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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Grewal v Chakraborty & Ors [2025] EWHC 709 (Ch) (04 February 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2025/709.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 709 (Ch) |
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CHANCERY DIVISION
7 Rolls Building Fetter Lane London |
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B e f o r e :
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IN THE MATTER OF | ||
MR SURINDER GREWAL | Appellant | |
- v - | ||
MS SARJIT NIKKI CHAKRABORTY AND OTHERS | Respondents |
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MR THOMAS appeared on behalf of certain of the Respondents
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Crown Copyright ©
MR JUSTICE RICHARDS:
MR GREWAL'S APPLICATIONS
Background
a. Mr Grewal had failed to comply with the Unless Order.
b. Mr Grewal lacked standing to bring the Fraud Proceedings as the right to bring those proceedings belonged to the Trustees.
Discussion
THE TRUSTEES' APPLICATION FOR AN ECRO
The correct approach and the court's powers
a. The threshold requirement is proof that Mr Grewal has "persistently issued or has made applications which are totally without merit" (Paragraph 3.1 of Practice Direction 3C).
b. Proof of at least three such applications is the bare minimum (Re: Ludlum (A Bankrupt) [2009] EWHC 2067 Ch). However, even where the bare minimum threshold is met, the test remains one of persistence.
c. If the court makes a determination that a particular claim or application is totally without merit, that determination is conclusive unless it is reversed on appeal. A litigant should not be permitted to look behind the certificate that a particular application is totally without merit. (Sartipy (aka Hamila Sartipy) v Tigris Industries Inc [2019] EWCA Civ 225).
d. In deciding whether to make a civil restraint order I am entitled to take into account any previous claims or applications which I conclude are totally without merit. I am not limited to claims or applications which were so certified at the time (Sartipy v Tigris). However, I do not consider that to be a relevant consideration here.
e. It does not follow that simply because the threshold condition is met, the court must necessarily make an extended civil restraint order. The point of such an order is not to punish for past conduct. The most important factor in the exercise of the court's discretion is an assessment of how great the "threat level" that the Appellant will continue to pursue wholly unmeritorious claims or applications. (Ridley v Blackpool County Court [2023] EWCA Civ 586 at [26]).
Application of those principles to the facts
a. my order today, refusing the application for permission to appeal;
b. the Order Under Appeal that dismissed three applications as totally without meri;
c. Martin Spencer J's order of 17 December 2024 (see paragraph REF _Ref193473667 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT above);
d. Leech J's order of 27 February 2024 (see paragraph REF _Ref193473718 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT above);
e. Zacaroli J's order of 14 May 2024 (see paragraph REF _Ref193473770 \r \h \* MERGEFORMAT above).
a. The ECRO will prohibit Mr Grewal from making applications. It will not prohibit him from defending applications that the Trustees make in connection with his bankruptcy.
b. The prohibition on making applications will not be absolute. Mr Grewal will be permitted to make applications, even applications that touch on the present proceedings, if he gets the consent of the nominated judge for the extended civil restraint order.
MR GREWAL'S APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL