[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Babalola, R (on the application of) v Bromley County Court [2015] EWHC 2514 (Admin) (16 June 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2015/2514.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 2514 (Admin)

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		16 June 2015

1. JUDGE WHIPPLE: This is an application for judicial review of the Bromley County Court. I have before me Mr Babalola who acts in person with the help of a McKenzie friend. I have been greatly assisted by the submissions that Mr Babalola has made. At the outset of the hearing today, I asked Mr Babalola how he wanted to manage today's hearing, in response to which he said that he wanted to do the talking but he wanted to be able to consult with his McKenzie friend while he was making his submissions. I have allowed that to happen. I have given him at least half an hour, I believe a little longer, in order for him to give me his submissions. I am perfectly satisfied that nothing he said to me orally today which was not already canvassed in the papers before me. I am sure he has derived great help from his McKenzie friend. I was late in the day invited to hear from his McKenzie friend directly, but I declined that application simply on the basis that I believe I now well understand what the case is and all the points that could possibly have been made on behalf of the claimant which have indeed now been made both orally and in writing.
2. I am going to dismiss this application for permission. I am satisfied that there is no arguable ground at all for seeking to judicially review the County Court. Let me give a brief synopsis of the chronology, giving only the important dates for present purposes.
3. The claimant applied for an interim injunction against the first and second interested parties, that is Amilia Nella and Kevin Smith, both of whom are present in person before me today and have waited quite some time for this case to be called on. Both of them owned flats in the same building as the claimant at 63 Overhill Road at the time of the events that we are concerned with.
4. In 2008 the then leaseholders of that building purchased flat C off the local council and at the same time released the council who was then the freeholder from its repair obligations. It seems that there may have been some discussion at that stage about changing the garden arrangements. These matters are not clear to me. I make no findings. I simply report what I have read in the transcript of judgment by the District Judge at a hearing in September of 2013.
5. In 2013 the claimant was trying to sell his flat. At that stage it emerged there was a dispute about whether his flat, flat A, had title to the whole of the rear garden to the property, or to a part of the front garden to the property. The claimant issued an application in the Bromley Court seeking an interim injunction to prevent Mr Smith and Miss Nella, who were defendants to that action, from disclosing the fact of the dispute to prospective purchasers or estate agents. The application for interim relief came before District Judge Brooks on 16 September 2013. I have the benefit not only of a transcript of that hearing but also the order that was made following that hearing. It is perfectly clear that District Judge Brooks dismissed the application for interim injunction for reasons given. He did so primarily on the basis that he really was not sure who was going to win or lose the case at the end of the day, so declined to issue an interim injunction because there was a substantive issue in relation to the lease plan and the bit as he called "marked green" on that lease plan (I quote from a passage page 99 of the bundle that I have in front of me).
6. Having dismissed the application for interim relief, he went on to deal with an application for costs that was made by counsel for at least one of the defendants at that hearing. Counsel had produced a schedule of costs, and having thought carefully about what was in the schedule and having expressed a view at the outset that the costs were quite high because they exceeded £4000, District Judge Brooks was in the end persuaded that in fact that was the right figure, and he ordered the costs as sought to be paid by the claimant There is a paragraph at the end of page 106 of this bundle where District Judge Brooks explained exactly what he was doing, he was ordering the costs as assessed at £4087.20, and he dismissed the application for interim injunction.
7. He went on to stay the substantive claim until 25 October to see if some agreement could be reached. There is discussion on the transcript about what should happen in the substantive claim, and there may well have been discussion at that stage of the substantive claim going on a particular track in the County Court, but it is perfectly clear to me that the claim at this stage had not been allocated to any track and any discussion of track or case management related to the substantive claim, not to the application for interim injunction. The application for interim injunction was of course a free-standing application in advance of allocation, and the costs went with the failed application for an interim injunction. The order was then drawn up reflecting DJ Brooks' decision. That order was sealed on 26 September 2013 and is at page 48 of this bundle.
8. The claimant before me has complained that the judgment of DJ Brooks was wrong in law. He advances a number of propositions too numerous for me to summarise here, but in essence he complains that DJ Brooks did not understand his case and allied his case against D1 and D2 together. He complains that the conclusion reached by DJ Brooks was incompatible with his, the claimant's, convention rights. He complains that there was no testing of Mr Smith's case, that inadequate reasons were given for the decision, that the costs awarded were disproportionate, that the hearing was in private when it should have been in public, and that the route of appeal was not explained to him.
9. I have not been able, after looking carefully at DJ Brooks' decision, to find any arguable error of law at all. The route of appeal from DJ Brooks lay to the Circuit Judge. It is a matter of record that the claimant did not appeal within time against the decision of DJ Brooks. He wrote to the court on 21 October 2013 seeking a reconsideration of the costs award. The court wrote back on 6 December telling him if he wanted to appeal he would have to make an application out of time and complete an appellant's notice which would be referred to the Circuit Judge. That is on page 45.
10. On 1 February 2014 one of the defendants started enforcement action to recover their costs. On 24 February the claimant wrote to the court asking the court to discharge the award for costs and to set a hearing to test the evidence in the case, saying that he was confused. On 18 July the claimant wrote to the court requesting various amendments to the order of DJ Brooks. The court wrote back on 19 August declining to do that. It was only on 30 September 2014 that the claimant lodged his appellant's notice and the matter came before Her Honour Judge Redgrave on 31 October 2014. She made an order on the papers refusing permission to appeal and giving reasons. She gave either party leave to apply to vary in 7 days. I take it that the claimant did apply to renew his application for permission to appeal because a further order was made on 5 February 2015 which recites that the claimant was present at a hearing but permission was again refused primarily on the basis that the application was woefully out of time, without any adequate explanation for the delay. That really was the end of the road for the claimant.
11. Judicial review lies for an error of law, as I have tried to explain to the claimant, but it is only in very, very exceptional cases that this court can interfere with the decision of a judge in the County Court, and only in very extreme cases, and this case comes nowhere near to being in that very narrow category. There are lots of cases cited in the White Book to this effect, and see section 54(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999. There is nothing in this case which comes close to putting it in the highly exceptional category of case where a judicial review of a junior court may be permissible. There is no arguable case here and I refuse permission to bring this judicial review.
12. I am sorry, that really is the end of the road I think for you Mr Babalola. Thank you very much for your attendance again. I am sorry that you all had to wait so long.
13. MR BABALOLA: I will like permission to apply, I am sorry to appeal.
14. JUDGE WHIPPLE: I can't give you permission. I can't even remember quite what the rules are but I think you will have to go and ask at the Court of Appeal. I don't think you can appeal but I may be wrong.
15. MR BABALOLA: My Lady then I will make a request for an expedited judgment at public expense.
16. JUDGE WHIPPLE: You want a transcript of my judgment.
17. MR BABALOLA: That is correct my Lady.
18. JUDGE WHIPPLE: Public expense, alright. I will give you an expedited transcript of my judgment at public expense but there is nothing more I can do for you.
19. MR BABALOLA: Thank you.