Case No: CO/979/2016
Neutral Citation Number: [2016] EWHC 1821 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 20/07/2016

Before :

Mrs Justice Whipple

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Between :

	Taher Moosavi	Claimant	
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	The Law Society (Solicitors Regulation Authority)	Defendant	

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Miss Fenella Morris QC (instructed by Radcliffe Le Brasseur) for the Claimant
Miss Chloe Carpenter (instructed by Bevan Brittan LLP) for the Defendant

Hearing dates: 7 July 2016

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Judgment
Mrs Justice Whipple: 
INTRODUCTION
1.	The appellant is a solicitor, admitted to the Roll of Solicitors in 2002. He appeals against the decision of an adjudication panel of the Solicitors Regulation Authority (“SRA”). The decision was dated 11 January 2016 and by it the SRA imposed conditions on his practising certificate.  He relies on five grounds of appeal to dispute those conditions.  The appellant brings this appeal under section 13A(6) Solicitors Act 1974.  
2.	The appellant was represented by Miss Fenella Morris QC and the SRA was represented by Miss Chloe Carpenter.  I am grateful to both of them for their helpful submissions.  
BACKGROUND
Outline Facts
3.	The appellant at all material times practised as a sole practitioner as Chancery Solicitors.  He was his firm’s Compliance Officer for Legal Practice (“COLP”) and Compliance Officer for Finance and Administration (“COFA”).  He had two clients of particular note, each of whom provided significant volumes of work: Colonial Capital Ltd (“Colonial”), which facilitated investments by private investors, corporate and individual, in distressed properties in the USA; and Castle Corporate Services Ltd (“Castle”) which facilitated investments by private investors, corporate and individual, in diamonds and graphene.  
4.	Investors in transactions organised by Colonial or Castle placed funds in escrow in the appellant’s client account.  I shall consider the escrow terms and the role played by Chancery Solicitors below.  The following amounts passed through the client account over time: £5,474,964.00, US$ 5,418,427.00 and € 126,286.69.  
5.	On 10 November 2013, the appellant says that he terminated his retainer with Castle, although some transactions were already in the pipeline and were concluded after that date, with money passing through the appellant’s client account after that date.  
6.	The appellant held his client accounts with HSBC (I understand there to have been more than one, to reflect the fact that client money was held in different currencies; they can collectively be referred to as the “client account”). On 3 December 2013, HSBC wrote to the appellant asking that money belonging to two named investors with Castle should be returned.  The Appellant says that he checked with Castle, and based on information provided by Castle he declined HSBC’s request.  On 6 December 2013 HSBC froze the appellant’s client account.  
7.	On 10 December 2013 the SRA commissioned a forensic investigation to be carried out and the officer conducting the investigation visited the appellant; the appellant cooperated fully with the investigation.
8.	The appellant then opened a new client account at Metro Bank (he told the forensic investigation officer that he had done this).  He used this new client account to run off outstanding Castle transactions.  He also used the new client account to continue his involvement with Colonial transactions, although he says he terminated his retainer with Colonial on 7 March 2014.  The appellant continued in practice dealing with other clients, and indeed renewed his practising certificate for the year 2014/15 without difficulty in November 2014. 
9.	The forensic investigation officer completed his report on 10 April 2015.  A supervisor at the SRA then produced a report for adjudication dated 13 May 2015 (her name was Beth Moreton and I shall refer to this report as “Beth Moreton # 1).  She recommended the imposition of conditions on the appellant’s practising certificate.
10.	On 9 June 2015, the appellant’s then solicitors made representations on his behalf.  
11.	On 9 July 2015, an SRA adjudicator decided to impose conditions on the appellant’s practising certificate, similar in nature and scope to those recommended in Beth Moreton # 1.  This was the “first adjudication”.  
12.	The appellant changed representative.  On 5 August 2015, the appellant’s new representative appealed the adjudicator’s decision of 9 July 2015.  The grounds of appeal included the appellant’s dissatisfaction with his former solicitors, and requested a rehearing.  
13.	On 30 September 2015 the appellant closed his business.  He ceased trading as Chancery Solicitors on 31 October 2015.  He applied for a new practising certificate on 8 December 2015. 
14.	On 18 December 2015, Beth Moreton delivered a second report for the appeal (to which I will refer as “Beth Moreton # 2), maintaining the same recommendation that conditions should be imposed on the appellant’s practising certificate.  
15.	On 4 January 2016, the appellant’s new representative submitted further representations in response to Beth Moreton # 2, including this: 
“[46] Due to the impact of the last two years Mr Moosavi neither wishes nor intends to act as a sole practitioner, manager, owner, COLP, COFA, account manager or client or office account signatory of any sole practitioner or authorised body at any point in the future. To be frank, it is not worth having a role which requires him to experience the approach of the SRA to regulation at any time in the future, to the extent that he can possibly avoid it.”
16.	On 11 January 2016, the Adjudication Panel of the SRA considered the appeal afresh.  The Panel dismissed the appeal (the “appeal panel” and the “appeal decision”).  In a reasoned decision, the appeal panel concluded that the appellant’s continued practice posed risks, connected with the transactions in which he had been involved on behalf of Castle and Colonial, which risks they described as follows (at [6.3]): 
“-	His failure to understand the potential misuse of his firm’s client account despite the advice provided by Professional Ethics and the consequent risk of failure to comply with the SRA Accounts Rules 2011;
-	The failure to adequately assess the risk/potential dangers of receiving and holding large sums of money from individuals where there was a risk of money laundering or which bear the hallmarks of fraud.”
The appeal panel decided that conditions should be imposed.  The conditions were narrower than those proposed by Beth Moreton # 2 and were in the following terms: 
“a) Mr Moosavi may not act as a sole practitioner of any authorised body.”
b) Mr Moosavi may not act as a manager or owner of any authorised body.
c) Mr Moosavi may not act as the Compliance Officer for Legal Practice or as the Compliance Officer for Finance and Administration for any authorised body.”
17.	The appellant lodged his appeal in the High Court against the appeal decision on 23 February 2016.  This is the hearing of that appeal.  
18.	On 22 April 2016 the appellant withdrew his application for a practising certificate for the current year.  
Related Disciplinary Proceedings
19.	The SRA is currently preparing to issue disciplinary proceedings in the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (“SDT”), but as yet no charges have been formulated and no disciplinary proceedings are formally underway.  Miss Carpenter tells me that issue of proceedings is anticipated within a few months of today, following which the case should proceed to substantive hearing within 6 months or so.  
High Yield Investments
20.	Much of the argument in this appeal has focussed on the appellant’s involvement with transactions generated by Castle and Colonial.  
21.	Solicitors must be careful not to become involved in fraudulent transactions or transactions which may be used for money laundering.  To that end, a Warning Notice was issued by the Law Society dated 10 September 2013, headed “High-yield investment fraud”.  It says this: 
“This warning notice is for anyone who is involved in, or is considering acting for clients involved in, the promotion or facilitation of financial arrangements that appear dubious.
Law firms have been targeted in the past by fraudsters promoting high-yield investment schemes which have proved to be ineffective and often fraudulent. Practitioners must not become involved in schemes that appear dubious or bear the hallmarks of possible fraud.
…
It is your duty to ensure you do not become involved in potentially fraudulent financial arrangements. Failure to observe warnings from the SRA could lead to disciplinary action or criminal prosecution. Attempts to limit your involvement, particularly by a purportedly “limited retainer” are ineffective in protecting you if you should simply not become involved.”
The Warning Notice listed certain “common characteristics” of such high yield fraud, including: 
“ -	Very high rate of return and disproportionate rewards, often within a short time frame – this is also a common characteristic in Ponzi schemes which involve payments to investors from subsequent investors rather than from any “profit” earned by the individual or organisation running the fraudulent operation.
				…
-	Security being offered to “investors” includes an undertaking from a law firm or that money will be held by a law firm – sometimes including reference to indemnity insurance or the Compensation Fund.
				…
-	Poorly drafted documentation.”
The Warning Notice noted that promotors often engage the assistance of law firms to lend credibility to the schemes, and to enable funds to be transferred via client accounts.  It advised solicitors to: 
“Ensure that proper due diligence is performed before accepting any funds into your client account – be extremely wary of any scheme which requires the depositing of any substantial sums of money with you particularly if you are to be paid for doing very little. Do not hold money in your client account (or any other account) for clients you know little about or who you are not providing legal advice to in relation to the transaction for which you are expected to hold money.”
22.	The appellant emailed the professional ethics unit at the SRA on 13 May 2013, asking for advice about his involvement with Castle and Colonial.  In that email, he did not name Castle and Colonial directly, but explained that his client (described as “company x”) was negotiating with a supplier (“company y”) to receive and hold funds from a third party purchaser (“company z”), those funds to be held in trust until company y supplies the goods to company z, whereupon the funds would be released to company y.  He asked for urgent advice as follows:
“I wanted to check with you whether there would be any problems with my firm’s accepting this instruction.  I am aware that under the Code of Conduct we are prohibited from acting in a banking capacity and that we can only hold funds pursuant to an underlying legal retainer.  Since my firm will be drafting the underlying agreement, I believe that we would not fall foul of that provision. Is this correct?”
23.	The advice he received in response is recorded in a telephone attendance note dated 31 May 2013 by Mary Morgan, Ethics Advisor of the SRA.  As the arrangements had been explained to her, she advised, amongst other things, that (i) it would be better if the investors’ money was held by the solicitors for company z; (ii) if he was to hold the money, he should not give out his client account details in case they were used for nefarious purposes; (iii) that the whole thing did sound like a scam to her, to which the appellant said that this would not be a huge sum, £10-20,000; and (iv) he should exercise extreme caution; and (v) to show he was not in breach of rule 14.5 he would need to show that he was actually dealing with an underlying transaction and not just drafting the agreement.  This was not the only contact between the appellant and professional ethics, but it is the contact relied on by the appeal panel.   
Rule 14.5
24.	The context for the appellant’s request for advice, and the advice which Mary Morgan gave him in response, was the Solicitors Accounts Rules 2011 (“SAR”), rule 14.5 of which provides:
“You must not provide banking facilities through a client account. Payments into, and transfers or withdrawals from, a client account must be in respect of instructions relating to an underlying transaction (and the funds arising therefrom) or to a service forming part of your normal regulated activities.”  
The Relevant Transactions
25.	So far as Castle was concerned, the appellant agreed by letter dated 22 May 2013 to draft (i) standard terms of agreement for the clients and the product providers, (ii) escrow terms for investors to incorporate into their agreements with the product provider, and (iii) terms of business between the clients and his own firm.  The fee payable to his firm was £1,000 for the drafting plus 0.5% of the value of the funds paid into the firm’s client account in relation to these transactions, pursuant to the escrow terms at (ii).  
26.	The appellant provided escrow terms, which were then included in hundreds of agreements between investors and product providers, parties who were not the appellant’s clients.  The appeal panel was shown, as I have been shown, a sample agreement which included those terms, namely a purchase order dated 20 October 2013 for the supply of graphene by Graphene HiTech to Mr Walter Evans, with Castle named as intermediary.  Mr Evans’ investment was to be held by the appellant’s firm in escrow, with the escrow details (including bank account details) set out in the document.  I have been shown nothing to indicate that the appellant was involved in negotiating or advising on the underlying purchase deal.  
27.	In relation to Colonial, the appeal panel also saw, as I have seen, a bond purchase agreement worth £1,000,000, with an annual rate of interest of 14%, between an individual investor named Lam Toi and Colonial, which included escrow terms reflecting the appellant’s template prepared for Colonial.  I have been shown nothing to indicate that the appellant was involved in negotiation or advising on the underlying bond purchase.  
LAW
28.	The SRA has the power to impose conditions on a solicitor’s current practising certificate under section 13A(1) of the Solicitors Act 1974 (as amended) and the SRA Practising Regulations 2011, regulation 7.  The purposes for which a condition may be imposed are regulatory, not punitive (see Brandon [2008] EWCA Civ 967 at [28]).  
29.	The test to be applied by the SRA is set out in Odunlami v Law Society [2008] EWCA Civ 1598 at [21]: 
“…regulatory conditions are imposed where they are necessary in the interests of the public and the reputation of the profession.  They must not only be necessary but also reasonable and proportionate”.  
30.	Conditions imposed by the SRA must be targeted at a specific risk: see F Razeen [2008] EWCA Civ 1220.  
31.	A solicitor who has a condition placed on his practising certificate has a right of appeal to the High Court under the Solicitors Act 1974, section 13A(6) and (7), 28(3D) and SRA Practising Regulations 2011, regulation 8.6(b).  The High Court reviews the decision of the SRA.  In the course of that review, the High Court must give weight to the decision of the primary decision-maker: see Lebow [2008] EWCA Civ 411 at [23] and Bryant v SRA [2012] EWHC 1475 at [15].  
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
32.	The appellant advances five grounds of appeal.  They are as follows:
a)	Failure to put allegations to the appellant
b)	Misapplication of Patel v SRA 
c)	Failure to consider necessity, reasonableness, or proportionality of imposing conditions and removing COFA/COLP authorisations
d)	Errors of Fact
e)	Failing to have regard to all material considerations.  
I shall address each of these grounds in turn, although I shall alter the sequence in which I take them. 
ANALYSIS
Ground 1: Failure to put allegations to the appellant
33.	Much of Miss Morris’ attack under this ground was focussed on the history prior to the appeal decision.  She said that there had been errors of fact and understanding along the way, and she pointed to particular parts of Beth Moreton # 1, and the first adjudication.  But the SRA acceded to the appellant’s request for an appeal by way of rehearing after the first adjudication.  Therefore, Beth Moreton # 1 and the first adjudication, and any errors which may be contained within them, were water under the bridge by the time the matter came before the appeal panel.  By then the appellant had had, and taken, the opportunity to point out the mistakes.  The appeal panel stated in terms that it had considered the matter afresh.  It is clear that it did consider matters afresh, because, for example, points of fact in the first adjudication which had been challenged by the appellant as inaccurate, were corrected in the appeal decision.  I do not consider the sequence of events leading up to that appeal decision – and any errors made along the way but corrected subsequently – to be worth recording in close detail. My focus must be on the appeal decision itself. 
34.	The role of the appeal panel was to assess the risk, if any, posed by the appellant.  The panel had to be fair in their evaluation of the risks, and fairness in this context would include telling the appellant the gist of the allegations against him and giving the appellant the right to make representations: see eg R v SSHD ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531.  
35.	Miss Morris complained that the appeal panel focussed on issues which did not form a significant part of Beth Moreton # 2, and so the appellant was left at a disadvantage because he had not been given a fair opportunity to address those points in his submissions to the appeal panel.  The skeleton argument submitted for the appellant (not drafted by Miss Morris but adopted by her) set out the “new” points as follows at [40]:
“a) He relied on information provided by his client as sufficient evidence of money-laundering checks, and there was no evidence before the Panel that money-laundering checks had been carried out at all;
b) Although the investors were not Mr Moosavi’s clients, Mr Moosavi nevertheless held a position of trust in respect of them and therefore had a reputation to protect;
c) Mr Moosavi lacked insight because he believed he was acting with the approval of Professional Ethics and because he believed that his arrangements were not part of a high yield investment fraud,
d) It was also surprising that the Appeal Panel found that Mr Moosavi was in breach of rule 14.5 of the SAR 2011 when Ms Moreton in her report to Panel had stated that no decision had yet been taken as whether there had been a breach of that rule.”
36.	I reject point (d) as misconceived.  The appeal panel made no finding about whether the appellant was in breach of rule 14.5.  It found only that there was a risk of breach: see below under Ground 2.  
37.	None of these, anyway, were “new” points.  They were different aspects of the appeal panel’s analysis of the appellant’s involvement in the Castle and Colonial transactions, which had been the reason for the SRA’s intervention in the first place, and had been the subject of extensive representations filed on behalf of the appellant.  Miss Carpenter prepared a helpful table annexed to her skeleton argument, setting out the various exchanges between the SRA and those acting for the appellant.  I am quite satisfied that the appellant had every opportunity to explain his involvement in the Castle and Colonial transactions.  I am also satisfied that the appeal panel was entitled to express itself as it did, in the context of identifying and evaluating risk. 
38.	There is no merit in Ground 1.  
Ground 2: Misapplication of Patel
39.	In Patel v SRA, a case involving an alleged breach of rule 14.5, the Divisional Court referred to the “underlying legal transaction”, with which the money held in the solicitor’s client account was connected.  On the facts of that case, there was no underlying legal transaction (see paragraph 10 of the judgment, noting that payments connected with a joint venture drafted by Mr Patel were not challenged as contrary to rule 14.5 by the time the matter came before the Divisional Court).  
40.	The appeal panel correctly understood Patel (see [6.18] of the appeal decision).  The distinction which Miss Morris tried to draw on the facts, between that case and this case, is not material.  The appeal panel accepted (as I do) that there was an underlying transaction here, but the appeal panel was concerned that the underlying transaction(s) would have required little, if any, involvement from the appellant.  The appeal panel was not persuaded that the fact that the appellant had drafted template terms for the investors and the suppliers to use was sufficient to demonstrate that the appellant had undertaken professional work with which the payment into escrow was connected, rather than merely offering banking facilities.  It concluded that “drafting contracts for clients does not of itself justify the receipt of significant sums into the client account for investors … we consider [the template agreements shown to the appeal panel] are unlikely to have required legal advice or involved legal work” [6.18]. 
41.	This correctly reflects Patel, applied in the context of assessing risk.  There was a very real risk here that the appellant had simply allowed his client account to be used as a bank account, and thus that he had broken rule 14.5.  The appeal panel made no finding either way on that issue.  It simply identified the risk, correctly.  I agree with its evaluation.  There is no merit in Ground 2.  
Ground 4: Error of fact
42.	The appellant complains that the appeal panel got material facts wrong.  First, it is said that the appeal panel failed to take account of the fact that the appellant had repeatedly contacted Professional Ethics to discuss his involvement with Castle and Colonial.  This challenge is misconceived: the appeal panel recorded that he made multiple contacts: see [6.9].  The fact that the appellant had repeated contact with Professional Ethics was noted, and indeed informed the appeal panel’s conclusion that he had failed to follow the advice he was given (see [6.9] and 6.14]).  I agree with that conclusion.
43.	Secondly, it is said that the appeal panel was wrong to suggest that the client transactions had “sufficient common characteristics” with the high yield investments outlined in the Warning Notice.  The appeal panel was not deciding that these were high yield investments within the terms of the SRA Warning Notice, but simply saying that some of the characteristics were similar to high yield investments, and that there was a risk which the appellant should have guarded against – he should have been alert.  I have set out above some of the characteristics listed in the Warning Notice which would appear to have some relevance to the Castle and Colonial transactions.  I agree with the appeal panel’s conclusion on this point.
44.	Thirdly, it is said that the appeal panel was wrong to conclude that HSBC’s actions in December 2013 should have put the appellant on notice of the dangers of his involvement in these schemes.  The appeal panel refers to this at [6.11].  I do not accept the appellant’s criticism.  This was a fair point for the appeal panel to take against the appellant.  Most lawyers would be very concerned if their client accounts were frozen without explanation.  Even if the appellant believed that this action was a response to two dissatisfied investors (i) he did not know that, and should have been alert to the possibility of a different explanation; and (ii) that should anyway have been worrying, and caused him to think about whether there was a problem not just with Castle but also with Colonial whose business model – and use of the appellant’s client account – appeared to be similar.    
45.	The appeal panel did not make any material error of fact.  Ground 4 fails.  
Ground 5: Failing to take into account material considerations
46.	The appellant also complains that certain material considerations were not taken into account.  First, he argues that the Warning Notice did not impose an absolute bar on becoming involved in schemes of this nature.  That of course is correct.  But that is to miss the point.  The Warning Notice was intended to put solicitors on alert.  The appeal panel was correct to focus on whether the appellant had paid sufficient attention to it, and had exercised sufficient caution.  I agree with the conclusion of the appeal panel: the Castle and Colonial transactions should have caused suspicion.  
47.	Secondly, he argues that the appeal panel failed to give proper consideration to the appellant’s conduct since these problems first arose, namely by terminating his retainers with Castle and Colonial and not opening a client account for the intervening period.  The answer to this is that the transactions with both clients continued, even after December 2013 when his HSBC client account was frozen.  The appeal panel was perfectly entitled to conclude that the risks were demonstrated, notwithstanding his termination of retainers with both clients.  
48.	I conclude that the appeal panel did take into account all material considerations and did not leave out of account anything they should have considered.  Ground 5 fails. 
Ground 3: Necessary, Reasonable and Proportionate
Approach
49.	I come to this point last in sequence, because it is best considered once the ground has been cleared of other points of detail relating to the appeal decision.  I have concluded that the appeal decision was procedurally fair, in that the appellant had had an opportunity to answer the allegations (and indeed had done so through representations filed on his behalf), that the appeal panel correctly directed themselves in law and applied their directions correctly, that they made no material error of fact, and left no material consideration out of account.  That being so, the only remaining question is whether they came to a decision which was necessary, reasonable and proportionate, balancing the various interests engaged, on the basis of the information before them.  
50.	In considering this issue, I remind myself that the SRA is charged with regulating the conduct of solicitors, and I place weight on the view reached by the appeal panel, a specialist tribunal with statutory responsibilities.  It is within the panel’s area of expertise to identify any risks associated with continued practice as a solicitor, and to assess the appropriate response to them.  
Necessity for Conditions
51.	Miss Morris says that no conditions are or were necessary because by the time of the appeal decision, the appellant had in fact given up his sole practice, he was not engaging clients or putting himself in a position to make the mistakes which the appeal panel was worried he had made in the past.  He had already volunteered by submissions dated 4 January 2016 that he would not act in future as a sole practitioner, manager, owner, COLP, COFA, account manager or client or office account signatory of any sole practitioner or authorised body at any point in the future.  
52.	In answer to this suggestion, Miss Carpenter relies on Lebow.  In that case, the solicitor had failed to file accounts in the past, but was at the time of imposition of the conditions no longer practising or intending to practice.  The Master of the Rolls (Sir Anthony Clarke) said this: 
“[35] … it does seem to me that the failure to file reports in a timely fashion in the past does, or would, give rise to a risk to the reputation of the profession if Miss Lebow should decide in the future to practise as a sole practitioner – that’s to say, a sole principal or a sole director of an incorporated or unincorporated legal practice.
[36] If she had a practising certificate without any conditions there would be nothing to stop her practising in that way. The question is whether in those circumstances the imposition of the conditions was both proportionate and reasonable. In my judgment it was both proportionate and reasonable. The failure to file the accounts was a matter of some importance even if her accountant was significantly to blame.”
53.	Miss Carpenter is correct to rely on Lebow.  If the appellant is not restricted, there remains a risk to the public.  The fact that the appellant is not currently practising or intending to, at least not in a capacity as sole practitioner or partner, is insufficient to displace the need for conditions.  
Delay
54.	The appellant then focuses on the delay between the first involvement of the SRA in December 2013, and the imposition of conditions for the first time in July 2015, a period of 19 months.  Such a delay is said to be significant because (i) it demonstrates that the risks were not considered by the SRA to be pressing or urgent.  (ii) That leads to an inconsistency of treatment: the SRA did nothing for all those months, and then imposed conditions which were a “sledgehammer”; that inconsistency was unreasonable and shows the conditions imposed, in the end, to be unnecessary and / or disproportionate to the perceived risk. (iii) The appeal panel should have considered the risks posed by the appellant’s continued practice, based on the appellant’s circumstances at the time the panel came to consider the issue of conditions in July 2015, and not based on the historic picture; by July 2015, the appellant was no longer in practice as a sole practitioner, he was no longer acting for Castle or Colonial, and there had been no further problems for 19 months: this should have been taken into account in his favour.   
55.	The SRA’s answer to the delay point on the facts is that it took a long time to investigate the appellant: “this is a complex matter and additional time was needed for the FI [forensic investigation] officer to carry out further work before the disciplinary aspects could commence” (from Miss Carpenter’s skeleton at [35]).    
56.	I agree with Miss Morris that 19 months is a long time for the SRA to get around to imposing conditions in this case.  The documents I have been shown by Miss Carpenter, specifically the template agreements used by Castle and Colonial’s investors, based on the appellant’s draft wording, raise an obvious (to me) question over the nature and purpose of the underlying transactions; I have in mind the reaction of Mary Morgan, the Professional Ethics advisor, when first presented with these arrangements, who thought “the whole thing sounded a bit like a scam”. 
57.	On top of the delay in imposing conditions, it will be some months before this matter comes before the SDT.  Miss Carpenter again says that the investigations are taking a long time, and that panel solicitors have been instructed and will issue proceedings soon.  But the SRA was first alerted to potential problems in the appellant’s practice in December 2013 and it will now be 2017 before this matter comes before the SDT.  That seems a very long time.  
58.	The issue for me, however, in the context of this appeal, is whether the delay between December 2013 (investigation commences) and July 2015 (conditions imposed by the first adjudication, then maintained with some variation by the appeal panel) affects the validity of the appeal decision. 
59.	The appeal panel were aware of this lapse of time.  It considered that point at [6.20] and said this:  
“The purpose of conditions is to address risk. We note Mr Moosavi’s good character and regulatory history and that he has cooperated with both the SRA and the police and tried to resolve investors’ complaints. Nevertheless Mr Moosavi presents the future risk that he may not comply with his regulatory obligations should he continue to practise without suitable controls being put in place … .”
This was to acknowledge that some water had flowed under the bridge since the problems first came to light in 2013, but to conclude that the risk for the future remained.  That was a permissible, and in my judgment, correct conclusion.  I am not persuaded that the appeal panel was required to analyse in any greater detail the effect of the time elapsed since December 2013 when the problems first came to light.  The appeal panel had correctly directed itself on the law at [5.4] and knew that conditions could only be imposed if they were necessary, proportionate and reasonable.  Their analysis of the delay since December 2013 was conducted against those reference points, and correctly.  
60.	The fact that the appellant had not been subject to conditions any earlier than July 2015 is surprising, but in the end to his advantage.  It meant that he was allowed to continue to practice free of conditions for a period of 19 months during which time he arguably could have been subject to conditions, if the SRA had moved faster.  In fact, the appellant was subject to conditions for the first time only around a year ago.  To date that is not an unduly long period.  
Impact Assessment
61.	Miss Morris separately complains that the appeal panel failed to engage in any assessment of the impact of the conditions on the appellant personally.  She says this was necessary to determine whether a “fair balance” had been struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community in imposing conditions.  And she says that the impact of these conditions will be devastating, because they will prevent the appellant working in his chosen profession for so long as they remain in place.  
62.	There are two answers to this point.  First, I have been offered no evidence at all to support the proposition that these conditions will inhibit the appellant so significantly that he will, in effect, be unable to work as a solicitor.  The conditions are formulated to enable him to work as an employed solicitor, where he can provide legal services without having the management responsibility which comes with sole practitioner status or partnership in a firm.  Miss Morris says that were he to obtain employment, the fact that he has conditions on his practising certificate could become known to his clients and might cause them to shun him.  I accept that the imposition of practising conditions might make it difficult for him to find work as a solicitor and might cause him difficulty with some clients, but I am unable to conclude that they amount, in effect, to a prohibition on him practising at all (and thus an obstacle to him earning a living from his chosen profession).  There is no evidence that they have had or will have that extreme effect.   
63.	Secondly, the appeal panel’s purpose in imposing conditions was to address the risks identified.  It explained its approach in this way at [6.20]:
“ … As the risk relates to Mr Moosavi’s decision-making regarding the client work he takes on, the risk can be addressed by restricting his practice to remove or reduce his future responsibility for such decisions.”
64.	I agree with Miss Carpenter that it is impossible to devise a lesser set of conditions which guard against the identified risks.  Indeed, the appeal panel rejected the wider conditions suggested in Beth Moreton # 2, and settled on the three conditions set out in the appeal decision as the minimum which would address those risks.  Once accepted that the appellant posed risks if he was allowed to practice without restriction, and thus that conditions were necessary, there was no viable option short of the conditions which were in fact imposed, to meet that risk.  I do not believe that on the facts of this case the appeal panel was obliged to spell out its conclusion in any greater detail, or to confirm specifically that this represented a fair balance between the competing private and public interests. 
Overall Assessment
65.	I should at this point deal with two alternatives Miss Morris suggested: either that there should not have been any conditions imposed at all, or that there should have been some lesser conditions.  I have already addressed and dismissed the suggestion that there should have been no conditions.  The appeal panel was justified in concluding that there had to be conditions imposed, and to argue the contrary is unrealistic in the circumstances.  Conditions were necessary.
66.	Miss Morris suggested alternatively that a lesser condition could be imposed, requiring the appellant to notify the SRA if the appellant wished to renew his practising certificate or become employed by a firm or undertake any legal work (or in any other circumstance which could be thought appropriate).  But I cannot see how such a condition would be capable of operation in practice: the SRA cannot simply respond to the appellant’s proposed career moves as and when he undertakes them; it has a process to follow and that takes time and resources; further, it would leave the risks identified by the appeal panel without any current safeguard, and as Lebow emphasises, that would not be the right approach in the public interest.  
67.	I therefore agree with Miss Carpenter that these conditions are the minimum safeguard against the identified risks.  It follows that I conclude they are reasonable and proportionate in content.  
Summary
68.	In summary, I conclude that the appeal panel imposed a necessary, proportionate and reasonable set of conditions.  I reject Ground 5. I note that the Grounds of Appeal extend to an article 8 challenge, and a challenge that the appeal panel’s conclusion was “manifestly unfair”.  These further points were not argued by Miss Morris at the hearing.  For reasons already given, they are anyway without foundation.  
CONCLUSION
69.	I dismiss this appeal.