Neutral Citation Number: [2013] EWHC 453 (Admin)

Case No. CO/12523/2012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE  COURT

Royal Courts of Justice
The Strand
London
WC2A 2LL

Date: Tuesday 19th  February 2013

B e f o r e:

LORD  JUSTICE MOSES

and

MR  JUSTICE  KENNETH  PARKER
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B E T W E E N:

DAVID  McINTYRE
Appellant
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THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent
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Mr Julian Atlee (instructed by Lewis Green & Co, London W1H 1NP)
appeared on behalf of the Appellant

Mr Toby Cadman (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service)
appeared on behalf of the Respondent
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J U D G M E N T

LORD JUSTICE MOSES:

1.  This is an appeal pursuant to section 103 of the Extradition Act 2003 against an extradition order made at the request of the Government of the United States of America.  The appeal is brought under section 93(4) of the Extradition Act.

2.  On 12 September 2012, at Westminster Magistrates' Court, District Judge Evans handed down a judgment.  This is a Part 2 case. Extradition of the appellant is sought for the purpose of prosecution in connection with eight counts contained in an indictment dated 30 September 2011 preferred by a grand jury at the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.  It is unnecessary to detail the offences in respect of which it is sought to prosecute the appellant.  They relate to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and illegal gratuities, and essentially corruption, that is an agreement to pay, and payment of, gratuities to a public official.

3.  The point that arises raises the question of whether the appellant should be extradited having regard to section 91 of the Extradition Act 2003.  There were no other grounds for refusing extradition and none was advanced.  But very late on in the hearing a representative of the appellant asked the district judge whether he would adjourn the extradition hearing for psychiatric evidence to be obtained because it was said that the appellant's post traumatic stress following service in Iraq was such that he ought not to be extradited, particularly since it was contended that the United States would not be in a position to look after him or treat him as he should be treated once he had been extradited.

4.  The District Judge refused the application for an adjournment.  He subsequently gave a written judgment in which he explained his reasons.  He pointed out that there was no evidence of the appellant's psychiatric difficulties; that the application was made only because there might be a need for psychiatric assessment as he might be suffering from post traumatic stress disorder.  That was clearly an insufficient basis for an adjournment and the District Judge rightly refused it.  He pointed out that the question of medical evidence arose on an earlier application for an adjournment so that the appellant could be treated for "tendon damage", and it was only right at the last minute that any question of post traumatic stress disorder was raised.  The order for extradition was made and, as I have indicated, Mr McIntyre appealed.

5.  The appellant then sought further time in order to obtain the psychiatric evidence that he had first said he wanted to obtain at the hearing last year before the district judge.  A representation order had been granted on 7 December 2012.  

6.  On 16 January 2013 Master Egan held a case management hearing, pursuant to CPR Part 52 Practice Direction 22.6A(11).  These are important proceedings in the Divisional Court, and for that matter in relation to Administrative Court matters generally, because they provide an opportunity for controlling what would otherwise be the slow, wandering process leading up to a hearing.  They are orders made by Master Egan in order properly to control proceedings in this court.  When, following such a hearing, orders are made, they are orders of the court and they are to be obeyed.  Failure to obey them will no doubt lead to the end of the case.  

7.  Orders were made that the Armed Forces should provide medical evidence and that all the appellant's evidence should be lodged by 29 January 2013, with any evidence from the Government of the United States of America to be provided by 5 February 2013.  These were important directions, vital for the proper conduct of this case.  They were disobeyed.  It is with some dismay that I observe that the solicitors, no doubt under pressure from the appellant, took the view that, rather than obey those directions, rather than apply to Master Egan for a variation, they could leave the matter until the hearing of the case today.  That was far too late.  The obligation of the appellant and those he instructed was to obey the order of Master Egan.  If they found that they could not obey it, their obligation was to go back before Master Egan to seek a variation, or to comply with the order.  What they were not entitled to do was to disobey the order and seek to come to this court in disobedience of the order.  

8.  In fact, it was no fault of the appellant's solicitors or of Mr Atlee.  There was no evidence to support the medical grounds on which the appellant sought to resist his extradition.  His representatives had worked hard.  They had, as I understand it, obtained a medical report but it was not favourable to the appellant.  Quite rightly, they have not shown us that report.  They were under no obligation to do so.  But it is wholly unacceptable to come to this court in disobedience of Master Egan's order and then ask for further time in case medical evidence to support the appeal might be obtained.

9.  The application for an adjournment is coupled with an application to change his solicitors on the grounds that the appellant has now lost faith in them and further solicitors wish to act.  Again, that is far too late.  

10.  Extradition is designed to be speedy.  It rarely is.  But the one thing the courts (and indeed through case management hearings) can do is to seek to resist blatant attempts to delay the inevitable.  Extradition was inevitable in this case because there were absolutely no grounds for resisting it.  

11.  For those reasons I would dismiss this appeal.

MR JUSTICE KENNETH PARKER:  I agree.

MR ATLEE:  My Lord, may I apply for the usual order?

LORD JUSTICE MOSES:  Yes, you can have whatever it is you need.

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