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England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions >> Eaton v Auto-Cycle Union Ltd & Ors [2022] EWHC 2642 (KB) (25 October 2022) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2022/2642.html Cite as: [2022] EWHC 2642 (KB) |
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KING'S BENCH DIVISION
LIVERPOOL DISTRICT REGISTRY
60 Canal Street, Nottingham, NG1 7EL |
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B e f o r e :
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Darren Eaton |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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(1) The Auto-Cycle Union Limited (trading as ACU) (2) Motor Sport Circuit Management Limited (3) Stephen Tomlinson and Pamela Redmayne (Sued as the Chairman and Race Secretary of the Preston and District Motorcycle Club) (4) Eddie Nelson (5) Chris Berisford |
Defendants |
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(instructed by Irvings Law Solicitors) for the Claimant
William Clerk (instructed by DWF Law LLP) for the Defendants
Hearing dates: 18, 19, 20 July and 22 September 2022
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Crown Copyright ©
The Hon Mr Justice Turner :
INTRODUCTION
THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
THE BACKGROUND
"We also remind you that, as from 2018, the straw bales will be prohibited on the FIM homologated circuits." [Emphasis in original]. Within the description of type C devices was incorporated:
"NB: As from 2018, straw bales will be forbidden."
THE CLAIMANT'S CASE
THE EXPERTS ON BREACH
THE CLAIMANT'S RESIDUAL CASE
THE LEGAL ANALYSIS
"A mountaineer about to undertake a difficult climb is concerned about the fitness of his knee. He goes to a doctor who negligently makes a superficial examination and pronounces the knee fit. The climber goes on the expedition, which he would not have undertaken if the doctor had told him the true state of his knee. He suffers an injury which is an entirely foreseeable consequence of mountaineering but has nothing to do with his knee.
On the Court of Appeal's principle, the doctor is responsible for the injury suffered by the mountaineer because it is damage which would not have occurred if he had been given correct information about his knee. He would not have gone on the expedition and would have suffered no injury. On what I have suggested is the more usual principle, the doctor is not liable. The injury has not been caused by the doctor's bad advice because it would have occurred even if the advice had been correct."
"Lawyers have focused on the scope of duty question since the decision of the House of Lords in SAAMCO but the question was not conjured up in that case and arises in a wider context. As Lord Sumption JSC pointed out in Hughes-Holland [2018] AC 599, paras 21–24, it is an established principle that the law addresses the nature or extent of the duty of the defendant in determining the defendant's liability for damage. Thus, in Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 QB 66 Denning LJ said that the questions of duty, causation and remoteness run continually into one another and continued (p 85):
"It seems to me that they are simply three different ways of looking at one and the same problem. Starting with the proposition that a negligent person should be liable, within reason, for the consequences of his conduct, the extent of his liability is to be found by asking the one question: Is the consequence fairly to be regarded as within the risk created by the negligence? If so, the negligent person is liable for it: but otherwise not.""
CAUSATION
CONCLUSION
(i) The only relevant respect in which the track was in breach of duty was in the failure to comply with the safety requirement laid down by Mr Nelson to bind the tyres in the tyre wall together;
(ii) The central purpose of binding the tyres was to prevent loose tyres from escaping onto the track and causing danger to those participating in the race;
(iii) Binding the tyres would not have presented a more yielding and forgiving surface to a rider colliding with the barrier (if anything, the surface would be less so);
(iv) Mr Nelson's decision to abandon straw bales as a component part of safety barriers on the track was entirely justified. Indeed, although he was not strictly bound by the FIM standards, he may have been subject to criticism for not taking the prompt opportunity of his inspection to abandon the deployment of straw bales in anticipation of the introduction of the FIM ban;
(v) Reintroducing straw bales would not have been an appropriate or even rational response to the risk posed by unbound tyres. Indeed, it would probably have made the barriers less rather than more safe;
(vi) I am satisfied that there was an impact between the claimant and the upper edge of the tyre barrier and that this determined the unusual anatomical location of his injury. However, the height of any straw bale above the level of the tyre wall would have been a matter of mere happenstance. A straw bale the upper edge of which was positioned level to the tyre wall would not have led to a better outcome;
(vii) Criticisms relating to the absence of recticel or similar material were not justified on the evidence;
(viii) Criticism of the length of the run off was also not adequately supported on the evidence.