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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Rowland v Blades [2021] EWHC 2928 (Ch) (04 November 2021) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2021/2928.html Cite as: [2021] EWHC 2928 (Ch) |
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IN THE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS
OF ENGLAND AND WALES
CHANCERY APPEALS (ChD)
On appeal from the order of Deputy Master Hansen
Dated 12 March 2021
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NC |
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B e f o r e :
Sitting as a judge of the High Court
____________________
CHRISTOPHER ALAN ROWLAND |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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SHARON MARGARET BLADES |
Respondent |
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Mr Thomas Roe QC and Mr Simon Lillington (instructed on direct access) for the respondent
Hearing dates: 29 October 2021
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Crown Copyright ©
HHJ JARMAN QC:
"It is the duty of the court applying the statutory principles to do justice between the parties with due regard to the statutory considerations. The first and second of these considerations are the intentions of Dr Rowland and Ms Blades as creators of the trust and the purposes for which the Property is held. The trust was created so that the Property should be their joint weekend/holiday home (a purpose that had failed by November 2009) and from that date I am satisfied that Ms Blades used the Property to the effective or constructive exclusion of Dr Rowland, at least so far as weekend usage is concerned. I say that for the following reasons. Ms Blades accepted in evidence that she "made it plain from November 2009 that [the new partner] would not be welcome". True it is, that on occasion she "invited" Dr Rowland to provide her with dates when he might want to visit the Property, but Ms Blades was very much in control of the agenda and in situ at the Property, certainly at weekends (which was the only time that Dr Rowland could realistically go), and any invitation was always subject to the clear proviso that Dr Rowland was not to attend at the Property with the new partner. That stipulation is perhaps understandable on one level, given Ms Blades' strong feelings on the subject, but I consider it to have been an unreasonable restriction and Ms Blades never withdrew it. I accept that Dr Rowland acknowledged Ms Blades' sensitivity around this subject, and agreed not to take the new partner to the Property, but I do not believe that I should hold this against Dr Rowland and find that he thereby voluntarily excluded himself. It seems reasonably clear that had Dr Rowland ignored Ms Blades' wishes and taken the new partner to the Property, there is every risk that there would have been another altercation of the kind that occurred in early 2011 when Ms Blades turned up at Dr Rowland's flat unexpectedly."
"I am bound to say that I was unpersuaded by either of the parties' submissions in relation to quantum. In my judgment, [Dr Rowland's] figures were unrealistically high contending for a daily rate of £650 per day and a total figure of £288,800 and [Ms Blades'] figure were unrealistically low, contending for a daily rate of £83.34 (or £250 per 3-day weekend) and a total figure of £36,000."
"I remind myself that having found that Ms Blades should pay an occupation rent to Dr Rowland, my task in ascertaining the amount of such rent is to do justice between the parties with due regard to the relevant statutory considerations and having regard to my findings of fact above. It seems to me that the fairest way to arrive at the appropriate figure in the particular circumstances of this case, dealing as we are with a holiday home (albeit a very grand one) and an exclusion at weekends (including a Monday or a Friday) only, and having regard to the principles on which mesne profits are calculated by way of analogy, is to ascertain a daily rate for such weekend usage that reflects the open market value of such usage."
"In arriving at the appropriate daily rate, I must have regard to the expert evidence of the joint expert, Mr Briggs. In considering the evidence of the joint expert, I consider that Mr Briggs' Valuation 3 is the most relevant and helpful in the present circumstances. This valuation considers "the rent that would be payable for occasional weekend and short usage of Tadmarton House from September 2009 to October 2018". At paragraph 24.3.1 of his Report Mr Briggs says this:"
"I am of the opinion that the Rental Value that would have been payable over the period September 2009 – October 2018 for the occasional weekend and short usage of the Property over the period is as set out in the table below:
Date Yearly Monthly Daily Sep-18 £62,550 £5,212 £171 Sep-17 £60,191 £5,016 £165 Sep-16 £57,922 £4,827 £159 Sep-15 £55,739 £4,645 £153 Sep-14 £53,637 £4,470 £147 Sep-13 £51,615 £4,301 £141 Sep-12 £49,669 £4,139 £136 Sep-11 £47,797 £3,983 £131 Sep-10 £45,995 £3,833 £126"
"It seems to me that that these are the figures I should adopt... I consider the open market rate to be the appropriate rate, having regard to the analogy with mesne profits."
"2009-2010: £126 per day x 3 days = £378 x 2 per month = £756 x 12 = £9,072
2010-2011: £131 per day x 3 days = £393 x 2 per month = £786 x 12 = £9,432
2011-2012: £136 per day x 3 days = £408 x 2 per month = £816 x 12 = £9,792
2012-2013: £141 per day x 3 days = £423 x 2 per month = £846 x 12 = £10,152
2013-2014: £147 per day x 3 days = £441 x 2 per month = £882 x 12 = £10,584
2014-2015: £153 per day x 3 days =£459 x 2 per month = £918 x 12 = £11,016"
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Total £59,958."
"(1) A beneficiary who is beneficially entitled to an interest in possession in land subject to a trust of land is entitled by reason of his interest to occupy the land at any time if at that time—
(a) the purposes of the trust include making the land available for his occupation
[…].
(3) This section is subject to section 13."
"(1) Where two or more beneficiaries are (or apart from this subsection would be) entitled under section 12 to occupy land, the trustees of land may exclude or restrict the entitlement of any one or more (but not all) of them.
(2) Trustees may not under subsection (1)—
(a) unreasonably exclude any beneficiary's entitlement to occupy land, or
(b) restrict any such entitlement to an unreasonable extent.
(3) The trustees of land may from time to time impose reasonable conditions on any beneficiary in relation to his occupation of land by reason of his entitlement under section 12.
[…]
(6) Where the entitlement of any beneficiary to occupy land under section 12 has been excluded or restricted, the conditions which may be imposed on any other beneficiary under subsection (3) include, in particular, conditions requiring him to—
(a) make payments by way of compensation to the beneficiary whose entitlement has been excluded or restricted, […]."
"(1) Any person who is a trustee of land or has an interest in property subject to a trust of land may make an application to the court for an order under this section.
(2) On an application for an order under this section the court may make any such order—
(a) relating to the exercise by the trustees of any of their functions […]
as the court thinks fit.
[…]."
"(1) The matters to which the court is to have regard in determining an application for an order under section 14 include—
(a) the intentions of the person or persons (if any) who created the trust,
(b) the purposes for which the property subject to the trust is held,
[…]
(2) In the case of an application relating to the exercise in relation to any land of the powers conferred on the trustees by section 13, the matters to which the court is to have regard also include the circumstances and wishes of each of the beneficiaries who is (or apart from any previous exercise by the trustees of those powers would be) entitled to occupy the land under section 12.
[…]."
"These statutory powers replaced the old doctrines of equitable accounting under which a beneficiary who remained in occupation might be required to pay an occupation rent to a beneficiary who was excluded from the property. The criteria laid down in the statute should be applied, rather than in the cases decided under the old law, although the results may often be the same."
"The court's power to order payment to a beneficiary, excluded from property he would otherwise be entitled to occupy, by the beneficiary who retains occupation, is now governed by sections 12 to 15 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, having been formerly equitable in origin. However, I think that it would be a rare case where the statutory principles would produce a different result from that which would have resulted from the equitable principles."
"It seems to me that that discussion is very much directed to bankruptcy cases and should not cause me to take a different approach to this case than that provided for under TOLATA. In fact, as I understood their submissions, neither party suggested that I should discard the statutory regime in favour of the general equitable principles or that the result would be any different if I did."