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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Amos v Mancini & Ors [2020] EWHC 1063 (Ch) (30 April 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2020/1063.html Cite as: [2021] RTR 8, [2020] EWHC 1063 (Ch), [2020] WTLR 417, [2020] WLR(D) 346, 23 ITELR 158, [2020] 4 WLR 86 |
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BUSINEE AND PROPERTY COURTS IN WALES
PROPERTY TRUSTS AND PROBABTE LIST (ChD)
IN THE ESTATE OF ROYSTON LEONARD AMOS DECEASED
2 Park Street, Cardiff, CF10 1ET |
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B e f o r e :
Sitting as a judge of the High Court
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SANDRA ANNA AMOS |
Claimant |
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- and – |
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(1) BEVERLY MANCINI (2) SULLIMAN KHAN (3) NIKKI MANCINI |
Defendants |
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None of the defendants appeared or was represented
Hearing dates: 27 April 2020
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Crown Copyright ©
Covid-19 Protocol: This judgment was handed down by the judge remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and released to Bailii. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10.00 am 30 April 2020.
HH JUDGE JARMAN QC :
(1) In this Act, the "forfeiture rule" means the rule of public policy which in certain circumstances precludes a person who has unlawfully killed another from acquiring a benefit in consequence of the killing.
(2) References in this Act to a person who has unlawfully killed another include a reference to a person who has unlawfully aided, abetted, counselled or procured the death of that other references in this Act to unlawful killing shall be interpreted accordingly.
"The change in attitude reflected by the statutory gradation of offences of unlawful killing and, in particular, the mitigation that was sometimes present in case of diminished responsibility or provocation led to justifiable dissatisfaction with the application of the forfeiture rule indiscriminately in every case of unlawful killing."
327. In that case it was held that the rule did not debar a driver found guilty of manslaughter by reckless driving from relying upon a certificate of insurance. Phillips LJ said that and other similar cases of unlawful killing by the manner of driving a motor vehicle could be justified on the basis of public policy requiring there to be valid insurance for the benefit of the family of the victim.
"Manslaughter is a crime which varies infinitely in its seriousness. It may come very near to murder or amount to little more than inadvertence."
"It is time to pause to take stock. Thus far, apart from the motor cases, there has been no instance of the court failing to apply the forfeiture rule to a case of unlawful killing. So far as the rule is concerned, I cannot see any logical basis for not applying it to all cases of manslaughter…in the crime of manslaughter the actus reus is causing the death of another. That actus reus is rendered criminal if it occurs in one of the various circumstances that are prescribed by law. Anyone guilty of manslaughter has…caused the death of another by criminal conduct. It is in such circumstances that the rule…applies."
"The appropriate course where the application of the rule appears to conflict with the ends of justice is to exercise the powers given by the [1982] Act."
"24. The Claimant contends that the Forfeiture Rule is of no application to at least some cases of manslaughter and that it ought not to apply in this case given the medical evidence concerning the mental health of the Claimant on 9 April 2013 when he unlawfully killed his partner and son.
25. In my judgment the effect of the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeal in Dunbar v. Plant (ante) and the authorities that followed that decision (Dalton v. Latham (ante) and Re Land Deceased (ante)) render that submission entirely unarguable. Philips LJ could not have been clearer in his view that since the passage into law of the Forfeiture Act 1982 there was now "…no reason for the court to attempt to modify the forfeiture rule. The appropriate course where the application of the rule appears to conflict with the ends of justice is to exercise the powers given by the Act". As Judge Norris QC observed in Re Land Deceased (ante), that reasoning must be regarded as part of the ratio of the majority. As Patten J put it in Dalton v. Latham (ante), the decision of the majority in Dunbar v. Plant (ante) "…must now be taken to be a binding statement of the law as to the application of the rule of public policy. It applies to all cases of unlawful killing including manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility …" I could depart from this analysis only if I considered that both Judge Norris QC and Patten J were plainly wrong. Not merely do I not consider that either was plainly wrong but in my judgment they were both entirely correct.
"It is sufficient that a serious crime has been committed deliberately and intentionally. … the important point is that the crime that had fatal consequences was committed with a guilty mind (deliberately and intentionally). The particular means used to commit the crime (whether violent or non-violent) are not a necessary ingredient of the rule."
"Although it is doubtful whether Dunbar v Plant is strictly authority for the proposition that all cases of manslaughter attract forfeiture, it has been treated as binding, and the judicial consensus is now clearly that the forfeiture rule does not admit manslaughter exceptions, and that relief is available only under the provisions of the Forfeiture Act 1982."
"The presence or absence of moral culpability is irrelevant to the application of the rule. It does not appear that causing death by dangerous driving, although this is unlawful killing, has attracted forfeiture." [And in a footnote] "Given the inflexibility of the rule as it applies to manslaughter, it is not clear whether there is any sustainable logic to this distinction."
"It is probable - although not certain - that the forfeiture rule does not apply to other cases of unlawful killing; for example, to cases where there is a conviction for causing death by dangerous driving." [And in a footnote] "There appear to be no reported cases where it has been suggested that the rule applies to causing death by dangerous driving. Section 20 of the Road Safety Act 2006, which came into force in 2008, created an additional offence of "causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving". It is virtually certain that the forfeiture rule does not apply to someone convicted of this new offence."
2. – Power to modify the rule.
(1) where a court determines that the forfeiture rule has precluded a person (in this section referred to as "the offender") who has unlawfully killed another from acquiring any interest in property mentioned in subsection (4) below, the court may make an order under this section modifying the effect that rule.
(2) the court shall not make an order under this section modifying the effect of the forfeiture rule in any case unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the conduct of the offender and of the deceased and to such other circumstances as appear to the court to be material, the justice of the case requires the effect of the rule to be so modified in that case.
(3) in any case where a person stands convicted of an offence of which unlawful killing is an element, the court shall not make an order under this section modifying the effect of the forfeiture rule in that case unless proceedings for the purpose of brought before the expiry of the period of three months beginning with his conviction.
(4) the interests in property referred to in subsection (1) above are –
(a) any beneficial interest in property which (apart from the forfeiture rule) the offender would have acquired –
(i) under the deceased's will (including, as respects Scotland, any writing having testamentary effect) all the law relating to intestacy or by way of ius relicti, ius relictae or legitim;
…
(b) any beneficial interest in property which (apart from the forfeiture rule) the offender would have acquired in consequence of the death of deceased, being property which, before the death, was held on trust for any person.
"It is a tragedy for you as much as anyone else. As a result of what happened that night you have lost your beloved partner of 30 years. Your loss is a devastating one and I have no doubt whatsoever that that is a significant punishment in itself, far exceeding anything that this Court could or would consider passing. However, the simple fact is that the speed that you hit the car ahead was such that it was shunted forward and then the same happened, by reason of that impact, to the two cars ahead in the line of traffic. Two of those drivers also sustained injuries which led them going to hospital. The only possible conclusion, it seems to me, is that your lapse in concentration was a significant one."