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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Shierson & Anor v Rastogi (A Bankrupt) [2007] EWHC 1266 (Ch) (25 May 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2007/1266.html Cite as: [2007] EWHC 1266 (Ch) |
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CHANCERY DIVISION
IN BANKRUPTCY
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
MALCOLM SHIERSON JONATHAN BIRCH |
Appellants |
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- and - |
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VIREN KUMAR RASTOGI (a bankrupt) |
Respondent |
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MR CHARLES PURLE QC (instructed by Bivonas Limited) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 15 – 17 May 2007
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Crown Copyright ©
The Chancellor :
"that a fraud of precisely the kind alleged by RBG's liquidators was being perpetrated both on RBG and its financiers."
On 26th November 2004 the Court of Appeal refused the Bankrupt permission to appeal from the decision of Hart J.
"...only if satisfied that the bankrupt has failed or is failing to comply with an obligation under this Part."
(1) failure to explain or account for the disparity between the amount of the judgment awarded by Hart J and the value of the assets disclosed by him,(2) failure to disclose or account for the proceeds of sale of shares in Allied Deals Inc, and
(3) failure to disclose a beneficial interest in Regent's Trust, Portman Trust or Clipter Holdings Ltd.
"shall...give to the trustee such information as to his affairs...as the trustee may for the purposes of carrying out his functions under any of this Group of Parts reasonably require".
Failure to perform that duty before discharge may result in the commission of the offences prescribed by ss.353 to 356. The concern of the Trustees on this application is that the obligation of the bankrupt under this section may continue to be backed by criminal sanctions and its performance encouraged by a wish to be relieved of the disabilities to which I have referred in paragraph 7 above.
"2. RBG was in the metals business. It was established by VR in 1996 and by September 2001 had a turnover of US$1.7 billion. On 30th January 2002 its auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, resigned giving as their reasons under Section 394 of the Companies Act 1985, the breakdown of trust and confidence between themselves and the directors arising out of their failure to obtain satisfactory explanations for the fact that confirmation of indebtedness from six apparently independent customers of RBG had all apparently been faxed at the same time on the same fax machine from the same address. Further investigations resulted in an application being made on behalf of its principal creditor, West LB, for the appointment of provisional liquidators, an application that was granted on 3rd May 2002. The liquidation revealed a deficit of some $445 million with liabilities of $330 million-odd owed to the banks which had financed its trading. Its assets included some $406 million owed to it by trading counterparties none of which has proved to be recoverable.
3. The essence of the claim is that this situation is the result of a fraudulent scheme which was designed to extract, and succeeded in extracting, several hundred million US dollars from financiers. According to the claimants, the scheme involved the invention of a very large number of bogus metal and other mineral trading transactions. It was implemented by the creation of a world wide network of trading counterparties who were controlled by VR and AJ, by the fabrication of the trading transactions and by the dissipation of the funds extracted. These bogus transactions were presented to financiers as genuine trades with independent trading companies for the purposes of extracting funds. This was done first through the sale to the financiers under receivables agreements of the liabilities purportedly owing to RBG as a result of these trades and, secondly, the raising of trade finance in respect of purported purchases. It is said that by the time the music stopped in May 2002 at least two-thirds of RBG's ostensible trade was the result of these activities."
"7. The trading counterparties to which the allegation relates were ostensibly located in Hong Kong, Singapore, Dubai, India and the United States. In Hong Kong, RBG's principal agent was Mr Murthy who was assisted by Dhwaraswamy Somasekharan ("Mr Sekhar"), at times assisted by a Mr Vineet Kumar Aggarwal. In Singapore the assistants were Subhash Rastogi, Tarun Kumar Aggarwal and Sanjay Sikri, the brother of Pankaj, the London-based assistant. In Dubai, the assistants were Ravindra Rastogi and P K Keerthan. In India, their assistants included Y K Aggarwal and Artul Jain.
8. It is RBG's case that these assistants took their instructions from and reported to VR and AJ, the latter being assisted and sometimes represented by Sheetal. The purported trading with the counterparties was typically done on a matched transaction basis. The sale by one counterparty to RBG was matched by a purchase by another counterparty from RBG. The purported purchases by RBG usually required immediate settlement whereas its purported sales were on credit terms, often 180 days. Trade finance was used to fund purported purchases. The receivables created by the purported sales on credit terms were used to obtain receivables finance, typically 95% of the face value. This finance would then be misappropriated to and for the benefit of the counterparties.
9. The net result, according to RBG, is that when the music stopped it was left with irrecoverable assets in the form of liabilities to it on the part of counterparties in the sum of $400 million-odd and liabilities to the banks who financed the trades of over $300 million. On the footing that the trades were bogus it claims the latter sum from VR and AJ on the grounds that their orchestration of the fraudulent scheme was a breach of their fiduciary duties as directors of RBG which has resulted in that loss. If, on the other hand, the transactions to the counterparties or some of them were real transactions it seeks to make them liable for the amount of the counterparties' unpaid liabilities to RBG on the footing that they are liable as quasi recipients of RBG's property received by the counterparties under the transactions, relying for this purpose on the approach of the court, in Trustor v Smallbone (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 1177."
"10. [The Bankrupt and his co-defendant Mr Anand Jain] deny these claims. They say that as far as they were concerned all the transactions between RBG and the counterparties in question were arms length transactions with trading entities which were independent of RBG and, so far as they were aware, independent of each other. The fact that all of the counterparties in question, who number about 250, have in the event failed to respond to any of their liabilities to RBG can be explained by the fact that they were all relatively small businesses which had been enabled to trade as a result of the imaginative credit and other terms afforded to them by RBG. Their inability to respond to their liabilities was no more than the consequence of the unexpected shutting down of RBG's business following the appointment of the provisional liquidators. If, and to the extent that it now appeared from the evidence that some or all of transactions reveal an apparently incestuous web of connections between the counterparties inconsistent with their mutual independence, those were matters for which [the Bankrupt and Mr Jain] could provide no explanation save to suggest that the responsibility for this state of affairs might lie in the unauthorised actions of RBG's local representatives in Hong Kong, in particular Mr Murthy and Mr Sekhar. Both [the Bankrupt and Mr Jain] were adamant that they knew nothing of these matters and were certainly not themselves responsible for controlling the affairs of the counterparties in question."
"13....the fraud alleged by RBG was both massive and complex. Its proof, however, seems to me to depend on RBG being able to establish the truth of one central proposition, namely that the counterparties were not independent of RBG or of each other but were in fact controlled by [the Bankrupt and Mr Jain]. Unless [the Bankrupt and Mr Jain] can show a realistic prospect of demonstrating at trial that that was not the case, it seems to me that RBG is entitled to judgment against them, at least so far as liability is concerned. RBG seeks in its evidence to go further and to assert that not only were the counterparties so controlled but that all the transactions with which they entered with RBG were, as it is put in the evidence, "bogus". This does not appear to me to be a necessary element of RBG's claim to hold the defendants liable for breach of fiduciary duty. Whether or not the transactions were "bogus" in the sense of being merely the product of the generation of a transactional paper trail, the mere fact that they were presented by the defendants to RBG's auditors and its financiers as being transactions with apparently independent counterparties will be sufficient to establish breach by the defendants of their fiduciary duties as directors of RBG.
14. If that is right, then the ability of the defendants to show a realistic prospect of success on the "control" issue should be determinative of this application so far as liability is concerned. The litigation disadvantages on which they rely (absence of disclosure or independent sources of documentation and so forth) have to be seen in that context."
"The existence among the Sha Tin documentation of the paraphernalia necessary for the successful execution of a scheme such is alleged by RBG in these proceedings; e.g. the statutory books, accounts, banking and other documents for the Hong Kong counterparties, the blank letterhead paper (some pre-signed), the company chops (again sometimes pre-signed) shipping documentation, shows (as [the Bankrupt and Mr Jain] recognise in their evidence), that Mr Murthy has some explaining to do if one is to avoid the conclusion that he was centrally involved in a fraudulent scheme of precisely the character alleged by RBG. The most damning documentation however is that which evidences that Mr Murthy and Mr Sekhar not only had no need to explain themselves to [the Bankrupt and Mr Jain], but regularly accounted to them throughout the period in which the scheme was operated for their actions in operating it."
"31. This response does not however explain the fact of the existence, in the form in which they do exist, of the Keerthan reports. As with the Sekhar reports, these reports only make sense as an accounting to someone of funds which are being paid by RBG to various counterparties and then being used by other counterparties to discharge their liabilities to RBG or its financiers, or transfer to one or other of the Rastogi brothers, the net balances being accounted for as RBG's money. That form of accounting presupposes that the counterparties are mere creatures of RBG, who have no independence whatsoever in relation to transactions to which the relevant entries relate. The conclusion from these reports is, in my judgment inescapably, that the counterparties were not independent of RBG or of each other, and that a fraud of precisely the kind alleged by RBG's liquidators was being perpetrated, both on RBG and its financiers. The only refuge for the defendants is to say that if that was the case, then it had nothing to do with them. That assertion is however, in my judgment, simply incredible in the face of the direct documentary evidence of their involvement, sparse though that is. Its relative scarcity is easily explained from RBG's point of view by the suggestion that there must have been a systematic destruction of documentation at the London end, following PricewaterhouseCoopers' resignation in January 2002, and prior to the appointment of provisional liquidators in May 2002. But such of the documentation as does survive makes it quite simply unbelievable that the persons at the centre of the web were not the very persons to whom the Sekhar and the Keerthan reports were expressly addressed. In my judgment, there is no realistic prospect of the defendants being able to demonstrate the contrary at trial.
32. As indicated earlier, their protestation that it is unfair to them to have to respond to the allegations without the benefit of disclosure from RBG has to be seen in the context of that which they have to refute, namely the lack of independence of the counterparties and the fact that it was they who were orchestrating the transactions. It is difficult to see how any amount of disclosure will enable them to displace either of those conclusions. On the other hand, proof in relation to any one of the alleged counterparties that it was in fact independent, at least in relation to a transaction where one of the reports points to it as having been a mere creature of RBG, would go a long way to removing an essential premise of the liquidator's case in relation to all the alleged counterparties, at least so far as summary judgment is concerned. So far as such an approach is concerned, the defendants have, if their denials are to be believed, a huge pool of independent evidence upon which they could draw in order to provide the telling counter-example. The pool consists of a list of ostensibly independent counterparties listed in the schedules which appear at pages 328 to 340 of Volume 2 of the application bundle. No such example has, however, been relied upon. [the Bankrupt and Mr Jain] were the chief operating officers of RBG throughout the period during which this ostensibly massive trading was going on. If any of the counterparties was a genuine independent trader, it is quite simply incredible that [the Bankrupt and Mr Jain] have not been able to produce, or even point to, some third party source which would corroborate that fact.
33. For these reasons, I have reached the conclusion that RBG is entitled to summary judgment against the defendants."
"36....once it is accepted, as I have accepted, that RBG through [the Bankrupt and Mr Jain] were controlling both sides of the transactions in question, the question whether and in what further sense, they may have been "bogus" transactions is academic. The orchestration of the transaction in question would have been fatal to, if nothing else, the validity of the credit insurance on which the receivables finance was based, even if otherwise compliant with the warranties given in the relevant finance agreements. It may be objected that this is not squarely addressed by the evidence but it is, in my judgment, obvious.
37. The second answer is that if the transaction in question was "a real one" even though it was secretly orchestrated by the defendants, the loss which RBG had suffered is ostensibly a greater one, namely its inability to collect the "real debt" owed to it by the shell counterparty in question.
38. My conclusion is that once RBG has established that [the Bankrupt and Mr Jain] controlled the counterparties, it is entitled to claim damages on the footing that, notwithstanding the non-recourse provisions, it is liable to the financiers in the sums for which they have lodged proofs in the liquidation. By parity of reasoning, unless RBG is able to assert that the transactions were real ones, it is not entitled to claim damages by reference to the sums which it ought to have received as a result of those transactions.
39. Accordingly, the sum in respect of which RBG is entitled to summary judgment is, in my judgment, the sum measured by reference to its apparent liability to the financiers; i.e., a figure either of US$307 million odd or US$333 million odd, mentioned earlier as being a point on which I would welcome the further assistance of counsel."
"19. If one stands back in this case, the materials put before the judge in detail cry out for an explanation; indeed they do more than that. It seems impossible that there can be any rational explanation as to how these materials exist other than they evidenced dealings with counterparties controlled by the defendants. None of the matters which it is suggested might turn up on the way to trial displace that overwhelming inference.
20. That being so, I can see no reason or point in granting permission to appeal. The case is all one way."
"lending institutions by inducing them to provide finance to RBG Resources plc....("RBG") secured upon RBG's metal transactions by dishonestly representing to such lending institutions that:
1. All such metal transactions represented the genuine sale of metal and/or;
2. Such metal transactions were at arms length to RBG and/or;
3. Such metal transactions were with counterparties not connected to or otherwise controlled by RBG."
I understand that the trial is fixed for September 2007 and is estimated to last at least three months.
"Counsel for [the Bankrupt] accepted that the allegation at the heart of the case against his client was that he was a party to fraud and that he had extracted assets from [RBG] which he was hiding. He submitted, however, that the findings of fraud and extraction of assets made against his client in the English proceedings that I have mentioned, and in certain foreign proceedings mentioned later in this judgment, are not admissible against him in the application before me. For the reasons hereinafter appearing, I accept that submission."
"Whether or not any of the evidence relied on in those proceedings actually proves that [the Bankrupt] was a party to fraud or that he has extracted assets from [RBG] is not a question I have to consider. Suffice it to say that that evidence is not before me and the findings made in those proceedings are inadmissible in the proceedings before me for the reason I have already given."
"So on the trial of the issue in the civil court, the opinion of the criminal court is equally irrelevant."
I then considered the later authorities and concluded that that proposition was still good law and rejected the submission that it applied only to cases in which the earlier decision is that of a criminal court. I concluded in paragraph 27 that the "factual findings and conclusion of Nelson J in the earlier proceedings are not admissible as evidence of the facts so found in these proceedings". The Court of Appeal followed the decision in Bairstow on this point in Simms v Conlon [2006] EWCA Civ 1749.
"The consideration payable by the purchaser in respect of the sale and purchase hereby agreed shall be USD53,000,000...The payment instructions to the purchaser shall be given by vendor separately."
"In his witness statement [the Bankrupt] denies ever receiving the proceeds of sale of any shares in Allied Deals Inc. This tallies with his evidence in his s.333 interview, when he said, "that money, I think, has either gone to RBG Enterprises or has gone to RBG Holdings". There is no reliable evidence that [the Bankrupt] personally received any part of the proceeds of sale of any shares in Allied Deals Inc.....Given [the Bankrupt's] denial, the truth of which has not been tested by cross-examination, and in the absence of any reliable evidence to contradict it, I do not consider that a case has been made out to justify the suspension of the running of the discharge period."
"The short, and to my mind, conclusive answer to this allegation was provided by [counsel for the Bankrupt], when he pointed out that [the Bankrupt] denies having an interest in either of the Trusts (a denial, I would add, that has not been tested by cross-examination) and [the Trustees] have produced no evidence in these proceedings that he does have such an interest. [Counsel for the Bankrupt] submitted, and I accept, that Mr Shierson's evidence on this issue amounts to no more than conjecture, suspicion and surmise, which is no substitute for hard evidence."
In paragraph 12 the Registrar, on the authority of Bairstow, rejected the orders in the Swiss proceedings on the grounds that they were brought by the liquidators of RBG rather than the Trustees.
"Despite [the Bankrupt] appearing to be removed as a beneficiary of the Portman Trust I want to investigate whether he ultimately has an interest therein, since I firmly believe that his removal as a beneficiary of the Trust in 1999 was designed to put assets beyond the reach of RBG's creditors."