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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Tackaberry & Anor v Hollis & Ors [2007] EWHC 2633 (Ch) (13 November 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2007/2633.html Cite as: [2007] EWHC 2633 (Ch) |
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CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
Douglas Francis Michael Tackaberry John Antony Tackaberry |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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Peter Hollis Pauline Cobbett Anthony Beacham |
Defendants |
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Katharine Holland (instructed by Penningtons) for the First Defendant
Hearing dates: between 8/10/07 and 12/10/07
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Evans-Lombe :
"I am negotiating for the purchase of a house and should be glad if you will act as my solicitor ... ".
"It is intended to raise a mortgage on the property to the extent of £500 the balance being paid in cash. You will note from a letter that I enclose that the vendor is willing to allow a mortgage of the amount we require [to] remain on the property, I should like you to get in touch with him and find out whether this would be more advantageous to me than a loan from a bank or building society."
"We understand from Messrs W. Levens & Son that you are acting for the vendor of the above property, and shall be glad to receive draft contract [Sic] for approval on behalf of our client Mr A. J. Tackaberry."
"I enclose letter and report today received from the builder I instructed. Having regard to the defects mentioned by the builder I must question whether under present circumstances any building society would advance more than £500. You should carefully consider the matter with the members of your family and then return the letter and report to me and say whether, notwithstanding the report, you still wish the purchase to proceed …."
"I regret that owing to various members of the family being away just now I have been unable to arrange whether we shall go on with the purchase of the house. I expect to be able to let you know definitely by Tuesday night's post. …"
"We have now gone into this matter thoroughly and it has been decided that we shall proceed with the purchase.
From the beginning it was expected that we should have to lay out a fair amount on necessary repairs such as papering and woodwork repair. We did not however expect to have to repair roof, chimneys and drains and renew cisterns. We think that the vendor should meet us in respect of these last items and make us a substantial allowance to cover same. We should be glad if you would get in touch with him and see whether he is agreeable to this course.
We should be glad if you will proceed with applying to building society for[a] loan, we agree with you that in view of the report the application should be for £500 instead of the amount previously arranged."
"Although the vendor's offer appears rather small we are inclined to accept it. The price asked for the house was £1,200 the vendor agreeing to allow something for repairs but our offer of £1,050 was accepted on the understanding that this allowance for repairs would not be made. Another thing is that we have been looking for a house of this situation and size for the past twelve months and feel that we should not risk this expense and trouble all over again. In these circumstances we think that we cannot hold out for more."
"We are now quite settled down in the new house and like it very much although things seem a bit crowded after Waltham Abbey, but I expect we'll get used to that."
"I have agreed to sell to Mr Chas Tyler of 5 Highland Road Bromley a small strip of my garden for the sum of £37 10s. Mr Tyler will be communicating with you in connection with this matter."
"My sister Gwendolin is shortly proceeding to America to obtain a visa. She must pass a sort of "means test". Could you write to her bankers (Barclays Bromley) to the effect that she is interested in my house to the extent of £600 and so enable them to issue a letter to the American Consulate as to her means?"
Mr Bailey responded to the effect that "her charge is really £650".
"201 Widmore Road
It has been decided to sell the above property. My sister, Miss Alice M. Tackaberry, will act on my behalf. I would be glad if you would send me the necessary authorisations for signature."
The proposed sale did not take place. It was the first of a number of abortive attempts to sell the Property.
"We act for Mr F.R.G. Tackaberry of 33 Heathdene Road Wallington, Surrey who is proposing to purchase the above property for the sum of £2700. We understand that our client already has an interest in the property which will be set off against the purchase price. We are further informed that you hold the deeds of the property and act for other members of the family whose interest our client is buying."
"We do hold the deeds on behalf of your brother Anthony and there is nothing with these deeds to say that your brother Frank has any interest whatsoever in the property although I am under the impression that at one time he did have some interest. Will you please let me know whether the property is to be sold to your brother Frank for £2700 and the amount which is to be set off against the purchase price."
"As you know, the property is in your name and I shall therefore be deducing title but shall be obliged if you will confirm the selling price and let me know the amount due to your brother. If you do not know, who will know please?"
"I confirm that I am agreeable to selling the above property to my brother Francis R. Tackaberry for £2700. The proceeds of sale are to be allocated as follows:
Gwendolin M. Tackaberry. | 700. 0. 0. | In settlement of Charge on the property |
Francis R Tackaberry. | 333. 6. 8. | 1/6th. Of residue (£2,000.0. 0) |
Alice M. Tackaberry. Henry J. Tackaberry. Thomas R. Tackaberry. Cyril J. Tackaberry. Anthony J. Tackaberry |
333. 6. 8. 333. 6. 8. 333. 6. 8. 333. 6. 8. 333. 6. 8. |
} }Equal Share of Legal Costs, }Stamp Duty, etc. to be }deducted from each of these }payments. |
Net payment required for F.R. Tackaberry will thus be £2366 13s 4d
I would be glad if you will accept payment for the house on my behalf and pay the amounts as above. My share can be paid into my account at Barclays Bank Bromley Kent."
"Frank can't get a mortgage on 201 Widmore Road Bromley so we want him to rent it from us. …So now if you would be so good as to draw up some kind of an agreement letting him have 201 at say £200 a year …."
There is no evidence that anything like this was done.
"My sister Gwendolin M. Tackaberry has written stating that she would like to take over the Widmore Road house. I am quite agreeable to this and would be glad if you would arrange the transfer.
On 15th May 1961 I advised you that I was agreeable to selling the house to Francis R. Tackaberry for £2700 but on my last visit to England I suggested to Frank that this figure be substantially reduced so that the sale could be completed. I think that this proposed reduction should be implemented in this new proposal so I consider that £1700 would be the figure to work on. Gwen would retain £700 in settlement of the charge in her favour and the net proceeds of £1000 would be shared amongst those listed in my letter of 15/5/61. Costs would be charged in accordance with normal practice.
I am sure everyone will be satisfied with this arrangement."
"I have today received a letter from your brother Anthony stating that he is agreeable to you taking over 201 Widmore Road and he suggests the purchase price should be £1700 so that as there is, I understand, £700 owing to you, the net amount to be found by you would be £1000 which sum less the costs would be divided between Frank, Alice, Henry, Tom, Cyril and Anthony in equal shares. Obviously Anthony will agree to this and I feel sure that your sister Alice will agree. I do not anticipate any difficulty with Henry or Tom but will Frank and Cyril agree? You will appreciate that when the matter came up in May 1961 the suggested purchase price was £2700. On that basis each one of the six would have had £333 6s 8d less a proportion of the costs etc. whereas on the present basis each one will only get £166 13s 4d less costs."
"My sister Gwendolin M. Tackaberry has revived her proposal to buy the above property and has asked me to write to you. I would be glad if you would arrange to have it transferred to her. £1700 was the price mentioned in my letter of 4th July 1963 and I am prepared to let it go at that."
"Before he went back to Australia, my brother Tony told me that the proceeds from the sale would be divided evenly between the five of us."
"I note that my brother Frank is now anxious to leave [number 201]. When I last saw him in January 1966 he said he wanted to leave then and as the rest of the family were agreeable to the house being sold I asked him to see an estate agent and arrange the sale but I heard nothing further from him. Lately my sister Gwen has been consulting with agents about the sale of the house and I would not like to upset any plans she may have made. If Frank is definitely leaving the place it could be sold much more simply and quickly.
Gwen has spent a lot of time and money keeping the house in good repair over the years so she has the greatest say in its disposal and although I am agreeable to the house being sold as soon as possible I would not now do anything without consulting her. Perhaps you could have a word with her and see what she intends doing now that there is a prospect of the house being without a tenant during the coming winter."
"We understand that you have been instructed to act on behalf of our mutual client Miss Tackaberry … in regard to the sale of her freehold property to our applicant Mr A. J. Salmins… at the agreed figure of £6,500 …."
It seems from the correspondence which followed that this sale also fell through, on this occasion, because Frank was not in a position to move out of the Property which he was still occupying.
"(2) The said property was purchased for the purpose of providing a family home for John Breene Tackaberry and Marie Ellen Tackaberry the parents of the parties hereto of the second part and for the said parties hereto of the second part…" [Anthony, Thomas, Frank and James].
The recital continues as altered repeating the reference to Frank with in addition the words "and his sisters". A new third recital is added recording the fact that the Father and his wife made their home at the Property. The fifth recital records that the consideration for the purchase of the Property by Anthony "was not in fact provided by [Anthony] alone but was provided by the parties of the second part" the four surviving male Siblings, Anthony, Thomas, Frank and James.
"I am considering claiming for refund of part of the UK income tax deducted from my UK dividends. The return I have to complete asks if I possess or keep a place of abode in the United Kingdom. Before completing this form I would be glad if you would advise how the claim would affect my position with the UK tax department. I have paid no tax on this property for years. Presumably my brother [Frank] paid any taxes which were due. I have received no rent or other payments from the house but I question whether the UK tax department would believe this. The amount of possible refund for this year [1-7-69/30-6-70] is about £25. Would you please advise by air mail whether I should proceed with or defer my claim."
"I am very doubtful whether 201 Widmore Road is a place of abode available for you. If the furniture in the house is yours then definitely it would be a place of abode, but if as I believe to be the case the furniture belongs to your brother Frank or anyone else then I cannot see that it is a place of abode. Furthermore could it not be said that you are a part owner only of the property. "
"We will have to decide what to do with the Widmore Road house. It is in my name but Gwendolin and Francis have an equal interest in it with me. Frank has been living there rent free for some time (he pays the rates and tax on it) and I would not like to disturb this arrangement. I would be glad to have your suggestions."
"201 Widmore Road stands in your name although I believe you owe your sister Gwendolin £650 unless of course it has been repaid since October 1968 which I doubt.
By the will and codicils you have left this property on your death to Bill [Gwen] and your brothers Tom, Frank and [James]. Tom and [James] having died it means the property will pass to such of them [Gwen] and Frank as are living at the date of your death. That is to say that if one only is living at the date of your death that one will take the whole property and if neither of them are living at the date of your death then the property would fall into residue and pass under your will to such of them Michael, Pauline, John and Frank's child or children as shall be living at the date of your death and attain the age of 21 years and if more than one in equal shares."
"When the house was originally purchased, Daisy and Bill [Margaret and Gwen] contributed financially to its purchase, while the house was actually conveyed into Tony's name as a matter of convenient administration. (In passing I consider it would be a rather curious piece of convenient administration and would in due course be intrigued to know the reason why). The technical administrative steps do not appear to have been taken to clear the title in respect of the original contribution by Daisy and Bill, nor indeed does any step appear to have been taken to execute some record of the way in which the house proceeds were to be divided up in the event of a sale. However it seems to me to be clear that Tony is presently of the view that the right course is to share the proceeds three ways, that is to say, between himself, Bill and Frank."
"As I understand it, Tony, years ago, proposed (or agreed to the idea of) a three-way split between himself, Frank and Bill. However so far as I am aware this idea was never formally recorded in an executed deed, although if my recollection is correct he was generally in favour of this idea still two years ago … Since such a resolution would have advantages for all three (some much needed cash for Tony, capital – for flat – for Frank and repayment of investment for Bill [Gwen]) I took it upon myself to instruct my own solicitors when I returned to the UK to look at the situation and comment on the three-way split idea. In sum, the advice which I was given was that the family appeared to have set up an informal trust of the Property and it may indeed have amounted to a tontine (an arrangement whereby the survivor of a pool of persons takes the whole fund). "
"Tony last visited England in 1977 and there was no evidence of Parkinson's disease then but I remember there was some general discussion about wills and Tony said that there would no [sic] trouble with his will as his estate would be divided six ways. I assumed that took care of nephews and nieces but it seemed to indicate the existence of a will then whereas the present will we are dealing (sic) was probably drawn up shortly before his death at an advanced stage of the disease and much influenced by Mrs Torto. That will would clearly indicate his understanding of the ownership of the house. I have been wondering whether that will had been drawn up by Lucas and Bailey's successors."
The two witnesses of material fact called by the Claimants were the Claimants themselves. The material part of Douglas' witness statement lies between paragraphs 10 and 14 where he sets out his understanding of the ownership of the Property. This is preceded by an uncontroversial description of how the Property was used by the family, namely, as a place to live available to any member of the family according to need and a centre where the family met from time to time, usually at annual festivals. Douglas' father Frank seems to have made the most use of the Property as his home. Douglas accepts that he never discussed the ownership of the house with Frank. His first impression was that Alice and Gwen had an "interest" in the Property but he felt a "strong sense that it was the family's home". Later his "understanding" was that the Property belonged to Frank since he appeared to be taking all decisions about the Property and its upkeep. He discovered that the Property was "not owned by Frank in about 1988 or slightly later" as a result of discussions with his father. He accepts that he did not "really know the background" and that he "didn't understand much of the detail of what Frank was telling me." Otherwise his witness statement is uncontroversial concluding with a description of the more recent history of the Property and the decline in its state of repair. His cross-examination was confined to questions about unsuccessful attempts by himself, assisted by the Second Claimant, to establish a possessory title to the Property and the suggestion that he took steps to obstruct Mr Hollis from taking possession of the Property as executor of Anthony's last will. These are matters which are, in my view, peripheral to the issue which I have to decide.
"I always understood since I was any age to understand anything that the Property belonged to family members and that any member of the family was entitled as of right to return and live there. It never crossed my mind that it belonged to any one of them. "
Then at paragraph 13, having said he was never involved in discussions of proposed sales of the Property in 1982, contributions to the purchase price or mortgages of the Property because he did not see them to be relevant because the Property was a "family home", he continues:-
"Later on when I specifically started to discuss the ownership of the Property with Frank and [Gwen] they told me that it went to the last one surviving which they all expected to be Frank. … I cannot recall anyone explaining to me why the Property was held in Tony's name. I assume it was because he was around and was the youngest male over 21."
The claim to the Property, or to an interest in the Property is based on the allegation that the circumstances of its acquisition by Anthony were such that the court should find that he purchased the Property subject to a constructive trust, either, in favour of the Siblings or the last survivor of them, or, in favour of the Siblings, now, in effect, of their deceased estates, in equal shares. The decisions of the courts in this area have usually been based on facts arising from disputes between divorcing married couples or separating co-habitants. The authorities establish that the principles of law which determine those cases arise under the law of trusts which fall to be universally applied and which apply equally in the more complicated circumstances which cases, such as the present, involve.
"(1) The law does not recognise a concept of family property, whereby people who live together in a settled relationship ipso facto share the rights of ownership in the assets acquired and used for the purposes of their life together. Nor does the law acknowledge that by the mere fact of doing work on the asset of one party to the relationship the other party will acquire a beneficial interest in that asset.
(2) The question whether one party to the relationship acquires rights to property the legal title to which is vested in the other party must be answered in terms of the existing law of trusts. There are no special doctrines of equity, applicable in this field alone.
(3) In a case such as the present the inquiry must proceed in two stages. First, by considering whether something happened between the parties in the nature of bargain, promise or tacit common intention, at the time of the acquisition. Second, if the answer is "Yes," by asking whether the claimant subsequently conducted herself in a manner which was (a) detrimental to herself, and (b) referable to whatever happened on acquisition. (I use the expression "on acquisition" for simplicity. In fact, the event happening between the parties which, if followed by the relevant type of conduct on the part of the claimant, can lead to the creation of an interest in the claimant, may itself occur after acquisition. The beneficial interests may change in the course of the relationship.)
(4) For present purposes, the event happening on acquisition may take one of the following shapes. (a) An express bargain whereby the proprietor promises the claimant an interest in the property, in return for an explicit undertaking by the claimant to act in a certain way. (b) An express but incomplete bargain whereby the proprietor promises the claimant an interest in the property, on the basis that the claimant will do something in return. The parties do not themselves make explicit what the claimant is to do. The court therefore has to complete the bargain for them by means of implication, when it comes to decide whether the proprietor's promise has been matched by conduct falling within whatever undertaking the claimant must be taken to have given sub silentio. (c) An explicit promise by the proprietor that the claimant will have an interest in the property, unaccompanied by any express or tacit agreement as to a quid pro quo. (d) A common intention, not made explicit, to the effect that the claimant will have an interest in the property, if she subsequently acts in a particular way.
(5) In order to decide whether the subsequent conduct of the claimant serves to complete the beneficial interest which has been explicitly or tacitly promised to her the court must decide whether the conduct is referable to the bargain, promise or intention. Whether the conduct satisfies this test will depend upon the nature of the conduct, and of the bargain, promise or intention.
(6) Thus, if the situation falls into category (a) above, the only question is whether the claimant's conduct is of the type explicitly promised. It is immaterial whether it takes the shape of a contribution to the cost of acquiring the property, or is of a quite different character.
(7) The position is the same in relation to situations (b) and (d). No doubt it will often be easier in practice to infer that the quid pro quo was intended to take the shape of a financial or other contribution to the cost of acquisition or of improvement, but this need not always be so. Whatever the court decides the quid pro quo to have been, it will suffice if the claimant has furnished it.
(8) In considering whether there was a bargain or common intention, so as to bring the case within categories (b) and (d) and, if there was one, what were its terms, the court must look at the true state of affairs on acquisition. It must not impute to the parties a bargain which they never made, or a common intention which they never possessed.
(9) The conduct of the parties, and in particular of the claimant, after the acquisition may provide material from which the court can infer the existence of an explicit bargain, or a common intention, and also the terms of such a bargain or intention. Examining the subsequent conduct of the parties to see whether an inference can be made as to a bargain or intention is quite different from examining the conduct of the claimant to see whether it amounts to compliance with a bargain or intention which has been proved in some other way. (If this distinction is not observed, there is a risk of circularity. If the claimant's conduct is too readily assumed to be explicable only by the existence of a bargain, she will always be able to say that her side of the bargain has been performed.)"
"(b) Inferred common intention (pp906A-908D): Lord Diplock points out [in Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC886] that, even where parties have not used express words to communicate their intention (and therefore there is no direct evidence), the court can infer from their actions an intention that they shall both have an interest in the house. This part of his speech concentrates on the types of evidence from which the courts are most often asked to infer such intention viz. contributions (direct and indirect) to the deposit, the mortgage instalments or general housekeeping expenses. In this section of the speech, he analyses what types of expenditure are capable of constituting evidence of such common intention: he does not say that if the intention is proved in some other way such contributions are essential to establish the trust."
"124. In many cases, there will, in addition to the contributions, be other relevant evidence as at the time of acquisition. Such evidence would often enable the court to deduce an agreement or understanding amounting to an intention as to the basis on which the beneficial interests would be held. Such an intention may be express (although not complying with the requisite formalities) or inferred, and must normally be supported by some detriment, to justify intervention by equity. It would be in this way that the resulting trust would become rebutted and replaced, or (conceivably) supplemented, by a constructive trust.
125. While an intention may be inferred as well as express, it may not, at least in my opinion, be imputed. That appears to me to be consistent both with normal principles and with the majority view of this House in Pettitt, as accepted by all but Lord Reid in Gissing (see at 897H, 898BD, 900E-G, 901B-D, and 904E-F), and reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638 at 651 F-653A. The distinction between inference and imputation may appear a fine one (and in Gissing at 902G-H, Lord Pearson, who, on a fair reading I think rejected imputation, seems to have equated it with inference), but it is important.
126. An inferred intention is one which is objectively deduced to be the subjective actual intention of the parties, in the light of their actions and statements. An imputed intention is one which is attributed to the parties, even though no such actual intention can be deduced from their actions and statements, and even though they had no such intention. Imputation involves concluding what the parties would have intended, whereas inference involves concluding what they did intend.
127. To impute an intention would not only be wrong in principle and a departure from two decisions of your Lordships' House in this very area, but it also would involve a judge in an exercise which was difficult, subjective and uncertain."
I have come to the conclusion that the Claimants have failed to discharge the burden of proof which rests on them to show that Anthony held the Property, on its acquisition and subsequently, on either of the trusts alleged in the particulars of claim. I have arrived at that conclusion for the following reasons:-
1. That the burden of proof rests on the Claimants is established by the fact that the Property was acquired in Anthony's name. More than that, however, the documentary evidence that came into existence at the time of the purchase shows that Anthony provided the whole of the purchase price, either from his own money or from the proceeds of secured borrowings at interest from Barclays Bank and from the Original Family Loans. When those loans were repaid they were replaced by loans from Margaret and Gwen which were also at interest and secured on the Property and which were either used for the purpose of repaying the Original Family Loans or for the purpose of funding repairs and improvements to the Property. The only non-commercial aspect of all of this was the fact that Gwen's loan of £650 in 1932 was at a very concessionary rate of interest, some of which she seems later to have waived. There is no firm evidence that any of these loans were repaid other than by Anthony, the person solely liable to repay them. It may possibly be that some part of the 1932 loans has not been repaid. Even if that is what actually happened it does not seem to me to affect the vital issue, namely, how was the purchase price of the Property provided on acquisition, which must be answered that it was provided by Anthony. Monies advanced by way of loan are not, without more, to be treated as contributions to the purchase price of property so that the lender acquires a beneficial interest in that property as a result; see re Sharpe (a bankrupt) [1980] 1WLR 219 per Browne-Wilkinson J at page 222.
2. There is evidence that, at the time of the purchase, Anthony had been in full-time employment for some years doing responsible and, probably, well-paid jobs. There is no evidence to support the suggestion that he cannot have provided the money to repay the loans to him to fund the purchase from his own resources.
3. There is no evidence, coming from the time of the acquisition of the Property that, when he acquired it, there was an agreement or understanding by Anthony that the Siblings, or any of them, would be entitled to an interest or interests in it. In my judgment documentary evidence where Anthony can be seen using the word "we" in correspondence with solicitors and consulting his family before taking decisions in relation to the purchase, is insufficient to establish such an agreement or understanding. The evidence, which I have set out above, of the circumstances surrounding the purchase and the way in which the purchase price was provided are a strong contra-indication to the existence of any such agreement or understanding.
4. Further the documents show that it was Anthony alone who dealt with the auctioneers selling the Property and with L & B who treated him as their client purchasing it. It was he who instructed L & B to find a surveyor to carry out an inspection and to make the other arrangements leading to completion of the purchase. Actions such as these are not conclusive that he was not a trustee but they are indicative.
5. It is a prerequisite of the establishment of a trust that it is possible to discern, from the agreement or arrangements setting it up, who the beneficiaries of the trust were intended to be. It is the Claimants' case that the beneficiaries of the suggested trust in this case are eight of the ten children of the Father excluding Mary and John who went to America before the Property was purchased. An important part of the Claimants' case are the letters, in particular, the letter of 15th May 1961 written by Anthony to L & B from Australia in which he sets out those of his brothers and sisters who are to share the proceeds of sale of the Property after the discharge of Gwen's mortgage securing a debt of £700. This letter is treated in subsequent correspondence dealing with the further attempts to sell the Property as showing how Anthony intended that the proceeds of sale of the Property should be shared. Mary and John are not included in those sharing the proceeds. There is, however, no evidence that, assuming that there was an agreement or understanding amounting to a trust, Mary and John were to be excluded from it. The Claimants' case that the beneficiaries were to be the Siblings is based on the oral evidence of John (Junior) that he understood that this was to be the arrangement. If the unexecuted trust deed of 1969 can be treated as evidence, Mary and John were excluded from the beneficiaries. But so was Gwen who was also excluded as receiving a share of the proceeds of sale by 15th May 1961 letter. Henry is one of the sharers under that letter. If absence abroad and relative wealth were the criterion for deciding which of the Father's children were to benefit from the Property then it is strange that Henry should be one of the beneficiaries since it seems from paragraph 10 of John's witness statement that at the time of the purchase Henry was living in China. Indeed it was John's evidence, under cross-examination, that Henry was not apparently a beneficiary "because of his £30,000 win [which happened in 1932] and his departure to China". It was not until Anthony executed a codicil to his first will on 21st February 1969 that Gwen was in any way included as a potential sharer in the proceeds of the Property and until Anthony's letter of 16th February 1977 that he indicated that Gwen should share in the proceeds of sale equally with himself and Frank. In my judgment it is not possible to discern from the evidence the extent of the beneficial class under the trust which the Claimants allege.
6. Anthony's actions in relation to the Property following its purchase were inconsistent with the existence of a trust as alleged. In describing the underlying facts I have set out letters and documents in which Anthony appears to be acting as if he was the owner of the Property, for example, giving directions for its insurance, for the fencing of the garden. These are not necessarily inconsistent with his holding the Property upon trust for others besides himself. However selling part of the garden and applying the proceeds in reduction of his own bank borrowings as described in paragraph 18 above was inconsistent with the existence of such a trust unless those proceeds were applied in reduction of Anthony's borrowings from Barclays Bank, borrowed in order to provide the original purchase price. However it was inconsistent with the existence of such a trust that by the second codicil to his will dated 21st February 1969 he devised "my freehold dwelling house and premises 201 Widmore Road, Bromley" to Gwen, Tom, Frank and James. On the Claimants' case they were already entitled to it jointly with Anthony.
7. The fact, accepted on all sides, that after its purchase the Property was used as a dwelling and as an assembly point for the Tackaberry family does not assist the Claimants' case. "The law does not recognize a concept of family property"; see per Lord Justice Mustill in the passage quoted above from his judgment in Grant v Edwards .
8. There is no evidence that any of the Siblings acted to their detriment in reliance on any agreement or understanding with Anthony that they would have an interest in the Property. This is not a case like Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch210 (a case of proprietary estoppel but where the claimant is required to show detriment incurred in reliance on the relevant representation) where the claimant, a farm manager, spent the whole of his working life working for a landowner in reliance on the promise that he would succeed to the farmhouse, and the farming business associated with it, under the landowner's will. In my judgment the fact that neither Anthony nor any of the Siblings took any step to formally record the trust alleged until, as a result of Anthony's death, it was too late, cannot constitute detriment.
9. The delay in bringing these proceedings: the claim in these proceedings was first advanced in correspondence in April 2005, approximately 20 years after the death of Anthony, soon after which the existence of his second will and its effect to pass the Property to Mrs Torto must have come to the attention of the Siblings. Previously, in December 1998, Douglas had applied in the Land Registry for the title to the Property to be vested in him as a result of alleged adverse possession of the Property by Frank continued by him. The application was misconceived and was dismissed. However in the proceedings in the Land Registry Douglas made no mention that he might have a claim to the Property under the will of his father in whom it had become vested.
"44 At the time the Property was purchased it was intended by Anthony and his Siblings, other than Mary and John, that the beneficial interest in the Property would not be in Anthony alone but would be shared between them."
For these reasons, in my judgment, this claim fails on the facts. That conclusion makes it unnecessary for me to consider the more difficult legal question raised by Miss Holland's alternative contention that a constructive trust of land cannot exist where the interest in the land, allegedly held upon trust, takes a form of co-ownership not known to English law.