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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Idrees v Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] EWHC 624 (Admin) (15 February 2011) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2011/624.html Cite as: [2011] EWHC 624 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		15 February 2011

1. LORD JUSTICE MOSES: This is an extraordinary appeal against a decision of the Justices for the County of Bedfordshire in Luton given on 7th May 2010. The appellant was accused of fraud contrary to sections 1 and 2 of the Fraud Act 2006. It was alleged that he had made a false representation, namely that an unknown person impersonated the appellant for the purpose of taking and passing a theory driving test in Bournemouth for the benefit of the appellant. The offence was alleged to have been committed on 26th June 2009.
2. A person who has never been identified but was known to have impersonated other people in nine test driving centres appeared with a driving licence in the appellant's name. He was spotted, not allowed to sit the test and left. He left behind the driving licence. The evidence was that the driving licence, albeit with a slight typographical error in the address, was the driving licence of this appellant, Mr Mohammed Idrees. The test had been booked. The circumstances in which it had been booked were significant. It was booked on line with a credit card in the name of someone else. The owner of the credit card has never been traced. A contact number was given but it was not the contact number of this appellant, although the dialling code was a dialling code for Luton which was the area in which this appellant lived.
3. The important facts surrounding the booking of the test, as found by the magistrates, were that this appellant had tried on 15 occasions to pass the theory driving test on each of which he had failed. Furthermore, he had booked those tests to be taken in Urdu. On this 16th occasion the booking was made for the theory test to be taken in English. Furthermore, it is the custom of those running the theory test centre to send confirmation. It was found as a fact that the Driving Standards Agency had sent a confirmation letter detailing the date, time and location of the theory test for this appellant.
4. The appellant's solicitor, not Mr Smith, submitted that there was insufficient connection between the unknown person and the appellant for any tribunal properly directing itself to convict at the close of the prosecution case. The magistrates rejected that submission. The defendant gave evidence and further submissions were made at the close of the evidence. The magistrates convicted. They rejected the submission of no case to answer. They focused upon the fact that the only person who could possibly benefit from the passing of that test was the appellant. Furthermore, there was evidence that the theft of his driving test had been reported to the police three days after the attempt to take the theory test.
5. The issue on this appeal, as the magistrates posed in the question they asked, was whether there was sufficient evidence at the close of the prosecution case. In my judgment there plainly was. Indeed, any contrary view would have been perverse. The magistrates rightly focused upon the fact that the only person who could possibly have benefitted from this attempt by the unknown person to impersonate Mr Idrees was Mr Idrees himself. No other sensible explanation has been advanced. Courageously Mr Smith today, landed with this brief, sought to submit that somebody might have taken pity on Mr Idrees' plight in failing to pass his test on 15 previous occasions and had arranged for the unknown man to impersonate him without Mr Idrees' knowledge. Anything is possible. The magistrates are required to confine their deliberations on the facts to that which is not fanciful. Such a possibility advanced by Mr Smith was wholly fanciful. If one adds to that benefit the circumstance that the test had been booked for Mr Idrees in English on this occasion, whereas previously he taken it 15 times in Urdu, the evidence becomes overwhelming.
6. If I had been the legal adviser to the magistrates I would have advised them to refuse to state a case. Any argument that there was insufficient evidence was wholly implausible. In those circumstances I would have at least waited until some judge of this court ordered them to state a case before taking up public time and money. For the reasons I have given this appeal is dismissed.
7. The appeal is dismissed and I answer yes to the question at paragraph 16, was there sufficient evidence on which the magistrates' court could find a case to answer at the end of the prosecution case, such that a properly directed court could convict.
8. MR MILLER: My Lord, I do not have a figure with me or any instructing solicitor in relation to costs. I do not know if you would allow me five minutes to make a phone call or whether it is for costs to be taxed.
9. LORD JUSTICE MOSES: Can we not fix a sum? Is he legally aided?
10. MR SMITH: Yes.
11. LORD JUSTICE MOSES: With any contribution?
12. MR SMITH: I am not aware that he has made any contribution.
13. LORD JUSTICE MOSES: It is a bit academic. Why could I not assess a figure of say 500?
14. MR MILLER: The appellant would have to pay from his own pocket in any event. It does not come from public funds.
15. LORD JUSTICE MOSES: Do you know the wording of the order?
16. MR MILLER: I do not know of any specific wording.
17. LORD JUSTICE MOSES: There is. Since nobody knows it I am not going to make it.