Neutral Citation Number: [2010] EWHC 90162 (Costs)
Claim No: 7AF02116
SCCO Ref: 0902943
IN THE SENIOR COURTS COSTS OFFICE
FROM THE CENTRAL LONDON COUNTY COURT

Clifford’s Inn, Fetter Lane
London, EC4A 1DQ

Date:  3 March 2010 

Before :

MASTER WRIGHT, COSTS JUDGE, SITTING AS A DEPUTY DISTRICT JUDGE 
OF THE CENTRAL LONDON COUNTY COURT
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Between :

	KENNETH RONALD PARKER	Claimant	
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	JOEL CARLOS SEIXO	Defendant	

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Mr Robert Marven (instructed by Bakers Solicitors) for the Claimant
Mr Jamie Carpenter (instructed by Keelys Solicitors) for the Defendant

Hearing date:   30 December 2009

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Judgment

Master Wright: 

THE BACKGROUND 
1.	The Claimant’s bill of costs sets out the background as follows: 
“The Claimant sustained injuries and consequential losses arising out of an accident which occurred on 23 August 2004 whilst visiting a petrol station in Streatham Hill. 
The Defendant negligently reversed his vehicle into the Claimant knocking him to the floor.   As a result the Claimant suffered a fractured leg which required surgery and included the insertion of metalwork. 
Funded by way of an After-The-Event insurance policy issued by Keystone on 13 October 2004, the Claimant instructed legal representation.    Liability was admitted without delay and the Claimant proceeded to obtain medical evidence.   The Claimant’s injuries were complex and further surgery was required.   Proceedings were issued and served in order to protect the Claimant’s claim from becoming statute barred. 
The parties were initially unable to agree quantum of damages and the matter proceeded towards a quantum of damages trial which had been set for 20 October 2008.   On 9 September 2008 the parties reached agreement in respect of quantum and the trial set for 20 October 2008 was vacated. 
Damages were agreed at £120,000 with the Defendant paying the Claimant’s costs to be assessed in default of agreement. 
The parties have been able to agree the Claimant’s base costs [£30,708.82 including VAT] but the Additional Liability (After-The-Event Insurance Premium) remains in dispute.
The Keystone Insurance Policy provided the Claimant with both own solicitors costs and disbursements cover [this has now been agreed – see the Witness Statements of Mr Christopher James Marden and Mr Julian David Oldfield dated 14 January 2010 and the Defendant’s Supplementary Submissions dated 19 January 2010] and also Adverse Costs and Disbursements Cover.    This enabled the claim to be conducted without the need for a CFA and Success Fee.  The Keystone policy is individually assessed and underwritten and it incorporates a staged approach to reflect the Claimant’s exposure to risk at any given time.   The premium is calculated on the basis of bespoke individual risk underwriting.”
2.	The full relevant chronology is as follows: 
“23.08.2004	Accident.
	
13.10.2004	ATE insurance policy taken out – premium of £551.25 (including IPT) becomes payable. 
	
19.10.2004
	Letter of claim.	
4.11.2004
	Liability admitted.	
26.01.2007
	Defendant notified of the ATE policy and the premium stages. 
	
13.08.2007
	Proceedings issued.	
24.09.2007
	Proceedings served.	
06.11.2007
	Defendant offers £75,000.00.	
20.11.2007
	Defence served admitting liability.  Second stage premium of £9,555.00 (including IPT) becomes payable. 
	
05.03.2008
	Defendant offers £85,000.00.	
08.05.2008
	The claim is allocated to the multi track.	
09.06.2008
	Defendant’s listing questionnaire with estimated total costs of £20,783.58. 
	
19.06.2008
	Claimant’s estimate of costs to trial, including £6,874.74 disbursements after Stage 2 premium and £10,516.63 total disbursements, including trial disbursements of £4,025.00.   The total estimate to trial is £45,992.00 excluding premium. 
	
28.07.2008
	Defendant offers £100,000.00.	
12.09.2008
	Claim settled for £120,000.00.	
24.09.2008
	Consent Order sealed.	
20.10.2008
	Trial date now vacated.”	

3.	The Claimant’s letter notifying the Defendant of the ATE policy and the premium stages dated 26 January 2007 says: 
“In accordance with the Access to Justice Act, we put you on notice that the Claimant additionally seeks to recover their Legal Expenses Insurance Premium Tax and any applicable interest.  The details are as follows: 
Insurance	:	Europ Assistance Insurance Ltd	
Cover	:	Own and adverse costs and disbursements	
Cost effective from	:	Midday 13.10.2004	
Limit of Indemnity	:	£50,000.00
	
Premium Stages	:		
Stage 1	-	Inception to service of Defence or Judgement in Default 
	
Stage 2	-	Service of Defence until 28 days pre-trial
	
Stage 3	-	From 28 days pre trial to Trial.   The Trial Premium will be rebateable by 75% if the case settles prior to commencement of the Hearing. 
	
Stage 4	-	In the event of Part 8 Costs Proceedings.
	
Yours faithfully 
Bakers Personal Injury Solicitors”

POINTS OF DISPUTE AND REPLIES 
4.	The Defendant’s Points of Dispute and the Claimant’s Replies in so far as they relate to the ATE Insurance Premiums are as follows: 
“1&2	The After the Event Insurance Premiums 

The Claimant was injured in a road traffic accident on 23rd August 2004. 

Liability was admitted early and within the protocol period. 

Proceedings were issued and the matter settled by consent. 

The Claimant purchased an after the event insurance policy with a staged premium on 13th October 2004.  The three stages were as follows: 

Stage One:  Inception to service of Defence or Judgment in Default. 

Stage Two:  Service of Defence until 28 days pre-trial. 

Stage Three:  From 28 days pre trial to trial. 

Stage Four:  In the Event of Part 8 costs proceedings. 

As can be seen from the Bill of Costs, the stage one premium is £551.25 and the stage two premium is £9,555.00. 

The policy is, it is assumed, double sided. 

When assessing the reasonableness or otherwise of the amounts claimed it is necessary to assess the risk that the Claimant’s insurer’s will have to pay own side costs and adverse costs. 

The Costs Practice Direction 

The CPD 11.10 provides guidance in respect of determining this issue: 

In deciding whether the cost of insurance cover is reasonable, relevant factors to be taken into account include: 

(1)  where the insurance cover is not

purchased in support of a conditional fee agreement with a success fee, how its cost compares with the likely cost of funding the case with a conditional fee agreement with a success fee and supporting insurance cover; 

(2)  the level and extent of the cover provided; 

(3)  the availability of any pre-existing insurance cover; 

(4)  whether any part of the premium would be rebated in the event of early settlement; 

(5)  the amount of commission payable to the receiving party or his legal representative or other agents.  

Taking each point in turn the Defendant submits: 

1.  The claim was an RTA to which fixed success fees applied.  Thus, the Claimant, had he signed a CFA, would have incurred a costs liability in terms of the success fee of £3,807.74 (inclusive of VAT). 

Even if one adds a sum for a single sided insurance premium then the £10,106.25 claimed in the present case appears wholly excessive, unreasonable and disproportionate. 

2.  The Defendant is unable to comment on this point without having a copy of the full policy terms and conditions.   This document is requested below. 

3.  The Solicitors for the Claimant are requested to outline: 

1.  Whether the Claimant had any pre-existing insurance that would have covered this claim;  and 

2.  What steps were taken to ascertain the availability of such cover. 

Upon receiving a reply to this point the Defendant will comment further.

3 & 4  Once again, the Defendant is unable to comment without having sight of the relevant policy documents. 

Assessing the Risk

The Claimant has confirmed that the policy is individually assessed and underwritten. 

The Court cannot properly assess the reasonableness or otherwise of the premium until the Claimant’s insurance company disclose their methodology in respect of the calculation of the premium. 

It is well known that very few road traffic cases reach trial.  In Rogers v Merthyr Tydfil Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1134 the Court of Appeal were concerned with the reasonable of a DAS ATE premium. 

The DAS premium comprised of three stages which are broadly similar to the stages in the present case. 

In the evidence given before the Court of Appeal DAS gave the following statistical information: 

1.   63% of their cases settled within stage one (paragraph 39). 

2.  95% of all cases settle within stage two or before stage three is invoked (paragraph 40).

3.   Thus, only 5% of cases reach stage three (paragraph 41).    

It is important to note that the figures from DAS relate to all injury claims, not simply RTAs.  It cannot be controversial to state that the risks involved in RTAs are far less than those involved in slipping cases for example. 

Keystone (via the Claimant) have been asked to confirm the percentage of RTA claims they lose, and therefore have to pay costs, after the stage two premium has been paid but before the stage three one is invoked. 

The Claimant has refused to answer this very simple question. 

The Claimant is therefore requested to:

1.  Clarify how the premiums are calculated and the methodology used (including at what stage the premiums are calculated). 

2.   Disclose the full policy terms and conditions. 

3.  Disclose statistical information relating to how many RTA claims are lost, causing payment of costs to be 

made by the insurer, after stage two but prior to stage three.   If the insurer does not have this information the Claimant is asked to specifically state this fact. 

On the present evidence the Defendant submits that the amount of the premium is both unreasonable and disproportionate. 

In particular, the Defendant submits that the Claimant’s underwriters have assessed the risk of losing this case incorrectly and unreasonably. 

The Defendant offers £3,600 for the premiums for stage one and stage two. 

	

The paying party has no need to assume;  this has already been confirmed in correspondence.

This assessment is carried out by the ATE insurer in order to calculate the Premium at the outset of the claim.   It is not one of the five factors to consider (with hindsight) when assessing the reasonableness of the Premium at the conclusion of the claim.

The receiving party agrees CPD 11.10 should be applied.

The receiving party agrees this comparison calculation would be appropriate and as such agrees the paying party’s calculation of £3,807.74. 

The paying party’s assertion would depend upon an appropriate level for a single-sided premium and crucially no figure has been suggested.

The receiving party attaches a copy of the full policy terms and conditions.   Also attached is a copy of the Claimant’s letter (dated 26th January 2007) to the Defendant’s Insurer, Norwich Union, which sets out the level and extent of the cover provided. 

The Defendant’s Insurer, Norwich Union, is also the Claimant’s Insurer and therefore the receiving party avers this request for information to be otiose and unnecessary.   However, for the sake of completeness, the receiving party can confirm the Claimant’s motor policy with Norwich Union, via the Broker (Ramasis Insurance) had no Legal Expense Insurance included.  
The receiving party once again refers to the Claimant’s letter dated 26th January 2007 sent to the Defendant’s Insurer.

Correct.

Using the five factors, as detailed by the paying party above, the receiving party considers the Court will be able to properly assess the reasonableness or otherwise of the premium without the Claimant’s Insurance Company disclosing their methodology in respect of the calculation of the premium.

The receiving party refers to the paying party’s own cited case of Rogers v Merthyr Tydfil and more specifically to Paragraph 117 dealing with the “Evidence justifying the ATE premium claimed” Paragraph 117 reads as follows:- 

“If an issue arises about the size of a second or third stage premium, it will ordinarily be sufficient for a claimant’s solicitor to write a brief note for the purposes of the costs assessment explaining how he came to choose the particular ATE product for his client, and the basis on which the premium is rated – whether block rated or individually rated.  District judges and costs judges do not, as Lord Hoffman observed in Callery v Gray (Nos 1 and 2) [2002] UKHL 28 at [44] ;  [2002] 1 WLR 2000, have the expertise to judge the reasonableness of a premium except in very broad brush terms, and the viability of the ATE market will be imperilled if they regard themselves (without the assistance of expert evidence) as better qualified than the underwriter to rate the financial risk the insurer faces.   Although the claimant very often does not have to pay the premium himself, this does not mean that there are no competitive or other pressures at all in the market.   As the evidence before this court shows, it is not in an insurer’s interest to fix a premium at a level which will attract frequent challenges. 
(The receiving party’s brief note explaining how he came to choose the particular ATE product for his client is attached).

In order to assess the reasonability of the single-sided premium, the receiving party will respectfully ask the Court to consider the following comparable taken from the Litigation Funding in April 2003;  the year before the inception of the Claimant’s policy in the instant case.   The following is the only entry in Litigation Funding around this time which relates to a multi-track RTA matter involving the second stage of a staged premium policy.   Fortunately it relates to the DAS 80e policy which was scrutinised by Lord Justice Brooke in the paying party’s cited case of Rogers v Merthyr Tydfil where it was considered entirely reasonable and allowed in full. 

Litigation Funding (April 2003) DAS 80e policy for Multi track RTAs was £5,617.50. 

When this figure is added to the agreed comparable figure under a CFA and Success fee of £3,807.74, a total funding cost of £9,425.24 is reached. 

It is clear from the above comparison calculation that the Keystone Premium claimed at £10,106.25 is not manifestly different from the total funding cost had this matter been conducted under a CFA and Success Fee.   When considering the additional benefits to the Claimant in using the Keystone Policy, as detailed on the Solicitors brief note as to how this particular product was chosen, it is the submission of the receiving party that the premium claimed is entirely reasonable.”	

5.	The Claimant’s “brief note” explaining how he came to choose the Keystone ATE policy states: 
“Following the guidance of the Court of Appeal on paragraph 117 of Rogers v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council, the reasons why the Keystone policy was endorsed are as follows: 
A)		Keystone are a reputable and established provider of ATE insurance.  They launched their own ATE scheme several months before the Law Society’s “Accident Line Protect” product.    The policy is individually rated.  They generally underwrite all categories of personal injury litigation.  They have developed a significant market position in underwriting cases that are perceived as difficult, or that have been rejected by other ATE providers.  It was important to recommend an ATE provider in which both the Claimant and his solicitor could have confidence. 
B)		The policy has an adequate level of indemnity. 
C)		Premiums are deferred and the client is not required to take out any loan or interest. 
D)		Keystone provide an efficient and helpful service, particularly where decisions need to be made during the currency of a case.  They adopt a flexible approach.   
E)		There is no application fee payable. 
F)		Keystone do not impose rigorous reporting controls. 
G)		Unlike most other ATE Policies, Barristers fees are covered. 
Dated this 1st day of May 2009 
Signed Bakers Solicitors 
Solicitors for the Claimant.”
6.	At the hearing of the detailed assessment the Claimant was represented by Mr Robert Marven and the Defendant by Mr Jamie Carpenter.   I am grateful to them for their written submissions and for their submissions at the hearing. 
DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS 
7.	Mr Carpenter submitted that the Court of Appeal in paragraph 117 of Rogers did not rule out the disallowance of part of an ATE premium.  The court said that it would ordinarily be sufficient for a claimant’s solicitor to write a “brief note” explaining how he came to choose the particular ATE product for his client and that District Judges and Costs Judges do not have the expertise to judge the reasonableness of a premium except in very broad brush terms.   
8.	He submitted that this observation simply reflects the fact that Costs Judges do not possess the expertise to decide to a nicety whether a premium is reasonable, but it is not intended to make ATE insurers the sole arbiters of what is a reasonable premium.   If a premium is obviously unreasonable, because it bears no relationship to the insurer’s risk or because an individually assessed premium has been assessed on the basis of wrong information from the solicitors, then the Costs Judge is entitled to – and should – disallow it on assessment. 
9.	He pointed out that the Court in Rogers itself conducted a broad brush cross check (at [109] – [110]) and in Smith v Interlink Express Parcels Ltd [2007] EWHC 90095 (Costs) the Senior Costs Judge reduced the first stage premium under a Temple policy on the basis that the premium seemed to be too high given the likely exposure and risk at that stage.   Further, he submitted that the Court in Rogers did not address a particular feature which arises in this case, namely that liability was admitted at the first opportunity and yet the premium continued to be payable as if liability was in dispute.   Furthermore the level of indemnity (£50,000.00) was inadequate to cover both sides’ costs had the matter proceeded to trial on liability.    The total of both sides’ estimates of costs to trial was a little under £67,000.00.   Even allowing for a reduction in the Defendant’s costs on assessment, that would have left a shortfall of around £15,000.00.   Had liability been disputed with the Defendant’s costs commensurately higher – the shortfall would have been even larger.   Quite conceivably it would not have covered the Claimant’s profit costs at all. 
10.	Mr Carpenter referred to paragraph [107] of the Court’s judgment in Rogers.  The Court’s support for staged premiums was, he submitted, predicated on the fact that they gave an incentive to a defendant to admit liability at an early stage, thus justifying the fact that the later stages of the premium would generally exceed a one stage premium payable at the outset.   This rationale was wholly negated if the defendant has to pay the entire premium, despite having admitted liability at the earliest possible opportunity.   He submitted that such a result would be perverse and that a staged premium is per se unreasonable if it makes no allowance at a subsequent stage for the fact that liability had been admitted before that stage is reached   Each stage of the premium must reflect the actual risks pertaining at the time. 
11.	He referred to the examples of ATE policies mentioned by the Court in Rogers.  He said that it was striking that, whereas in those policies the Stage 2 premium is generally around twice the Stage 1 premium, in this case it was 17 times, in a case in which liability had been admitted.   He said that there is no explanation for that astonishing disparity.   He submitted that either the approach to rating was unreasonable or it was based on information from the Claimant’s solicitors which bore no relationship to reality. 
12.	Mr Carpenter referred to the risks faced by the Claimant in this case.   He submitted that the total conceivable loss referable to Stage 2 was both sides’ costs between the defence and 28 days before trial.  From the Claimant’s listing questionnaire estimate, this seemed to have been about £30,000.00.   From the Defendant’s equivalent, this seemed to have been about £14,000, so the maximum potential loss was around £44,000.00.
13.	However, this loss could only occur if the claim failed completely during Stage 2, ie, if the Claimant simply abandoned the litigation.   Given the admission of liability, the likely value of the claim and the fact that the Claimant had received interim payments of £14,000.00 which would have to be repaid if he gave up the litigation, the chance of this happening was infinitessimal. 
14.	The only other way the Claimant’s insurer could incur a loss in Stage 2 was if the Defendant made a Part 36 offer which the Claimant rejected and later sought to accept out of time.   The chance of this happening was very small – he submitted no more than 5%.    In those circumstances the amount of the loss would be the Claimant’s disbursements and the Defendant’s total costs during Stage 2, around £17,500.00 in total (£14,000.00 for the Defendant and £3,500.00 for the Claimant).   He submitted that if the reasonable premium was calculated in accordance with the evidence given in Rogers and applied by the Senior Costs Judge in Smith it would be £1,447.00, ie (£17,500.00 x 5%) + 25% (for overheads) + 5% (to self-insure the premium) + 5% (IPT).
15.	Mr Carpenter referred to the evidence in the Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs Preliminary Report of the number of personal injury claims that fail between issue of proceedings and trial.   He submitted that regard should be had to that evidence if the Claimant’s insurer was entitled to rate the premium at the outset without reference to the fact that liability might be admitted.    The figures provided by an insurer with 8% of the market in RTA, EL and PL claims (at paras 2.1 onwards) showed: 
a)	During 2008, 22,726 claims were notified. 
b)	Proceedings were served in 1,414 cases (6.22% of total claims notified). 
c)	99 of the issued cases proceeded to trial (7%). 
d)	Of the 93% of issued cases disposed of before trial, 50 or 60 were drop hands settlements. 
e)	There was no mention of claims being issued and disposed of before trial with a costs order in the defendant’s favour.
16.	He submitted that this data clearly demonstrates the following: 
a)	The greatest risk of the claim failing entirely occurs in Stage 1, where many cases are abandoned pre-issue. 
b)	Once a claim has been issued, it will almost inevitably proceed to a settlement in favour of the Claimant or (much more rarely) a trial. 
c)	96% of the claims concluding in Stage 2 conclude with an order for costs in the Claimant’s favour. 
d)	Around 4% of cases issued and ending in Stage 2 result in the Claimant bearing his own costs. 
e)	An infinitessimal number of cases result in the Claimant incurring a liability to pay the Defendant’s costs during Stage 2.
17.	Mr Carpenter submitted that there was therefore effectively no chance that the insurer would incur a liability for the Defendant’s costs during Stage 2 and there was a 4% chance that the insurer would incur a liability for the Claimant’s own costs.    A reasonable premium calculated on this basis would be (£30,000 x 4%) + 25% + 4% + 5% = £1,965.   Even if 50% were allowed for overheads (as per Temple’s and Keystone’s evidence in Rogers (see paragraph 73 of the judgment) the Stage 2 premiums would be £1,736 and £2,358 respectively. 
18.	In the circumstances he submitted that the Defendant’s proposal of a total premium of £3,600 representing £551.25 in Stage 1 and £3,048.75 in Stage 2 (made in the Points of Dispute) was more than reasonable.  
19.	Alternatively, he submitted, the court must have regard to the costs that would have been incurred had an adverse costs only premium been taken out and used in conjunction with a CFA (see Section 11.10(1) of the Costs Practice Direction).   The fixed success fee would have been £3,162.50 including VAT.   A Temple policy (see Rogers at paragraph 64) for a multi-track road traffic accident would have been available for £650 + £1,100 + 5% IPT = £1,837.50 making a total of £5,000.   This was about half of the premium claimed in this case. 
20.	In his supplementary submissions dated 19 January 2010 Mr Carpenter conceded that the Claimant’s ATE policy was properly to be considered a “both sides” policy in that it provides cover for the Claimant’s own profit costs and disbursements if a Part 36 offer is not beaten.   However he submitted that this does not affect the Defendant’s case in relation to the quantum of the premium.   The points made at paragraphs 15 to 18 above still held good.  The figure of 5% mentioned in paragraph 14 above was probably an over estimate.   If the calculations referred to in paragraphs 12 to 14 above were reworked using that 5% chance, taking into account the potential liability for the Claimant’s own profit costs, the reasonable Stage 2 premium would still have been only £3,638.25 including IPT with 25% overheads or £4,365.90 with 50% overheads. 
21.	Mr Carpenter submitted that the point made at paragraph 11 above still remained unexplained.  Why is the Stage 2 premium 17 times the Stage 1 premium?    If there is double the exposure, one would expect a Stage 2 both sides premium in general to be double the cost of a single sided Stage 2 premium.   The Stage 2 premium from Temple for precisely this sort of claim (multi track road traffic accident) would have been £1,100 (see Rogers at paragraph 64).   Why was this premium more than eight times the cost of that one?
CLAIMANT’S SUBMISSIONS 
22.	Mr Marven for the Claimant referred to paragraph 117 of Rogers (see the Claimant’s Replies set out under the heading “Assessing the Risk” in paragraph 4 above).    He also referred to the note for the purposes of the costs assessment set out in paragraph 3 above.   He said that, in summary, the note explains that:   Keystone are a reputable and established ATE insurer;  the premium is individually rated;   the indemnity is adequate;   and the policy has various other advantages.   In short, he said that it was plain that the Claimant’s Solicitors had acted responsibly in procuring insurance with Keystone. 
23.	He submitted that the Defendant was plainly wrong in asserting that unless the insurers disclose their methodology in respect of the premium the court cannot assess that premium.   He said that the Defendant was in effect inviting the court to embark on precisely the task which the Court of Appeal said in Rogers should be eschewed by Costs Judges.    It was not the task of Costs Judges to second-guess an experienced underwriter.
24.	He referred to Section 11.10(1) of the Costs Practice Direction which invites comparison between the cost of the ATE premium claimed and the costs that would have been incurred if a policy that covered only the other side’s costs had been taken out, along with a CFA which provided for a success fee.  The Defendant had asserted that by comparison with a notional “single sided premium” the premium claimed here seemed excessive.   Mr Marven submitted that the court should be wary of embarking on a detailed comparison with other premiums and policies (see paragraph 117 of Rogers).  
25.	He said that, conspicuously, the Defendant had not attempted to adduce any expert evidence to make good his complaint despite the fact that his insurers had access to all costs estimates together with final amounts claimed.   He submitted that the Defendant’s insurers (who were Norwich Union who also insured the Claimant) must have had sufficient resources and expertise to procure such evidence if they had wanted to do so.
26.	Mr Marven denied that the premium claimed by the Claimant was disproportionate.   He referred to paragraph 105 of Rogers and submitted that it was necessary here, in the sense of the word used in Rogers to incur a staged premium.
27.	Mr Marven said that the Defendant’s initial offer of £75,000 on 6 November 2007 (see paragraph 2 above) put the Claimant at immediate risk.   On 20 November 2007 the Defence was served admitting liability.   However the Defence is a robust one and defends the claim both on causation and quantum.  The Defendant obtained a Surveillance Report from CSB Surveillance Investigations in December 2007.   
28.	He said that the Stage 2 premium had not been fixed when the ATE policy was taken out on 13 October 2004.   By the time the Stage 2 premium became payable on 20 November 2007 there had been both a serious offer of settlement by the Defendant and a serious Defence on causation and quantum. 
29.	Mr Marven submitted that under the Temple and DAS policies referred to in Rogers Stage 3 would have been reached by the time this case had settled and so a higher premium would have been payable if one of those policies had been taken up.    Further there was no evidence of any policy which the Claimant could have purchased at a lower cost in a high value multi-track road traffic act case.  Rogers was a low value fast track public liability case and not comparable to this case, where more expert evidence and court management was involved.
30.	He further submitted that it was wrong to try to extrapolate figures from other cases and policies which were so different.   The reference to the ratio between Stage 1 and Stage 2 was for that reason unhelpful.   It could equally be said that the Stage 1 premium was strikingly low and the Stage 2 premium was strikingly high for perfectly good reasons.   There was no evidence that another policy would have been cheaper. 
31.	Mr Marven referred to the evidence in the Jackson Preliminary Report (see paragraph 15 above).   He said that this was unhelpful and referred me to the judgment of Hoffmann J (as he then was) in Land Securities Plc v Westminster City Council [1993] 1 WLR 286 where he said (at 288 at F): 
“In principle the judgment, verdict or award of another tribunal is not admissible evidence to prove a fact in issue or a fact relevant to the issue in other proceedings between different parties.” 
32.	Mr Marven also referred me to the Defendant’s assertion that the limit of indemnity of £50,000 in this case was too low and that the policy was consequently inadequate to cover the Claimant’s own costs.    He said that there was no reason to suppose that the Claimant would not have arranged for the limit of indemnity to be increased if a Stage 3 premium had to be taken up. 
 CONCLUSION 
33.	In my judgment the Defendant’s submissions are misconceived.  This is not a case where the court should (without the assistance of expert evidence) regard itself as better qualified than the underwriter to rate the financial risk the insurer faced.   The judgment of the Senior Costs Judge in Smith relates to costs only proceedings where (in an employment liability case) the damages were agreed at £1,700.    Nothing, it seems to me, could be further removed from the facts of this case.   Similarly the premiums referred to in Rogers were block rated in respect of situations very far removed from this case which is a high value multi-track claim where the premiums are individually rated and staged (quite properly).   
34.	The Claimant’s Solicitors Response to the Defendant’s Supplementary Submissions make the perfectly valid point that the Claimant’s risk of succeeding or failing to beat the Defendant’s offer of £75,000 during Stage 2 was finely balanced because the Claimant was still undergoing medical treatment and medical investigations when the offer was made and when the second stage premium was calculated. 
35.	In my judgment, the premiums should be allowed as claimed.