usually implies some positive conduct on the part of someone, I would accept that there may well be cases where benign neglect may still be described as a use for the purposes of display of advertisements within Class 13. However, on the undisputed evidence before the district judge in the present case, the only reasonable conclusion was that this particular flank wall was not being used in 1974 by anyone or for anything, save for its structural function as a wall. The fact that the faded lettering was still visible in 1974 does not mean that the wall was being used by the land owner or anyone else for the purposes of display, whether or not that which was being displayed was an advertisement.
20. I do not accept the interested party's submission that it was sufficient to amount to a use for the display of advertisements in 1974 that the purpose of display had existed at the time when the painting was first carried out in or before 1920. That is simply a repetition under another guise of the "once an advertisement always an advertisement" submission, which I do not accept for the reasons set out above.
21. In view of my answers to questions (a) and (b), an affirmative answer to question (c) would be of no avail to the interested party. In any event, the real issue was not whether the gantry did or did not form part of the advertisement that was erected by the interested party in 2001 or whether its attachment to the site did or did not amount to a substantial alteration in the manner or use of the site for display of advertisements, but whether the erection of the panel containing an illuminated scrolling display advertisement on a part of the flank wall amounted to such an alteration. There was no suggestion that there had been a "substantial increase in the extent ... of the use of the site for the display of advertisements" (on the assumption, contrary to my answers to questions (a) and (b) above, that the wall was being so used in 1974). The advertisement erected by the interested party covered rather less than a quarter of the surface of the flank wall.
22. While I accept that the question whether there had been a substantial alteration in the manner of the use of the site for the display of advertisements was a question of fact for the district judge, I have great difficulty in understanding how she could reasonably have concluded that, on the assumption that the faded wall painting was still an advertisement in 1974, the erection in 2001 of an illuminated scrolling advertisement on a part of the wall with a gantry for ease of maintenance, was not a substantial alteration in the manner of the use of the wall for the display of advertisements.
23. I do not accept the interested party's submission, which was accepted by the district judge, that in reaching a conclusion as to whether there had been such an alteration, it was either necessary or indeed appropriate for the district judge to consider for herself the effect of the new advertisement on the amenity of the surrounding area. The district judge believed that her approach was supported by certain observations, which she recognised were made obiter, by Collins J in R(on the application of Maiden Outdoor Advertising Limited) v Lambeth London Borough Council [2004] JPL 820. That case was concerned with notices which had been issued by the defendant local planning authority under section 11 of the 1995 Act.
24. Having concluded that the notices had to be quashed for a number of reasons which are not relevant for present purposes, Collins J said in paragraph 75:

"That being so, it is strictly unnecessary for me to consider whether, in addition or in the alternative, there is a deemed consent under Class 13. However, I have heard argument about it and I should give my views."

25. Having said that the introduction of illumination was capable of amounting to a substantial alteration in the use of the site for the display of advertisements, Collins J said in paragraphs 80 to 82:

"80. It seems to me that, as things stand, it is necessary to consider in relation to any particular site whether the provision of illumination does amount to a substantial alteration in the manner of the use of the site. It may or it may not, and that will depend upon the effect of the illumination in any particular case.

81. It is to be remembered that the approach under the Act, and under the Regulations, is that powers should be exercised only in the interests of amenity and public safety. If there is a deemed consent to an advertisement, it seems to me that it is relevant to consider, as things stand, whether the illumination does have an effect on amenity or does create a danger. If it does not in any way, it is difficult to see how it could properly be regarded within the context of the approach to construction that should be adopted of these Regulations as a substantial alteration.

82. It is pertinent in my judgment to have regard to the purpose behind the need for control, which is to further the interests of amenity and to avoid any danger. It may well be thought by Lambeth, and it may be perfectly reasonable so to believe, that the advertisements, even as they are, are contrary to amenity. That is a matter which may have to be considered in the future. But as the matter stands under the Regulations, there is nothing positive that could be done unless it can be established within the terms of Regulation 8 that there is a substantial effect on amenity, or a danger resulting from this. It would be right in those circumstances to consider whether the illumination ... creates any additional adverse effect."

26. It is not in dispute that the Regulations control the display of advertisements only "in the interests of amenity or public safety": see section 220(1) of the Act and Regulation 4(1)(a) of the Regulations. The question whether there has been a "substantial alteration" must be considered within that context. However, it does not follow that a Magistrates' Court, in deciding whether or not there has been a "substantial alteration" in the manner of the use of the site for the display of advertisements, should attempt to decide whether the alteration has or has not had an adverse effect on amenity or public safety. It is sufficient that the alteration is capable of having such an effect. An alteration in the manner of the use of the site for the display of advertisements may still, in ordinary language, be described as "substantial" even if its effects are beneficial in terms of amenity or public safety. Views may legitimately differ as to whether a particular alteration to the manner in which a site is being used for the display of advertisements is harmful or beneficial to amenity or public safety.
27. Under the Act and Regulations issues relating to amenity and public safety are for local planning authorities or, on appeal, the Secretary of State, not for the magistrates to determine. If the local planning authority considers that a substantial alteration in the manner of the use of the site for the display of advertisements is beneficial in terms of amenity or public safety, that will be a factor to be taken into account by the local planning authority when deciding whether or not express consent should be granted under Regulation 5(1), and may (not must, see Kingsley v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1991] 62 P&CR 589) be taken into consideration by the local planning authority in deciding whether there should be a prosecution under section 224 of the Act, or whether other enforcement action under section 225 of the Act or section 11 of the 1995 Act would be appropriate.
28. When paragraphs 81 and 82 of the judgment of Collins J are read in context, it can be seen that he was not suggesting that questions of amenity or public safety were for the magistrates to determine. Thus, in paragraph 86 of his judgment, he said:

"86. The matter therefore that would have to be considered in relation to Class 13 is whether, as a matter of fact, there could be said to be a substantial alteration in the circumstances prevailing around and in relation to this site. That exercise has not been conducted and I am not able on the material before me to say positively one way or the other whether it would be correct to conclude as a matter of fact that there was or was not a substantial alteration. As it is, all I can say is that, on the way that the Council have considered it, they were wrong to conclude that there was such a substantial alteration."

29. The challenge in the Maiden case was to the manner in which the local planning authority had exercised its discretionary powers under section 11 of the 1995 Act, and it is in that context that the dicta of Collins J must be understood. I would leave open the question whether a local planning authority, in deciding whether or not there has been a substantial alteration, must expressly consider whether there has been an adverse effect on amenity or public safety, or whether these are two separate questions, since that issue does not arise in the present case and, in practice, may well be a distinction without a difference for the reasons set out in paragraph 27 above.
30. It follows, in my judgment, that the district judge was not required to form a view as to whether there had been an adverse effect on amenity or public safety. She was simply concerned with the essentially factual question: was the undoubted alteration in 2001 to the manner in which the wall was being used for the display of advertisements (assuming that fading paint work was still an advertisement) a "substantial alteration"? In my judgment, there was only one reasonable answer to that question. The new advertisement is very different indeed from the painted letters on the wall. It uses about a quarter of the area of the wall, and is a hoarding containing an illuminated display of scrolling advertisements. With or without a gantry beneath for ease of maintenance, such an advertisement was substantially different from using the whole of the flank wall to display an advertisement painted directly onto the brickwork.
31. In his submissions Mr Farrell referred to the case of Mills and Allen Ltd v City of Glasgow [1980] JPL 409 in which the Glasgow Sheriff Court did not accept a submission that an alteration from a painted gable wall advertising Raleigh Bicycles, to a smaller advertisement for Carlsberg Special Brew, painted onto plywood sheets which were nailed to the wall and surrounded by a timber frame, was a "substantial alteration" in the use of the site for the display of advertisements:

"On the second point [the Sheriff] could not accept, however, that the interposition of sheets of plywood between the paint and the stonework of the building must necessarily be regarded as a substantial alteration in the manner of the use of the site for the purpose of displaying advertisements, nor could he see that it necessarily made any difference that, according to the pursuers' averments, the new advertisement was surrounded by 'a nominal timber frame'. The general appearance and effect of an advertisement might be the same whether it was painted directly on a wall or on sheets of plywood or metal nailed to the wall, or printed on paper which in turn was pasted on the underlying surface. Changes from one such method to another may be no more than comparatively minor changes in the method used to achieve what may in appearance be almost exactly the same display. They were not necessarily substantial alterations in the manner of the use of the site for the purpose of that display."

32. Each case will turn on its own facts. An illuminated, scrolling advertisement as shown in the photographs before the district judge, which shows in relatively short consequence two different advertisements, is very different from a non-illuminated, static, wall painting, where the paint has been applied to the brickwork direct.
33. So far as the gantry is concerned, the district judge concluded that it was not part and parcel of the advertisement, based on an inspector's reasoning in a decision letter dated 8 December 2004. As Mr Williams pointed out on behalf of the appellant, the question was not whether the gantry formed part and parcel of the advertisement, but whether, when all the circumstances were looked at as a whole, there had been a substantial alteration in the manner of the use of the site for the display of advertisements. In my judgment, the gantry formed part of that overall picture. But given my conclusions on the other issues, I find it unnecessary to resolve that question.
34. For these reasons, I would answer question (c) not directly but in these terms: if the site had been used for the display of advertisements on 1 April 1974, there would have been a substantial alteration in the manner of that use in 2001.
35. It follows that, on the agreed or admitted facts, the display of the advertisements referred to in the information was unlawful because it did not have the benefit of a deemed consent under Class 13 in Schedule 3 to the Regulations. For my part, I would therefore allow this appeal and would remit the case to the district judge with a direction to convict the interested party.
36. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: I agree.
37. MR WILLIAMS: My Lord, I am grateful. I would ask that an order be made in those terms, to be remitted to the district judge with such a direction. My Lord, I also seek our costs of today.
38. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: We have had a schedule from the interested party, but we have not had a schedule from you. Are you asking for assessed costs?
39. MR WILLIAMS: My Lord, I was under the impression a schedule of costs had been served on the court. I am not sure whether the other side received the costs, and if so whether any point is taken.
40. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: The answer is: there is a nod. You can take it that you have served an appropriate schedule. But perhaps we ought to just have a look at it. Is there any issue, Mr Farrell, as to costs?
41. MR FARRELL: Mr Crowe is going to deal with this.
42. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: Mr Crowe, yes.
43. MR CROWE: My Lord, yes.
44. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: Let me have a look at the schedule then. Yes, Mr Crowe, what is the argument?
45. MR CROWE: My Lord, the issue is this. My Lord considers the two statements of costs, and whilst obviously they are not mutually intertwined, one will see that on the interested party's schedule approximately 31 hours of work was done in preparation for this appeal, and I am excluding counsel's fees in relation to this. If one compares that to the appellant's schedule of costs, if my mathematics is even remotely right, we are approaching somewhere in the region of 91 hours, and on behalf of the interested party that would be excessive in terms of preparation. No issue is taken in relation to the hourly rates set down in the schedule, but significant issue is taken with the number of hours taken to prepare this three-hour hearing.
46. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: Yes, Mr Williams?
47. MR WILLIAMS: My Lord, I cannot help you with any instructions as to where those hours were spent. The only submissions I may make, my Lord, are that, clearly, the totals of the costs sought in this case -- the appellant's schedule of costs comes in at some £7,000 less expensive than the other side's, and it may be, my Lord, that where there are two barristers on the other side and only myself here, the majority of the paper work was dealt with by my solicitors. As I say, my Lord, I may only make the point that this is an accurate reflection of the hours that the solicitors actually spent attending on the parties and on the court and on the documents. But, my Lord, I would submit that it is not disproportionate, particularly having regard to the amount claimed by the other side.
48. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: Yes. Thank you very much.
49. MR CROWE: My Lord, I do not think I can expand greatly, other than to say that two counsel have indeed appeared on behalf of the interested party, but two counsel have not always been instructed. Counsel's fees, when one seeks senior counsel to deal with a point that may be impacting on an industry -- certainly that is expected of the interested party -- I would not ask that they in any way be penalised in relation to the opposite side's costs. Their costs must be proportionate. They must be proper costs in the course of preparation for this case.
50. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: Thank you. We will retire to consider the position.

(Short adjournment)

51. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: The appeal will be allowed, as we have indicated, with the direction as set out in Sullivan J's judgment, and the appellant should have its costs. We assess those costs on the basis that we do not consider that the sum claimed for the preparation time on pages 1 and 2 of the schedule can be supported as reasonable. We propose to half those to £4,200, but we see no justification, having looked at the schedule for the interested party, for interfering with any of the other figures, so that the total sum assessed will be the sum of £4,200, plus whatever is on the disbursements page. If anybody is quicker than me, I would be grateful for them to give me the total sum.
52. MR CROWE: I believe it is £13,667.46.
53. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: Since it is a purely mathematical exercise, what I propose to order is therefore that the costs are assessed in the sum of £13,667.46, but if for any reason, which I am sure there is not, Mr Crowe has got it wrong, then it can be agreed and the appropriate alternative figure submitted to the associate. Thank you all very much.