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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> FF v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWHC 2566 (Admin) (24 September 2021) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2021/2566.html Cite as: [2022] WLR 2411, [2022] 1 WLR 2411, [2021] EWHC 2566 (Admin), [2021] WLR(D) 498 |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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FF |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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Secretary of State for the Home Department |
Defendant |
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- and - |
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Prince Nasser Bin Hamad Al Khalifa of Bahrain |
Interested Party |
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Robin Tam QC and Saara Idelbi (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 29th June 2021
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Dove :
The Facts
"It is the general policy of the Home Office not to discuss or comment on an individual's immigration matters with a third party. We have obligations under the Data Protection Act and in law generally to protect this information. I am therefore unable to comment on Prince Nasser.
The Home Secretary has the personal power to exclude from the UK a foreign national whose presence would not be conductive to the public good. Exclusion powers are very serious and no decision to exclude is taken lightly. All exclusion decisions must be justified and based on sound evidence, and in all cases the Home Secretary must exercise her power in a way that is considered reasonable, proportionate and consistent. In making a decision, the Home Secretary would also take into account the views of relevant departments including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of Communities and Local Government.
The Government will continue to look at cases that are brought to its attention and act in accordance with the individual circumstances involved."
"25. Accordingly, even though FF made a request that the Secretary of State give an exclusion direction in relation to Prince Nasser, it would be contrary to this standard principle for the Home Office to tell FF what immigration action has been taken in relation to Prince Nasser, or what consideration has been given to FF's request. The Home Office takes the view that this must apply even though FF has issued legal proceedings concerning his request for an exclusion direction; the principles of privacy and confidentiality in relation to immigration affairs would be nearly meaningless if a third party could discover the outcome of their request simply by issuing proceedings.
26. Consequently, although I can confirm that officials looked at FF's request, I cannot say anything more about what view has been formed about the request or whether or not any immigration action has consequently been contemplated or taken in relation to Prince Nasser."
Policy
"Overview
A decision to exclude an individual from the UK is made by the Home Secretary (or Minister of State acting on behalf of the Home Secretary) following a recommendation. This must set out why exclusion is appropriate, either on the grounds that it is conducive to the public good or on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health.
Recommendations to exclude must be made on the facts of the particular case and must set out how the relevant test is met along with the evidence you have considered to support your conclusions. Where a recommendation to exclude is based on the public policy test, you must clearly set out how the decision is in line with Regulation 27 and the principles set out in Section 1 of the EEA Regulations 2016.
…
Assessing Cases
A recommendation to exclude an individual from the UK must be based on reliable evidence. This might include the use of criminal record checks, particularly where the recommendation is to exclude the person on the basis of criminality in the UK or overseas. In other cases, the evidence may not be so straightforward and a greater degree of scrutiny and assessment may be required.
You must consider all of the evidence available to you and give appropriate weight when deciding whether to recommend exclusion. For example, rumours or uncorroborated tip-offs by members of the public are likely to carry less weight than an assessment provided by a professional body or evidence supplied by another government department. However, where evidence has already been assessed by law enforcement agencies or similar organisations, it will usually be reasonable to rely on that assessment without undertaking your own consideration of the reliability of the underlying evidence.
…
An exclusion decision must be reasonable, consistent with decisions taken in similar circumstances, and proportionate. There must also be a rational connection between exclusion of the individual and the legitimate aim being pursued, for example safeguarding public security or tackling serious crime.
If, having consulted with any relevant stakeholders and senior caseworkers, you intend to submit to the Home Secretary or Minister of State with a recommendation on exclusion, you must make sure your submission clearly sets out the options, with the evidence to support your conclusions and recommendation."
"3. If SO15 decides to take on the investigation in a case referred by a private individual, lawyer or organisation, the individual/organisation will be informed that SO15 are willing to take on the investigation. From that point all investigative decisions and the decision whether or not to arrest a suspect will be made by SO15 and any decision on prosecution will be made independently by CTD in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors. A copy of the Code can be found on the CPS website www.cps.gov.uk
4. If such an investigation is not possible SO15 will inform the victim/s of the decision and the reasons for it as soon as reasonably practicable in accordance with the Victim's code. Any private individual, lawyer or individual who has submitted evidence on behalf of the victims will also be informed in writing.
5. If appropriate SO15 should refer the allegation to the Special Cases Department of the National Security Directorate of the Home Office for potential immigration action and inform them of the reasons why a safe and proportionate investigation is not feasible."
Ground 1: submissions and conclusions
"The legal effect of the policy
29. In 2001, in R v (Saadi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 1 WLR 356, para 7 Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR, giving judgment of the Court of Appeal, said: "The lawful exercise of [statutory] powers can also be restricted, according to established principles of public law, by government policy and the legitimate expectation to which such a policy gives rise." Since 2001, however, there has been some departure from the ascription of the legal effect of policy to the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Invocation of the doctrine is strained in circumstances in which those who invoke it were, like Mr Mandalia, unaware of the policy until after the determination adverse to them was made: and also strained in circumstances in which reliance is placed on guidance issued by one public body to another, for example the Department of the Environment to local planning authorities: see R (WL (Congo)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] 1 WLR 2168, para 58. So the applicant's right to the determination of his application in accordance with policy is now generally taken to flow from a principle, no doubt related to the doctrine of legitimate expectation but free-standing, which was best articulated by Laws LJ in R (Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at [68]:
"Where a public authority has issued a promise or adopted a practice which represents how it proposes to act in a given area, the law will require the promise or practice to be honoured unless there is good reason not to do so. What is the principle behind this proposition? It is not far to seek. It is said to be grounded in fairness, and no doubt in general terms that is so. I would prefer to express it rather more broadly as a requirement of good administration, by which public bodies ought to deal straightforwardly and consistently with the public.""
Ground 2: submissions and conclusions
"Reasons: the general position
26. There are powerful reasons why it is desirable for administrative bodies to give reasons for their decisions. They include improving the quality of decisions by focusing the mind of the decision-making body and thereby increasing the likelihood that the decision will be lawfully made; promoting public confidence in the decision-making process; providing, or at least facilitating, the opportunity for those affected to consider whether the decision was lawfully reached, thereby facilitating the process of judicial review or the exercise of any right of appeal; and respecting the individual's interest in understanding – and perhaps thereby more readily accepting – why a decision has been made. This last consideration is reinforced where an interested third party has taken an active part in the decision-making process, for example by making representations in the course of consultations. Indeed, the process of consultation is arguably undermined if potential consultees are left in the dark as to what influence, if any, their representations had.
27. The disadvantage, accepted by Jay J in this case, is that having to provide reasons – particularly where they have to withstand careful scrutiny by lawyers – might involve an undue burden on the decision-maker. Exceptionally, there may be some powerful public interests, such as national security, which could justify withholding reasons, but there is no such competing public interest under consideration here.
28. Statute frequently, and in a wide range of circumstances, obliges an administrative body to give reasons, although the content of that duty, in the sense of the degree of specificity of the reasons required will vary from context to context. However, absent some statutory obligation, the question whether reasons are required depends upon the common law.
29. It is firmly established that there is no general obligation to give reasons at common law, as confirmed by Lord Mustill in Ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531. However, the tendency increasingly is to require them rather than not. Indeed, almost 20 years ago, when giving judgment in Stefan v General Medical Council [1999] 1 WLR 1293, 1301, Lord Clyde observed:
"There is certainly a strong argument for the view that was once seen as exceptions to a rule may now be becoming examples of the norm, and the cases where reasons are not required may be taking on the appearance of exceptions."
30. In view of this, it may be more accurate to say that the common law is moving to the position whilst there is no universal obligation to give reasons in all circumstances, in general they should be given unless there is a proper justification for not doing so."
"58. An important objective of environmental policy is to protect and preserve special features of the landscape and certain important buildings. So special status is given, for example, to areas of outstanding natural beauty, the Green Belt, and listed buildings. They have this status because it is considered that in general their preservation enriches the quality of life. These features are not to be preserved at all cost, but strong reasons, and sometimes very exceptional reasons, will be required to justify interfering with them. For many citizens, a development which has an adverse impact on the countryside or which causes a change in the character of the landscape in their locality, particularly if the development brings in its wake a corresponding increase in noise, traffic and lighting pollution, will be perceived as lessening the quality of their everyday lives. For some third parties, a development of this nature may also have some economic impact if it affects the value of their property. There will obviously be situations where the benefits of a particular development outweigh the environmental disadvantages, and nobody can expect to live in a time capsule. But in my judgment the common law would be failing in its duty if it were to deny to parties who have such a close and substantial interest in the decision the right to know why that decision has been taken. This is partly, but by no means only, for the instrumental reason that it might enable them to be satisfied that the decision was lawfully made and to challenge it if they believe that it was not. It is also because as citizens they have a legitimate interest in knowing how important decisions affecting the quality of their lives have been reached. This is particularly so where they have made representations in the course of consultation. They cannot expect their detailed representations to be specifically and individually addressed, but as participants in the process, they can expect to be told in general terms what the committee perceived to be the advantages and disadvantages of a particular development, and why the former clearly outweighed the latter.
59. In a general sense this may be considered an aspect of the duty of fairness which in this context requires that decisions are transparent. The right for affected third parties to be treated fairly arises because of the strong and continuing interest they have in the character of the environment in which they live. Even if the decision to allow a development does not affect any property or financial interest, it may damage other non-pecuniary interests which affected parties may value equally highly. In my judgment, these are powerful reasons for imposing a duty to give reasons, at least if the reasoning process is not otherwise sufficiently transparent.
60. The decision in this case involved a development in the Green Belt and was also in breach of the development plan. Public policy requires strong countervailing benefits before such a development can be allowed, and affected members of the public should be told why the committee considers the development to be justified notwithstanding its adverse effect on the countryside. In my judgment these considerations demand that reasons should be given. Even if there are some planning decisions which do not attract the duty to give reasons, there is in my judgment an overwhelming case for imposing the duty here.
61. That conclusion is in my judgment reinforced where the committee departs from the officer's recommendation. The significance of that fact is not simply that it will often leave the reasoning obscure. In addition, the fact that the committee is disagreeing with a careful and clear recommendation from a highly experienced officer on a matter of such potential significance to very many people suggests that some explanation is required. As I have said, I would not impose the duty to give reasons on the ground that the committee's decision appears to be aberrant within the principle in Ex p Cunningham [1992] ICR 816, but the dictates of good administration and the need for transparency are potentially strong here, and they reinforce the justification for imposing the common law duty."
"79. Where the public interest in ensuring that the relevant decision-maker has considered matters properly is especially pressing, as in cases of grant of planning permission as a departure from the development plan or in cases of grant of planning permission as a departure from the usual protective policy in respect of the Green Belt, that is a factor capable of generating an obligation to provide reasons. This is because requiring the giving of reasons is a way of ensuring that the decision-maker has given careful consideration to such a sensitive matter. Similarly, where a person's private interest is particularly directly affected by a decision, that may also provide a normative basis for imposition of a duty to give reasons, as exemplified in Ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 and Ex p Cunningham [1992] ICR 816. In the planning context, I think that there is particular force in this point where the decision appears out of line with a natural and reasonable expectation on the part of the public that decisions will comply with the local development plan and with national policy to protect the Green Belt. Although it might be said that decisions to allow development in the Green Belt or contrary to the development plan are not aberrant as such, in that such decisions are not uncommon and cannot be assumed to be irrational, I think that they do give right to an important onus of justification on the part of the decision-maker which, taken with the parallel public interest considerations in such cases, grounds an obligation under the common law to give reasons in discharge of that onus.
80. In my judgment, the foundation for the identification of a duty to give reasons for the decision of the council in this case is the fact that the decision to grant planning permission appeared to contradict the local development plan and appeared to subvert the usual pressing policy concern that the Green Belt be protected (I think either of these factors alone would be sufficient), which engaged a particular onus of justification on the part of the council which could only be adequately discharged by the giving of a sufficient indication of its reasons for making the decision it did. The structured planning consideration required in this case was more complex than the simple issue of planning judgment which arose in Ex p Chaplin 76 P & CR 207. In my view, the fact that the council's decision was contrary to the reasoning and recommendation in the officer's report is not as such a matter which generates an obligation to give reasons; rather, it is something which means that the council cannot refer to the officer's report pursuant to the approach in Ex p Fabre 80 P & CR 500 to show that it has discharged the duty upon it, which arose for the reasons to which I have referred."
"33. It is not contended that the Director is subject to an obligation to give reasons in every case in which he decides not to prosecute. Even in the small and very narrowly defined class of cases which meet Mr Blake's conditions set out above, we do not understand domestic law or the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to impose an absolute and unqualified obligation to give reasons for a decision not to prosecute. But the right to life is the most fundamental of all human rights. It is put at the forefront of the Convention. The power to derogate from it is very limited. The death of a person in the custody of the state must always arouse concern, as recognised by section 8(1)(c), (3)(b) and (6) of the Coroners Act 1988, and if the death resulted from violence inflicted by agents of the state that concern must be profound. The holding of an inquest in public by an independent judicial official, the coroner, in which interested parties are able to participate must in our view be regarded as a full and effective inquiry: see McCann v United Kingdom [1996] 21 EHRR 97, 163–164, paras 159-164. Where such an inquest following a proper direction to the jury culminates in a lawful verdict of unlawful killing implicating a person who, although not named in the verdict, is clearly identified, who is living and whose whereabouts are known, the ordinary expectation would naturally be that a prosecution would follow. In the absence of compelling grounds for not giving reasons, we would expect the Director to give reasons in such a case: to meet the reasonable expectation of interested parties that either a prosecution would follow or a reasonable explanation for not prosecuting be given, to vindicate the Director's decision by showing that solid grounds exist for what might otherwise appear to be a surprising or even inexplicable decision and to meet the European Court's expectation that if a prosecution is not to follow a plausible explanation will be given. We would be very surprised if such a general practice were not welcome to Members of Parliament whose constituents have died in such circumstances. We readily accept that such reasons would have to be drawn with care and skill so as to respect third party and public interests and avoid undue prejudice to those who would have no opportunity to defend themselves. We also accept that time and skill would be needed to prepare a summary which was reasonably brief but did not distort the true basis of the decision. But the number of cases which meet Mr Blake's conditions is very small (we were told that since 1981, including deaths in police custody, there have been seven such cases), and the time and expense involved could scarcely be greater than that involved in resisting an application for judicial review. In any event it would seem to be wrong in principle to require the citizen to make a complaint of unlawfulness against the Director in order to obtain a response which good administrative practice would in the ordinary course require."
"When deciding what fairness demands, it is necessary to have regard to the whole context in which the decision under section 12 is to be taken. In my view, fairness requires disclosure in this case for the following reasons. Firstly, the enormity of the alleged crimes. Were it not for that feature, it is clear that the Secretary of State would not have consulted the requesting states or the human rights organisations. Secondly, if the Secretary of State does not extradite Senator Pinochet to one of the requesting states, he will be returned to Chile, and it is likely that he will never be tried for these alleged crimes anywhere. In view of the gravity of the charges, that is a startling result of the exercise of ministerial discretion. It simply serves to underline the monumental importance of the decision that the Secretary of State is poised to make. No doubt that is why he would prefer to disclose the report. Thirdly, the scope of the disclosure now sought is very limited indeed. It is that there should be disclosure to the four requesting states alone, but only on terms that they agree to receive them on terms of confidentiality. The details of these terms would have to be worked out, since the requesting states would clearly need to be at liberty to disclose the report to independent doctors of the relevant disciplines. Fourthly, when one assesses the impact of the proposed limited disclosure, it should also be borne in mind that there has already been the widest possible dissemination of the basic conclusions of the medical report. The whole world already knows that the gist of the report is that Senator Pinochet is unfit to stand trial, because he would not be able to follow proceedings, give intelligible instructions to those representing him on trial, or give a coherent statement of his case. All of that emerges clearly enough from the answers given by the Secretary of State to questions in Parliament on 12 January 2000. The additional disclosure to a very limited class of persons needs, therefore, to be put into its true perspective. Finally, in my view, it is simply not possible to assess how likely it is that, following disclosure of the report, the requesting states would be able to make representations on the medical issue that they would not otherwise be able to make, representations which might influence the decision that the Secretary of State has to make.
In my judgment, the cumulative effect of these considerations is that fairness requires disclosure of the report to the limited extent that I have indicated. In reaching this conclusion, I have not overlooked the fact that, as a matter of common law, there was a public interest in maintaining the duty of confidence owed to Senator Pinochet in respect of the contents of the report. But there was a competing public interest in disclosure to the extent that this was necessary to enable the Secretary of State to carry out the consultation exercise fairly, and thereby to discharge his functions under section 12 of the 1989 Act properly. It is for the court to decide how this balance should be struck. I have no doubt that, for the reasons already given, the balance comes down in favour of the limited disclosure that is requested by the applicants in this case."
"Personal information
(1) Any information to which a request for information relates is exempt information if it constitutes personal data of which the applicant is the data subject.
(2) Any information to which a request for information relates is also exempt information if –
(a) it constitutes personal data which does not fall within subsection (1) and
(b) the first, second or third condition below is satisfied.
(3A) The first condition is that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under this Act –
(a) would contravene any of the data protection principles, or
(b) would do so if the exemptions in section 24(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (manual unstructured data held by public authorities) were disregarded.
(3B) The second condition is that the disclosure of the information to a member of public otherwise than under this Act would contravene Article 21 of the UK GDPR (general processing: right to object processing).
(4A) The third condition is that –
(a) on a request under Article 15(1) of the UK GDPR for access to personal data, the information would be withheld in reliance on provision made by or under section 15, 16 or 26 of, or Schedule 2, 3 or 4 to, the Data Protection Act 2018, or
(b) on a request under Section 45(1)(b) of that Act, the information would be withheld in reliance on subsection (4) of that section.
(5A) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information which is (or if it were held by the public authority would be) exempt information by virtue of subsection (1).
(5B) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to other information if or to the extent that any of the following applies-
(a) giving a member of the public the confirmation or denial that would have to be given to comply with section (1)(a) –
(i) would (apart from this Act) contravene any of the data protection principles or
(ii) would do so if the exemptions in Section 24(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018 were disregarded;
(b) giving a member of the public the confirmation or denial that would have to be given to comply with Section 1(1)(a) would (apart from this Act) Article 21 of the UK GDPR
(c) on request under Article 15(1) of the UK GDPR for confirmation of whether personal data is being processed, the information would be withheld in reliance on a provision listed in subsection 4A(a);
(d) on a request under section 45(1)(a) of the Data Protection Act 2018 the information would be withheld in reliance on subsection (4) of that section.
(7) In this section –
"the data protection principles" means the principles set out in –
(a) Article 5(1) of the UK GDPR and
(b) Section 34(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018;
"data subject" has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3 of that Act);
"personal data" and "processing" have the same meaning as in Parts 5 to 7 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3(2), (4) and (14) of that Act);
"the UK GDPR" has the same meaning as in Parts 5 to 7 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3(10) and (14) of that Act)."
Standing
"68. This case, in my view, is an exceptional one. Having regard to the factors highlighted by Mr Hickman, which I have summarised at [62] above, it seems to me that FF has more than merely a "significant interest" in the case. His position, in my view, goes well beyond the position of the claimant in Evans.
69. None of the factors relied on by FF would, perhaps, in isolation, be sufficient to establish that FF would obtain a benefit within the meaning intended by Paragraph 19(3), but the Director needed to consider all of the factors and make a judgment on the whole. Taking the relevant factors together, it is clear to me that his decision in this case was, with respect, wrong, and that FF's proposed judicial review proceedings against the Home Secretary do have the potential to produce a direct, personal, and real benefit to FF, in accordance with the principles that I have outlined at [60] above, albeit not one that is likely to result in any financial or other material (as opposed to psychological or moral) benefit.
70. Mr Hickman submitted that there are other specific errors of law in the Director's reasoning in reaching the Decision that are sufficient to vitiate it as a matter of public law. In light of my conclusion above, it is not necessarily for me to comment on each of his arguments specifically, but broadly he submitted that (i) the Director applied too narrow a concept of "benefit" in reaching his decision and (ii) the Director defended his decision in his letter of 12 December 2018 on the basis that he was entitled to reach the Decision on the basis of the information that was available to him "and in accordance with the discretion afforded to him". In relation to the latter, Mr Hickman submitted that the Decision was not a matter of discretion, and it should be clear from my judgment above that I agree. I also agree with Mr Hickman that the Director appears to have applied too narrow a concept of "benefit" in reaching the Decision."
Relief