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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Baz v General Dental Council [2025] EWHC 643 (Admin) (20 March 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2025/643.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 643 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
SITTING IN LONDON

		20th March 2025

FORDHAM J Note: This judgment was handed down on 20.3.25 by circulation to the parties by email and uploading to the National Archives.

FORDHAM J:

Introduction

1. This case is about challenging, in the High Court, a professional misconduct determination of a professional conduct committee (PCC). In essence, I have had to decide whether the case should go ahead at all and, if so, in what form. Should it be judicial review or statutory appeal?

Outcome

2. What I have decided is this. The case should proceed, as a statutory appeal only. The 6-page document lodged by the Claimant with the Court in the judicial review claim (on 1.4.24) will stand as the grounds of appeal. The Form N461 lodged by the Claimant with the Court in the appeal (also on 1.4.24) will now be issued by the Court – at my direction – with an extension of time. There will be a substantive hearing of the appeal in the High Court with a time estimate of one day. The Defendant (the GDC, who prosecuted the case before the PCC) will be respondent to the appeal. It will be able to file and serve a response to the appeal. The Claimant will be able to file and serve a reply. Both parties will be able to file and serve skeleton arguments and authorities, in good time, and within a prescribed timetable. All future communications with the Court must be copied to the other party. I will now explain what has taken me to that destination.

The GCRO and Green-Light Order

3. A two-year General Civil Restraint Order (GCRO) was imposed on the Claimant by Chamberlain J on 14.3.22. It expired on 14.3.24. Its consequence was that, prior to 14.3.24, the Claimant needed special pre-issue permission (which I will call a "Green-Light" Order) before issuing any proceedings, including an appeal and a judicial review. The test for a Green-Light Order was whether the proposed claim was "frivolous or vexatious". A Green-Light Order does not mean – unless it says so – that the proceedings have been assessed as viable, in the sense of being arguable with a realistic prospect of success. Viability is generally assessed only when the other party has had the chance to address whether the proceedings are arguable with a realistic prospect of success.
4. The Green-Light Order in this case was made on 28.3.24. In the green-light order (28.3.24), Chamberlain J ordered:

The Applicant has permission to issue the proposed claim for judicial review or application for permission to appeal against the Proposed Defendant/Respondent.

The Green-Light Order made explicit, in a recital, that the Court was not deciding viability of any claim or appeal:

nothing in this Order is a determination that the proposed claim for judicial review or application for permission to appeal is arguable or has a real prospect of success.

The reference to "permission to appeal" is explained by the fact that the Claimant had asked for Green-Light permission under the GCRO, for judicial review or appeal. She and Chamberlain J had not considered whether the appeal is as of right (ie. without the filter stage of permission to appeal), as Mr Bradly KC accepts it is.

The PCC Decision

5. The Defendant's PCC is its adjudicative arm. A PCC was convened to consider allegations made against the Claimant. Its decision was made on 18.1.24 and formally notified to the Claimant on 1.2.24. Formal notification triggered a 28-day statutory period to file an appeal with the High Court. That meant filing an appeal by the end of February 2024. Guidance documents accompanied the notification about how to appeal. The PCC's 310-paragraph determination records that the hearings had taken place on 30.10.23 to 8.11.23 and 8.1.24. It records that the PCC found the following: that there had been misconduct by the Claimant; that there was an impairment of fitness to practise on her part; that erasure (Dentists Act 1984 s.36P(7)(a)) was the appropriate sanction; and that it was appropriate to make an order of immediate suspension (1984 Act s.36U(1)). It would be a strong thing for a Court to find that it is "frivolous or vexatious" for an individual to exercise a statutory right of appeal, conferred by Parliament as of right (ie. without the filter stage of permission to appeal), in respect of a decision finding misconduct and directing erasure. But it is a possible conclusion. The Court would examine the circumstances, and in particular any response from the Defendant, to see whether it was indeed "frivolous or vexatious".

Judicial Review

6. The Defendant's PCC is a public authority. So is the Defendant itself. The High Court has a supervisory jurisdiction over them, enforceable by a claim for judicial review pursuant to CPR 54. A statutory right of appeal triggers the discretionary bar of alternative remedy. The judicial review Court will generally insist on the appeal route being pursued. That also avoids the 28-day time limit being circumvented. But there are pockets where judicial review might be needed. The appeal route does not oust the judicial review jurisdiction.
7. A judicial review claim (Form N461) has a box on the first page which the Court fills out. In the present case, that box records the date of 1.4.24, as being the date on which the judicial review claim was lodged with the Court. The Court stamp applied to the box is then dated 16.5.24. That stamp records the date on which the judicial review claim was "issued" by the Court. That means there is an official recognition from the Court – on the face of the claim form – that it took the Court 6 weeks to issue the claim. Sometimes there are complications with documents, or fees or fee-exemption. But not in this case. The Claimant has shown that she had her fee-exemption sorted by 2.4.24. The Court's delay in issuing a claim is not the responsibility of either party. A claimant has to serve the papers on the defendant and interested party. But it is the "issued" claim which has to be served. And the Claimant did not have an "issued" claim until 16.5.24.
8. The Claimant's position is this. She first lodged her judicial review papers on 1.4.24. She had a fee exemption in place on 2.4.24. She refiled the papers on 3.4.24. She has been able to substantiate this. The Defendant was not aware of any of it at that time. However, within just a few days the Claimant had told the Defendant (by email 5.4.24) that: "I … have pursued a judicial review". The Defendant did not take the opportunity – at that stage or after that – to ask her to explain what she had done; nor to ask her to send it what she had lodged with the Court. Instead, the Defendant decided to communicate with the Court. And it chose not to cc the Claimant into those communications.
9. The Defendant emailed the Court (24.5.24) to ask whether any judicial review or appeal had been received by the Court from the Claimant. The Court subsequently (3.7.24) provided the Defendant by email with the "claim form and associated material". The judicial review claim (N461) was within a 216-page claim bundle. The bundle contained the Green-Light Order (28.3.24). The Defendant was later told by the Court – in an email dated 7.8.24 – that the judicial review claim had been received by the Court on 15.4.24. But the Defendant had received the claim documents from the Court (3.7.24), including the Court-completed box on the front of N461 bearing the lodging date of 1.4.24. The discrepancy between 1.4.24 and 15.4.24 was evidently not queried with the Court. The Claimant was not cc'd into the communications. The Court has not substantiated 15.4.24 as the date on which the claim form was received. The Claimant has been able to disprove it. I am quite sure that nothing could in any event turn on the 2-week difference between lodging on 1.4.24 and lodging on 15.4.24, when the impugned decision was notified on 1.2.24, prompt pre-action correspondence had been written by the Claimant, and she had been awaiting the Green-Light Order.

The Grounds Document

10. Also within the judicial review bundle – lodged on 1.4.24 by the Claimant and received from the Court on 3.7.24 by the Defendant – was a Statement of Facts and Grounds. This important document is 6-pages and 32-paragraphs long. It identified the grounds on which the Claimant sought to have the High Court quash the impugned PCC decision. Those grounds involve allege procedural irregularity, and more particularly bias.

The Judicial Review Filter-Stage

11. A judicial review claim involves a permission stage, at which a Judge applies the viability test (whether the claim is arguable with a realistic prospect of success), and the discretionary bars like alternative remedy and delay. The Judge will make that decision in light of what the defendant and any interested party have said in their N462 acknowledgment of service (AOS) with its accompanying summary grounds of resistance and materials. There is no such filter-stage for a statutory appeal against a PCC erasure decision. In the present case, the Filter-Stage would have been an opportunity to regularise the parties: the judicial review defendant should have been the PCC; the interested party would have been the GDC. That would easily have been done, and rightly no point is taken on it by Mr Bradly KC. The other points would have been alternative remedy (the statutory right of appeal), delay (if raised) and viability (if raised). That stage was never reached.

The Defendant's Application for Set-Aside and Strike-Out

12. The application which is before me is the Defendant's application (in Form N244) filed by it on 5.8.24. The Defendant had originally asked for the application to be dealt with without a hearing, but it subsequently asked for the two-hour oral hearing which took place in front of me. The Defendant's application asks for a set-aside of the Green-Light order of Chamberlain J (28.3.24), on the basis which I identify below. It then asks for a strike-out order in relation to the claim for judicial review. Three distinct strike-out grounds are given in the N244: (1) delay in issuing the proceedings; (2) non-service of the Green-Light Order; (3) non-service of the claim form. I will need to deal with each.

The Basis for Set-Aside

13. The basis for setting aside the Green-Light Order is this.

i) The Claimant had made an application (Form N244) on 7.2.24, seeking "permission to apply for judicial review and/or permission to appeal to the High Court". By "permission", she meant Green-Light permission under the GCRO, which had yet to expire. She lodged an application bundle (163 pages). It included proposed grounds of judicial review or appeal. Those grounds were a document of just over 6-pages, 32-paragraphs. In substance, they matched the Grounds Document subsequently filed.

ii) Having considered the papers, Chamberlain J wanted to know whether the Defendant had any submissions to make about whether the proposed proceedings were "frivolous or vexatious". He made a First Order (27.2.24) which did two things. First, it gave a deadline (15.3.24) for the Defendant to provide any "reasons" why the Claimant "should not be permitted to issue a claim for judicial review or application for permission to appeal" (§2). Secondly, it imposed a duty on the Court to serve the First Order on the Defendant.

iii) Chamberlain J's subsequent Green-Light Order (28.3.24) was expressly made on the basis that the Defendant had missed its communicated deadline (15.3.24) and that, absent any response from it, it was "not possible to conclude that the proposed claim for judicial review or application for permission to appeal is frivolous or vexatious". Chamberlain J recorded in a recital that he understood there to have been an email from the Court (27.2.24) serving the First Order on the Defendant.

iv) This was unfair to the Defendant, who went unheard. It never received the First Order. It received no email from the Court (27.2.24). It has searched its in-boxes and junk-email. The Court, for its part, has been unable to identify any "sent email".

v) The Defendant would have wanted to make submissions on whether judicial review or an appeal would be "frivolous or vexatious". It has been denied that opportunity.

14. That, in my judgment, would be an unanswerable basis for the Defendant being heard and the Court revisiting the Green-Light Order with a view to setting it aside. But that is subject to two considerations. One is procedural; the other is substantive. The first is whether the Defendant acted sufficiently promptly in seeking set-aside. The second is whether the Defendant has something material to say about "frivolous or vexatious", and then whether it is persuasive. I will address each in turn.

Set-Aside 1: Defendant's Promptness

15. The Defendant became aware of the Green-Light Order (28.3.24) immediately. The Claimant emailed it to them at 12:42 on that day. Yet it took the Defendant 4 months until 5.8.24 to make its Form N244 application to set aside the Green-Light Order. The Defendant knew, on 28.3.24, from the express terms of the Order that there had been from the Claimant "an application notice dated 7.2.24 seeking permission under a GCRO to issue a claim for judicial review or application for permission to appeal"; that there had been an "accompanying bundle"; that there had been an Order (27.2.24) requiring service on the Defendant and giving a deadline of 15.3.24; and that Chamberlain J understood there to have been service by email (27.2.24). Mr Bradly KC submits that there was no duty of promptness (still less the 7 days to which the Claimant has referred). But the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2024 tells legal professionals and litigants that their "attention is drawn" to the "need" to "ensure that applications are made at the earliest stage possible" (§2.1.3.3). Mr Bradly KC points to the facts that the Defendant (from 8.4.24 to 3.7.24) was awaiting confirmation from the Court as to whether a judicial review claim or appeal had been received by the Court. The Defendant knew what the PCC decision was, and that it was appealable by right. It knew about the GCRO and its expiry date (14.3.24). It knew it could take a delay point and an alternative remedy point at the Filter-Stage of any judicial review. I can understand that, if the Defendant wanted to address "frivolous or vexatious" based on an analysis of the substance of the grounds being advanced for impugning the PCC decision, then getting sight of them would have been important. Even then, it could have filed N244 and asked for a direction that documents be provided. Or it could have asked the Claimant. Despite the Defendant's difficulties on promptness, I have decided to deal, in the interests of justice, with the substance of the position. But it does bring into sharp focus whether the Defendant really is addressing "frivolous or vexatious" based on an analysis of the substance of the grounds being advanced for impugning the PCC decision.

Set-Aside 2: Frivolous or Vexatious

16. This is the necessary logical focus of the set-aside. The next question, logically, is whether the Defendant has now shown the Court that it would be "frivolous or vexatious" for the Claimant to seek – by judicial review or appeal – to impugn the PCC's decision (18.1.24). There was a one paragraph description in a supporting witness statement (5.8.24) which describes 16 previous legal claims brought by the Claimant against the Defendant, including two in the High Court. I accept that the Defendant was flagging up that it had something to say, on the question on which Chamberlain J was focusing in the Green-Light Order. He intended by the First Order that the Defendant have the opportunity to provide their "reasons" relevant to this question. The non-service by the Court of the First Order denied them that opportunity. The two-hour hearing of this set-aside application provides a full opportunity. Chamberlain J may or may not have permitted a two-hour oral hearing. The Defendant has secured one. But at this point, the substance evaporates. The Defendant did not, in the event, focus on this point. No argument was advanced before me – still less substantiated or developed – as to why it would be "frivolous or vexatious" for the Claimant to proceed to challenge the PCC's decision on the grounds in the Grounds Document. No background materials were provided. I was given no visibility at all, in relation to any of those previous claims. The Claimant was given no critique to answer. There was no response which engaged with the grounds of challenge. Mr Bradly KC readily accepted that "frivolous or vexatious" was not really the focus of the hearing. He described the points which the Defendant might have made in March 2024 as "water under the bridge". He declined to characterise as "frivolous" or "vexatious" a statutory appeal by the Claimant against the PCC's decision. Instead, he focused on the points about events which post-date 28.3.24, as a basis not for set-aside of the Green-Light Order; but as a basis for strike-out of the judicial review claim.

My Decision on Set-Aside

17. In these circumstances, I dismiss the application for set-aside. The Green-Light Order stands. Whether it would matter, given the expiry of the GCRO on 14.3.24, is not a question which arises. I turn to the three grounds for strike-out. I have set them out above. Again, I will put aside questions of timing of the N244 and focus on the substance of the points raised.

Strike-Out 1: Claimant's Promptness

18. The Defendant's strike-out application gives as a first basis that "the proceedings were not issued promptly and were in any event issued out of time". In the end, Mr Bradly KC focused on two things. One was the lapse of 2 weeks between the Green-Light Order (28.3.24) and the date (15.4.24) when the judicial review claim documents were filed according to what the Court told the Defendant (by email on 7.8.24). The other was the delay in the Court issuing the judicial review claim (16.5.24).
19. In my judgment, there is nothing in these points. I do not consider that there has been any material delay by the Claimant; nor any material delay which could justify striking-out the proceedings. The PCC decision was reached on 18.1.24 and on the same day the Claimant sent her letter before claim to the Defendant. The Defendant's response came on 30.1.24. On 1.2.24 the Claimant was formally notified of the PCC decision and was told she had 28 days to appeal it. That deadline was 30.2.24. Her application (N244) for permission to issue judicial review or an appeal was made promptly on 7.2.24. The papers were then with the Court. She could not commence any claim without a green-light order, because of the GCRO. There was then the time-frame laid down in the First Order (27.2.24), the passing of the deadline for the Defendant's response (15.3.24), and the time taken for the Court to consider the papers culminating in the Green-Light Order (28.3.24). By now, the 28 day appeal deadline had passed (30.2.24) but the Claimant could not issue without Green-Light permission. On 15.3.24, the GCRO expired but the Claimant did not simply press on. In my judgment, she was wise not to do so. She had made an application for Green-Light permission, which was awaiting consideration. She no longer needed it, but the proposed proceedings were – properly and promptly – the subject of an application for it. What if Green-Light permission had been refused? She could have been criticised for pressing on. She was right to await the Court's Green-Light decision. Having received Green-Light permission, she promptly lodged papers (1.4.24), sorted out her fee exemption, and then told the Defendant (5.4.24) she had lodged proceedings. The subsequent 6-week delay within the Court in issuing the claim (16.5.24) was not attributable to her. From her perspective, the Defendant knew the papers had been lodged. She did not know the Defendant was subsequently chasing information.
20. I can see no relevant delay, still less such as would justify striking-out the claim. Nor is there delay such as would justify refusing permission if the Filter-Stage had been reached. Nor was there any subversion of the 28-day appeal time-limit. Finally, it is difficult to overlook that the promptness points are coming from a party who itself took 4 months to apply to set aside an order.

Strike-Out 2: Lack of Service of the Green-Light Order

21. The Defendant's strike-out application gives as a second basis "lack of service of the Order made by Chamberlain J on 28.3.24". I did not understand this point. Mr Bradly KC did not rely on it. The Green-Light Order was sent by the Claimant to the Defendant by email on 28.3.24 at 12:42pm. That was the same day.

Strike-Out 3: Non-Service of the Claim Form

22. The Defendant's strike-out application gives as a final basis "lack of service of the Claim Form within the period provided for by CPR 54.7 or at all" where "valid service [is] the foundation of the Court's jurisdiction to hear the claim: see R (Good Law Project) v SSHSC [2022] EWCA Civ 355, in particular §§36-41". In the end, this was the mainstay of the strike-out application. Even then, Mr Bradly KC accepts the following four points. First, service by first-class post was an option available to the Claimant, which could be confirmed by certificate of service (Form N215). Secondly, that the Claimant did send the claim documents, once the claim had been issued (16.5.24), by first class post with a proof of posting which she has been able to produce (17.5.24). Thirdly, that the Claimant would have had no reason to suppose that these had not been received within the Defendant's offices. Fourthly, that although an email from the Defendant to the Claimant (4.4.24) had drawn her attention to service by email: (a) that was only said in relation to appeal documents; and (b) it did not say that service by email was the "only" way of serving the Defendant.
23. Mr Bradly KC submits in essence as follows. Service in CPR 54.7 means "actual service" (Good Law §24). Since the documents were never received by the Defendant, there has been a default of service. The four accepted points are no answer to that. It means the Claimant needs to show that she has taken all reasonable steps to comply (Good Law §§81-82), under CPR 3.1(2)(a). She should have made an application for an extension of time (N244). She cannot meet the "all reasonable steps" test.
24. I have been unpersuaded by these submissions. In my judgment, the Claimant plainly did take all reasonable steps to comply. I have described the four accepted points. The Claimant used the first option in Form N215. She obtained a proof of posting. She also duly filed N215 with the Court (17.5.24). She acted promptly. She also promptly told the Defendant (5.4.24) that the claim had been lodged. As I have mentioned, the Defendant for its part chose to chase the matter with the Court, using unilateral communications. It did not ask the Claimant and it did not cc her. The Defendant received the claim documents from the Court (3.7.24). I will extend the Claimant's time to effect service of the judicial review claim. I will dispense with the need for service to be re-effected, in circumstances where the documents were supplied by the Court (3.7.24). I will dispense with the need for any further application to extend time. The Defendant's strike-out (N244) and witness statement did not identify such a step as needed. I have no doubt that the Claimant would have issued another N244 notice had she been alerted.

My Decision on Strike-Out

25. In these circumstances, I will dismiss the application for strike-out. That leaves the obvious question of whether this case should proceed, and if so how. I could leave that question for the Filter-Stage, when the discretionary bar could be considered. But it is far better having regard to the overriding objective, armed with the information I need and everyone having had a fair opportunity to say their piece, to grasp the nettle.

The Judicial Review Discretionary Bar: Statutory Appeal

26. The Defendant's consistent position has been that the appropriate mechanism is, and has always been, statutory appeal. This point was made in the pre-action letter of response (30.1.24). Information about how to appeal was again provided when the PCC decision was formally notified (1.2.24). The statutory 28-day deadline (Dentists Act 1984 s.36S(3)) expired on 30.2.24. The appeal is to the High Court. It is governed by CPR Part 52. The appeal can succeed and the appealed decision be quashed (s.36S(6)(b)) if the decision is shown to have been wrong or unjust by reason of serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings (CPR 52.21). That includes the grounds on which judicial review is being sought in the Grounds Document. Mr Bradly KC accepts that the Court has power to extend time if to refuse it would, in all the circumstances, be so unfair as to impair the essence of the right of appeal. That test is a very high threshold.
27. Mr Bradly KC makes these key points. The discretionary bar of alternative remedy has always been applicable in this case. The Claimant was repeatedly warned. In making the Green-Light Order, Chamberlain J was not endorsing judicial review. He was not addressing viability or discretionary bars. The statutory time limit has long expired. The judicial review Court has no power to transfer the claim to continue as if commenced as a statutory appeal. The wrong procedure has been adopted. It is inappropriate, and too late, to rectify the position.
28. I put aside the twist in the case, to which I will come shortly.
29. The Claimant had her statutory right of appeal to the High Court. There is no permission to appeal stage. The grounds on which she wishes to impugn the PCC Decision fall within the scope of an appeal (CPR 52.21). Parliament intended a person made the subject of an erasure order to be able, as of right, to appeal to the High Court. In this case, expiry of the GCRO (14.3.24) came 2-weeks after the 28-day appeal deadline. A Green-Light Order was sought, in a prompt application (7.2.24) which asked for "permission to apply for judicial review and or permission to appeal". The Claimant was not insistent on judicial review. She would have been content with appeal (hence the word "or" after "and"). Both of Chamberlain J's orders (27.2.24 and 28.3.24) referred to "permission to issue the proposed claim for judicial review or application for permission to appeal". The word here was "or". By the time the Green-Light permission had been received, the appeal was out of time and an extension of time was inevitably needed for an appeal. That was no fault of the Claimant. It introduced a fragility so far as the appeal route was concerned. She had treated judicial review and appeal as being parallel actions. She had told the Defendant (in her email on 5.4.24) that she had "pursued a judicial review and [lodged] an appeal, adhering to the permissions granted by Chamberlain J in his order dated 28.3.24".

Appeal as the Way Forward

30. I have no doubt that the appeal route is the correct one, and it is how this case should now proceed. There is no need for judicial review, given the statutory appeal. The Claimant should not be shut out. She has made sustained efforts to pursue her case. Having had every opportunity to demonstrate that her grounds are in substance "frivolous or vexatious", the Defendant has not done so. The Claimant's concern is to have her case heard in the High Court, ventilating her grounds. Her actions did not subvert or circumvent the statutory appeal time limit. I am satisfied, in the circumstances I have described so far, that an extension of time for the appeal should be granted, meeting the high threshold test of being necessary in the interests of justice, because otherwise there would be an impairment of the essence of the right of appeal. I am not persuaded that the Court lacks the power to direct that a judicial review claim continue as an appeal, dispensing with formalities. If it were necessary, I would grant an extension of time for an appeal to be lodged now. I am not deciding a Filter-Stage viability (arguability) question. The appeal has no Filter-Stage. I have not been persuaded that the appeal is frivolous or vexatious. The appeal is as of right. It should proceed to substantive determination.

The Twist in the Case

31. I have mentioned three things. First, that the Green-Light permission was "to issue the proposed claim for judicial review or application for permission to appeal". Secondly, that the Claimant told the Defendant, in her email on 5.4.24, that she had "pursued a judicial review and [lodged] an appeal, adhering to the permissions granted by Chamberlain J in his order dated 28.3.24". Thirdly, that the Court was asked by the Defendant whether any appeal had been received (24.5.24) and ultimately received only the judicial review claim documents (3.7.24), with the Claim Form being formally stamped as issued by the Court on 16.5.24.
32. The twist in the case was this. The Claimant told me at the hearing that she did lodge appeal papers with the Court, with appeal grounds equivalent to the judicial review Grounds Document, at the same time as she lodged the judicial review. There was an equivalent appeal bundle. It contained the Green-Light Order. She obtained a fee exemption. She originally lodged papers with the Court of Appeal, thinking that was the right court for this appeal. She thinks the appeal got lost within the Court system. It was never "issued" by the Court. She chased the Court, but with no success. Only the judicial review was issued. Feeling that the Court staff work hard with a heavy workload, she did not want to make a complaint.
33. The Claimant was able to substantiate this. She retrieved and was able to forward to the Defendant and to the Court the emails. There was a confirmation (2.4.24) that her applications for fee remission had been successful, including in respect of her appeal notice (Form N461). There was an email on 1.4.24 at 13:23 from the Claimant to the Court, which attached two fee exemption forms (EX160) for N161 (appeal) and N461 (judicial review). N161 and N461 were each described as accompanied by their statement of facts (N461) and grounds for appeal (N161). I have seen the 175-page appeal bundle including Form N161 (1.4.24). I have seen the 7-page, 31-paragraph grounds of appeal which reflect the substance of the judicial review Grounds Document. The appeal Form N161 was never issued by the Court. But it was lodged, promptly after the Green-Light Order had been received, albeit after expiry of the 28-day period.
34. The fact that the Claimant had promptly – as soon as she had the Green-Light Order – sought to pursue an appeal which was her right, but it had never been issued by the Court, fortifies my conclusion that the Claimant should not now be shut out. It reinforces my conclusion as to all reasonable steps, and as to the extension of time for the appeal. True, the Court of Appeal was not the correct court. True, the Defendant's email address had been given on 4.4.24 for appeal documents. True, the Claimant could have thought to send a communication to that address which attached the unissued Form N161. On the other hand, the Claimant did clearly tell the Defendant by email the next day (5.4.24) that the appeal had been lodged. And, after that, the Defendant did not ask her about that or ask her to provide documents. It chose to communicate unilaterally with the Court.

Order

35. I was able to set out in my confidential draft judgment what I was minded to order, and I had the advantage of the parties' responses. My order will be as follows:

1. The Defendant's application dated 5^th August 2024 to set aside the Order made by Chamberlain J 28^th March 2024 is dismissed.

2. The Defendant's application dated 5^th August 2024 to strike out the Claim Form in these proceedings is dismissed.

3. The Court is to issue the Appeal Notice N161 dated 1^st April 2024 (as sent to the Court by the Claimant by email on 1^st April 2024).

4. The Claimant's grounds for Judicial Review – being the 6-page document dated 01.04.2024 headed "Statement of Facts" which was lodged with the Claimant's Judicial Review Claim Form N461 – stand as the Claimant's Ground of Appeal.

5. Save for service of the issued Form N161 referred to at paragraph 3 of this Order and as provided for below, further service of the Claimant's bundle of documents in the appeal is dispensed with.

6. Time for the lodging and issue of the Form N161 referred to at paragraph 3 of this Order is extended, to the date on which the Form N161 is issued by the Court in accordance with this Order.

7. Time for service of the Form N161 by the Claimant on the Defendant is extended to 4pm on Friday 28 March 2025.

8. The Defendant shall by 4pm on 1 May 2025 is to file at the Court and serve upon the Claimant its Response to the appeal.

9. The Claimant shall by 4pm on 12 June 2025 file and serve on the Defendant her Reply to the Defendant's Response to the appeal.

10. At the time of filing and serving their Response and Reply provided for at paragraphs 8 and 9 of this Order the Defendant and Claimant, respectively, must also file and serve bundles containing copies of any legislative provisions and authorities upon which they intend to rely in the appeal.

11. The hearing of the appeal is to be fixed on the first convenient date after 6 October 2025, with a time estimate of one day, preceded by a pre-reading period of one day. In advance of the hearing:

(a) The Claimant is to file and serve her appeal hearing bundle and her Skeleton Argument, by 4pm on the date which is six weeks before the date for the hearing of the appeal. The Appeal Hearing Bundle must be indexed and paginated, and available electronically and in doublesided hard-copy form: see (b) below. It must include: (i) Form N461; (ii) the Grounds document (paragraph 4 above); (iii) this Order; (iv) the judgment [2025] EWHC 643 (Admin); (iv) the Response and Reply documents (paragraphs 8-9 above); and (v) the bundles of legislation and authorities (paragraphs 10 above).

(b) If the Claimant requires the Defendant's assistance in putting the constituent materials together into an Appeal Hearing Bundle indexed and paginated, and available electronically and in doublesided hard-copy form, she should seek that assistance no later than eight weeks before the date of the hearing of the appeal.

(c) The Defendant is to file and serve its Skeleton Argument by 4pm on the date which is six weeks before the date for the hearing of the appeal.

12. The Claimant's Claim for Judicial Review is dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.

13. All communications between a party and the Court are to be copied to the other party.

14. The parties have liberty to apply, in writing on notice to the other party, to vary the directions set out in this Order.

Consequentials

36. In light of the parties' responses to the confidential draft judgment, I can deal here with the finalised order and any consequential matters. Subject to one qualification, I think the Claimant has an unassailable application for the costs of resisting the applications for set-aside and strike-out. Those applications were not well-founded and have squarely failed. Costs should follow the event. The qualification is that no further step is appropriate so far as those costs are concerned until the final disposal of the appeal. That is because there may be other relevant costs orders – in whoever's favour these have been made – and there may be an interrelationship. It is, for example, necessary in the interests of justice that the Court should be able to consider its set-off powers (discussed in R (Black) v SSJ [2024] EWHC 1376 (Admin)), looking at the position in the round. Any costs assessment would need to be on the litigant in person basis, but an assessment is premature. This is my Order as to costs:

15. Subject to paragraph 16 below, the Defendant shall pay the Claimant's costs of the applications dated 5th August 2024 to set aside the Order made by Chamberlain J 28th March 2024 and to strike out the Claim Form in these proceedings is dismissed, including the costs of the hearing on 4 March 2025, to be assessed at litigant in person's rates if not agreed.

16. All further steps relating to the costs order in paragraph 15, including any costs assessment, are stayed until the final determination of the appeal.

37. I decline the Claimant's invitation to certify the Defendant's applications for set-aside or strike-out as "totally without merit". The applications have failed but they do not meet that threshold. A point was raised by the Claimant about public records and an ongoing appeal, and the Defendant has confirmed that it will include a statement in the GDC and DPHS websites, reflecting the fact that the Claimant has appealed the PCC's decision.
38. The Defendant – properly and proactively – raised with me the question of the Court making some form of order to recreate the immediate ongoing suspension, but without erasure, which would have applied had there been an in-time appeal. The Claimant's response is to ask for an order mandating her reinstatement. I am not going to make any order requiring any change to the register. At most, it would be replacing erasure with ongoing suspension. In all the circumstances of the case, I consider that the way forward is to proceed with the appeal, without changes to the register. When the appeal is resolved on its merits, the erasure will be overturned, varied or upheld depending on the outcome. As to that, I express no view. In dealing with the Defendant's applications, I have not been addressing the merits of the appeal. So far as understanding what has happened in this case, this judgment stands in the public domain.

Unilateral Communications

39. This is an appropriate further opportunity to mention the position as to unilateral communications with the Court. Unless demonstrably administratively benign, or unless there is some identified compelling reason, unilateral communications (behind the back of another party) should be avoided: see CPR 39.8. The rule refers to "a party to proceedings" and, strictly speaking, "proceedings" and "party" may be thought to mean proceedings which have been issued and served. On the other hand, I see CPR 39.8 as reflective of a cardinal rule (Bell v Brabners LLP [2021] EWHC 560 (QB)) engaging considerations of fairness and transparent dealing. Court staff should not have to police who is in the cc line of an email. In this case there was from 28.3.24 a Court Order in proposed proceedings, in which the Claimant and Defendant were both named; and each party had a ready means of cc'ing the other when emailing the Court.