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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Allnutt v The Nags Head Reading Ltd & Ors [2019] EWHC 2810 (Ch) (29 October 2019) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2019/2810.html Cite as: [2019] EWHC 2810 (Ch) |
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BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
COMPANIES COURT (ChD)
Re: THE NAGS HEAD READING LIMITED
And re: THE COMPANIES ACT 2006
Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
EDWARD CHARLES ALLNUTT |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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1. THE NAGS HEAD READING LIMITED 2. SYLVIA ANN LODGE 3. LAURA ANN LODGE 4. SAMUEL JODY OATES 5. MICHAEL OATES |
Defendants |
____________________
Richard O'Dair (instructed by Hewetts) for the Second to Fifth Defendants
Hearing dates: 8, 9 and 10 October 2019
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
ICC JUDGE PRENTIS :
"case confused his status as an employee with his status as a statutory director and a shareholder. The Tribunal found that his employment terminated by agreement in November 2015. His statutory directorship ended with the majority vote to remove him at the meeting on 9 February 2016 and Michael Oates' e-mail of the same date which resulted in his removal from the Companies House register. His shareholding of 10,000 shares remained unaffected by any of the above".
"On the 9th February 2016 the Petitioner was removed as a director and employee of the Company without notice. The Company was a quasi-partnership and the Petitioner had a legitimate expectation to be involved in its management".
"shares be bought by the remaining shareholders at a price to be fixed by the Court. Compensation for loss of office. Such compensation as the Court thinks fit. Or that such other order may be made as the Court thinks fit".
"A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this Part on the ground (a) that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members (including at least himself)…".
"If the court is satisfied that a petition under this Part is well founded, it may make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of".
Examples are then given.
"In section 459 Parliament has chosen fairness as the criterion by which the court must decide whether it has jurisdiction to grant relief. It is clear from the legislative history… that it chose this concept to free the court from technical considerations of legal right and to confer a wide power to do what appeared just and equitable…
Although fairness is a notion which can be applied to all kinds of activities, its content will depend upon the context in which it is being used… the context and background are very important.
In the case of section 459, the background has the following two features. First, a company is an association of persons for an economic purpose… The terms of the association are contained in the articles of association and sometimes in collateral agreements between the shareholders. Thus the manner in which the affairs of the company may be conducted is closely regulated by rules to which the shareholders have agreed. Secondly, company law has developed seamlessly from the law of partnership, which was treated by equity… as a contract of good faith. One of the traditional roles of equity… was to restrain the exercise of strict legal rights in certain relationships in which it considered that this would be contrary to good faith. These principles have, with appropriate modification, been carried over into company law.
The first of these two features leads to the conclusion that a member of a company will not ordinarily be entitled to complain of unfairness unless there has been some breach of the terms on which he agreed that the affairs of the company should be conducted. But the second leads to the conclusion that there will be cases in which equitable considerations make it unfair for those conducting the affairs of the company to rely on their strict legal powers. Thus unfairness may consist in a breach of the rules or in using the rules in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to good faith".
"(1) A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests of the company…
(4) This duty is not infringed-
(a) if the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest; or
(b) if the matter has been authorised by the directors.
(5) Authorisation may be given by the directors-
(a) where the company is a private company and nothing in the company's constitution invalidates such authorisation, by the matter being proposed to and authorised by the directors…
(6) The authorisation is effective only if-
(a) any requirement as to the quorum at the meeting at which the matter is considered is met without counting the director in question or any other interested director, and
(b) the matter was agreed to without their voting or would have been agreed to if their votes had not been counted.
(7) Any reference in this section to a conflict of interest includes a conflict of interest and duty and a conflict of duties,"
"the transaction or arrangement is not liable to be set aside by virtue of any common law rule or equitable principle requiring the consent or approval of the members of the company".
"The general duties-
(a) have effect subject to any rule of law enabling the company to give authority, specifically or generally, for anything to be done (or omitted) by the directors, or any of them, that would otherwise be a breach of duty, and
(b) where the company's articles contain provisions for dealing with conflicts of interest, are not infringed by anything done (or omitted) by the directors, or any of them, in accordance with those provisions".
"Subject to the provisions of the Act, and provided that he has disclosed to the directors the nature and extent of any material interest of his, a director notwithstanding his office-
(a) may be a party to, or otherwise interested in, any transaction or arrangement with the company or in which the company is otherwise interested…".
"… the duty 'to declare the nature of his interest' must, I think, impose on a director the duty to disclose full information as to the nature of any transaction which it is proposed to enter into. The disclosure must be such that the other director or directors can see what his interest is and how far it goes".
"[It] is a rule of universal application, that no one, having [fiduciary] duties to discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which may conflict, with the interest of those whom he is bound to protect.
So strictly is this principle adhered to, that no question is allowed to be raised as to the fairness or unfairness of a contract so entered into".
"The essence of the Duomatic principle, as I see it, is that, where the articles of a company require a course to be approved by a group of shareholders at a general meeting, that requirement can be avoided if all members of the group, being aware of the relevant facts, either give their approval to that course, or so conduct themselves as to make it inequitable for them to deny that they have given their approval. Whether the approval is given in advance or after the event, whether it is characterised as agreement, ratification, waiver, or estoppel, and whether members of the group give their consent in different ways at different times, does not matter."
"If a director of a company informs shareholders of an intended action (or a past action) on the part of the directors, in circumstances in which neither the directors nor the shareholders are aware that the consent of the shareholders is required to that action, I do not think it is right, at least without more, to conclude that the shareholders have assented to that action for Duomatic purposes. As a matter of both ordinary language and legal concept, it does not seem to me that, in such circumstances, it could be said that the shareholders have 'assent[ed]' to that action. The shareholders have simply been told about the action or intended action, on the basis that it is something which can be, and has been or will be, left to the directors to decide on, and no question of 'assent' arises."
"In that passage the words 'at least without more' may be significant. It is relevant to consider whether the circumstances were such that the shareholders would be expected to voice any objections, even if they were not aware of their legal rights. When a court is considering what, if anything, can be inferred from a party's silence, the factual context is a matter of critical importance. If the surrounding circumstances are such that it would be unconscionable for a party to remain silent at the time and only raise his objections later, then I would have thought that assent can be inferred from silence."
"(ii) If the shareholders with full knowledge of the relevant facts consent to the director exploiting those opportunities for his own personal gain, then that conduct is not a breach of the fiduciary or statutory duty.
(iii) If the shareholders with full knowledge of the relevant facts acquiesce in the director's proposed conduct, then that may constitute consent. However, consent cannot be inferred from silence unless:
(a) the shareholders know that their consent is required; or
(b) the circumstances are such that it would be unconscionable for the shareholders to remain silent at the time and object after the event.
(iv) For the purposes of propositions (ii) and (iii) full knowledge of the relevant facts does not entail an understanding of their legal incidents. In other words the shareholders need not appreciate that the proposed action would be characterised as a breach of fiduciary or statutory duty".
32.1 She drew my attention to the doctrine of laches, with particular reference to Frawley v Neill [2000] C.P.Rep.20. The defendants not seeking any remedy of their own, that can be no more than an analogy; and in this case any unconscionability would be accounted for by application of the doctrine of acquiescence.
32.2 She relied as well on section 1157 of the Act to suggest that even if there were a breach by Mr Allnutt, it was one which in proceedings for that breach would be excused. It seems to me that section 1157 can serve as a useful check against any conclusion of unfairness, but no more than that.
"15. In the autumn of 2013 the Butler pub, located near the Nag's Head, came up for sale. Michael Oates and [Mr Allnutt] had previously been customers of the Butler pub. [Mr Allnutt] was interested in buying the Butler pub and there were discussions between all the directors/ shareholders as to whether they wished to contribute towards its purchase. After discussions, only [Mr Allnutt] was interested in pursuing the venture and, in July 2014, [Mr Allnutt], Stephen Stanton and one other person formed a partnership and purchased the freehold of the Butler pub. After some refurbishment, the Butler pub was run by a manager on behalf of the partnership. [Mr Allnutt] was not involved in managing or running the Butler pub.
16. [Mr Allnutt's] involvement in the purchase of the Butler pub caused disquiet among the other four director/ shareholders and a shareholders' meeting was held on 10 August 2014. It was apparently the only shareholder meeting which was minuted, and even then the minutes were completed retrospectively on 15 August 2014 by Michael Oates. At the meeting there was discussion, disagreement and arguments. Michael Oates accused [Mr Allnutt] of a 'conflict of interest' under company law as he was a director/ shareholder of the Nag's Head but was involved in the operation of another pub nearby. The minutes record that 'The meeting finished without a vote on what should happen next'".
49.1 his involvement in the Butler was not such as could reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest with his duties to the Company: section 175(4)(a);
49.2 if it was, then any breach was approved at the August 2014 meeting, being authorised under section 175; or disclosed and approved under regulation 85; or approved by the Duomatic principle;
49.3 if not, then after 2014 there has been acquiescence, such that the defendants cannot now rely on the breach as the ground for deeming his February 2016 removal as a director not unfair.
"Mr Allnutt asked whether the directors of the Nag's Head would like to come in on their new venture. Although Michael was all for this, having admired the pub for years, I was not an advocate for many reasons. Firstly, due to Michael retiring from bar duties and Mr Allnutt spending a fair bit of time in Thailand, my workload at the Nag's Head had increased considerably and it felt like I was now doing the majority of the work. I saw no reason that this would change by acquiring another pub, and in fact the same would probably happen there, meaning my work load would increase even more. Secondly, I thought it would have a detrimental effect on the Nag's Head business. The Butler was 0.2 miles from the Nag's Head (a 3 minute walk). I had no problem with Mr Allnutt purchasing another pub, but not one so close to us. Mr Allnutt argued that another good pub in our area would make this the side of town to come to, and although I understood his point I couldn't see that we were going to double our current clientele, and therefore felt that having an 'alternative' to the Nag's Head made bad business sense. I told him so".
"Meeko said he thought my owning the Butler was a conflict of interest… and thought I should resign my directorship or should be taken to court. I explained my stance that there were no secrets to what we were doing and both he and Jody had known all along the plans and I pointed out that there was nothing that could compromise the Nag's. Besides the pub would have been sold anyway, and remain a pub as it is a listed building, and in many ways it was better to have someone with the Nag's interest at heart than any other operator. Not only had we disclosed our interest in buying the freehold but we had offered the directors of the Nag's Head the opportunity to run it for us".
"Ted had recently purchased another Pub (The Butler), 200 metres from the Nag's Head, with 2 partners, Steve Stanton and Pete Lincoln".
"asked Ted if he could let us know exactly what was going on at the Butler"
which indicates that the others attending did not know. Mr Allnutt's reply was that
"he thought it pretty obvious to anyone".
"Ted said that he had done his best not to interfere with the Nags Head's operation.
Meeko asked him if he was at the Butler to make money.
Ted replied of course he was…
Sylv wanted to know what he was planning to sell in the pub.
Ted said that it would be a kind of a café during the day and a pub in the evening.
Lola asked if he would be selling Sunday Lunches.
Ted said they would".