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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> AB v CD [2019] EWHC 3381 (Fam) (22 November 2019) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2019/3381.html Cite as: [2019] EWHC 3381 (Fam) |
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FAMILY DIVISION
Strand London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
(In Private)
BETWEEN:
____________________
AB |
Applicant |
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- and - |
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CD |
Respondent |
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MR M. JARMAN (instructed by BP Collins Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Respondent Mother.
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Crown Copyright ©
MRS JUSTICE JUDD:
Background
The Parties' Respective Cases
"It is the father's case that whilst the child had periods of time staying in England and Brazil, the child was habitually resident in Brazil immediately before the wrongful removal."
In the father's own statement, after setting out a substantial amount of detail as to the arrangements for the family in Brazil and what he considered to be their future intentions, the father states that:
"E's state of settlement alternated between the two countries, Brazil and England, and he became integrated at each environment when he was there."
The father's case is that he did not consent to the mother removing E and indeed that his consent was based on the particular circumstances that he would go to England and on the premise that the parties would stay together as a family. So far as the mother's Article 13(b) defence is concerned, he is prepared to offer undertakings. In the event that the court concludes that E is not habitually resident in Brazil, I am invited to return him to Brazil pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction.
I have been provided by both parties with submissions on the law in relation to habitual residence, and I have read and considered them both carefully. I intend to quote from the position statement prepared on behalf of the father. In the case of TY v HY [2019] EWHC 1310 Fam, the relevant principles to be considered were summarised by MacDonald J:
"35. The term 'habitual residence' is not defined in the 1980 Convention or the 1985 Act. The Court of Justice of the European Union has however stated that habitual residence will be evidenced in each case by some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment (see Re A (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) [2009] 2 FLR 1).
36. Whether there is some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment is a question of fact to be determined by the national court, taking into account all the circumstances specific to the individual case. Within this context, the factual enquiry in this case must be centred throughout on the circumstances of the NY's life that are most likely to illuminate her habitual residence. With respect to those circumstances, in Re A (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) and Mercredi v Chaffe [2011] 2 FLR 515 the Court of Justice of the European Union identified the following, non-exhaustive, list of circumstances that might be relevant in a given case:
i) Duration, regularity and conditions for the stay in the country in question;
ii) Reasons for the parents move to and the stay in the jurisdiction in question;
iii) The child's nationality;
iv) The place and conditions of attendance at school;
v) The child's linguistic knowledge;
vi) The family and social relationships the child has;
vii) Whether possessions were brought, whether there is a right of abode and whether there are durable ties with the country of residence or intended residence.
37. The test articulated and illuminated by the Court of Justice of the European Union is the test that is applied by the domestic courts following the decision of the Supreme Court in Re A (Jurisdiction: Return of Child) [2014] 1 FLR 111). Whilst Re A (Jurisdiction: Return of Child) was not a case under the 1980 Convention, the Supreme Court made clear in Re KL (A Child) [2014] 1 FLR 772 that the same test is applicable in proceedings under that Convention. That decision, and the decisions of the Supreme Court subsequent to it in Re L (A Child) (Custody: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2014] 1 FLR 772, Re LC (Children) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2014] 1 FLR 1486, Re R (Children) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2015] 2 FLR 503 and Re B (A child) (Habitual Residence: Inherent Jurisdiction) [2016] 1 FLR 561 have articulated the following principles of general application relevant to the case before this court:
i) It is the child's habitual residence which is in question and hence the child's level of integration in a social and family environment which is under consideration by the court determining the question of habitual residence.
ii) In common with the other rules of jurisdiction, the meaning of habitual residence is shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity. Proximity in this context means the practical connection between the child and the country concerned.
iii) In assessing whether a child has lost a pre-existing habitual residence and gained a new one, the court must also weigh up the degree of connection which the child had with the state in which he resided before the move.
iv) The relevant question is whether a child has achieved some degree of integration in social and family environment. It is not necessary for a child to be fully integrated before becoming habitually resident.
v) It is the stability of a child's residence as opposed to its permanence which is relevant, though this is qualitative and not quantitative, in the sense that it is the integration of the child into the environment rather than a mere measurement of the time a child spends there.
vi) In circumstances where the social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those on whom she is dependent, it is necessary to assess the integration of that person or persons (usually the parent or parents) in the social and family environment of the country concerned.
vii) In respect of a pre-school child, the circumstances to be considered will include the geographic and family origins of the parents who effected the move.
viii) The requisite degree of integration can, in certain circumstances, develop quite quickly. It is possible to acquire a new habitual residence in a single day. There is no requirement that the child should have been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time.
ix) A child will usually, but not necessarily, have the same habitual residence as the parent(s) who care for her. The younger the child the more likely that proposition but this is not to eclipse the fact that the investigation is child focused.
x) Parental intention is relevant to the assessment, but not determinative. There is no requirement that there be an intention on the part of one or both parents to reside in the country in question permanently or indefinitely.
38. With respect to the latter point, the parents' intention to settle permanently in the State, manifested by certain tangible steps, for example the lease of a residence, may constitute an indicator of the transfer or residence (Case C-523/07) [2010] Fam 42). However, parental intent is only one factor, along with all other relevant factors, that must be taken into account when determining the issue of habitual residence (Re KL (Abduction: Habitual Residence: Inherent Jurisdiction) [2013] UKSC 75).
39. In considering the question of habitual residence, it is not necessary for the court to make a searching and microscopic enquiry (Re B (Minors)(Abduction)(No 1) [1993] 1 FLR 988). In Re B (A Child)(Habitual Residence: Inherent Jurisdiction) [2016] 1 FLR 561 (a case not under the 1980 Hague Convention) Lord Wilson noted as follows at [45]:
"The concept operates in the expectation that, when a child gains a new habitual residence, he loses his old one. Simple analogies are best: consider a see-saw. As, probably quite quickly, he puts down those first roots which represent the requisite degree of integration in the environment of the new state, up will probably come the child's roots in that of the old state to the point at which he achieves the requisite de-integration (or, better, disengagement) from it."
40. Within this context, as noted above, the requisite degree of integration can, in certain circumstances, develop quite quickly. It is possible to acquire a new habitual residence in a single day and there is no requirement that the child should have been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time. In this regard, I note that in Re B (A Child)(Habitual Residence: Inherent Jurisdiction) [2016] 1 FLR 561 Lord Wilson noted as follows at [46]:
"One of the well-judged submissions of Mr Tyler QC on behalf of the respondent is that, were it minded to remove any gloss from the domestic concept of habitual residence (such as, I interpolate, Lord Brandon's third preliminary point in the J case), the court should strive not to introduce others. A gloss is a purported sub-rule which distorts application of the rule. The identification of a child's habitual residence is overarchingly a question of fact. In making the following three suggestions about the point at which habitual residence might be lost and gained, I offer not sub-rules but expectations which the fact-finder may well find to be unfulfilled in the case before him:
(a) the deeper the child's integration in the old state, probably the less fast his achievement of the requisite degree of integration in the new state;
(b) the greater the amount of adult pre-planning of the move, including pre-arrangements for the child's day-to-day life in the new state, probably the faster his achievement of that requisite degree; and
(c) were all the central members of the child's life in the old state to have moved with him, probably the faster his achievement of it and, conversely, were any of them to have remained behind and thus to represent for him a continuing link with the old state, probably the less fast his achievement of it."
"The term 'habitual residence' is not defined in the 1980 Convention or the 1985 Act. The Court of Justice of the European Union has however stated that habitual residence will be evidenced in each case by some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment (see Re A: (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) [2009] 2 FLR 1."
"Whether there is some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment is a question of fact to be determined by the national court, taking into account all the circumstances specific to the individual case. Within this context, the factual enquiry in this case must be centred throughout on the circumstances of the child's life that are most likely to illuminate her habitual residence. With respect to those circumstances, in Re: A (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) and Mercredi
v Chaffe [2011] 2 FLR 515, the Court of Justice of the European Union identified the following, non-exhaustive, list of circumstances that might be relevant in a given case:
(i) Duration, regularity and conditions for the stay in the country in question;
(ii) Reasons for the parents move to and the stay in the jurisdiction in question;
(iii) The child's nationality;
(iv) The place and conditions of attendance at school;
(v) The child's linguistic knowledge;
(vi) The family and social relationships the child has;
(vii) Whether possessions were brought, whether there is a right of abode and whether there are durable ties with the county of residence or intended residence."
Habitual residence at the time of the departure to Brazil (E's second visit)
The Trip itself
"In my judgment the following principles should be deduced from these authorities.
(1) Consent to the removal of the child must be clear and unequivocal.
(2) Consent can be given to the removal at some future but unspecified time or upon the happening of some future event.
(3) Such advance consent must, however, still be operative and in force at the time of the actual removal.
(4) The happening of the future event must be reasonably capable of ascertainment. The condition must not have been expressed in terms which are too vague or uncertain for both parties to know whether the condition will be fulfilled. Fulfilment of the condition must not depend on the subjective determination of one party, for example, "'Whatever you may think, I have concluded that the marriage has broken down and so I am free to leave with the child." The event must be objectively verifiable.
(5) Consent, or the lack of it, must be viewed in the context of the realities of family life, or more precisely, in the context of the realities of the disintegration of family life. It is not to be viewed in the context of nor governed by the law of contract.
(6) Consequently consent can be withdrawn at any time before actual removal. If it is, the proper course is for any dispute about removal to be resolved by the courts of the country of habitual residence before the child is removed.
(7) The burden of proving the consent rests on him or her who asserts it.
(8) The enquiry is inevitably fact specific and the facts and circumstances will vary infinitely from case to case.
(9) The ultimate question is a simple one even if a multitude of facts bear upon the answer. It is simply this: had the other parent clearly and unequivocally consented to the removal?"
Transcribed by Opus 2 International Limited Official Court Reporters and Audio Transcribers 5 New Street Square, London, EC4A 3BF Tel: 020 7831 5627 Fax: 020 7831 7737 [email protected] |