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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> OJO v Public Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal Torino (Italy) [2017] EWHC 623 (Admin) (01 March 2017) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2017/623.html Cite as: [2017] EWHC 623 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		1 March 2017

1. MR JUSTICE NICOL: This is an application by Victor Ojo for bail. On 2 February 2017 he was arrested pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant from Italy. The European Arrest Warrant is a conviction warrant and states:

"The applicant has been convicted of participation in a crime of a Mafia type of organisation and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment of which 2 years, 2 months and 8 days is left to be served after allowance is made for pre-trial detention."

2. The applicant was brought before the Westminster Magistrates' Court on the day of his arrest. He was remanded in custody on the grounds that, if given bail, it was reasonably feared that he would fail to surrender. On 10 February 2017 a bail application was made to the magistrates' court. Bail was refused on that occasion for the same reasons.
3. This application for bail was received in the Administrative Court Office on 16 February 2017. It came before Sir Alan Wilkie, sitting as a deputy High Court judge on 21 February 2017, when the application for bail was adjourned until today to allow the respondent further opportunity to gather further information from Italy.
4. The extradition hearing is due to take place in Westminster Magistrates' Court on 6 March 2017. That is only a few days' time and Mr Fidler, when the matter was called on, suggested that the application for bail might be adjourned. It seemed to me that there was no purpose in adjourning it and Mr Fidler needed to be put to the choice as to whether to abandon the application for bail or to continue it. He chose to continue it.
5. Because this is a conviction EAW, the presumption in favour of bail does not apply: see Extradition Act 2003 section 4(2B).
6. The applicant is a national of Nigeria and of Ireland and he has passports from both of those countries. The respondent's concern is that he has insufficient ties in the United Kingdom and that there are reasonable grounds to fear that he would fail to surrender if bail was granted. It is of some interest that at the time he was arrested he was at Heathrow about to board a flight to Nigeria.
7. The applicant has proposed that the respondent's concerns regarding failure to surrender could be adequately addressed by proposed conditions, including a cash security, a specified residence, electronically monitored curfew, daily reporting to the police, passport to be retained by the police and specific terms as to keeping his phone on and charged. The applicant also argues that he was released pre-trial. He has served a substantial portion of the sentence that was ultimately imposed and, by looking at the guidance from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, it can be seen that a system of conditional release operates in Italy and there is no reason to believe that he would not be entitled to such conditional release.
8. As to that last matter, it is of course open to the applicant to address those types of argument to the district judge at the extradition hearing which is due to take place next week. If the arguments in support of what Mr Fidler contends were overwhelming, I accept that that might be a good reason to grant bail. It is not for me to prejudge how the district judge at Westminster Magistrates' Court might view those arguments, save to say that I do not accept that they are of such overwhelming merit that they allow Mr Fidler to invoke them in support of this application. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's information is fairly sparse; it suggests that the grant of conditional release is a discretionary decision. While Mr Fidler may have some argument as to how those conditions might be satisfied in the applicant's case, those arguments are not, in my view, so overwhelmingly obvious that they should lead to a conclusion that bail ought to be granted.
9. Mr Fidler also draws attention to the further information provided by the respondent Judicial Authority dated 22 February 2017, which says that the applicant was released in March 2009 and at that stage no restrictions were imposed upon him. That is as may be, but the further information also makes clear that sentence was not passed until 13 January 2012, it did not become final until 18 March 2013, and an order of execution was not made until 21 June 2013. Thus, the fact that the applicant was released without conditions in March 2009 does not, in my judgment, assist Mr Fidler in this application for bail.
10. It is also said that the applicant has lived openly and travelled in and out of the UK since 2013 and has done so on one or other of his passports that he is entitled to. That is as may be, but it does not, in my judgment, resolve the concerns which the respondent expresses as to the fear as to whether the applicant would surrender if granted bail now.
11. For all of these reasons, I consider that, notwithstanding the proposed conditions offered by the applicant, this application for bail should be refused.