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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens (a firm) [2007] EWHC 1826 (Comm) (27 July 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2007/1826.html Cite as: [2007] EWHC 1826 (Comm), [2008] Lloyd's Rep FC 47, [2008] 1 BCLC 697, [2008] PNLR 4, [2008] Bus LR 304 |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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STONE & ROLLS LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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MOORE STEPHENS (A FIRM) MOORE STEPHENS LLP |
Defendants |
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Mr Mark Howard QC and Mr Tom Adam (instructed by Barlow Lyde & Gilbert) for the Defendants
Hearing dates: 9 and 10 July 2007
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Crown Copyright ©
The Hon. Mr Justice Langley :
Introduction
The First Question
The Second Question
The CPR
The Decision of Toulson J
Liquidation of S&R
The Particulars of Claim
"SUMMARY
1. This summary is included for the convenience of the Court. It does not form part of the Claimant's case, which is set out more fully below.
THE CLAIMANT
2. The Claimant ("S&R") is a company incorporated under the laws of England and Wales. At all material times:
(1) …
(2) the manager of S&R was a Croatian national, Zvonko Stojevic, who:
(a) was a shadow director of S&R; and
(b) held a power of attorney on behalf of S&R
THE DEFENDANTS
3. …
4. Moore Stephens were extensively involved in the affairs of S&R and other entities controlled by Mr Stojevic in the period leading up to S&R's liquidation in 2002. In particular, Moore Stephens acted as auditors to S&R between 1997 and 2001, signing unqualified audit reports for the financial periods ending 31 December 1996 to 1999.
THE LIQUIDATION OF S&R
9. S&R went into provisional liquidation on 15th November 2002 as a result of the judgment of Mr Justice Toulson…
10. The judge awarded Komercni Banka $94,470,382.28 damages for deceit against both defendants. He found that Mr Stojevic, who was the controlling mind of S&R, had dishonestly colluded with an Austrian company, BCL Trading GmbH ("BCL"), to create artificial commodity sales to enable S&R to obtain funds under letters of credit issued by Komercni Banka, with such funds then being recycled to BCL.
11. On 15th January 2003 the provisional liquidators of S&R, Ian Williams and Laurence Pagden of Benedict Mackenzie LLP, were appointed liquidators of S&R by the Secretary of State.
S&R'S CASE IN OUTLINE
12. In this action S&R alleges that:
(1) Moore Stephens were negligent in their conduct of the audits for 1996 to 1998;
(2) Mr Chasty and Mr Anstis were dishonest in certain aspects of their conduct of the audit for 1998;
(3) As a result of the above, Moore Stephens failed to detect and/or (through Mr Chasty and Mr Anstis for the 1998 audit) turned a blind eye to:
(a) Mr Stojevic's dishonesty; and
(b) a pattern of fraud involving numerous fraudulent and/or irregular payments out by S&R to entities controlled by Stojevic and his associates;
(4) any reasonably competent auditor who had detected such matters, and/or not turned a blind eye to them, would have resigned and/or reported them to the relevant authorities. S&R's primary case is that this would have occurred by the end of October 1997 at the latest;
(5) thereafter Mr Stojevic would have been unable to procure that fraudulent and/or irregular payments were made out of S&R.
13. The losses to S&R resulting from the continuance of the fraudulent and/or irregular payments out are set out in Schedule 1."
"14. At all material times until its provisional liquidation in November 2002, S&R was controlled by Mr Stojevic and owned by Law Investments Limited ("Law Investments"), an Isle of Man company which was in turn owned by Mr Stojevic's family trust. Mr Stojevic is, and was, a highly intelligent and secretive Croatian businessman who controlled numerous companies in various jurisdictions and used trustees and nominee directors in order to conceal his association with them.
16. Mr Stojevic's intention throughout was to use S&R as a vehicle of fraud, i.e. it was intended to be, and became, a vehicle through which funds were extracted from banks which believed that they were financing bona fide commodity trades and then paid away to third parties who were under the influence or control of Mr Stojevic. The fraudulent transactions which he planned and executed through S&R became both larger and more obviously fraudulent as he realised that Moore Stephens had failed to detect his earlier frauds and would probably not detect his frauds in the future."
"EXPRESS TERMS
48. The express terms of Moore Stephens' retainer were set out in a letter of engagement from Moore Stephens to the directors of S&R, dated 19th December 1996. This was signed by Mr Stojevic on behalf of S&R, to confirm agreement with its terms, on 14th January 1997.
49. The letter of engagement provided, in part, as follows:
…(2) We have a statutory responsibility to report to members whether in our opinion the financial statements give a true and fair view and whether they have been properly prepared in accordance with the Companies Act 1985. In arriving at our opinion, we are required to consider the following matters, and to report on any in respect of which we are not satisfied:
(a) whether proper accounting records have been kept by the company…
(b) whether the company's balance sheet and profit and loss account are in agreement with the accounting records and returns;
(c) whether we have obtained all the information and explanations which we consider necessary for the purpose of our audit; and
(d) whether the information in the directors' report is consistent with that in the financial statements…
(4) We have a professional responsibility to report if the financial statements do not comply in any material respect with applicable accounting standards, unless in our opinion the non-compliance is justified in the circumstances. In determining whether or not the departure is justified we consider:
(a) whether the departure is required in order for the financial statements to give a true and fair view; and
(b) whether adequate disclosure has been made concerning the departure…
Scope of audit
(7) Our audit will be conducted in accordance with the Auditing Standards issued by the Auditing Practices Board, and will include such tests of transactions and of the existence, ownership and valuation of assets and liabilities as we consider necessary…
(11) The responsibility for safeguarding the assets of the company and for the prevention and detection of fraud, error and non-compliance with law or regulations rests with yourselves. However, we shall endeavour to plan our audit so that we have a reasonable expectation of detecting material misstatements in the financial statements or accounting records (including those resulting from fraud, error or non-compliance with law or regulations), but our examination should not be relied upon to disclose all such material misstatements or frauds, errors or instances of non-compliance as may exist…
IMPLIED TERM
52. The exercise of reasonable skill and care required, amongst other things:
(3) that if they became aware of information which indicated that fraud or error might exist they should obtain an understanding of the nature of the event and the circumstances in which it had occurred, and sufficient other information to evaluate the possible effect on the financial statements;
(4) that if they believed that the indicated fraud or error could have a material effect in the financial statements, they should perform appropriate modified or additional procedures.
TORT
53. Moore Stephens owed the Claimants tortious duties co-extensive with the contractual duties set out above."
"plan and perform their audit procedures and evaluate and report the results thereof, recognising that fraud or error may materially affect the financial statements."
"LOSS
396. As a result of the matters set out above, S&R has suffered loss and damage, as set out in Schedules 1 and 2 below. The sums set out in Schedule 1 all constitute irregular and/or fraudulent payments out to third parties for no value and/or not made in the ordinary course of business and were the continuation of a type of irregular and/or fraudulent transaction which Moore Stephens negligently failed to discover during the course of their audits. Against those sums S&R gives credit for the sums set out in Schedule 2 on the basis that those sums were paid back to S&R by the recipients of the sums set out at Schedule 1.
397. The total sum, net of interest, claimed by S&R is thus $141,721,864.85 less $47,007,249.11 = $94,714,615.74.
INTEREST
398. At all material times Moore Stephens was aware of the extent of S&R's indebtedness, whether to banks or to other parties, and of the fact that (1) trading and other receipts would be used to reduce this indebtedness and/or that (2) payments out to third parties would increase that indebtedness. On this basis S&R claims compound interest as special damages at the US Prime Rate plus 1% totalling $78,890,064.12. Particulars of the calculation of this sum are contained in Schedule 3."
Analysis of the Claim
(2) S&R was "throughout" used by Mr Stojevic as "a vehicle of fraud" to extract money from banks and pay it away to the fraudsters: paragraph 15.
(3) It was part of the responsibility of Moore Stephens, as auditors of S&R, to plan the audits "so that we have a reasonable expectation of detecting material misstatements in the financial statements including those resulting from fraud": paragraphs 16, 17 and 18. The responsibility "for the prevention and detection of fraud" was expressed in the same provision of the letter of engagement to be the responsibility of S&R. It is not alleged (and would not be right if it was alleged) that Moore Stephens was under a duty to prevent a fraud in S&R, but the detection and reporting of fraud was an incident of the duty of care owed as auditors to S&R.
(4) For the purposes of these applications it must be assumed that had Moore Stephens discharged the duty of care owed to S&R the fraudulent conduct would have been detected and brought to an end.
(5) The loss claimed is expressed in terms of the payments out made by S&R following the fraudulent acquisition of the payments in which alone enabled and led to those payments out being made. The principal sum claimed, USD 94.715 million, bears a striking resemblance to the amount of the judgment in favour of KB (paragraph 10) but that is at least partially a coincidence. The greater part by far of the monies paid away was the recycling to BCL and its associates of the proceeds of the fraud on KB. In any event it is accepted that for present purposes all the monies paid away were ill-gotten and were "received" by S&R under a liability to repay them to those from whom they had been dishonestly obtained.
(6) There is an artificiality (as Mr Simpson accepted) in the focus on the payments out: they were made and could only be made from monies to which S&R had no entitlement. In the witness statement of Mr Pagden (one of the joint liquidators of S&R) it is accepted that "all monies claimed as losses in this action were fraudulently obtained." Further, as Mr Howard submitted, because the case on causation depends on Moore Stephens blowing the whistle and the monies thereafter not being paid away as they in fact were, if the whistle had been blown there would have been no money coming in to pay away. The evidence is, as I have said, that the fraudulently obtained monies were paid away within days and often on the same day. Mr Simpson rightly put it in his skeleton argument that the fraudulent obtaining of the monies from KB and other banks was an integral part of the fraud. He submitted, however, that it was not an integral part of the loss claimed because "the mere obtaining of money is not a loss causing damage." I do not agree in the circumstances of this case. The obtaining and paying away of the money can only sensibly be viewed together.
(7) The claim for compound interest as special damage is somewhat remarkable. It appears to be based on the fact that S&R had debts to the knowledge of Moore Stephens and that if the fraudulently obtained monies had not been paid away they could have been used to reduce those debts. There is no allegation that S&R actually incurred any interest debt (compound or otherwise), nor that Moore Stephens were aware of it, nor is any case made as to how the funds could legitimately have been used to reduce any debt. In his submissions, Mr Simpson also suggested that the monies could have earned compound interest if available to be placed on deposit.
Ex Turpi Causa: The Law
"No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action on an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa…there the court says that he has no right to be assisted. It is on this ground the court goes; not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff."
"Held, dismissing the appeal (Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Goff of Chieveley dissenting), that a claimant to an interest in property, whether based on a legal or equitable title, was entitled to recover if he was not forced to plead or rely on an illegality, even although it transpired that the title on which he relied was acquired in the course of carrying through an illegal transaction; that, in the circumstances, by showing that she had contributed to the purchase price of the property and that there was a common understanding between the parties that they owned the property equally the defendant had established a resulting trust; that there was no necessity to prove the reason for the conveyance into the sole name of the plaintiff, which was irrelevant to the defendant's claim, and that since there was no evidence to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust the defendant was entitled to succeed on her counterclaim."
"It is important to observe that, as Lord Mansfield made clear, the principle is not a principle of justice; it is a principle of policy, whose application is indiscriminate and so can lead to unfair consequences as between the parties to litigation. Moreover the principle allows no room for the exercise of any discretion by the court in favour of one party or the other."
"He brought an action against the defendant claiming that he had suffered injury, loss and damage and that the defendant was in breach of a common law duty to treat him with reasonable professional care and skill, that on the known information the responsible medical officer should have realised that he was in urgent need of treatment and was dangerous, and that, had he been given treatment, he would not have committed manslaughter and would not have been subject to the prolonged detention which he faced. The judge refused to strike out the action, holding that the plaintiff was not precluded from recovering damages consequent on his own criminal act.
On appeal by the defendant:-
Held, allowing the appeal, (1) that the rule of public policy that a plaintiff should not be able to rely on his own criminal or immoral act was not confined to particular causes of action; and that public policy only required a court to deny its aid to a plaintiff seeking to enforce a cause of action if he was implicated in the illegality and sought to rely on the illegal act in putting forward his case, and the operation of the policy was restricted to those who were presumed to have known that what they had been doing was unlawful; that acceptance of a plea of diminished responsibility did not remove the plaintiff's responsibility for his criminal act; and that, accordingly, since his claim arose out of his commission of a criminal offence, and since he had to be taken to have known what he was doing and, despite the reduction of his culpability by reason of his mental disorder, that it was wrong, the court was precluded from entertaining his claim."
"We do not consider that the public policy that the court will not lend its aid to a litigant who relies on his own criminal or immoral act is confined to particular causes of action. Although Mr. Irwin asserted that in the present case the plaintiff's cause of action did not depend upon proof that he had been guilty of manslaughter, the claim against the defendant is founded on the assertion that the manslaughter of Mr. Zito was the kind of act which Dr. Sergeant ought reasonably to have foreseen and that breaches of duty by the defendant caused the plaintiff to kill Mr. Zito. Further the foundation of the injury, loss and damage alleged is that, having been convicted of manslaughter, the plaintiff will in consequence be detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 for longer that he otherwise would have been. In our view the plaintiff's claim does arise out of and depend upon proof of his commission of a criminal offence. But whether a claim brought is founded in contract or in tort, public policy only requires the court to deny its assistance to a plaintiff seeking to enforce a cause of action if he was implicated in the illegality and in putting forward his case he seeks to rely upon the illegal acts."
"whether, in this case, the plaintiff's demand is founded upon the ground of any immoral act or conduct…"(my emphasis)
"I do not believe that there is any general principle that the claimant must either plead, give evidence of or rely on his own illegality for the principle to apply. Such a technical approach is entirely absent form Lord Mansfield's exposition of the principle. I would, however, accept that for the principle to operate the claim made by the claimant must arise out of criminal or illegal conduct on his part. In this context "arise out of" clearly denotes a causal connection with the conduct, a view which is implicit in such different cases as Lane v Holloway and the recent case to which we were referred in this court, Standard and Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation & Ors, Court of Appeal transcript, Friday 3 December, 1999. In my view the principle applies when the claimant's claim is so closely connected or inextricably bound up with his own criminal or illegal conduct that the court could not permit him to recover without appearing to condone that conduct."
"In summary, therefore, if ex turpi causa is to apply in tort something more than wrongdoing, whether general or even on the occasion directly in question, is needed. Perhaps the most useful starting point for discovering this additional ingredient is found in the observations of Bingham LJ (as he then was) in Saunders v Edwards [1987] 2 All ER 651, [1987] 1 WLR 1116. Although the case was concerned with an illegality arising from a misrepresentation the discussion is of general application:
Where issues of illegality are raised, the courts have to steer a middle course between two unacceptable positions. On the one hand it is unacceptable that any court of law should aid or lend its authority to a party seeking to pursue or enforce an object or agreement which the law prohibits. On the other hand it is unacceptable that the court should, on the first indication of unlawfulness affecting any aspect of a transaction, draw up its skirts and refuse all assistance to the claimant, no matter how serious his loss, nor how disproportionate his loss to the unlawfulness of his conduct. On the whole the courts have tended to adopt a pragmatic approach to this problems, seeking, where possible, to see that genuine wrongs are righted, so long as the court does not thereby promote or countenance a nefarious object or bargain which it is bound to condemn. Where the claimant's action in truth arises directly ex turpi causa he is likely to fail. Where the claimant has suffered a genuine wrong to which the allegedly unlawful conduct is incidental, he is likely to succeed.
…
In my judgment, where the claimant is behaving unlawfully, or criminally, on the occasion when his cause of action in tort arises, his claim is not liable to be defeated ex turpi causa unless it is also established that the facts which give rise to it are inextricably linked with his criminal conduct. I have deliberately expressed myself in language which goes well beyond questions of causation in the general sense."
"the authorities supported the proposition that where a claimant has to rely upon his own unlawful act in order to establish part or the whole of his claim, the claim will fail, in whole or in part. In order for the claimant to continue to work in his employment, he would have to deceive his employers by falsely representing that he did not suffer from epilepsy, and would thus have committed a criminal offence: that of obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception. This deception would be neither collateral nor insignificant, not least because of the risks to others caused by the claimant continuing to work whilst suffering from such a condition. The claimant's deliberate deception struck at the root of the contract under which he earned remuneration. It was inappropriate for the courts to approach the case by considering the question of whether or not the public conscience would be affronted."
"The correct principle seems to me to be substantially the same as that identified by Beldam L.J. as being applicable to cases in which the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio applies. It is common ground that that maxim does not itself apply here because it is correctly agreed that there is no principle of public policy which prevents the appellant from pursuing his cause of action for damages for negligence or breach of duty against the respondents. The question is not whether he can recover at all but whether he is debarred from recovering part of his alleged loss.
However, as I see it, the principle is closely related. It is common ground that there are cases in which public policy will prevent a claimant from recovering the whole of the damages which, but for the rule of public policy, he would otherwise have recovered. The principle can perhaps be stated as a variation of the maxim so that it reads ex turpi causa non oritur damnum, where the damnum is the loss which would have been recovered but for the relevant illegal or immoral act. A classic example is the principle that a person who makes his living from burglary cannot have damages assessed on the basis of what he would have earned from burglary but for the defendant's negligence."
"Illegality may affect a tort claim in many ways ranging from an essential part of the story giving rise to liability to some remote aspect of quantum. For this reason I favour a broad test of the kind proposed by Clarke L.J. namely: is the claim or the relevant part of it based substantially (and not therefore collaterally or insignificantly) on an unlawful act? Such a broad test has the merit of simplicity. It does not involve the judge having to make very specific and difficult value judgments about precisely how serious the misconduct is or whether it would result in imprisonment or whether the claimant's loss is disproportionate to his misconduct."
Conclusion: The Reliance Test
Application of the rule to Corporations
"(1) Is the knowledge of Mr Lewis … to be attributed to the Claimants?
(2) If so, does the illegality, of which the Claimants would then be treated as having been aware, mean that their claims in these proceedings are so tainted or…so inextricably linked with the corruption that the court should decline to entertain them?"
"I consider that the court should decline to entertain the deceit claim on the grounds that the alleged deceit is so closely involved with the illegal venture: ex turpi causa non oritur actio. The same applies to the conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty claims."
Attribution generally
"The authorities show clearly that different persons may for different purposes satisfy the requirements of being the company's directing mind and will. Therefore the question in my judgment is whether in relation to the Yulara transaction, Mr Ferdman as an individual exercised powers on behalf of the company which so identified him. It seems to me that Mr Ferdman was clearly regarded as being in a different position from the other directors. They were associates of his who came and went. SAFI charged for their services at a substantially lower rate. It was Mr Ferdman who claimed in the published accounts of DLH to be its ultimate beneficial owner. In my view, however, the most significant fact is that Mr Ferdman signed the agreement with Yulara on behalf of DLH. There was no board resolution authorising him to do so. Of course we know that in fact he signed at the request of Mr Stern, whom he knew to be clothed with authority from the Americans. But so far as the constitution of DLH was concerned, he committed the company to the transaction as an autonomous act which the company adopted by performing the agreement. I would therefore hold, respectfully differing from the judge, that this was sufficient to justify Mr Ferdman being treated, in relation to the Yulara transaction, as the company's directing mind and will. Nor do I think it matters that by the time DLH acquired Yulara's interest in the Nine Elms project on 16 March 1988, Mr Ferdman had ceased to be a director. Once his knowledge is treated as being the knowledge of the company in relation to a given transaction, I think that the company continues to be affected with that knowledge for any subsequent stages of the same transaction. So, for example, if (contrary to the judge's finding) the £1,030,000 sent by Yulara on 29 May 1986 had been received beneficially by DLH as a loan, but Mr Ferdman had resigned or died a week earlier, I do not think that DLH could have said that it received the money without imputed knowledge of the fraud."
Attribution where acting in fraud of the company: the "Belmont rule".
Reeves and the "very thing".
"Held, (1) that where the deceased, whether of sound or unsound mind, had committed suicide when the defendant was found in breach of a duty of care to guard against his doing so, it would not represent covert connivance at or countenancing of suicide or constitute an affront to the ordinary citizen's conscience to permit his estate to recover against the defendant; and that, accordingly, the defendant could not rely on a defence based on public policy or the maxim ex turpi causa…
(2) Allowing the appeal (Morritt L.J dissenting), that, since the duty of care found owing to the deceased existed irrespective of his being of sound or unsound mind, and since his suicide was the very act against which the defendant had been required to guard, that act did not constitute a new or intervening act such as would break the chain of causation, nor was the defendant's breach a failure to which he had knowingly and willingly consented; and that, accordingly, the defences of novus actus interveniens and volenti non fit injuria were inapt and could not be invoked to bar the plaintiff's claim…
(3) That (per Lord Bingham of Cornhill C.J), although the Act of 1945 was applicable, it was inappropriate in the circumstances to reduce the plaintiff's award to reflect responsibility by the deceased for his loss; and that (per Buxton L.J.) since the deceased's act was that which the defendant had been under a duty to take steps to prevent, the statutory defence was inapposite; and that, accordingly, the plaintiff's claim succeeded in full…"
"Second, the present case does not fit at all well into the explanation of the defence given by Kerr L.J. in the Euro-Diam case [1990] 1 Q.B. 1: the defence applies where it would affront public conscience to grant relief "because the court would thereby appear to assist or encourage the plaintiff in his illegal conduct or to encourage others in similar acts."
I accept that this does not purport to be a complete statement of the nature and terms of the defence. I also accept that the actual application of Kerr L.J.'s exposition of ex turpi causa in the Euro-Diam case itself has been disapproved: see Tinsley v. Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340, 363. Nevertheless, the exposition in my view remains a valuable guide to the basis of the defence, and was accepted as such by Lloyd L.J in the Kirkham case [1990] 2 QB 283. To grant relief in our case does not assist or encourage either Mr Lynch or others in his situation to continue in their disapproved conduct; and even less is that the effect of the grant of relief to Mr Lynch's representatives. Nor even are others in Mr Lynch's position encouraged to act on their representatives' behalf: all that the latter recover is their actual loss, and no element of profit or windfall benefit."
"It is true that the failure to take reasonable care provides the opportunity for the suicide but the occurrence of that event depends wholly on the will and intention of the prisoner. In my view the voluntary, deliberate and informed act of a plaintiff (or one whom the plaintiff represented) intended to exploit the situation created by the defendant albeit in breach of duty precludes a causative link between the breach of duty and the consequences of the plaintiff's action. If the law is otherwise then those who fail to take reasonable care will become insurers for the deliberate actions of those to whom they owe their duty of care. In my view this would extend the law of negligence far beyond its proper scope."
Conclusions
(2) I can see no reason why the same result should not follow if the relevant personal claim were to be pursued by Mr Stojevic's trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee should in principle be in no better position than the bankrupt.
(3) I can see also no compelling reason why a corporation should not be subject to the same considerations in circumstances in which the relevant wrongdoing is to be attributed to the corporation following the normal principles of law applicable to attribution.
(4) In this case the law of attribution would, I think, subject to what I have called "the Belmont rule", attribute to S&R the knowledge and the wrongdoing of Mr Stojevic. His role in S&R was as clear an example of the "directing mind and will" as is perhaps likely to exist.
(5) For the purposes of the Belmont rule, the question to be asked is whether S&R was the victim of the wrongdoing or the perpetrator of it; whether the fraud was committed against or by S&R.
(6) The answer to this question is not, to my mind, so straightforward. The primary victims of the fraud were KB and the other losers. The fraud undoubtedly exposed S&R to liabilities to KB and the other losers, which it could not meet once, as was intended, the monies fraudulently obtained were paid away as they were to those responsible for the fraud. On the other hand S&R lost nothing to which it was ever entitled. S&R was in a real sense the perpetrator of the fraud on KB and the banks and the liability to which it was thereby exposed was not just the product of that fraud but the essence of it. In the particular circumstances of this case in my judgment it would be artificial not to fix S&R with the knowledge and wrongdoing of Mr Stojevic and also artificial to describe S&R even as a secondary victim of the fraud.
(7) What, then, of Reeves? I think this is the key question.
(8) Moore Stephens can and do say that creditors of S&R should not obtain via a company which has committed a fraud against them compensation from the auditors to the company which they could not in law obtain direct. They can also rightly say that the duty of an auditor cannot be expressed in terms of a duty to prevent a fraud being committed against or by the company audited.
(9) S&R can and do say that this is one of those unusual situations in which the defendant as auditor, even if not owing a duty properly expressed as a duty to prevent fraud, does owe and must be assumed to have been in breach of a duty of care which had it not been broken would have revealed the fraud and brought it to an end. It would be, I think, unfortunate if the "very duty" test were to be applied so as only to catch a duty so expressed and not one that had that specific effect if properly discharged. S&R can also say that in most, if not all, claims against auditors for negligent audits a successful claim will enure to the benefit of the company's creditors.
(10) Again, I do not find this an easy question to resolve. But trying to stand back, and at the risk of fudging the strictures to be found in Tinsley v Milligan (albeit with some authority to encourage me), I do not think the "conscience of the ordinary citizen" would find anything so repugnant in S&R pursuing this claim which would justify ruling it impermissible by use of the unforgiving and uncompromising operation of the ex turpi maxim. I would confess (if confession it be) to deriving comfort in reaching this conclusion from the accepted application to the claim of the law of contributory negligence. I think the objective of the maxim can indeed properly be fulfilled by precluding any recovery which would enure to the benefit of the individual perpetrator or perpetrators of the impugned conduct, in this case Mr Stojevic. Nor can I see any principled basis on which defrauded creditors of a company should be in a worse position than those whose debts arose in the ordinary course of business.
Compound Interest?
The Order to be made