Neutral Citation Number: [2015] EWHC 2330 (Admin)
Case No: CO/19/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 31/07/2015

Before :

HIS HONOUR JUDGE KEYSER Q.C.
sitting as a Judge of the High Court
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Between :

	DEAN RICHARD WILSON	Claimant	
	- and -		
	THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRANSPORT
-and-
(1) PRINCESS CRUISE LINES LIMITED
(2) INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION	Defendant	

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The Claimant in person
Mr Andrew Kinnier (instructed by The Treasury Solicitor) for the Defendant
The Interested Parties did not appear and were not represented. 
Hearing date: 14 July 2015

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Judgment
HHJ Keyser Q.C.: 
Introduction
1.	This is the claim of Mr Dean Richard Wilson for judicial review of a decision made on 1 October 2014 by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (“MCA”).  MCA is an executive agency of the Department for Transport and is responsible, among other things, for the enforcement, in respect of ships registered in the UK, of the provisions of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (“the Convention”), which is a treaty of International Labour Organisation (“ILO”).
2.	The proceedings arise out of an employment dispute between Mr Wilson and his former employer, Princess Cruise Lines Limited (“PCL”), a company registered in Bermuda and part of the group responsible for P&O Cruises.  Mr Wilson believed that PCL had terminated his employment in response to, or retaliation for, a complaint he had made about its conduct towards him and more generally.  He asked the MCA to investigate his grievance, with a view to enforcing compliance by PCL with its duties under the Convention.  His complaint in these proceedings is that the MCA has persistently failed to investigate his complaint fairly and without bias.  
3.	The claim is brought by permission granted by Alexandra Marks, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, at a hearing on 25 March 2015.  PCL and ILO were joined as interested parties but took no part in the proceedings.  Mr Wilson has represented himself throughout, and before me the defendant was represented by Mr Andrew Kinnier; I am grateful to them both for their assistance in written and oral submissions.

The legal framework
4.	The Convention is not directly enforceable in domestic law but establishes standards which states that have signed the Convention should enforce through their own domestic legal systems.  The Convention was ratified by the UK on 7 August 2013 and its provisions have been implemented in UK law by statutory instrument.
5.	The Convention comprises three parts, namely the Articles, the Regulations (“the Convention Regulations”) and the Code.  For the purposes of these proceedings, Convention Regulation 5.1.5 is relevant; it provides as follows:
“1.	Each Member shall require that ships that fly its flag have on-board procedures for the fair, effective and expeditious handling of seafarer complaints alleging breaches of the requirements of this Convention (including seafarers’ rights).
2.		Each Member shall prohibit and penalize any kind of victimization of a seafarer for filing a complaint.
3.		The provisions in this Regulation and related sections of the Code are without prejudice to a seafarer’s right to seek redress through whatever legal means the seafarer considers appropriate.”
The explanatory Standard A5.1.5 states: 
“The term ‘victimization’ covers any adverse action taken by any person with respect to a seafarer for lodging a complaint which is not manifestly vexatious or maliciously made.”
6.	At the material time, effect was given to Convention Regulation 5.1.5(2) within UK law by regulation 13(5) of the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Labour Convention) Survey and Certification) Regulations 2013 (“the Survey and Certification Regulations”).  The following provisions of regulation 13 are material:
“(1)	The shipowner and the master of a ship to which this regulation applies must ensure that there is available to a seafarer on that ship a procedure to lodge a complaint alleging a breach of the requirements of the Maritime Labour Convention and for that complaint to be resolved fairly, effectively and expeditiously.”
“(4)	A seafarer may lodge with the MCA a complaint alleging a breach of the requirements of the Maritime Labour Convention, and the MCA must treat the source of any such complaint as confidential.
(5)	The shipowner and the master of a ship must ensure that a seafarer is not subjected to any detriment on the grounds that the seafarer has lodged a complaint, whether through an on-board procedure or to the MCA, alleging a breach of the requirements of the Maritime Labour Convention.”
7.	Accordingly, for the purposes both of Convention Regulation 5.1.5 and of regulation 13 of the Survey and Certification Regulations, “complaint” refers specifically to an allegation of a breach of the requirements of the Convention.  The concept of “victimization” in Convention Regulation 5.1.5 is translated into the Survey and Certification Regulations as the concept of subjection to any detriment.
8.	At the material time in 2014 the standards to be implemented and enforced under the Convention were set out, for ships registered in the UK, in Merchant Shipping Notice (MSN) 1848 (M), which was given force by the Survey and Certification Regulations.  The question what domestic legislation if any applied to a complaint such as Mr Wilson made to the MCA was not subject of much analysis at the hearing.  Marine Guidance Note (MGN) 487 (M) contains provision regarding on-shore complaints.  Reference was made to section 4, which deals with complaints made by seafarer.  However, that specifically refers to Convention Regulation 5.2.2, which provides that “seafarers on ships calling at a port in the Member’s territory who allege a breach of the requirements of [the] Convention” should have a right to report the complaint; it does not therefore apply to Mr Wilson’s complaint, which was not made from a ship calling at a UK port.  Anyway, section 4 provides for an initial investigation to be carried out by the MCA surveyor, and section 4.3 provides:
“During the investigation the master, shipowner and any other person involved in the complaint should be given a proper opportunity to express their views.”
Even if, as I think, that provision has no direct application to Mr Wilson’s complaint, it is useful for reference when considering how that complaint was dealt with.

The background
9.	By an Employment Agreement dated 18 February 2014, Mr Wilson was engaged by PCL as a Fleet Trainer.  On 25 February 2014 at Adelaide he joined MV Diamond Princess, a vessel that from at the latest the end of March 2014 was registered in the UK.  His contractual disembarkation date was 6 May 2014.  Article 3 of the Employment Agreement contained provision for the duration and termination of the employment.  In summary: the employment would terminate on the disembarkation date but could be terminated earlier by either party on 30 days’ written notice or in certain circumstances without notice.  However, as PCL’s written offer of employment dated 23 January 2014 made clear, the initial term of a little more than two months was in the nature of a probationary period and it was anticipated by both parties that, upon its satisfactory completion, a further agreement would be made for a longer term.
10.	Even before he signed the Employment Agreement, and thereafter during the term of his employment, Mr Wilson expressed concerns regarding the way in which PCL conducted its affairs; in his summary grounds of claim he says that these concerns left him with “no option other than to raise a number of grievances with [PCL].”  I shall say more about the particular grievances later in this judgment.  The last of them arose at the beginning of April 2014 in respect of cabin allocation; Mr Wilson took exception to being moved from an officers’ cabin to a ratings’ cabin.  In the course of communications regarding that particular grievance, he widened the scope of his comments well beyond the allocation of cabins.  On 3 April he sent an email to his line manager, Ms Jaime Seba, in the following terms:
“My position remains that based on my own experiences and observations since joining the company, I do not accept that the Core Values that Princess Cruises forces its employees to adhere to are the genuine beliefs that certain leaders and other individuals within the organisation actually hold.
My viewpoint is not just based on this latest issue regarding the cabin change Jaime, it reflects my observations and experiences of the organisation as a whole.”
11.	Mr Wilson copied that email to two other people in senior positions with PCL, namely Mr Stuart Smith, the Director for Learning and Organizational Development, and Ms Jan Swartz, PCL’s President.  Upon reading the email, Ms Swartz sent an email to Ms Elana Siegel, the Senior Vice President, Human Resources: “I am concerned that someone in this state of mind is responsible for prepping our crew for the critical Asia season.  Should we send a replacement?”
12.	PCL’s internal emails during the ensuing week show clearly that it was considered necessary to replace Mr Wilson, at least for the time being, though they do not demonstrate that any decision had been taken concerning the termination of his employment as distinct from the continuance of his tour of duty.  Arrangements were put in place for a replacement, and for Mr Wilson to disembark early and attend a meeting in the UK with Mr David Colclough, the General Manager for Human Resources of Princess Cruises UK, to discuss his grievances.  In an email on 8 April, Mr Smith wrote to Mr Colclough: “[W]e want to give him a chance to explain what his issues are with our Company.  After you (sic) discussion with him, Jaime and I would like to have a call with you to discuss Dean’s issues and discuss next steps—if any.”  On the same day, Ms Seba sent to Mr Wilson an email in the following terms:
“The Fleet Trainer’s role in preparing our crew for the critical Asia season is pivotal, and we must ensure that the individuals in this role positively represent the Company to our employees, and professionally communicate with the shipboard leadership and shoreside management.  Unfortunately the judgment you have shown through the manner in which you have communicated your discontentment leaves us very concerned about the impact this may have on your overall effectiveness.  In light of this, we have decided to shorten your contract so you can meet with shoreside leadership to discuss your concerns in person.  This will allow us the opportunity to address your issues, while limiting the operational impact.
Please be prepared to disembark on Thursday, 10 April in Taipei.  … Your wages will be paid for an additional 30 days from your disembarkation date.  We have then arranged for you to meet with David Colclough in our Southampton Office to share your concerns and experiences.  …”
13.	The meeting between Mr Wilson and Mr Colclough took place on 15 April 2014 and was attended also by Mrs Jan Caiels, PCL’s Assistant Fleet Personnel Manager at the Southampton office.  Following that meeting, Mr Colclough discussed the matter with personnel in PCL’s operational management.  Thereafter on 6 May 2014 Mrs Caiels wrote to Mr Wilson in the following terms:
“Thank you for attending this office on Tuesday 15 April to discuss the issues that arose whilst on board Diamond Princess and your early disembarkation on 10 April 2014.
Your comments have been passed to Operational Management at Santa Clarita office and we regret to advise the decision has been made to terminate your employment.  This is based on your questioning of the company’s Core Values and the lack of adherence to them as a company.
As stated in your Employment Agreement, the first 90 days on board are considered a probationary period, during which time the company reserves the right to terminate your employment.
We wish you well in your future endeavours.”
14.	Mr Wilson was unhappy—and, he says, surprised—to receive that letter and submitted a complaint to Mr Arnold Donald, the Chief Executive Officer of PCL’s parent company, Carnival Corporation Plc.  With a view to providing a response to Mr Wilson, internal communications took place at PCL.  One of these was an email dated 12 May 2014 from Mr Colclough, who offered the following thoughts:
“•	Mr Wilson chose to elevate relatively minor issues (e.g. cabin allocation) to senior management (Jan) at a very early stage in his employment, before allowing resolution through appropriate channels.
•	his questioning of adherence to core values was based on personal opinion with insufficient evidence to qualify his allegations due to short tenure and inexperience with the company.
•	as a trainer, Mr Wilson would be able to negatively influence large groups of people onboard, and potentially cause considerable damage in terms of morale amongst the crew.  Hence the decision was made to remove him from the ship, which I believe Jan was in agreement with.”
15.	On 22 May 2014 PCL’s Director, Employee Relations, Ms Michele Rabe, wrote a long letter to Mr Wilson in response to his complaint to Mr Donald.  The letter, sent from PCL’s head office at Santa Clarita, California, dealt with some specific matters and continued:
“At this point [viz. in early April 2014], your management team felt you were unhappy with the terms of employment and it was decided to shorten your rotation, giving you an opportunity to meet with Mr David Colclough, General Manager of our Southampton manning office, to better understand the issues you were facing.  From a contractual standpoint, we do have the right to shorten your contract as long as we make arrangements to pay you 30 days in lieu of notice.  This payment was arranged and therefore we have fulfilled our contractual obligations.
The decision to terminate your employment was in recognition that you seemed dissatisfied with the term and conditions of your employment.  This was in no way a retaliatory action.  In fact, from your experience onboard, we confirm that our Learning & Development team have reviewed their onboarding process and amended several of their procedures to ensure new staff have better clarity on some of our practices in an effort to avoid this type of situation in the future.”
16.	Mr Wilson regarded the terms of this letter as directly inconsistent with those of the letter of 6 May 2014.  Having subsequently seen PCL’s internal communications and, in particular, Ms Swarz’s email of 3 April 2014, he suggests that it represents a deliberate attempt to mislead him as to the reasons for the termination of his employment.  At all events, in May and June 2014 he continued to pursue his grievances directly with PCL, but without success.

The reference to the MCA and subsequent events
17.	By an email on 25 June 2014 Mr Wilson made a formal complaint to the MCA, contending that PCL had terminated his employment for questioning its adherence to its own core values and had thereby victimized him in breach of Convention Regulation 5.1.5(2).  The email is long; the following extracts sufficiently show the substance of the complaint to the MCA.
“Having joined the vessel, numerous things happened.  The company lost my passport photos that I submitted for my Discharge Book, it lost in total three bank mandate forms which resulted in my pay being messed up for February and March.  I eventually arranged to be paid on board but then I had to pay the company a $30 fee to send the money back to my account in the UK.  This fee was eventually refunded.  I was told that the job would be tax free, but when I joined Diamond Princess I was told that the ship was being re-flagged on the 27th March 2014 under the British flag, and that this would affect my wages.  I was also told that the role of Corporate Fleet Trainer was a two-stripe non-uniformed officers role.
Having been in Dry Dock in Singapore for three weeks, MV Diamond Princess was overbooked for the first cruise leaving Singapore at the beginning of April.  I was shown a list of cabin changes that had been sent from the Los Angeles office.  That list stated that I was being moved cabins, from an officers cabin to a ratings cabin on 3 deck.  I understand that the list also had passengers’ names on it who were being allocated Fleet Cabins.  I thought this was strange.
I made a complaint to my line manager, Jaime Seba, in the LA office about the fact that I had never been told that I was expected to berth in any type of cabin.  I had previously been in contact with Jaime regarding the other issues I have listed above, and at that point she was of the position where she agreed I had valid points to make, and that my complaints were demonstrations of communication issues that the Princess needed to improve.
However, when I complained about the cabin situation I was told that I had to berth anywhere on the ship.  My response, which also included and referred to my other previous experiences of things not being exactly what I was told at the point of recruitment, was that I didn’t think that certain leaders and individuals at Princess adhered to the company’s own Core Values.  One Core Value is that ‘we respect our team’.  … The Core Values included things like ‘doing it right’ and ‘we innovate’ etc. …”
After the meeting [that is, with Mr Colclough], I then suddenly received a letter dated 6th May 2014 … telling me that my employment at Princess Cruises had been terminated.  The letter states that my employment was terminated because I had questioned the company’s Core Values and the company’s failure to adhere to them.  Nothing else.”
In its letter dated 22 May 2014 Princess tried to retract the reason of terminating my employment.  It changed to saying that my employment had been terminated because I did not seem happy with the ‘terms and conditions’ of my employment. …
For clarity, I want to emphasise that Princess Cruises terminated my employment because I questioned the fact certain leaders and individuals within the organisation do not adhere to the Core Values. …
I have asked Princess Cruises to either reinstate my employment or compensate me to the equivalent of the wages I would have earned during the second contract it had scheduled for me (19th June 2014 – 19th December 2014).  The response has been to refuse both.  I require that they do one or the other.”
There were a number of attachments to the email, including the letters of 6 and 22 May 2014.
18.	Mr Neil Atkinson, a Principal Surveyor for MCA, carried out an investigation into Mr Wilson’s complaint.  He considered the complaint and associated documents received from Mr Wilson.  He also made enquiries directly with Mr Colclough regarding the apparent discrepancy between the letters of 6 and 22 May 2014.  Mr Colclough responded by an email dated 26 July 2014:
“Although [the letter of 6 May] informs Mr Wilson that a decision has been made to terminate his employment, I must advise that our Office does not have the authority to make such decisions.
Mrs Caiels’ statement that the decision was based on Mr Wilson’s questioning of the company’s Core Values and the lack of adherence to them as a company was incorrect, and an unfortunate result of misinterpretation of advice given by his operational management.
The subsequent letter from Michele Rabe, dated 22 May 2014, provides the true reasons as to why Mr Wilson is not to be offered further appointments with Princess Cruise Lines Limited, a Bermuda company, and I must therefore ask that you disregard the letter from Mrs Caiels in respect of the complaint.”
19.	On 31 July 2014 Mr Atkinson sent to Mr Wilson an email in which he set out the results of his investigation:
“From my perspective the crux of the matter with respect to compliance with Regulation 5.1.5 of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 are the two letters mentioned above [viz. those of 6 May and 22 May]. It would appear from my discussions with the company that the contents of Mrs Caiels’ letter was (sic) incorrect, and an unfortunate result of misinterpretation of advice given by operational management.
Furthermore, the Southampton office does not have the authority to make such decisions.  This rests with the Santa Clarita office and it is the letter from Michele Rabe which provide (sic) the reasons why you would not be offered any further appointments.
Taking everything into account and acknowledging that the matter had been [could have been?] dealt with differently to avoid confusion the MCA has concluded that there has not been any breaches of the requirements of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 and that you have been given every opportunity to express your concerns to various members of the management of Princess Cruise Lines Ltd, a Bermuda company.”
20.	Mr Wilson regarded Mr Atkinson’s acceptance of PCL’s explanation of the letter of 22 May as “bizarre”.  In these proceedings he has complained strongly that Mr Atkinson failed to establish “the actual date that [his] employment had been terminated” (statement of facts and grounds, paragraph 59), which he maintains is the critical matter for determination.  He submitted that the acceptance of PCL’s explanation and the failure to address the critical matter were indicative of the MCA’s bias in favour of PCL.
21.	On 14 August 2014 Mr Wilson sent an email to Mr Prasad Panicker, the MCA’s Head of Maritime Security and Safety Management Operations, in which he said that he “[did] not accept” Mr Atkinson’s response and that he therefore wished to “escalate” his complaint back to Mr Panicker.  The email ended: “Please explain why [the MCA] has failed to comply with this requirement [viz. enforcement of Convention Regulation 5.1.5(2)].”  Mr Wilson seems to have intended his email to engage Step 1 of the MCA’s complaints procedure:
“If you are not satisfied with the service from the MCA please get in touch with the person or section that you have been dealing with.  They will be keen to put the matter right if they can. …
We are confident that most concerns can be addressed at this first step.  If you write directly to the Chief Executive we will consider your complaint at the lower level first.  If you feel that you have explored this avenue as far as you can, then please move to Step 2.”
On 15 August 2014 Mr Panicker replied to Mr Wilson:
“In my absence, Neil has had various discussions and meetings with David Colclough and other personnel in P&O.  Neil has carefully looked into the evidence available from P&O and your emails and also had statements from P&O on your case.  Based on the evidence provided, Neil has concluded that there was no evidence of victimisation and there has been no breach of MLC Regulations.
You are free to take legal advice on your contractual dispute with P&O and the MCA will have no part to play in that dispute.”
22.	Mr Wilson was not satisfied with this response and decided to take his complaint to Step 2 of the MCA’s complaints procedure by writing to the Chief Executive.  This he did by email on 20 August 2014, contending that the MCA “had failed to enforce the Maritime Labour Convention Regulations 2006 and [had] demonstrated bias” towards PCL in the course of its investigation.  He wrote:
“I submitted a formal complaint to the MCA on the 25th June 2014 and have found that the MCA has been bias (sic) towards Princess Cruises in its investigation of that complaint.  The MCA has ignored the evidence that I submitted, and subsequently ignored the conflicting statements provided by Princess Cruises in its defence of my complaint.  The evidence that I submitted to the MCA confirms a clear breach of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 Regulations.  Despite this, Princess Cruises asked the MCA to simply ‘disregard’ that evidence, a request that the MCA complied with.
It is not acceptable for the MCA to demonstrate bias towards a ship owner.  It is also not acceptable for the MCA to ignore the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 Regulations.  These regulations are in place to protect seafarers.”
The email also complained of differential treatment in the course of the investigation of the complaint, which again was said to be indicative of bias:
“On the 25th July 2014 I telephoned the MCA to get an update.  Whilst on the telephone I was placed on hold as the gentleman who answered my call spoke with Neil Atkinson.  I was informed that Neil Atkinson had taken over the handling of my complaint because Prasad Panicker was on annual leave.  I asked if I could speak with Neil and I was told that if I wanted to communicate with him I would need to send an email.  I have since been told however by Prasad Panicker that in his absence Neil had various discussions and meetings with David Colclough and other personnel in P&O.”
23.	Upon receipt of Mr Wilson’s complaint, the MCA replied by email:
“Following your complaint we will be conducting an independent assessment of the evidence by one of our Consultant Surveyors.”
The email did not make clear what the nature of the independent assessment was to be.  Specifically, it did not make clear whether the purpose of the independent assessment was to assess afresh the original complaint against PCL or to assess the adequacy and propriety of the MCA’s investigation into that original complaint.
24.	The independent assessment was carried out by Mr David Carlisle, a Consultant Surveyor at the MCA who worked in a different office from Mr Atkinson.  Having reviewed the documentation, on 4 September 2014 Mr Carlisle sent an email to Mr Philip Naylor, the MCA’s Director of Maritime Safety and Standards, setting out the conclusions he had reached after considering the material submitted to him.  He noted that, having made a complaint against the MCA, Mr Wilson would be “highly unlikely to accept any findings that an MCA consultant surveyor [would] ‘independently’ bring to the table”.  However, he set out his opinion:
“1. Mr Wilson appears to have been given every opportunity to express his concerns and his views of unfair treatment although from my reading he has been less than forthcoming when asked about alleged breaches of the company core values and specific information related to his criticism of the company.
2. I cannot find any evidence of Mr Wilson being ‘victimized’. Victimisation is the less favourable treatment of someone compared to their peers because they, in good faith, have complained (whether formally or otherwise) that someone has been bullying or harassing them or someone else, or supported someone to make a complaint or given evidence in relation to a complaint.  Mr Wilson was on a probationary period (within the first 90 days) and was deemed unsuitable (for various reasons) to continue in the employ of Princess Cruises.  Mr Wilson is clearly not getting the answers he wants nor (sic) feels he deserves from either Princess Cruises nor (sic) the MCA.
3. It should be noted that the wording of MLC Title 5 Standard A5.1.3 is not helpful in that it defines victimization as ‘any adverse action … for lodging a complaint.’  This would imply that Mr Wilson’s dismissal was a direct result of the complaint.  That being the case shipowners would never be able to get rid of a seafarer if the process started with a complaint.  I cannot believe that this was ever the intention in that wording … Neil Atkinson could perhaps advise further.  In any case, my reading of this situation is that Mr Wilson was not dismissed for raising the complaint, rather for attitudinal (negative impact on other staff) and procedural (not following the complaints procedure) shortcomings.”
25.	The meaning of “victimization” was then canvassed in a sequence of emails within the MCA.  On 9 September 2014 Mr Atkinson commented on Mr Carlisle’s query and concluded: “If a seafarer make a complaint and as a result is then sent home or is given menial or is given unpleasant tasks or have their overtime stopped for no other reason than making a complaint, I think it would be fair to say that the seafarer has suffered detriment.”  Mr Naylor replied to Mr Atkinson on 11 September 2014: “Neil, Thank you for providing your analysis which seems fair and reasonable and in line with David’s report.”  He said that, as this was the first complaint of its kind, he wanted to “tread cautiously” and on the basis of legal advice.  On the following day Mr Simon Whitbourn, an internal lawyer at the MCA, confirmed Mr Atkinson’s understanding of victimisation and said that he would be happy to look at the matter further.  Mr Wilson submits that this sequence of communications shows, first, that the MCA lacked a clear understanding of the Convention Regulations and, second, that the second investigation was not truly independent of the first investigation.
26.	The decision of the MCA upon the independent assessment was communicated to Mr Wilson in a letter dated 1 October 2014 from Mr Naylor.  The text of the letter reads as follows:
“I am in receipt of a copy of your email to our Chief Executive dated 20th August 2014.  I am responding to you directly because my responsibilities include the application and operation of the Maritime Labour Convention.
Following receipt of your email I arranged for one of our Senior Consultant surveyors to investigate your complaint.  This official had no prior involvement with your case.  Now that his investigation has been completed I am in a position to advise you as follows:
1) We have found no evidence to substantiate your allegation of MCA bias at any stage of investigating your complaint.
2) We do not find any breach of the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC 2006) on the part of your former employer, Princess Cruises.
3) Contrary to the assertion in your email, it is evident from your correspondence that Princess Cruises issued you with an amended notice of termination dated 22nd May 2014.
Taking the foregoing into account we consider that your employment was terminated for a reason other than the fact that you made a complaint against the company.
We are not able to offer any comment on your allegation of victimisation.  You may wish to consider seeking legal advice as to whether your termination amounts to victimisation.”
27.	As I have said, the letter of 1 October 2014 constitutes the decision of which judicial review is sought in these proceedings.
28.	Upon receipt of Mr Naylor’s letter, Mr Wilson immediately made a formal request that his complaint “be escalated to an Independent Complaints Assessors for the Department of Transport, in line with the MCA’s Complaints Procedures.”  This was a reference to Step 3 of the MCA’s complaints procedure:
“If you feel that your complaint has not been handled properly, you can ask us to refer the matter to an Independent Complaints Assessor appointed by the Department for Transport.
The role of the Assessor is to assess the manner in which the complainant’s case or request has been handled and also the way in which a complaint has been dealt with.”
29.	Mr Wilson’s complaints for the consideration of the Independent Complaints Assessor (“ICA”) may be summarised as follows: first, that the MCA had demonstrated bias in its handing of the investigations; second, that no notes were taken of the meetings and telephone conversations between the MCA and PCL; third, that the letter of 1 October 2014 failed to provide adequate reasons for the decision; fourth, that the MCA had failed in its duty to enforce the Convention Regulations.
30.	Meanwhile, Mr Wilson made a subject access request for documentation from the MCA.  The documentation that was provided to him included the internal emails mentioned above.  Having received that documentation, on 29 October 2014 Mr Wilson sent a pre-action letter to the MCA and a further email on 3 November 2014, intimating an intention to apply for judicial review of its decisions.
31.	On 12 November 2014 the defendant published the report by the ICA, Mr Stephen Shaw, upon Mr Wilson’s complaint against the MCA.
32.	The Introduction to the report summarised the complaint with which it was dealing: “that the Agency has failed to enforce the Maritime Labour Convention Regulations 2006, and has shown bias towards his former employers, Princess Cruises/ Carnival plc.”  The report made clear that the ICA could not determine legal liability, give an authoritative view on legal issues, review the compliance of PCL with its contractual obligations, or consider matters concerning freedom of information or data protection.  In short, it was a report into the MCA’s handling of Mr Wilson’s complaint, not a substantive determination of the complaint against PCL.  
33.	The report then reviewed the history of the matter and the principal documents and set out the terms of the ICA’s requests for information from the MCA and its responses.  The final two pages of the report set out his discussion of the issues and his conclusions.  The ICA rejected Mr Wilson’s allegations that MCA had failed to enforce the Convention Regulations and that it had demonstrated bias towards PCL.  He made observations regarding shortcomings in the conduct of the investigations by MCA.  He said that, if Mr Wilson felt that MCA had caused him injustice as a result of maladministration, he had the right to pursue the matter to the Parliamentary Ombudsman via his MP.
34.	It is convenient to set out some of the passages that show the ICA’s reasoning, regarding both Mr Wilson’s complaints about the investigation and the ICA’s more general observations.
“40.	It is abundantly clear that the Agency has given careful consideration to whether the Regulations were breached by Princess Cruises (witness Mr Naylor’s email of 11 September in which he said he wanted to ‘tread cautiously’ regarding the whole matter, and the MCA is entitled—in the absence of legal judgment to the contrary—to interpret the Regulations within the prism of employment law in this country as a whole.  Under domestic law, an employer is generally entitled to dispense with a worker’s services during the first year if they judge their performance to be unsatisfactory …
41.	I also cannot see evidence of bias towards Carnival Cruises.  Mr Atkinson had one telephone conversation with Mr Wilson as did Mr Prasad Panicker.  Mr Atkinson had two telephone conversations with Mr Colclough.  Mr Wilson’s emails were seen and considered by other officials.  The conclusion at the end was that the Regulations had not been breached: that was a considered judgement, not an expression of bias.
42.	I do though have some general observations about the way in which the MCA has conducted its review into Mr Wilson’s complaint.  I intend absolutely no criticism of the individuals involved, and I fully appreciate that this was the first occasion on which the Agency had been asked to ensure the enforcement of Regulation 5.1.5(2).  But for that very reason my comments as a lay individual may be of some value to the MCA going forward.
43.	These observations derive from the fact that enforcement of Regulation 5.1.5(2) is a formal obligation entered into freely by Her Majesty’s Government.  For that reason, I think any investigation into an alleged breach of the Regulation should also be characterised by some degree of formality.
44.	For example, Mr Carlisle could have been given terms of reference for his investigation.
45.	Even if that were not considered necessary, I think Mr Carlisle should have been asked to submit a formal report to Mr Naylor.
46.	I also think it would have been good practice if Mr Atkinson had taken contemporaneous file notes of his conversations with Mr Colclough.  Proper record-keeping is a further characteristic of an official review.
47.	As I have indicated, I found Mr Atkinson’s letter to Mr Wilson of 31 July rather difficult to follow in one place.  I also think the letter Mr Wilson received from Mr Naylor was on the short side, and that Mr Wilson is entitled to say that it did not give clear reasons for the judgements that had been reached.
48.	I am also surprised that Mr Whitbourn [MCA’s internal legal adviser] was not asked to provide a more detailed opinion on the implications of Regulation 5.1.5(2).  Such an assessment might have informed Mr Naylor’s letter; perhaps more significantly, it could prove helpful to the MCA going forward if and when other breaches of the Regulation are alleged.  I will not make a formal recommendation, but I strongly suggest that the Agency arranges for Mr Whitbourn to review the papers at his earliest convenience.
49.	On a different matter: so far as the MCA’s complaint handling is concerned, it would also have been good practice if at each stage the escalation process had been expressly flagged up.”

Subsequent events
35.	Mr Wilson filed his claim form in these proceedings on 30 December 2014.  On 18 February 2015 Mr Michael Kent QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, refused permission to apply for judicial review.  He considered that there was no evidence to support an allegation of bias; that the procedure adopted by MCA allowed Mr Wilson to put his case; that MCA had not misdirected itself; and that any deficiency in the reasons in the letter of 1 October 2014 had been remedied by the report of the ICA.  Mr Wilson renewed his application, and on 25 March 2015 Ms Alexandra Marks, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, granted permission at an oral hearing.  She expressed the view that Mr Wilson’s complaints of bias, procedural unfairness and inadequacy of reasons were reasonably arguable grounds for review.  She also urged the parties to attempt to resolve the dispute without the need for a further hearing.
36.	By a letter dated 27 April 2015 the defendant agreed to carry out a fresh review of Mr Wilson’s complaint.  Consequently a review was carried out by Ms Julie Carlton, Seafarer Safety and Health Manager with MCA, who reported on 29 May 2015.  She identified the nub of the complaint as being that Mr Wilson was dismissed as a result of making a complaint against PCL and she noted that this involved an allegation of breach of regulation 13(5) of the Survey and Certification Regulations 2013.  She identified three questions that had to be considered for the purpose of deciding whether there had been a breach of regulation 13(5): (1) Has Mr Wilson made a complaint alleging a breach of the Convention?  (2) If so, has he suffered detriment?  (3) If so, has he suffered the detriment as a result of having made a complaint alleging a breach of the Convention?
37.	Ms Carlton’s report addressed those three questions in turn.  Her conclusions may be summarised as follows:
1)	Mr Wilson’s complaints to PCL had concerned issues regarding the payment of wages, misinformation regarding the payment of tax on wages, allocation of cabin accommodation, and non-adherence to PCL’s Core Values.  None of the complaints constituted a complaint of non-compliance with the Convention.  For this reason if for no other, the obligation of MCA to enforce compliance with the Convention was not engaged.
2)	Although Mr Wilson had been paid in accordance with his contract for the full period of the agreed term, he had suffered detriment because he had a reasonable expectation of obtaining a renewal for a further term.
3)	Mr Wilson suffered detriment not because of his complaints about payment of wages or allocation of accommodation but because of the way he pursued the latter complaint, culminating in his questioning of PCL’s adherence to its own Core Values in the email that he copied to PCL’s President.
4)	The MCA did not fail to enforce regulation 13(5) of the Survey and Certification Regulations, because it was not engaged.
5)	It was not established that the MCA had been biased.  Mr Wilson had been given the opportunity to make representations and these had been considered.  The MCA was entitled to make enquiries of PCL regarding the complaint.  There was no basis for alleging bias against Mr Naylor; moreover, he no longer worked for the MCA and had no involvement in Ms Carlton’s review.
38.	The defendant considered that Ms Carlton’s report gave Mr Wilson everything that he could reasonably want from this litigation and invited him to discontinue the proceedings.  However, he did not consider that the report amounted to satisfactory redress.

Summary of Mr Wilson’s case
39.	Mr Wilson’s complaints before me regarding the decision of 1 October 2014, of which he seeks judicial review, may be summarised as follows.  First, the decision was made by Mr Naylor, whose involvement gives rise to an appearance of bias because of his long employment with a related company to PCL.  Second, the decision was not properly independent of Mr Atkinson’s earlier decision, and was procedurally unfair, because Mr Atkinson took part in email communications with Mr Carlisle and Mr Naylor.  It therefore did not overcome the procedural irregularities in respect of the earlier decision.  Third, the reasons stated in the decision letter are inadequate and, to the extent that they prescind from addressing the question of victimization, irrational.  Fourth, the apparent acceptance of PCL’s explanation of the discrepancy between the emails of 6 May and 22 May 2014 is explicable only on the ground of actual bias towards PCL.  Fifth, the failure to address what Mr Wilson considers to be the critical question, namely what was the date of the termination of his employment, vitiates the decision.
40.	Mr Wilson submits that the ICA’s decision dated 12 November 2014 (of which he has not sought judicial review) does not remedy the deficiencies of the previous decision, for the following reasons.  First, it did not purport to adjudicate on the initial complaint against PCL; therefore it did nothing to cure the MCA’s failure to discharge its obligation to enforce compliance with the Convention.  Second, the ICA was not independent of the Department for Transport.  Third, the documents before the ICA were selected by the MCA, which sent them as attachments to an email of 9 October 2014, and Mr Wilson was not given any opportunity to comment on the selection of documents or to add any further documents.  Fourth, the ICA was apparently unaware—as was Mr Wilson until the present proceedings were underway—that Mr Naylor had for many years worked for a company within the same group as PCL; therefore he was unable to address this particular issue of bias.
41.	Mr Wilson submits that Ms Carlton’s decision dated 29 May 2015 is inadequate for the following reasons.  First, the report does not address the question of the date of termination of his employment; he submitted to me that Ms Carlton “deliberately avoided” that issue so that she would not have to “face up to” the MCA’s earlier mistake.  In his written note for the hearing of the claim, he said: “the defendant has intentionally avoided the contentious matter of the date of termination, on the grounds of demonstrating bias towards Princess Cruises.”  Second, the report is wrong to conclude that Mr Wilson had not made a complaint of non-compliance with the Convention.  Mr Wilson accepted that, unlike the letter of 1 October 2014, Ms Carlton’s report was thorough and analytical, but far from finding this satisfactory he suggested that it showed that the document was carefully framed for forensic purposes and with a view to avoiding analysis of the MCA’s previous biased conduct.

Discussion
42.	In my judgment, Mr Wilson has not shown any grounds on which the decision of 1 October 2014 ought to be quashed or the MCA ought to be ordered to take any further action.  I shall accordingly dismiss his claim.
43.	It is convenient to begin at the end, with Ms Carlton’s decision, because the defendant contends—correctly, in my view—that this represents a new and comprehensive consideration of Mr Wilson’s initial complaint and renders the proceedings academic.  
44.	Mr Wilson has not contended that Ms Carlton’s investigation of his complaint was conducted in a manner that was procedurally unfair or that she failed to have regard to relevant matters or took irrelevant matters into account.
45.	He does contend that Ms Carlton was biased, but this contention is based, first, on his assertion that the MCA is biased towards shipowners (of which there is no evidence) and, second, on his complaint that the report does not address the issue of the date on which his employment was terminated; see above.
46.	I do not agree with Mr Wilson’s insistence that the date of termination of his employment is the critical question.  The critical question for the MCA to consider was whether Mr Wilson had been “subjected to any detriment on the grounds that [he had] lodged a complaint … alleging a breach of the requirements of the Maritime Labour Convention”: regulation 13(5) of the Survey and Certification Regulations.  The letters of 6 May and 22 May 2014, and in particular the discrepancy between their respective explanations of the reasons for the termination of Mr Wilson’s employment, were relevant inasmuch as they concerned the question whether the employment had been terminated, and thereby he had suffered detriment, because he had made a complaint to PCL.  This was a matter that was considered in the very first decision, by Mr Atkinson, and it was considered again by Ms Carlton.  The MCA was not obliged to decide that the explanation in the letter of 22 May 2014 was false.
47.	In my judgment, Ms Carlton correctly identified the short answer to Mr Wilson’s case: regulation 13(5) was not engaged, because Mr Wilson did not make a complaint to PCL alleging a breach of the Convention.  Mr Wilson’s complaint to the MCA was that PCL had terminated his employment because he had questioned the commitment of personnel at PCL to its Core Values: see his email of 25 June 2014, quoted in paragraph 17 above.  That was a clear reference to the terms of the second paragraph of the letter of 6 May 2014: see paragraph 13 above.	As Ms Carlton pointed out and as Mr Wilson accepted in the course of argument, a complaint to PCL that it or its leading personnel were not genuinely committed to its Core Values was not a complaint alleging a breach of the requirements of the Convention.  It follows that the reference by Mr Wilson to the MCA did not show a ground for alleging or finding a breach of regulation 13(5) of the Survey and Certification Regulations.  It may or may not have shown some ground for alleging or finding a breach of some point of contract or employment law; that, however, was not a matter for the MCA.
48.	Mr Wilson’s response to this reasoning, as recorded by Ms Carlton and maintained before me, was twofold.  First, he said that his complaint regarding non-adherence to the Core Values arose in part out of his experience in connection with the handling of his earlier complaint concerning cabin allocation.  Second, he said that the complaint regarding non-adherence to the Core Values was only an incidental part of that earlier complaint.  There are several reasons why this response does not assist Mr Wilson.
49.	First, the response misrepresents Mr Wilson’s specific complaint to the MCA; see paragraph 47 above.
50.	Second, even if (a) the termination of employment were on the ground of the complaint regarding non-adherence to the Core Values, (b) that complaint arose in part out of the handling of the earlier complaint regarding cabin allocation and (c) that earlier complaint were a complaint of a breach of the Convention, it would not follow, and it is not the case, that the termination of Mr Wilson’s employment was “on the grounds that [he had] lodged a complaint … alleging a breach of the requirements of the Maritime Labour Convention” (regulation 13(5)) or that he was subjected to “adverse action … for lodging a complaint [viz. alleging breaches of the requirements of the Convention]” (Convention Regulation 5.1.5 and Standard A5.1.5).  Put shortly: even if the letter of 6 May 2014 states the true reasons for the termination of the employment, the employment was not terminated on the grounds that he had lodged, or on account of his lodging, a complaint about cabin allocation, but because after he had received a response to that earlier complaint he in turn responded by calling into question PCL’s commitment to its own Core Values.  Ms Carlton deals with this point clearly in her report; I do not need to quote the relevant passages.
51.	Third, the complaint regarding cabin allocation was not a complaint alleging a breach of the requirements of the Convention.  The complaint was made in an email dated 31 March 2014 to Jaime Seba:
“I was informed today that I will be expected to move cabins on the 2nd April (Singapore) as the ship is overbooked for the next 2 week cruise.  I understand that as a result of the overbooking someone in the LA office has allocated me a cabin on deck 3, which I am told is a ‘ratings’ cabin.  I was shown the cabin earlier and although I am of course prepared to move cabins when I need to, please note that I will not be moving into a cabin that is less than what I was told to expect when I was offered the job.
…
I am finding it increasingly disappointing however that unfortunately this latest incident just adds to what is now becoming a long list of things that are not exactly as they were told to me when I was offered the role, or indeed when I accepted it.”
 	In a mild email on 1 April 2014, Ms Seba responded to the effect that, as the Fleet Trainer position was not part of the standard ship’s complement, there was no assigned cabin; Trainers were placed in officers’ cabins when they were available, but when they were not available the Trainers would be placed temporarily in other classes of cabin.  Mr Wilson replied:
“I cannot see anything in any of the information that has been provided to me either prior to accepting the role, at the time I signed the employment contract, or indeed in any other information that I have been given since accepting the role, that informs me that the company can put me in any grade of cabin lower than that of a 2 stripe officer that it chooses.  I can assure you Jaime that had I known about this I would have never applied for the role.  I would certainly never have accepted it.
Why therefore am I as a 2 striped officer expected to at times berth in an inward cabin, and one that is on deck 3 and usually used as a ratings cabin when I have never been told this?”
However, the employment agreement signed by Mr Wilson on 18 February 2014 did not say anything about him having the rank of a 2-stripe officer.  Nor did the offer of employment dated 23 January 2014; indeed, that offer specifically stated:
“Subject to satisfactory completion of your first tour of duty and following reviews of your performance by operational management, we would anticipate offering you a Two-Stripe and Above Officer International Employment Agreement for subsequent tours of duty.”
As Ms Carlton observed, in those circumstances the Convention and the regulations giving effect to it did not provide any relevant specification, of which a breach had been alleged.  Further, Mr Wilson’s terms and conditions of employment were similarly silent.
52.	For completeness, Ms Carlton also considered the complaints that Mr Wilson had made concerning wages.  The observations in paragraphs 49 and 50 above apply mutatis mutandis in respect of these complaints.  In addition, further matters show that these complaints are irrelevant for present purposes.  First, the complaints did not allege breaches of the requirements of the Convention.  Mr Wilson accepts that this is so in respect of a complaint that he made concerning advice he was given as to the payment of tax on his wages.  The other complaint regarding wages concerned arrangements for the mechanism of their payment.  Mr Wilson’s Employment Agreement incorporated the terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement.  Article 4F of the Collective Bargaining Agreement provided in part as follows:
“Wages are paid monthly in arrears (by the fifth business day of the month following the month in which the wages were earned) according to the Company’s records, including pay for the month that Employee disembarks. … Employee expressly consents to and authorizes the Company to arrange for, in its sole discretion, payment of wages by cash, check, negotiable instrument, wire transfer, direct deposit or any other commercially available method for the efficient, practical and prompt payment of wages earned, including, without limitation, deposit of wages into an account to secure a payroll, debit or stored value card, or any other account for the benefit of the Employee as may be arranged by the Company from time to time, or any other method or manner of payment agreed in writing between Company and Employee or set forth in any other controlling government-mandated contract.”
Mr Wilson’s reference to the MCA on 25 June 2014 (paragraph 17 above) did not allege that he had been victimised on account of any complaint regarding the payment of wages.  What it said was: “The company … lost in total three bank mandate forms which resulted in my pay being messed up for February and March.  I eventually arranged to be paid on board but then I had to pay the company a $30 fee to send the money back to my account in the UK.  This fee was eventually refunded.”  Mr Wilson has not identified the provision of the Convention of which PCL is said to have been in breach.  Ms Carlton approached the matter on the basis that the Convention, as implemented by MSN 1848 (M), required wages to be paid in accordance with the Employment Agreement.  However, Mr Wilson’s reference to the MCA did not allege a breach of the Employment Agreement, which gave PCL a discretion as to how to pay wages.  Ms Carlton also considered the terms of an email that Mr Wilson sent to PCL on 18 March 2014, and she correctly concluded that it was not a complaint of breach of the Convention but a request for reimbursement of a charge for the transfer of moneys to his bank in the UK.  I add that a similar observation might be made in respect of an email that Mr Wilson sent to PCL on 7 April 2014 regarding the payment of his wages for March.  He there requests that his wages be paid on that day, being five working days after the end of the month, rather than on 9 April; he did not allege to MCA, however, that he had been paid late in the event.
53.	Second, Ms Carlton concluded, consistently with the terms of Mr Wilson’s reference to the MCA, that the termination of employment was not on the ground of any complaint regarding payment of wages.  She wrote:
“Mr Wilson’s complaints [scil. regarding payment of wages] were resolved within the company and were not cited in any of the correspondence leading up to the decision … to terminate Mr Wilson’s contract on 10 April.  There is a reference to ‘wages’ issues raised by Mr Wilson in an email form Jaime Seba to David Colclough on 8 April … apparently in preparation for his meeting with Mr Wilson when the latter returned to the UK.  It does not seem to me, from the way this is worded, that Princess Cruises considered these as outstanding issues or material to the early termination of Mr Wilson’s contract on M.V. DIAMOND PRINCESS.  Rather, it reads as background information in case Mr Wilson raised these issues in the meeting.”
I regard Ms Carlton’s conclusion as unimpeachable.  It is certainly one to which she was entitled to come.
54.	In my judgment, Ms Carlton’s report gives to Mr Wilson everything to which he could possibly be entitled.  He has shown no proper ground for his suggestion that it displays bias or that it deliberately ignores matters embarrassing to the MCA, and I do not consider that such a suggestion would have been made by a reasonable and fair-minded person.
55.	I turn next to consider the decision of 1 October 2014, which is the decision of which judicial review is sought.  However, that decision does not exist in the abstract, because it was itself given as part of the MCA’s own internal complaints procedure after Mr Wilson expressed dissatisfaction with Mr Atkinson’s decision of 31 July 2014.  Therefore it is necessary to say something about Mr Atkinson’s decision.
56.	Mr Wilson complains that the decision of 31 July 2014 resulted from a procedure that manifested bias and procedural irregularity because Mr Atkinson (a) communicated directly with PCL but not with him, (b) did not give him an opportunity to comment on the discussions with PCL, (c) disregarded evidence that contradicted PCL’s case but accepted its unconvincing explanations and (d) in consequence reached a decision that was irrational.
57.	I can see no possible basis for alleging actual bias on the part of Mr Atkinson.  The procedure that he adopted does not in the slightest indicate that he was prejudiced in favour of PCL.  His apparent acceptance of PCL’s explanation of the differing justifications for Mr Wilson’s dismissal, whether it be right or wrong, does not show bias; it merely represents a conclusion reached on information received.  There is no question of Mr Atkinson having “disregarded” evidence, in the sense of deciding not to look at it; if he has disregarded evidence at all, it is only in the sense that he has treated the explanation in the letter of 6 May 2014 as incorrect and as having been corrected by the letter of 22 May 2014.
58.	The test for presumed bias is whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the decision-maker was biased; cf. Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 AC 357.  Even if Mr Wilson were correct in suggesting that Mr Atkinson adopted a procedure that was unfair to him, he has shown nothing that raises any case for presuming bias on Mr Atkinson’s part.
59.	As for the fairness of the procedure adopted, regard must be had to the nature of the complaint made by Mr Wilson and the investigation that Mr Atkinson was carrying out.  There was a short point concerning the circumstances of the termination of Mr Wilson’s employment.  The matter was not complicated; unlike many Convention issues, it did not require inspection of conditions and standards on board the vessel.  Mr Wilson made his point clearly and at length in his original reference to the MCA.  He says that he was denied the opportunity to speak to Mr Atkinson by telephone.  However, he has not identified what further matters he wanted to raise, and as Ms Carlton observed he did not raise any further substantive matters by letter or email between the time of his initial complaint and the conclusion of communications with Mr Panicker on 14 August 2014.  Mr Atkinson’s role was not a judicial one and there is no good reason that I can see why he should not have communicated directly with personnel at PCL for the purpose of obtaining its views, as envisaged by Marine Guidance Note (MGN) 487 (M) (paragraph 8 above).  In my view Mr Atkinson was entitled simply to make an enquiry and form a view as to whether any further action was required.  It was not necessary that he revert to Mr Wilson in the meantime.  Further, Mr Wilson has never subsequently raised any matter that in the least suggests that a further reference to him was required.  He has done nothing but assert that the facts clearly demonstrate victimization and that the critical issue is the date of termination of his employment.  Neither of these assertions adds anything material to his original complaint; each of them is wrong.
60.	In this regard, it is not to be forgotten that Mr Wilson pursued an initial avenue of in-house complaint by contacting Mr Panicker; see paragraph 14 above.  It was open to him at that stage to raise any matters of substance, but he did no more than insist on enforcement of Convention Regulation 5.1.5(2).
61.	As for the rationality of the conclusion reached by Mr Atkinson, this seems to me to be unimpeachable.  Mr Atkinson was perfectly entitled to come to the conclusion that the reason for terminating Mr Wilson’s employment was the dissatisfaction he had shown with the conditions of his employment.  But even if that conclusion were wrong, the fact remains that Mr Wilson’s complaint to the MCA (paragraph 17 above) did not allege victimization within the terms of the Convention because it did not identify as a cause of the termination of his employment any complaint of a breach of the requirements of the Convention.
62.	This is the context in which the decision of 1 October 2014 falls to be considered.  As I have mentioned, the scope of the review carried out by Mr Carlisle was not made wholly clear; see paragraph 23 above.  However, the decision itself covered both the question of the propriety of the initial investigation and the issue of breach of the Convention by PCL.
63.	The first complaint about the decision of 1 October 2014 is that it is tainted by bias on account of Mr Naylor’s previous employment history.  No basis for alleging actual bias has been shown.  The test for apparent bias has been set out at paragraph 58 above.  In my judgment there is nothing in the present case to support an allegation of apparent bias.  First, Mr Naylor had never been employed by PCL but by a UK company in the same group, and he had not worked for even that company for about five years.  It is simply unrealistic to suppose, and in my judgment a reasonable and fair-minded observer would not suppose, that there was a genuine risk of bias in favour of PCL; that conclusion is the stronger when one has regard to the nature of Mr Wilson’s complaint, namely a minor employment dispute involving one probationary individual.  Second, and in any event, Mr Naylor did not carry out the review investigation; that was done by Mr Carlisle.  Mr Naylor wrote the letter of 1 October 2014 as MCA’s Head of Maritime Security and Safety Management Operations and, as such, as the person responsible for the operation and application of the Convention.  It is right to observe that Mr Naylor’s letter went further than Mr Carlisle’s report to him, inasmuch as it expressly discounted bias.  However, as the only bases on which bias was alleged against Mr Atkinson were procedural unfairness and an incorrect conclusion, the substance of the allegation had been squarely addressed by Mr Carlisle, who had concluded that Mr Wilson had been given a fair opportunity to state his case and had rejected that case in respect of victimization.
64.	The second complaint about the decision of 1 October 2014 is that it was not wholly independent of the decision of 31 July 2014 and was procedurally unfair, because Mr Carlisle had email communications with Mr Atkinson and, indeed, with Mr Naylor.  In my judgment, there was no reason why Mr Carlisle should not discuss the matter with Mr Naylor.  In fact, he did no more than send him a report and raise the general legal question, not confined to Mr Wilson’s case, of the meaning of “victimization”.  Mr Atkinson’s input was sought on and confined to that legal question and was wholly unexceptional.
65.	The third complaint about the decision of 1 October 2014 is that the reasons given in the decision letter are inadequate and incoherent.  There is no doubt but that the letter is short and ill-written.  I am not persuaded, however, that its reasoning was so truncated or deficient as to provide a proper ground for review, even without regard to subsequent decisions.  As I have observed, the decision was made as part of the MCA’s complaints procedure; it has to be considered firmly in the context of Mr Atkinson’s earlier decision, Mr Panicker’s email of 14 August 2014 and Mr Wilson’s communications to the MCA.  Point (1) in the decision letter was unelaborated but to the point.  Mr Wilson had not provided any evidence of bias.  Even if this point could have been subject of further explanation, that would provide no proper ground for judicial review, in circumstances where no proper basis for alleging bias on the part of Mr Atkinson has been advanced.  The only procedural matters raised by Mr Wilson in respect of Mr Atkinson’s decision, namely communications with PCL, were within the scope of the complaint of bias; further, they did not provide a proper ground of complaint, for reasons already stated.  Points (2) and (3) in the decision letter seem to me to be perfectly intelligible and rational, particularly if they are read in the context of the communications from Mr Atkinson and Mr Panicker.  Further, for reasons already explained, Mr Wilson had not advanced any matter that amounted to a complaint of non-compliance with the Convention; in the circumstances, any arguable deficiency in the reasoning would not give rise to a proper ground for judicial review, even if later decisions were to be disregarded.
66.	The final paragraph of the letter of 1 October 2014 is certainly open to objection, because if read by itself and literally it would leave unanswered the very question in issue.  However, that is not a fair or proper way to read that paragraph.  The letter had already stated expressly both that there was not found to be any breach of the Convention by PCL and that the employment was not terminated because Mr Wilson had made a complaint.  Those were precisely the findings already made by Mr Atkinson.  They necessarily mean that there was no conduct contravening regulation 13(5) of the Survey and Certification Regulations.  (Mr Wilson had not alleged any other relevant detriment within the scope of that regulation.)  The final paragraph of the decision letter has to be read in that context.  If it is read in such a way, the final paragraph is most sensibly to be taken as an inept attempt to say what Mr Panicker had said in his email of 15 August 2014 (paragraph 21 above): “You are free to take legal advice on your contractual dispute with P&O and the MCA will have no part to play in that dispute.”  
67.	The fourth and fifth complaints about the decision of 1 October 2014—that the acceptance of PCL’s explanation for the letter of 6 May 2014 and the failure to address the question of the precise date of termination of the employment are indicative of bias and vitiate the decision—have been dealt with sufficiently above.
68.	After the decision of 1 October 2014, there was the review by the ICA.  Mr Wilson has not sought to challenge that decision, but he has raised several objections to it (see paragraph 40 above) and contends that these mean that the ICA’s decision of 12 November 2014 was incapable of curing earlier defects.
69.	Mr Wilson’s first complaint about the decision of 12 November 2014 is that it did not purport to determine the original complaint against PCL and therefore was incapable of addressing the failure of the MCA to determine that original complaint correctly.  Of course, the function of the ICA was to consider the adequacy of the MCA’s handling of the complaint, not to adjudicate on PCL’s compliance with the Convention; see paragraph 32 above.  However, for reasons already indicated there are no proper grounds for challenging the substantive decision to which the MCA has repeatedly come, namely that there was no breach of regulation 13(5) of the Survey and Certification Regulations.  Further, the ICA concluded that the MCA had carefully considered Mr Wilson’s complaint and had reached a considered judgment on the merits.
70.	Mr Wilson’s second complaint about the decision of 12 November 2014 is that the ICA was not independent of the Department for Transport.  That is not a proper ground of complaint.  The reference to the ICA was pursuant to the MCA’s own complaints procedure, which clearly stated that the ICA would be appointed by the Department for Transport; see paragraph 28 above.  The ICA was not part of the MCA.  There is no requirement of the complaints procedure or of fairness that he should be independent of the Department for Transport.
71.	Mr Wilson’s third complaint about the decision of 12 November 2014 is that the documents placed before the ICA were selected by the MCA and that he was not invited to select any documents.  However, it is clear that the ICA had access to comprehensive documentation, not to a partial or partisan selection.  When I pressed Mr Wilson on this matter in the course of the hearing, he was unable to identify any documents that ought to have been in front of the ICA but were not.  It should be observed that the ICA showed mastery of the case and cannot be supposed to have proceeded under any misapprehension.
72.	Mr Wilson’s fourth complaint about the decision of 12 November 2014 is that the ICA could not address the question of Mr Naylor’s bias, as he was unaware of Mr Naylor’s previous connection with a company related to PCL.  I make three observations as to this.  First, for reasons already indicated, there is no merit in the allegation of bias in respect of Mr Naylor.  Second, even if there were merit in that allegation, the matter would be academic because (a) there is no merit in Mr Wilson’s substantive case under regulation 13(5) of the Survey and Certification Regulations and (b) Ms Carlton has made a new determination that cannot be said to be tainted by bias.  Third, the ICA did deal squarely with the allegation of bias and procedural impropriety on Mr Atkinson’s part and rejected that allegation.

Conclusion
73.	For the reasons set out above, this claim must fail.  Mr Wilson’s fundamental complaint, namely that PCL was in breach of regulation 13(5) of the Certification Regulations, was rightly rejected by the MCA and in those circumstances the entirety of his case in these proceedings is academic.  Regardless of that point, the decision of 1 October 2014, though ineptly expressed, was a fair and unbiased decision, which, when read fairly and reasonably, stated clearly intelligible conclusions and enabled the reasons for those conclusions to be sufficiently understood.  Even if it were possible to raise objections to the state of the MCA’s decision-making as at 1 October 2014, any such objections would have been addressed by the subsequent decisions of the ICA on 12 November 2014 and Ms Carlton on 29 May 2015.
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