[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> F, Re [2004] EWHC 725 (Ch) (02 April 2004) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2004/725.html Cite as: [2004] WTLR 657, [2004] EWHC 725 (Ch), [2004] 3 All ER 277 |
[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
||
B e f o r e :
IN THE MATTER OF THE ENDURING POWERS OF ATTORNEY ACT 1985
____________________
IN RE F |
____________________
Leon Sartin (instructed by Harding Evans) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 15th March 2004
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Patten :
"…if the continued operation of the enduring power of attorney is likely to be a festering sore or a stumbling-block that prevents her children from behaving in a civil manner towards one another, then she would rather an independent receiver be appointed.
It is clear to me that the continued operation of the power is likely to be a stumbling-block that prevents any prospect of reconciliation between her son and daughter.
[Mr A] contends that his mother's views do not reflect an informed decision on the matter, that there would be considerable cost implications in appointing a receiver, and that there would be practical day-to-day difficulties over being reimbursed for small items of expenditure, such as purchasing items of clothing, giving Christmas or birthday presents, and treats such as going out for lunch.
I agree that there are cost implications, but when [the house] is finally sold and the net proceeds are properly invested, there should be relatively little for the receiver to do, and it is unlikely that the costs would be substantial. In any even, [Mrs F] has a fairly substantial estate, and the costs should not be disproportionate, or cause any hardship or adversely impact on her standard of living. The practical day-to-day problems to which [Mr A] referred can be easily overcome."
He therefore upheld the objection to registration on grounds of unsuitability.
i) Mr A's desire to sell the family home and the distress this has caused to Mrs F;
ii) Mr A's failure properly to secure and maintain the property following Mrs F's entry into a nursing home;
iii) the lack of information provided about Mr A's management of his mother's and father's affairs; and
iv) Mr A's own possible financial difficulties.
There was then further lengthy correspondence between Mr A and Mrs B's solicitors, in which allegations and counter-allegations of various kinds were made and rebutted, but on 18th August 2003 the objection to registration was listed for hearing on 25th September.
"This needs some explanation. It would amount in effect to a criticism of the donor's choice of attorney. But we would not wish this ground to be sustained merely because the attorney was not the sort of person that a particular relative would have chosen. It is our wish that the donor's choice of attorney should carry considerable weight. Thus, for example, a mother might be content to appoint her son as her EPA attorney despite being aware of a conviction for theft. We would not want her choice of attorney to be upset simply because a particular relative would not want the son to be his attorney. The question should be whether the particular attorney is suitable to act as attorney for the particular donor. In short, the Court should examine carefully all the circumstances - particularly the relationship between donor and attorney."
" The second ground of unsuitability is the hostility between the three children. The master considered that that fact alone rendered any one of them unsuitable to be Mrs W's attorney. In my judgment such hostility may well have such consequences but it all depends upon the circumstances. For example, had the estate of Mrs W been complex and had it required strategic decisions in relation to its administration, one would expect the attorney to have had to consult and work with her siblings in relation to the administration. In such circumstances the evident hostility between them would impact adversely on the stewardship of the attorney, no matter who was at fault in creating the hostility in the first place.
But in this case the estate is simple. I asked counsel what the position was and was told that there are the following assets: (1) a portfolio of investments of a value (as at 23 December 1998) of £211,189; (2) £20,000 in Premium Bonds; (3) a life policy (written in trust) of £30,000. As to the outgoings there is the cost of the nursing home at some £2,000 a month, and then, simply, the need for a modest amount to cover a regular hairdo, telephone bills and the like. And, of course, on the income side there is the old-age pension.
In other words there is nothing of any significance left to be done. The assets are under proper control. The income simply needs to be fed through to the nursing home. The evidence is that this has been done by Mrs X very efficiently. She has indicated more than once that she has never intended to charge for her services under the power of attorney and she does not intend to do so. Against this, if the Public Trustee were to come in, there would be an appointment fee and an annual fee of between £2,350 and £3,600 per annum. If a solicitor were appointed the total cost would be likely to be somewhat less than that.
It seems to me that it is not right to say that (irrespective of the background) hostility of the kind we have seen in this case between the children renders any one of them unsuitable to be Mrs W's attorney. In this case the hostility will not impact adversely on the administration. It would, in my judgment, be quite wrong to frustrate Mrs W's choice of attorney in this way. Whether it is or is not a good idea for a parent in Mrs W's position, when such hostility exists, to appoint one child alone as attorney is another question. But Mrs W did so and, on the evidence, did so knowing of the hostility. That is her prerogative and in my judgment, when the hostility does not interfere with the smooth running of the administration, the court should not interfere on the ground of unsuitability."